

Intelligence did not make a hard ideological choice among movements. It strove to embrace the widest possible range of liberation organizations, to understand their real possibilities of fighting for the liberation of their countries. Thus, in the Angolan liberation movement, along with the MPLA A. Neto, our intelligence tried to establish relations with the Union of the Peoples of Angola J. Roberto, and with the National Union for the Complete Liberation of Angola J. Savimbi. In Zimbabwe, intelligence was in contact with representatives of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Another thing is that not all of these parties agreed to cooperate with the Soviet Union, some of them preferred to rely on the United States and other Western countries.

Today, when a lot of things have been published, analyzed and included in the circulation of scientific and journalistic literature, it can be argued that the work of the CIA with the liberation movements (we do not touch on other Western intelligence agencies) was no less ambitious than the work of Soviet intelligence. Not only state, but also scientific, public, international, private business organizations were widely involved in it. The CIA created for this purpose a whole network of research centers, foundations, associations, attracted

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leading African scholars, prominent political scientists, mobilized huge financial resources.

Contacts with representatives of liberation movements sometimes turned into genuine political universities. There was an exchange of information, the problems of world and African politics, the experience of the ways of struggle and development of countries that had already escaped from the fetters of colonialism, their achievements and miscalculations were discussed. At that time, our intelligence officers, together with their African friends, had to understand the theories of Pan-Africanism Nkwame Nkrumah, Negritude and African socialism of Leopold Senghor, which were then popular among the African intelligentsia, preaching the originality of the historical path of development of the peoples of Africa and the inapplicability of common laws of historical development. Our connections wanted to know how true these theories are and what we think of them. I had to learn on the go.

The enrichment was mutual. And yet our scouts gave more than they received. A rare case for intelligence. There was a natural process of formation of the worldview and political positions of the leaders of the liberation movement in Africa. The Africans themselves were guided by the information they received in the course of communication with us, they themselves chose and determined their positions.

Working with representatives of the liberation movements distracted the scouts from purely reconnaissance tasks - acquiring sources of information and penetrating the objects of the main enemy. Therefore, not all scouts loved her, and the Center did not really like those who gave her a lot of time. Not always and not every intelligence officer was able to find the "golden" mean in this contradiction.

The liberation, anti-colonial process in Africa was a historically inevitable phenomenon. The colonial powers did not want to lose their positions and defended them at first mainly by force, military or terrorist methods, then, under the influence of events, increasingly by political means. They considered the policy of the Soviet Union in Africa as a threat to their interests, as its attempt to spread influence over Africa, as a communist threat to the African continent. There were both objective and subjective prerequisites for confrontation between the special services on the African continent.

One way or another, under these conditions, sometimes in the most difficult situation of political instability, crises and wars that were typical for Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, our intelligence service did its duty, solved, to the best of its ability, the tasks assigned to it by the country's leadership. chi, contributed to the processes of asserting the independence of formerly colonial and dependent peoples.

Years of the Congolese crisis (1960-1963)

In the early 1960s, the whole world followed with close attention the dramatic events in the Congo, a former Belgian colony in Africa. On June 30, 1960, the country declared independence. The parliament elected by the people formed a government headed by one of the leaders of the national liberation movement, Patrice Lumumba.

However, the Belgians did not want to accept the loss of the richest colony. Under the pretext of protecting the white population, Belgian military intervention followed.

A civil war broke out in the Congo with tragic consequences for the civilian population. Remnants of tribal relations (tribalism) and separatism, kindled by the colonialists, began to appear sharply. The Belgians provoked the separation of the richest province of Katanga from the Congo, placing their protege Tshombe at the head of it. On the verge of secession was the province of Congo Kasai, famous for its diamond deposits. There was a real threat to the territorial integrity of the country, its independence. There was an open struggle between foreign and supranational monopolies for the redistribution of spheres of influence and wealth of the Congo.

In the summer of 1960, the UN Security Council decided to assist the legally elected government of Lumumba in stopping the Belgian intervention and maintaining the country's territorial integrity. For this purpose, UN military contingents were sent to the Congo. The Soviet Union provided transport aircraft for their transfer to the Congo. However, strange events began to occur. The American-led UN administration in the Congo used UN forces not to repel Belgian aggression, but to fight the Lumumba government.

The Soviet government provided diplomatic and material support to the young African state in the form of

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Lumumba's government helped the national-patriotic forces of the country in the struggle to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the country. Therefore, it needed information about the plans and intentions of Western countries in the Congo. We also needed information about Congolese political parties and leaders, their positions, and foreign political orientation.

As part of the Soviet embassy that left for Leopoldville, there was a small group of intelligence officers headed by Leonid Gavrilovich Podgornov. The first days of their work in the Congo showed that the Americans were the masters of the situation in the country. They deftly used the apparatus of the UN administration and its military contingents in order to take the country into their hands. The Americans sought to eliminate those who interfered with them, including the Lumumba government itself.

The residency managed to obtain interesting information. It turns out that even before independence, the President of America's largest bank, Chase Manhattan, David Rockefeller, made a trip to the Congo. He met with representatives of the Belgian colonial administration, local political parties, and business circles. The trip resulted in the creation of a consortium that provided a loan of \$325 million to "solve" Congolese problems.

At the same time, the residency managed to obtain information about Lumumba's trip to the United States in July 1960. Lumumba was handled by Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon, concurrently chairman of the board of the Dillon Reed and Co. banking house. In the US, he was known as "Mr. Kongo".

During one of the official business meetings with our ambassador and Podgornov, who accompanied him as an interpreter, Lumumba said that Dillon offered him to agree to a 15-year UN guardianship in the Congo. He promised technical and humanitarian assistance, subject to the interests of private American companies and refusing to accept assistance from other countries. Dillon

invited Lumumba to sign a series of enslaving treaties that would make the Congo dependent on the United States.

Lumumba categorically refused, which explains the subsequent development of events, including the tragic fate of Lumumba.

After Lumumba returned from a trip to the USA, when it became clear to the Americans that Lumumba would never agree to the role of an American puppet, the CIA began to prepare a secret special operation to physically eliminate him. The decision to do so was made by the then US President Eisenhower!. One of the initiators of its adoption was "Mr. Kongo" - Dillon.

And the CIA went into action. On August 28, 1960, CIA Director Allen Dulles sent Head to his resident in Leopoldville

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I am reading the following telegram: "The leaders of the organization have come to the conclusion that if Lumumba retains his leadership, the inevitable result will be at best chaos and at worst an open road to a Communist seizure of power in the Congo, with disastrous consequences for the prestige of the United Nations and for interests of the free world as a whole. Because of this, we have decided that the elimination of Lumumba should be an urgent and top priority. In the current situation, this goal should become the defining one in our plan of secret actions "?,

The CIA developed various options for the elimination of the Congolese leader. In residency, Hedgeman hastily sought approaches to Lumumba, recruited agents in his entourage, and studied his political opponents. Initially, the option of poisoning Lumumba with biological poisons was adopted, causing death or a severe debilitating illness, depriving the victim of legal capacity and ultimately leading to death.

In order to implement this option, a highly secret employee of the CIA special laboratory, biochemist Joseph Scheider, arrived at Hedgeman's residency with a "suitcase of viruses"?

It was supposed to introduce poisons into food or a tube of Lumumba's toothpaste. However, the agents recruited by Hedgeman could not do this before the expiration date of the deadly viruses

expired.

Then it was decided to entrust the implementation of the terrorist attack to professional hired killers. Two agents recruited for this purpose among the criminals arrived in Leopoldville.

However, the killers were unable to get in touch with their intended victim. Lumumba did not leave his residence, which was surrounded by a double ring of guards. Mobutu's soldiers guarded Lumumba, waiting for an opportune moment to deal with him, and the UN troops protected Lumumba from the Mobutovites.

A new plan was hatched at CIA headquarters: to remove Lumumba from UN protection and turn him over to political opponents, which, in the conditions of the civil war in the Congo, would mean certain death for him.

Operations officer Michael Mulroney was sent to Leopoldville to see Hedgeman. It was he who developed, prepared and carried out this operation. Through agents in Lumumba's entourage, Lumumba's escape from his residence in Stanleyville was provoked. On the way, the commander of one of the units of the Ghanaian contingent of UN troops, an English officer, arrested Lumumba and handed him over to the rebellious Congolese authorities, that is, those from whom he was supposed to protect him.

The fate of the Congolese leader was sealed. Not daring to deal with Lumumba on their own, Mobutu and Kasavubu handed over Lumumba and his close associates Mpolo and Okito

Katangese

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separatist Tshombe. On January 17, 1961, all three were martyred immediately upon the arrival of the plane with the prisoners in Elisabethville.

A special CIA operation ended in a bloody outcome.

The residency worked in Leopoldville for a short time. On September 14, 1960, the then Chief of the General Staff of the Congolese army, Colonel Mobutu, having received a substantial amount of money from the Americans through the UN, carried out a coup d'état. He announced the severance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and, in an ultimatum form, demanded that the Soviet embassy leave Leopoldville in 24 hours.

Even the UN was shocked by Mobutu's actions and did not recognize the so-called collegium of commissioners he created, qualifying it as a body "without any justification in the Constitution of the Congo."

After Lumumba's arrest, the remaining members of his government, led by Lumumba's deputy Gizenga, moved to Stanleyville, the capital of the Eastern Province of the Congo. The embassies of a number of Afro-Asian countries accredited to the government of Lumumba also reached out there. The Americans, although ignoring the government headed by Gizenga, had a consulate in Stanleyville, which carried out intelligence and subversive work. It was headed by none other than the well-known American intelligence officer Frank Carlucci, who later became the US Secretary of Defense.

As L.G. told the author Podgornov, one day in the summer of 1961 he was invited to Staraya Square to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Mukhitdinov, who in those years dealt with international issues. The events in the Belgian Congo, he said, went far beyond the African continent in their significance. They are becoming more and more global. The colonial powers have given open battle to anti-colonialism, resorted to the use of military force, and are using the UN for their own purposes. The Congolese events aggravated relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, whose government insisted on the exact implementation of the UN General Assembly resolution on decolonization and cessation of interference in the affairs of the Congo. It would be extremely undesirable for Moscow, Mukhitdinov added, if the events in the Congo set a precedent for US intervention under the UN flag in other conflict situations.

Many Afro-Asian countries did not recognize the Mobutu regime and continued to support the Gizenga government as the legal successor to the Lumumba government. They looked at the Soviet Union: what position will it take? The international prestige of the USSR largely depended on this. Therefore, the Soviet government decided to send a diplomatic mission to Stanleyville to maintain constant contact with Gizenga. It was decided that the mission would be led by an experienced foreign intelligence officer

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Diplomats and representatives of the military also entered. Their tasks were as follows:

- get to the besieged Stanleyville and, on behalf of the Soviet government, establish direct contact with Gizenga;
- to ensure constant communication between Gizenga and the Soviet government. So far, this connection has been maintained irregularly through the representations of other countries, and we were not sure of it;
- provide advisory assistance to Gizenga in accordance with the instructions received;

- to persuade Gizenga to move away from a tough confrontational policy and recommend him to work towards uniting all the patriotic forces of the country, creating a coalition government in the capital of the Congo, Leopoldville.

The closing of the Soviet embassy in Leopoldville, Mukhitdinov concluded, had damaged the prestige of the USSR. One of the main tasks of the mission is the return of the embassy to the capital of the Congo and its official accreditation. When the Soviet flag rises again over the roof of the Soviet embassy in Leopoldville, and a stream of information flows from the capital of the Congo to Moscow, we will consider your task completed.

But how do you get to Stanleyville? The Eastern Province was blockaded by the armed forces of Mobutu, Tshombe, the leader of the rebellious province of Kasai Kalonji, hostile to Gizenga.

A difficult task then fell to the lot of Podgornov and his mission. It consisted of two foreign intelligence officers, two military officers and a diplomat from the Foreign Ministry, as well as three cipher radio operators from each of the departments. It was this group that Podgornov had to "drag" into the besieged Stanleyville through the rebellious southern provinces of Sudan and the tropical forests of Equatorial Africa, in which at that time there was no administrative power. In addition, the mission was carrying 2.5 tons of diplomatic baggage: sets of radio stations, including those for transmission to Gizenga, documents, money, ciphers.

The staff of the Center eagerly awaited the first news of the group's arrival in Stanleyville. Finally, on July 6, 1961, call signs made their way through thousands of kilometers. The radio station was deployed right in the hotel room, separated by sheets from the eyes of casual visitors. "The mission arrived at Stanleyville, made contact with Gizenga, and got to work." The Center breathed a sigh of relief: the first part of the instructions written in the decision of the Politburo had been carried out.

On September 24, 1961, the mission was already in Leopoldville. A session of the unifying parliament of the Congo was held, which decided to create a single government of the country in Leopoldville as the successor and successor to the government of Lumumba.

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Cyril Adula was appointed Prime Minister and Gizenga was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. Our mission has worked hard to bring the conflicting political factions of the Congo to a compromise solution.

Particular attention was paid to the need to develop clear conditions for unification that would guarantee personal security to representatives of the national-patriotic forces and the opportunity to work normally as part of a coalition government; the dissolution of military units not under the command of the Congolese national army; recognition of the diplomatic corps accredited to Stanleyville. In the light of these demands, the unifying session of the Congolese parliament took place in Lovanium, a suburb of Leopoldville.

It would seem that the second part of the order of the "instance" was also fulfilled - the embassy was returned to Leopoldville. But things got more complicated. A few days after the mission moved to Leopoldville, Podgornov was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where a low-ranking official, on behalf of Foreign Minister Bomboko, stated: "You entered the Congo through the back door without asking the permission of the owners, and must leave the country." . The right wing of the Adoula government, headed by Bomboko, Nendak's chief of security, and Mobutu, chief of the general staff of the Congolese army, refused to comply with the decision of the unification session of the Congolese parliament to recognize the diplomatic missions accredited in Stanleyville under Gizenga. The "survival" of the Soviet mission began. Podgornov, who sought meetings with Bomboko and demanded accreditation, was persistently repeated that his group did not enjoy diplomatic status, had no right to radio broadcasts, diplomatic mail, and did not enjoy diplomatic immunity. Demonstrations were held outside the embassy

slogans "Communists, get out of the Congo!". They were few in number and consisted of nominees. Articles began to appear in the local press demanding the expulsion of Soviet diplomats.

Even the Soviet Foreign Ministry trembled. A request came from Moscow about the expediency of leaving the diplomatic mission in the Congo and the possibility of leaving the country. However, an answer was given to Moscow that the mission had not exhausted its possibilities through ties of influencing the course of events and was counting on a favorable conclusion to the issue of accreditation. And so it happened.

The residency continued to work. Through her connections, she initiated a discussion in Parliament on the implementation by the government of the decision to accredit the diplomatic corps in Stanleyville. There were heated discussions on this issue in the government, where our friends, in particular Gbenye, who was the Minister of the Interior, defended our positions.

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In December 1961, Podgornov was once again invited to the Foreign Ministry. Bomboko accepted him. He stated that the Congolese Government had nevertheless decided to accredit the Soviet diplomatic mission as a full-fledged embassy and was ready to consider the issue of issuing an agreement to the Ambassador of the USSR when such a request was received.

It was a victory for Soviet diplomacy, in which foreign intelligence played a decisive role. Soon a new ambassador, S.S., arrived. Nemchina, B.S. Voronin replaced the exhausted Podgornov. They also replaced APN journalist Arseniev, who visited all the most tense points of the Congolese crisis. The residency began to work normally. Promising connections and agents appeared. There was a constant flow of information to Moscow.

For more than three years, the staff of the residency worked in conditions of political instability and civil war in the Congo. Twice, in September 1960 and November 1963, the residency in crisis conditions was forced to curtail its activities in connection with the provocative expulsions of the entire staff of the Soviet embassy and the suspension of diplomatic relations between the Congo and the USSR

Let us dwell in more detail on the events of late 1963, one of the most dramatic moments in the work of the foreign intelligence station during the Congolese crisis.

... Goth, who has ever happened to stand on the high hill of Stanley, towering over the waters of the Congo River in the place where it separates the capitals of two African states - Brazzaville and Kinshasa (during the rule of the Belgian colonialists - Leopoldville), will never forget the majestic panorama of the mighty African river, overflowing in this place for 30 kilometers, forming the so-called Stanley Pool, as if gaining strength for the last throw to the ocean through a rocky ridge called the Livingston Rapids.

On a November day in 1963, shortly before sunset, when the waters of the river began to turn crimson, a small ferry was approaching the landing stage of the Leopoldville pier, connecting the capitals of the two states. From the height of the hill, he looked like a water bug busily scurrying between thickets of floating hyacinth. On its deck, among a diverse crowd, wagons and cars, there is a Fiat with the diplomatic number of the Soviet embassy in Leopoldville. There are two people in it - the embassy adviser Boris Sergeevich Voronin, who is also a resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence, and the embassy attache Yuri Nikolaevich Myakotnykh. Yura, as he was affectionately called at the embassy, was pleased with his trip to Brazzaville. He conscientiously carried out the instructions of his ambassador in Leopoldville: he visited the editorial offices of a number of newspapers in the capital of the neighboring Congo, talked with employees

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nicknames of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Soviet embassy in Brazzaville had not yet been opened), purchased the goods necessary for the work and life of the staff, which were not available in stores

Leopoldville. Another half an hour, and he is already at home, in a cozy apartment, he will rest from the viscous and sticky African heat under the cool streams of air from the air conditioners.

Quite different thoughts swarmed in Voronin's head. He looked anxiously at the approaching shore. The ambassador's instructions were only a cover for his trip to Brazzaville. The main goal was to meet with the leaders of the two nationalist parties that were in opposition to the Leopoldville government, headed at that time by Cyril Adoula. Foreign intelligence has maintained contact with these national liberation movements since the autumn of 1960 on behalf of the "instance", as they said at that time.

Before leaving for the Congo, Voronin was received by the leaders of the international department of the "instance" on Staraya Square. The situation in the Congo, he was told there, was that, in all probability, the national-patriotic parties opposed to the government would be banned and go underground. Foreign intelligence was charged with maintaining covert contacts with their leaders. Voronin was disturbed by a premonition that this would not lead to good. Not only does such an assignment distract from the main work of acquiring agents among representatives of Western countries and obtaining information about their activities in the Congo. These parties are organizationally weak and have no experience of working in the underground. It will be difficult to maintain a secret relationship with them, and failure threatens with a major scandal, possibly breaking off diplomatic relations, as happened in September 1960.

Until recently, meetings with the leaders of these parties were held in Leopoldville. And although most of them were members of parliament, were part of the government, and the leader of the African Solidarity Party Gizenga was even his deputy prime minister, the meetings were held in compliance with the requirements of secrecy. But by the middle of 1963, the situation in the Congo deteriorated sharply. Dissatisfaction with the pro-Western policy of the Adoula government assumed a mass character. Armed demonstrations began. A number of districts were engulfed in the uprising. Foreign and Congolese military advisers flew over the rebellious areas on planes and corrected the course of actions of the punishers. The country again developed a civil war, which began to subside by the end of 1962.

National-patriotic parties were again banned. Gizenga was arrested and exiled to one of the malaria islands in the mouth of the Congo, who, after the death of Lumumba, led the party of the National Movement of the Congo Gbenye managed to escape. Photographs of the leaders of these parties were posted around Leopoldville and the surrounding area.

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stym, for the capture of each promised a large sum of money. However, until August 1963, the residency found opportunities to organize secret meetings with them in the Congolese capital. Of course, the risk was great. Everywhere patrols, outposts, checks. The army, gendarmerie and police had orders to shoot at all suspects. Diplomatic numbers did not help either. So, one evening the diplomatic car of the Czechoslovak embassy was fired on in the street. Czechoslovak diplomats were returning from some event. Fortunately, no one was hurt.

The situation was reported to the Center. But the tasks of maintaining contacts with banned parties in Moscow were not removed, the "instance" gave new instructions, demanded information.

In August 1963, the remaining leaders of these parties moved to Brazzaville. Residents began to meet with them in the capital of a neighboring state, where they traveled on behalf of the ambassador and to purchase food. It was safer to meet them in Brazzaville than in Leopoldville. But there was a bottleneck - the return to Leopoldville. The materials received at the meetings had to be transported across the state border.

Travel from Leopoldville to Brazzaville was a simplified procedure, visas and permits were not required. It was enough to present a diplomatic card. But will they

Leopoldville authorities to comply with international rules and respect the inviolability of Soviet diplomats and their baggage?

Voronin was thinking about this when returning from Brazzaville, where he held a number of important meetings and received voluminous packages with materials destined for the "instance". These packages were of particular concern to him. He did not know what was in them, and reproached himself for not having first familiarized himself with their contents. What if they ask for help, financial questions? If these documents fell into the hands of the Congolese authorities in the event of a provocation while crossing the border, this would be the strongest compromising evidence.

There were grounds for concern. The residency received information that the Congolese secret services were preparing a large-scale provocation against the Soviet embassy in order to close it. This information, in the absence of Voronin, who was on vacation, was received from a source who had direct access to Prime Minister Adula's inner circle. The source was considered reliable. Information was soon received from another source connected with the local secret services that a discussion had begun in the government about relations with the Soviet Union. The heads of the secret services and the commander of the army, Mobutu, insisted on closing the embassy and severing diplomatic relations. However, Adula and a number of ministers were against it. To a certain extent, this was reflected

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there are internal contradictions and power struggles in the Congolese leadership. Similar information was received by the residency of the Czechoslovak friends. In addition, information was received about the arrival in the Congo of a group of FBI officers to prepare an action against the Soviet embassy.

The current situation required the adoption of decisions on the work of a residency with connections.

In Moscow, Voronin discussed with the leadership the situation in Leopoldville and the advisability of continuing to maintain contacts with the leaders of the nationalist parties opposing the government. It was decided that, upon returning to the residency, he would study the situation on the spot, take measures to double-check the information about the impending provocation against the Soviet embassy, and report his thoughts to the Center.

Apparently, this decision was also influenced by reports from the embassy and the residency about the unexpected step taken by Prime Minister Adula towards the normalization of Soviet-Congolese relations. In the context of the anti-Soviet hysteria being whipped up in the country by the right-wing forces and their calls to "throw the Soviet embassy out of the Congo," Adula invited the entire staff of the Soviet embassy to dinner, which took place in a warm, relaxed atmosphere at the residence of the head of government. Adula and his associates made a number of proposals aimed at strengthening Soviet-Congolese relations. Adula expressed his wish to pay an official visit to Moscow.

Both the embassy and the residency regarded this step by Adula as a desire to strengthen their domestic political positions through a more balanced foreign policy, and in particular the normalization of relations with the USSR. Moscow, however, hesitated to respond, but the political opponents of Adula hurried to organize an anti-Soviet clique, which ultimately led to the suspension of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Congo for many years.

... The ferry approached the landing stage. There are several military vehicles, soldiers, gendarmerie, police on the pier. For those days, this was a common occurrence. The city was under martial law for several months. All highways, railway stations, airfields, river ports were heavily guarded. Here is the pier. Cars are slowly moving ashore. Documents are being checked. Voronin's car is closely followed by the car of the British embassy. The turn of our embassy "Fiat" is also coming up. And suddenly the peaceful picture changes dramatically. Our Fiat is surrounded by a dense group of gendarmes and people in civilian clothes. Voronin instantly understood everything. He manages to block the doors and lift the windows. Starts to tear papers, trying to destroy

their. Myakotnykh also understood everything and helps to eliminate materials. But car doors are knocked out with rifle butts, and diplomats

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forcibly pulled out of the car by the legs. Voronin tries to put his feet on the posts, but they pull him out, he hits the back of his head on the asphalt and loses consciousness. Both are severely beaten right there on the pier, thrown into the back of a gendarme pickup and taken away.

Those present are amazed at the brutal massacre. The British diplomat, a witness of this scene, having passed the border control, immediately goes to the Soviet embassy. There he stated that he did not share our ideological concepts and our policy in the Congo, but considered it his duty to tell about what had happened and to express indignation at the behavior of the Congolese authorities. So the Soviet embassy learned about the arrest of Voronin and Myakotnykh.

Further events developed with kaleidoscopic speed. Brief messages from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and intelligence to Moscow about what happened. The demand of the Soviet ambassador to urgently receive him at the local Foreign Ministry is a refusal. A call to the prime minister's office asking for admission - a refusal. With the consent of the ambassador, the residence officer, together with the embassy officer, go to the security office without prior notice. Slight confusion at the reception desk. The officers who are there are clearly confused and embarrassed. Behind the wall noise, fuss. Finally, some rank in civilian clothes appears and, on behalf of the head of the security service, Nendaki, in an emphatically rude manner, asks to leave the building. When leaving, the Soviet diplomats see two departing cars full of gendarmes, among them Voronin and Myakotnykh. Cars head towards the Ndolo military camp, where one of the darkest prisons in Leopoldville is located. Then Myakotnykh said that they managed to notice the car of the Soviet embassy, and this became moral support for them: they know, they are looking for, they are trying to help.

At the embassy, meanwhile, the first military patrols appear. For the time being, they do not prevent the entry and exit of employees from the territory of the embassy.

The ambassador continues to seek an appointment with the President of the country, Kasavubu, but receives refusals from members of his staff. Finally, at about two o'clock in the morning, accompanied by two employees of the embassy, having literally rammed the guards at the gates on the embassy "Seagull", he breaks into the presidential residence. About a quarter of an hour later, a sleepy Kasavubu comes out in a dressing gown. He speaks indistinctly. It seems that he is not aware of events. He promises to give a command and release our diplomats by morning. But everything suggests that he himself is no longer the master of the situation in the country. Soon he also became a victim of Mobutu's military coup. What else can be done? It remained to wait for the morning.

Voronin woke up on the iron floor of a gendarmerie's jeep, rumbling along the broken pavement of the port area of the city. Sitting next to him was a badly beaten Myakotnykh. From the outlines of houses flickering through the slits of the canvas canopy, I realized that they were being taken to the service without

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danger. It is next to the Soviet embassy and at the same time so far away. They are led into a room. The fleshy ones are taken to another. The interrogation begins. Voronin says everything that is necessary in such cases: a protest against the violation of diplomatic immunity, a demand for the arrival of the Soviet consul. Questions continue to pour in hail, despite the protests. By the nature of the questions, Voronin understood that a major provocation had been started. Everything is aimed at proving the existence of a conspiracy sent from the Soviet embassy to overthrow the government in the Congo. The idea is primitive, but the connection with the banned political parties of Lumumba and Gizenga is obvious. And that may play a role. To whom can you explain that such contacts, and even on the territory of a third state, are a common thing in diplomatic practice.

But on the other hand, not a single question about the intelligence work of the residency, which was carried out in the Congo. Not a single operational connection, not a single contact was named. And they were. Were also surrounded by Adula,

in the security service, in other important facilities. It means that nothing is known about this, Voronin thought with satisfaction, it means that we did not work so badly.

Noise behind the wall. An excited officer runs in. Says something to the interrogator. Voronin is taken away and again put into the car. There are already Myakotnykh.

Voronin and Myakotnykh are taken to the Ndolo prison located in a military camp. Kingdom of Mobutu. Drunken soldiers, beatings, bullying. Again interrogations. Under the threat of reprisals, they demand recognition that the Soviet embassy is the organizer of a communist conspiracy.

At night, a group of drunken soldiers breaks into the cell in which Voronin and Myakotnykh are kept. They are personally commanded by Mobutu. He is very tipsy. Our diplomats are once again beaten and dragged to the prison yard. They put it against the wall. Mobutu slurredly declares that the last opportunity has come to confess to participation in the anti-government communist conspiracy. Otherwise, shooting. Gives orders to soldiers. They raise their rifles. A terrible moment comes, but then Nendaka appears and convinces Mobutu of something for a long time. The latter gives the command to take the captives to the cell.

Was it staged, or did Nendaki's common sense prevail? We will never know this. Mobutu and Nendaka are now dead. Voronin died in 1977 from an exacerbation of a stomach ulcer, and Myakotnykh died in 1997 during the Bosnian crisis in the line of duty in the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia at Large.

The rest of the night Voronin could not close his eyes. Thoughts came into my head about the comrades who remained in the embassy, about residency, about tasks,

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which were placed before him in Moscow. How difficult for foreign intelligence were its first steps in this African country!

He remembered his conversations with Leonid Gavrilovich Podgornov. For several evenings in a row, Leonid Gavrilovich told Voronin about this rich African country, about the attempts of the neo-colonialists to maintain their positions there, to tear the Congo apart, about the formation of a residency. Voronin remembered his comrade's stories well; they helped him navigate the Congolese events.

And now everything is under threat again, thought Voronin. The right wing of the Adoula government took over and decided to settle accounts with the Soviet embassy for everything: for 1960 in Leopoldville, when the USSR supported the Lumumba government, and for helping Gizenga in Stanleyville, and for accreditation in Leopoldville in 1961.

In the morning, Voronin managed to forget himself in a heavy sleep.

Interrogations resumed in the morning. Now they were led by a group of people, among whom the Americans were guessed. The nature of the questions has also changed. They have become tougher, more specific. The documents seized during Voronin's arrest lay on the table. The interrogators referred to them, demanded answers to questions about what kind of assistance the Soviet Union provides to the government opposition with money, weapons, how much and what kind of personnel it trains in special schools in Moscow, when the coup d'état is planned, what the composition of the future - general government. Voronin was amazed. There was really no talk of anything like that.

In the morning, local newspapers came out with loud headlines announcing the revelation by the security service of an anti-government conspiracy, the threads of which were being pulled to the Soviet embassy. Photocopies of documents seized from Voronin were published, articles about individual diplomats who were credited with a leading role in organizing a conspiracy, decomposing the Congolese youth, and planting communist ideas in the country. The vicious article was dedicated to the Soviet ambassador Nemchin. The handwriting of foreign special services was guessed.

Reporting the situation to the Center, the residency concluded that the anti-Soviet campaign was purely political in nature and did not contain specific facts of intelligence activities of the residency.

By noon, the Soviet ambassador was invited to the Foreign Ministry, where they handed a note declaring all the staff of the embassy persona non grata and invited the entire staff of the embassy to leave the country within 48 hours. With the presentation of the note, the embassy was tightly blocked by Mobutu soldiers. None of the outsiders were allowed through, even diplomats of countries friendly to the USSR.
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agents were released into the city only during daylight hours and under supervision. The electricity and water supply was cut off. Soviet journalists outside the embassy were detained, interrogated and expelled from the country.

Voronin continued to courageously resist the security officers who pressed on him. He was no longer beaten. But that doesn't make it any easier. He understood that the most crucial moment had come. Gathering all his strength, Voronin stated in a firm voice that he was carrying out the ambassador's instructions in Brazzaville to maintain contact with people who only yesterday were part of the Congolese government, and the parties they lead are recognized in the world and have extensive international ties. The sovereign right of every state, every government to maintain and develop relations with foreign political figures. The Soviet embassy in Leopoldville did not and could not participate in any anti-government conspiracy.

The interrogators are clearly confused. Voronin is taken to the cell. By evening, Voronin and Myakotnykh are taken to the airfield, put on a plane and expelled from the country. Both are bruised, bruised, in torn clothes. Voronin who is barefoot.

Before the deportation, both were made by an American who appeared as if from under the ground, a duty proposal to change the "Siberian exile" for the "charms" of the Western world, to which Myakotnykh replied that he had already had the opportunity to experience these "charms" on his back.

And inside the embassy, hard work was going on in preparation for the evacuation. The residency was in a difficult position. With the expulsion of journalists, only one operative and a radio coder remained in it. And the residency has a large economy: cars, secret operative equipment, means of communication, secret documents, ciphers. All this must be properly attached or destroyed. You can't take anything with you - no one can guarantee the safety of departure. Czechoslovak friends helped. By agreement with the Center, they were given cars and some property, communication facilities. The rest had to be destroyed. Documents were burned on a fire in the courtyard of the embassy, high-quality special equipment with tears in their eyes was carefully smashed with a hammer, taken to the coast of the Congo and thrown into the water in a deep place. The ciphers were kept until the last hour, then they were burned and switched to open communication with the Center, they reported on the situation and departure.

But there were also agents, connections, contacts. The loss of some of them is inevitable. Some people managed to meet and even get important information: the extreme right-wing leaders of youth organizations patronized by Nendaka and Mobutu decided to organize a "departure" of Soviet diplomats - to arrange a demonstration on their way to the airfield, throw stones and provoke napa

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denie. In view of this information, the ambassador postponed his departure a few hours earlier. All embassy personnel flew out of the Congo safely.

Thus ended the three-year period of work of Soviet foreign intelligence under the conditions of the Congolese crisis of 1960-1963. Shortly after the expulsion of the Soviet embassy from the Congo, Mobutu carried out a new military coup and established a regime of one-man military dictatorship for many years.

! [e\$ collioys de 1a STA. - R, 1976 (ea. ZkhosK). - R 147. Cit. In: CIA conspiracies. - M.: International relations, 1979.

2 Ibid. - S. 110.

3 Ibid. - S. 115-116.

4 Ibid. - S. 130.

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The man from INFO

One of the veterans of the information and analytical service recalled how in the early sixties he first found himself within the walls of this foreign intelligence unit:

- In a small office on the seventh floor of a famous building on the Lubyanka, I was received by the head of the service, Philip Artemyevich Skryagin. He had a case before him, from which it was clear what path I had traveled, what characteristics, very contradictory, were given to me by the heads of the journalistic department. The first, received from the editor-in-chief of the department, who did not like me, emphasized obstinacy; leadership of my department.

The personnel officers from the Lubyanka were quite surprised by such disagreement, but Skryagin, apparently, its reasons, due to life experience, were clear. His attentive eyes were benevolent. Asked questions only on the merits. Having learned about my salary, he sighed, straightened his suspenders with some homely movement (the jacket hung on the back of a chair), warned: "With us you will lose about a third of your salary, but in six months you will catch up." It didn't make me smile too much. Apparently, he read this from the expression on his face and, smiling, added: "But I would like you to work for us." This phrase made the difference. She said it simply and sincerely and said the main thing about the interlocutor: he did not prevaricate, he was reliable, inspiring confidence.

Then, of course, I did not imagine how difficult my work would be, what responsibility the information service, which was simply called INFO, would bear. Not everyone had the same attitude towards her. Some considered the service to be something like a "sump" for those who were unlucky in the "field", in operational work. Others did not look very kindly at the "wise men" who took on

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themselves the courage to evaluate and send "upwards" the information that they received at the risk for themselves and their colleagues abroad. It seemed to them that only those who produce it themselves can know the true value of intelligence. There were skeptics on many levels. At the same time, they could not be denied experience. In addition, for many decades it fell to their lot to judge the value of information and to determine for themselves which intelligence message should be sent to the leadership of the USSR and which should not.

We have cited the opinion of a person who subsequently occupied a very high position in the service in order to give an idea of the situation in which the INFO service worked after the Patriotic War.

In the early postwar years, the intelligence services, their information centers, and the state security system as a whole were hit by a wave of reorganizations, unmotivated mergers, and new divisions with other departments. Let's not track this process day by day. We only note that in 1947, on the basis of foreign and military intelligence, the Committee of Information under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was created. The INFO service also joined its structure. In 1949, the Information Committee was seconded to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and most of its employees were returned to the Ministry of Defense. In January 1952, the staff of the Committee was divided between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the MIB. And in the first half of 1953, the Information Department of the MGB was transformed into a department and significantly reduced. Of the then 170 employees, only 12 information specialists, 12 translators, the secretariat and management - only 30 people left. They were dubbed the Department of Translations and Information Processing.

The head of the department was the former head of the Information Department, S.P. Novoselov. F.A. became his deputy. Skryagin, who previously worked as a GRU officer. In April 1954, F.A. Skryagin.

It is hard to imagine how 12 information workers could process all the information, and even follow the situation in the capitalist world using open data. Although the leadership of the department and intelligence (and at that time the First Main Directorate was headed by such experienced people as A.S. Panyushkin, who previously headed the USSR Embassy and residency in China, and then A.M. Sakharovsky headed PGU) did everything so that the Information Service does not crash. Service No. 1, as INFO was then called, had to work in an extremely busy mode. This could not but affect the quality of the presentation of intelligence data. That such a situation could not be maintained for a long time was obvious both to the rank and file workers and to those who led them. As noted by F.A. Skryagin later in the review of the work of Service No. 1 for 1952-1954 "a certain part of the difficulties, weaknesses and

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unit of the PGU at that time was the result of the negative influence on it of elements of subjectivism and voluntaristic decisions of individuals who headed the state security agencies of the USSR for some time.

All this happened at a time when the main blocs—NATO, CENTO, SEATO—were being formed in the West and East; military bases, including those equipped with nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, were multiplying along the perimeter of the Soviet borders.

A sufficiently powerful intelligence apparatus supplied foreign intelligence with information about plans and scenarios for an atomic attack on the USSR, about subversive actions against states allied with the USSR, about the political intentions of the United States and other Western countries regarding the "rejection of communism" and other phases of the development of cold war that threatened to escalate into regional and broader conflicts.

Expanding the range of sources required the information service to carefully analyze the information received, highlight the most relevant and reliable among them, filter out dubious data and identify disinformation. So it was with the information reported to the top leadership about the intentions of a number of Western countries to unleash a war against the USSR in the near future (1954). Only at a joint meeting was it possible to refute the dangerous fake. Such "products" could come either from an adventurous warehouse of sources, or from the bases of the enemy's special services. Sometimes they were made quite skillfully, as was the case with "photocopies" of allegedly authentic documents of the Vatican. However, factual and linguistic expertise helped to restore the truth. Needless to say, how useful such work turned out to be for the operational staff, helping to free the intelligence network from the enemy's frame-ups and simply falsifiers who sought to earn money by deceiving intelligence officers.

To generalize the experience of the service, to bring the entire team of intelligence officers closer to understanding the intricacies of the information work of F.A. Skryagin spared no time. Thanks to the efforts of the employees of the service, textbooks "Information work in intelligence" and a number of other materials were prepared and published. His other concern was the creation of a reliable, professionally trained backbone of the department. But the decisive factor in creating a well-coordinated, friendly and very combat-ready link of foreign intelligence, which the INFO service was becoming at that difficult moment, was the personal example of its leader.

There were no trifles in his work. He worked out the documents, striving to achieve complete clarity and authenticity, not faking one or another conjuncture. When required, he could work with the performers all night, performing one or another important task of leadership. He did not tolerate duplicity and opportunism,

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sycophants, slobs, intriguers. He himself behaved in the highest degree correctly, making remarks on the merits, avoiding offending human dignity. Being demanding, he did not tolerate rudeness. He once warned one good but unrestrained worker: "If you do not moderate your tone, then we will apply administrative measures against you."

His character traits reflected life experience and a difficult biography. He was born in 1910 in Pereyaslav-Khmel'nitsky, not far from Kyiv, in a peasant family, from childhood he had to combine work and study. In his early twenties, he became an investigator, graduated from justice courses in Kyiv. Then he served in the cavalry, and after demobilization, in 1934, he entered the military prosecutor's office. He was sent as a military lawyer to the 57th Special Corps in Mongolia. In the battles at Khalkhin Gol, he showed great personal courage and received the first military award - the medal "For Courage".

During the Great Patriotic War, he was the military prosecutor of the 150th Siberian Volunteer Division, which participated in the battles on the Kalinin Front, from where in March 1945 he was recalled to Moscow and seconded to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. Here he had to work with high-ranking German prisoners of war, in particular with the commander of the defense of Berlin, General of Artillery Weidling, the head of Hitler's personal guard, Lieutenant General Reitel, and the commander of one of the Nazi divisions, Lieutenant General Boehme. The department led by him obtained important information about the work of the Germans on the V-1 and V-2 rockets, about the last days of Hitler, about the prospects for Nazi sabotage activities in the territories of Germany liberated by the Soviet Army.

Military service, front-line experience, work with important information laid the foundation that helped F.A. Skryagin in his future work, in the most difficult situation of international crises, through which he led the Information Service - Berlin, Hungarian, Caribbean ... The latter was especially difficult, fraught with atomic war. During this period, the management of INFO and the main executors worked around the clock. It was extremely important to maintain restraint, to catch the main grain in the flow of information, to report it to the Soviet leadership in a timely manner and without distortions so that it could make informed decisions in the shortest possible time. Outwardly F.A. Even these days Skryagin was calm, collected, and seemed impassive, although the most responsible burden lay on his shoulders. The officer who was on duty with him on the most nervous, final day of the Caribbean crisis - October 28, 1962, says:

- Only at the beginning of the evening, when the radio began to broadcast N.S. Khrushchev in response to Kennedy's conditions, it became clear that war had been avoided.

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- Well, it seems, Philip Artemyevich, this cup has passed us.

"Yes," replied the head of the Intelligence Information Service, "but at the cost of what prestigious concessions..."

In his statement, one could feel bitterness about the situation in which the USSR was involved, as well as fears about future attacks on our country by the United States. Fortunately, the American side, its President Kennedy, then drew reasonable conclusions about the limits of their imperial claims to Cuba and began to look for ways to ease international tension.

By that time, the limitations of the INFO staff had been overcome, and in September 1962 the department was transformed by order of the KGB into the Information Service. The constructive position of the heads of Glavka A.S. played a big role in this. Panyushkin and A.M. Sakharovsky. "Thanks in many respects to them," wrote F.A. Skryagin, "in the central office and in the residencies, the attitude of the management and operational staff to information and analytical work in intelligence, as well as to the employees of the information unit, who gave this business all their knowledge and abilities, has changed dramatically for the better."

A natural mind, a sense of duty, insight - all these qualities played a role in the fact that intelligence found in the person of the head of the Information Service a worthy organizer who deserved the high authority of his colleagues. "Able, enterprising, obligatory," said intelligence chief A.M. Sakharovsky. — Philip Artemyevich approached the assessment and processing of materials very responsibly. Calmly and confidently dealt with the assigned issues. He was demanding, but not noisy. Skillfully raised people. He constantly found new forms and directions in his work, generously shared his experience with others. He carefully listened to other people's opinions, persistently defended his own, but this was not stubbornness.

Ruthless dedication to work, constant overwork affected his health. In October 1963, Philip Artemyevich ended up in the hospital. Before the New Year, he underwent a most complicated operation. He himself admitted to friends that he did not hope for a successful outcome. But the surgeons did the impossible. During his convalescence, he was visited by many of those whom he said he did not expect to see at his bedside. "Then I thought about a lot and asked myself if I was not too dry in relation to the people who showed me so much warmth and cordiality."

From September 1964, F.A. Skryagin returned to service and began working as a consultant to the head of the CCGT. Employees of Service No. 1 sent him a welcome address, which said: "We are sure, dear Philip Artemyevich, that the great experience you have accumulated in your work in our team, deep knowledge of modern

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other international problems will be of great benefit in the new area of your work.

In senior positions in intelligence, Major General F.A. Skryagin worked fruitfully until October 1978. He left to his successors a well-coordinated, efficient team, in which he is still remembered (Philip Artemyevich died in 1984)

Answering once the questions of the questionnaire, he said that he never regretted that his life turned out this way and not otherwise. Here are some of his answers that characterize the creed of this worthy person:

What do you value most in life?

— Conscience.

What do you value most in people?

- Decency.

What event was the most precious for you?

- Victory Day in May 1945. Joyful days were also for me when I finished some kind of work, I experienced it as a holiday.

What is the most important quality you value in people?

- Love for your work. Consistency, discipline.

- In the boss?

— Objective, honest attitude to personnel, professionalism, knowledge of the matter.

Such was the man who made it possible to strengthen an important foreign intelligence unit, give it a modern look, and later prepare its transformation into the Directorate of Intelligence Information of the SVR, which enjoys universal authority in intelligence.

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Operational equipment in intelligence

Operational equipment is a military weapon of a reconnaissance officer, which significantly expands his human capabilities, allows him to hear better, see farther and deeper, work faster and safer.

Operational and technical means appeared, most likely, simultaneously with intelligence itself and developed along with it, absorbing all the best that science and technology gave. Intelligence is a secret form of struggle, and only people armed with advanced technical achievements, means and methods that help to hide this struggle, make it invisible, as if non-existent, can ensure its secret character.

Probably, the first need for means of operational technology arose in order to hide the content of the transmitted information from being read by unauthorized persons, to make the text invisible or to disguise it in environmental objects, personal items, to reduce its volume and size.

When sending secret information by mail or by special couriers, the first step to solving this problem was the use of a cipher. At the same time, the key to deciphering the correspondence in most cases was not written down, it was learned by heart. Even Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich in his personal correspondence used a cipher, which was called the "gibberish letter".

A special place among the means of hiding the presence of a secret report is occupied by cryptography. Even in ancient times, organic salts and substances were used to apply invisible messages. The envoy of Russia in Sweden, Prince Andrey Khilkov, sent letters in cryptography personally for Peter [. In order to prevent classified materials from reaching the Turkish authorities, envoy I.P. Ignatiev sent them from Turkey to Moscow, packed

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not in special packages with wax seals, but in ordinary penny envelopes in boxes along with soap and herring. So-called sympathetic ink appeared to apply secret messages. In order to keep the ink recipe secret, various tricks were used during their transportation and storage. It is known that they were transported in a bottle baked in a cake, in a bottle of perfume, in a bar of soap, etc. Sometimes personal items were impregnated with them - a handkerchief, a tie, socks.

In any country, mail, telephone and telegraph are widespread, so intelligence officers have always sought to use these types of communications for their own purposes. However, considering that all of them may be under the control of special services, they were used only in compliance with strict security rules.

Various operational and technical means and methods occupy a worthy place among all areas of intelligence work, but operational equipment as such began to enter service only with the advent of photographic, film and radio equipment. The use of photographic equipment removed many acute questions in the work of obtaining documentary information.

To ensure security in working with agents who obtained documentary information, as well as to process the materials received from them, secret points were sometimes created where packages were opened, photographs, and other operations were carried out. At such points, the scouts looked through the materials delivered by the agent and made copies of those that were of interest. All this was done while the agent who brought the materials was having lunch or doing other things.

Only radio communication can ensure fast and timely delivery of reconnaissance materials to the Center. Only at the end of the 1930s did our intelligence succeed in organizing direct two-way radio communication between the Center and illegal residencies and agents in a number of major countries. The special situation that developed in the Far East in those years required the full use of the advantages provided by long-range radio communications, both to obtain information about events in the region and to control the activities of intelligence units from the side of the Center.

Speaking of radio communications in intelligence, one cannot fail to mention Richard Sorge, whose intelligence group used an illegally operating radio station in such a technically developed country as Japan for eight years and was not found. Over the period from 1939 to October 1941, more than 140 radio sessions were conducted. This could be ensured only with strict observance of the strictest secrecy measures developed personally by Sorge, which were implemented as a law by all members of his group. The radio transmitter used was thus selected and

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It was designed to reliably cover the distance from Tokyo to Vladivostok, where radiograms were received, and had the optimal power and radiation directivity for this distance.

Already during the Great Patriotic War, another serious problem began to be put forward for foreign intelligence in the line of operational equipment. We are talking about the installation by foreign specialists of eavesdropping equipment in our representative offices abroad, including in the premises of residencies. The ability to receive secret information from the premises, being far from it, for intelligence and counterintelligence has long remained an unrealizable dream. And now this dream has become a reality due to the development of radio engineering and the creation of transmitting devices that can be secretly installed in a controlled room. In his report to the intelligence leadership in September 1944, a resident in one of the developed Western countries noted that unforgivable mistakes were made in the work of the residency in matters of secrecy, which allowed the special services to install eavesdropping equipment in the premises where official meetings were held, and led to the leakage of important operational information. The Center also received information that eavesdropping equipment had been installed in other Soviet institutions in that country. This became possible because at that time the security of our buildings abroad was poorly organized. Among the service personnel from local citizens there were many agents of counterintelligence services. Repair work inside the building and on the territory of institutions was often carried out by foreign specialists without any control over their work. Local telephones were installed directly in office premises, even such as the offices of ambassadors and advisers, and specialists from local firms were invited to repair them.

Active search activities carried out in the buildings of Soviet missions abroad neutralized the ability of special services to use telephone sets as listening devices, and soon domestic devices appeared that made it possible to protect telephone sets from eavesdropping. In subsequent years, a significant number of wireline eavesdropping devices were discovered. Such funds were introduced by special services during the construction of new official representative offices by us, as well as during the repair or reconstruction of buildings.

In 1956-1957, eavesdropping microphones were found in Soviet institutions in a number of countries in Europe and the Middle East. The total number of microphones confiscated during this period reached 40 pieces, and they were found in the most important premises - in the offices of ambassadors, residents, referents, and military attaches.

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In the second half of the 1950s, radio transmitting eavesdropping devices with autonomous power supplies or with power from the mains began to become more widespread. One of the first eavesdropping radio transmitters was discovered in 1955 in the apartment of a Soviet employee of an international organization. In 1959, eavesdropping devices were also found in Soviet institutions abroad, and in 1960 even in the residence of the Soviet ambassador.

Summing up the results of the search activities carried out in the 50-60s, it should be noted that in the Soviet representative offices in the capitalist countries, a total of 169 different types of special equipment were identified, of which 112 telephones, 45 wired microphone systems, 9 radio microphone bookmarks and 3 car radio signaling devices. The neutralization of such a number of technical means of eavesdropping in our institutions abroad dealt a serious blow to the plans of foreign intelligence agencies to establish total control over Soviet institutions and citizens abroad. It should be noted that the technical equipment of search engine specialists in those years was quite modest, so the main results were achieved thanks to their experience and skill.

In the first post-war years, our domestic industry, unfortunately, did not have any major achievements in those areas of science and technology that were basic for the creation of new means of operational technology. Operational and technical measures were episodic. But already in the 1950s, the operational and technical support of foreign intelligence apparatuses began to improve markedly. There appeared small-size tape recorders, means of radio communication over short distances, highly secure secret writing recipes, new types of containers, and photographic equipment. If, in general, the armament of intelligence with operational technical means in those years left much to be desired, then in some areas of its use, many very original technical solutions were developed.

The means of photography, first of all, had to ensure the copying of documentary information coming from sources of information and obtained operationally. Only by the end of the 1950s, the German Leika apparatus was replaced by domestic special photographic equipment.

Microphotography began to be used to ensure covert communication with agents. In the practice of the work of residencies, there were cases when microphotography was the only means of maintaining operational communication between the intelligence officer and the agent. So, a Soviet illegal intelligence agent, brought to one of the major Western European countries, in the very first days

legalization came under

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vision of local intelligence agencies. It was necessary to immediately notify him of the danger that had arisen. In the current situation, communication with the Center by radio, as well as with the help of caches or other

methods were excluded. The only possible way remained - to transmit a message to the scout using a microdot.

Having successfully passed the mail channel, the message was received by the scout in a timely manner, and thus it was possible to prevent a development of events that was extremely undesirable for him.

Cryptography, due to its ease of application, quickly gained popularity among both scouts and agents. Moreover, domestic specialists have always been at their best in the development of chemicals, on the basis of which the most persistent secret writing recipes were made.

Along with ciphers, codes and cryptography, one of the most ancient technical means of reconnaissance - containers - in these years received another impetus for development and improvement. Circumstances required that the process of transferring and storing intelligence and operational materials be carried out more safely and expeditiously. In many cases, this could be done using containers, although there are strengths as well as weaknesses in working with containers.

One liaison agent was given a description of a cache located in a European capital, a map of roads near the cache. The description indicated that the cache could be reached along one of the paths that branched off from the main road, to the point where three bushes grew. Under the middle bush, a container was laid. However, according to this scheme, the binder could not find the container. They asked for a new description of it and made sure that it was given inaccurately: in the indicated place there was not one path, but several, and the same ones. It became clear that a mistake had been made in the choice of identification sign.

In one of the parks, a hiding place was picked up away from the footpath under a tree, among its roots. In the summer this cache was successfully used, but with the onset of winter after the first snowfall, it became impossible to use it: traces remained that could decipher the cache.

The success of a hiding operation is largely determined by the type of container, workmanship, strength, and how naturally it fits into the chosen place for laying and surrounding environment.

The development and entry into service of reconnaissance of electronic means of operational equipment in the post-war years did not take place to the extent that it was required by the working conditions. But as they were mastered, they demonstrated their necessity, and the situation began to improve. Already in 1955, the first samples of short-range radio communications appeared.

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In the same years, the first portable sound recording apparatus was developed for tacit recording of a conversation for an hour and a half on a wire sound carrier. It had the volume of a small book and could be placed in the operator's pocket.

As follows from the above facts, the operational and technical base of foreign intelligence in these years was in the process of formation, special equipment for operational purposes had insufficiently high characteristics, but due to the professional skills of operational technical staff and the desire of intelligence officers to work with equipment, very good results in solving reconnaissance tasks using the means of operational technology.

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In a family of friendly intelligence services (1950-1965)

In accordance with the instructions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR (April 1950), the Soviet ambassadors in Budapest, Bucharest, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia and Tirana not only

officially notified the first leaders of the countries of people's democracy about the termination of intelligence activities by the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe, but also expressed the desire of the Soviet side to establish cooperation between the state security agencies of our states, which included intelligence services. In a matter of weeks, agreements were reached on sending responsible officials of these departments to Moscow to negotiate and agree on practical issues of interaction.

During May-June 1950, a series of bilateral meetings were held in Moscow with partners from Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia, as a result of which appropriate agreements were concluded. They emphasized that the interaction of special agencies is an integral part of the interstate relations of the Soviet Union with the countries of people's democracy, and its main goal is the fight against the common main enemy, which was unanimously recognized by the intelligence services of the United States and their NATO partners.

In pursuance of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, representative offices of the Committee of Information of the USSR were opened in the capitals of the countries of Eastern Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia (as our foreign intelligence was called at that time). They were endowed with the following functions:

- exchange of intelligence information on issues of mutual interest;
- coordination of proposals for joint reconnaissance activities;

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- providing the necessary assistance in the daily operational work of foreign intelligence agencies.

In November 1951, the Information Committee was abolished, and the First Main Directorate (PGU) was recreated within the Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR, which was entrusted with conducting undercover intelligence in foreign countries. In the corresponding resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, it was emphasized that the PSU is also entrusted with "increasing assistance to the state security agencies of the countries of people's democracy" as one of the priority tasks. By June 1952, foreign representations of the Committee of Information joined the offices of senior advisers to the USSR Ministry of State Security under the security services. These apparatuses were established by the decision of the directive bodies of February 27, 1949 in order to "closer coordination of the efforts of the USSR Ministry of State Security with the security agencies of the countries of people's democracy in the context of the Cold War."

In foreign literature on the history of Soviet foreign intelligence, and in recent years, unfortunately, in some domestic publications, it is alleged that representatives of the special agencies of the USSR "performed arbitrariness in the countries of Eastern Europe and acted almost uncontrollably." However, archival documents and an unbiased study of the experience of our relations with friends refute this. It is enough to get acquainted with at least the main normative acts that regulated these issues, for example, with the Regulations on the Offices of Advisors of the USSR Ministry of State Security to security agencies in the countries of people's democracy and the Manual for advisers of the USSR Ministry of State Security to security agencies in people's democracies. Both of these documents were approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on October 22, 1951 and were strictly implemented, and violations and deviations from them were punished. In unambiguous wording, they fixed the "responsibility of advisers to the Party and the Government" for "skillful and full use of all opportunities to strengthen the security organs" of friends and for "directing their efforts to solve problems related to protecting the interests of the democratic camp." In the performance of their duties, advisers were instructed to proceed from local conditions and not allow "mechanical copying of the forms and methods of work of the USSR state security organs." They were categorically forbidden "to give advice and recommendations on problems that do not have

relation to operational activities", in other words, to intervene in internal affairs and "officially speak out on issues of domestic and foreign policy of host countries".

Death of I.V. Stalin in March 1953 led to significant changes in all areas of life in our country. In private

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In fact, the accumulated experience in the field of cooperation with the security agencies of the countries of the socialist community was creatively reworked and new guidelines for interaction were outlined jointly with them. The results of this work were recorded in the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On measures to strengthen intelligence and counterintelligence work abroad" dated June 30, 1954. The main task was to ensure further unification of efforts in the fight against the common main enemy. An important event in the implementation of the new guidelines and plans of the post-Stalin period was the meeting of the leaders of the security agencies of the European states of people's democracy, held in Moscow in March 1955. It helped to revitalize work, improve the activity of advisory apparatuses, strengthen the principle of comradely solidarity and mutually beneficial cooperation, and simplify bilateral and multilateral interdepartmental contacts.

In subsequent years, the beneficial effect of the decisions of the above-mentioned meeting became more and more pronounced in the work with friends in the field of free training of qualified personnel for them, providing them with special equipment. Information exchange developed and expanded, while our intelligence not only transmitted, but also received information materials of considerable importance and quantity from their Eastern European

colleagues.

After a painstaking study and analysis of the accumulated experience and specification of the list of issues related to the interaction of intelligence for each country separately, the offices of senior advisers of the USSR Ministry of State Security (since 1954 - the State Security Committee (KGB) under the USSR Council of Ministers) were within 1957-1958 were transformed into the offices of senior consultants of the KGB. It was not just a sign change, but a new quality of our work with friends. During the years after the war, they basically completed the formation of their intelligence services and gained experience and skills in conducting independent work. Now friends no longer needed advice, but only consultations, and even then only in the case of clearly expressed wishes. The center of gravity in the activities of the offices of senior consultants gradually shifted to maintaining completely equal contacts, coordinating joint efforts in strictly defined areas, as well as monitoring the implementation by the Soviet side of bilateral and multilateral agreements and mutual agreements. Over the next five years, this task as a whole was solved. Therefore, in 1962, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR decided to transform the offices of senior consultants into representative offices of the KGB of the USSR under the security agencies of the countries of the socialist community. The legal basis for interaction with friends, as before, was formed by bilateral interdepartmental

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nye agreements, which were improved as the need arose. The Instruction for employees of representative offices has also changed significantly. It was corrected on the proposal of the leadership of the PGU and the KGB of the USSR by the highest party and state authorities of the USSR in terms of stricter observance of the sovereignty of intelligence services.

Cooperation became more and more equal and mutually beneficial. It was most fruitful in the political, scientific and technical spheres. The intelligence agencies of the socialist countries over time provided our foreign intelligence with tangible assistance, not only passing on important information, but also facilitating the implementation of operational measures of a complex nature.

Later, in one of the decisions of the board of the KGB of the USSR, it was noted that interaction with the intelligence services of European friends and allies of the Soviet Union "is still an important factor in solving the tasks of ensuring the state security of the USSR and the countries of the socialist community." It was also suggested that in the future "to proceed from the nature of the relations that have developed with them and the degree of their readiness to deepen interaction, take into account their state interests and set an example of the impeccable fulfillment of mutual obligations on agreements and joint plans.

Numerous facts testify to the attentive, patient and tactful attitude of Soviet intelligence officers to their Eastern European colleagues, to taking into account their wishes and needs. This can be illustrated at least by the examples of interaction with the special agencies of Yugoslavia and Romania.

After the rupture of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948, the Yugoslav side was the first to take steps to resume contacts. In February 1964, a Yugoslav delegation was received in Moscow, headed by a member of the Central Committee of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKU), chairman of the Committee on Internal Policy of the Union Executive Council (government) of the SFRY S. Stefanovich. In the course of negotiations on a wide range of issues, he, in particular, stated that the security agencies of his country were ready to "transmit reliable information to Soviet foreign intelligence on the most important political, international and military-economic problems of interest to the USSR." In order to carry out such an exchange in practice, the Yugoslavs asked the leadership of the Soviet foreign intelligence to send their communications officer to Belgrade. Such an employee was seconded and performed the duties assigned to him until the end of 1966.

At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the SKYU in June 1966, the group of Vice-President of the SFRY A. Rankovič was sharply criticized for "pro-Soviet sympathies", and certain employees of the Yugoslav special agencies, according to the foreign press, were accused of maintaining "too much

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close contacts with the KGB of the USSR. In November 1966, at the request of the Yugoslavs, relations between the intelligence services of both countries were interrupted. However, already in December 1967, the Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs of the SFRY R Stijacic, during a visit to Moscow, raised in a conversation with the chairman of the KGB of the USSR the question of "the possibility of resuming cooperation between the security agencies of the SFRY and the USSR, which could develop on issues of ensuring the security of both countries, the exchange of experience in the use of operational equipment, the improvement of methods of combating a common enemy. Since the Yugoslavs later did not express their readiness to take practical steps to implement this wish, it was left by the Soviet side without consequences.

Interaction with the Romanian intelligence agency has been carried out on a fairly large scale since 1950. In accordance with an interdepartmental agreement, the Soviet side provided the Romanian special services with comprehensive assistance in training personnel and organizing intelligence activities. The first group of our consultants, who arrived in Bucharest at the beginning of 1950, was headed by A.M. Sakharovsky, who later for many years held the post of head of Soviet foreign intelligence.

It must be admitted that cooperation with Romanian friends did not always go smoothly, it had its ups and downs, due, as a rule, to the special position of the Romanian leadership on a number of domestic and international problems, on the question of the role and place of Romania in the socialist commonwealth. In August 1965, N. Ceausescu's entourage wished to stop cooperation between the security agencies of both countries, including between foreign intelligence services. Since then, until the fall of the N. Ceausescu regime, none of the parties raised the issue of resuming contacts.

Our relations with our Hungarian friends were also not easy to form and develop. In 1953, the Hungarian party and state leadership merged the state security department, which included a young intelligence service, with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic, which weakened foreign intelligence, since about half of its employees were transferred to other units. A single Ministry of Internal Affairs to strengthen them. And yet, with the help of Soviet advisers and consultants, by 1956 the formation of the Hungarian intelligence service was basically completed, the efforts of which had already begun to bring positive results. In accordance with the recommendations of the meeting of the heads of the state security agencies of the socialist countries, held in Moscow in 1955, the main attention of the Hungarian colleagues was focused on countering the intelligence services of the USA, England, West Germany and Austria. It was from them that a serious threat to socialism emanated at that time.

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to the Greek regime, if only because they actively took advantage of almost two million Hungarian emigrants.

As is known, after the creation of NATO, the ruling circles of the United States and other Western countries switched from a policy of "containment" to an active course towards "rolling back communism" and "liberating the countries of Eastern Europe from Soviet oppression." In the implementation of these plans, Western intelligence paid close attention to the "struggle for Hungary." In practice, this meant a large-scale and carefully planned activity to provoke a deterioration in Hungarian-Soviet relations, the formation in Hungary of a single bloc of anti-government forces.

According to Hungarian and Soviet intelligence data, in order to achieve these goals, the Americans created special intelligence centers on the territory of neighboring Western countries. Former gendarmes and officers of the Horthy army recruited by Western intelligence officers underwent special training there. As of January 1955, there were 59 such cadets in these schools.

An important role in supporting intelligence operations was assigned to Western intelligence stations operating under the cover of diplomatic missions in Budapest. By the joint efforts of Hungarian and Soviet intelligence officers and counterintelligence officers, at the beginning of 1956, 44 Western intelligence officers were identified. For example, 15 scouts operated under the cover of the US embassy, 7 in England, 6 in France, and 5 in Israel.

There was no shortage of signals that the Western intelligence services "are striving to create an influential political force in the country capable of taking power from the communists." In November 1956, this information was actually confirmed by CIA Director Allen Dulles at a meeting of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, stating that American intelligence, long before the start of events, contributed to the preparation of an anti-government uprising in Hungary and immediately after it began, immediately sent 20 experienced CIA officers to coordinate the actions of their agents in order to influence the development of the situation in Hungary to the advantage of the United States.

The office of the senior adviser of the KGB, through its line, reported to Moscow detailed information on the situation in Hungary, which the Hungarian colleagues willingly shared with him. There, she was treated properly and used, along with other information obtained by Soviet foreign intelligence around the world, to inform M. Rakosi and his associates.

As political passions escalated in Hungary and the struggle between various groups in the highest echelons of power intensified, moods also changed in the local special services.

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Criticism, by no means always fair, of the Soviet Union and its policy towards Hungary sounded more and more often. All this, of course, had a negative effect on the state of interaction. In October 1956, the intelligence adviser noted in his report to the Center that such sentiments among Hungarian colleagues "make it much more difficult to conduct a joint struggle against the real enemies of people's democracy." And yet, in spite of everything, cooperation with the Hungarian intelligence officers, who maintained a position of friendship with the Soviet Union, continued. One can even note the intensification of the exchange of information about the activities of Western intelligence agents both on Hungarian territory and beyond. Thus, by joint efforts, the plan of the Hungarian National Committee with headquarters in New York was obtained and sent to the top leaders of both countries in a timely manner. His main idea was to carry out a series of measures to persuade Hungarian diplomats in a number of foreign countries to go over to the side of the rebels and seize documents and even the premises of their embassies. Already during the armed clashes on the streets of Budapest, materials were received about attempts to form a battalion of Hungarian emigrants in Austria and its subsequent urgent transfer to Hungary to participate in the battles.

After the fall of power, by the decision of the government of I. Nagy, the state security agencies of the Hungarian People's Republic were liquidated.

The reconstruction of the Hungarian intelligence service and the restoration of cooperation with it began immediately after the suppression of the uprising. Already at the end of November 1956, its central office of 30 people began to function. With our help, during 1957, the normal work of the majority of Hungarian intelligence agencies abroad was established. All subsequent years, the interaction grew stronger and developed progressively on an equal footing, taking into account the lessons of the tragic events of 1956.

A distinctive feature of cooperation with foreign intelligence of Czechoslovakia was that it was actually a continuation of business contacts during the Second World War and the period of fateful events in this country in 1948. After all, the first post-war Soviet resident in Prague, I.A. Chichaev, as is known, worked fruitfully during the Great Patriotic War in London with the leaders of intelligence of the Czechoslovak government in exile.

On May 23, 1950, a delegation of state security agencies of Czechoslovakia visited Moscow. During the negotiations, the corresponding Soviet-Czechoslovak interdepartmental agreement was signed. By mutual agreement, a representative office of Soviet foreign intelligence was established in Prague under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Czechoslovakia. His competence included maintaining communications and providing comprehensive assistance to the intelligence department of the ministry. |

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During 1951, Czechoslovak intelligence experienced two major purges of personnel, as a result of which it lost approximately 80% of its leadership and operational staff. But the Soviet representatives had nothing to do with these painful events. These were echoes and consequences of those internal political events that played out in the country in 1948.

Our ties in the area of joint intelligence activities finally stabilized after 1955, when the implementation of the decisions of the meeting of the leaders of the state security organs of the European countries of people's democracy, held in Moscow in March of that year, began to have a beneficial effect on them. From then until the mid-1960s, Soviet and Czechoslovak intelligence officers acted hand in hand in the sphere of coinciding national interests of their states. For example, during this period, at least two dozen agents of Western intelligence services were jointly identified and neutralized, their recruiting approaches to almost 300 Soviet and Czechoslovak citizens were suppressed or used for operational purposes, 12 career US intelligence officers were exposed and expelled from Czechoslovakia. and Western countries. On an ongoing basis, an active exchange of intelligence information was carried out, as well as experience in conducting operational activities in all

intelligence activities. According to Czechoslovak friends, the assistance of Soviet colleagues in the field of practical application of the latest operational and technical means of Soviet production was very effective. Many employees of the Czechoslovak intelligence mastered operational skills or improved their professional qualifications in specialized educational institutions of the KGB of the USSR,

We mentioned above the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 30, 1954, according to which the main task of interaction with the intelligence agencies of the countries of people's democracy was declared to ensure the further unification of their efforts in work on the main enemy. This can be fully attributed to cooperation with Polish and Bulgarian friends.

Polish colleagues were provided with advisory and advisory assistance in organizing and improving their intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. The exchange of operational political data was rather intensive.

Interaction with Polish intelligence had one more feature: it involved not only units of the central apparatus of the KGB (first of all, of course, the PGU). In joint operations, the state security committees of our union republics - Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania - entered into direct contacts with the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs.

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By mutual agreement of the parties, joint opposition to the United States, as well as their NATO allies - Turkey and Greece, was chosen as the main direction of interaction between the Soviet and Bulgarian intelligence services. This setting was approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. And the results were not long in coming.

In 1957, 14 agents of the special services of the USA, Turkey and Greece were detained and neutralized on the territory of Bulgaria. In the same year, 25 recruiting approaches to Bulgarian citizens (mainly tourists) were thwarted in Austria, Greece, Germany, France and Turkey. In 1959, the hostile activities of another 19 agents were suppressed.

After the restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States and Bulgaria, the American diplomatic mission was opened in Sofia in February 1960. Among its 24 employees, 8 operatives of the CIA residency were soon identified and taken under control.

Gradually, drawing up annual plans for joint work on the main adversary and summing up the results of their implementation came into practice.

Bulgarian friends highly appreciated our help in training and advanced training of their personnel. Every year, specialized educational institutions of the KGB of the USSR accepted 20-25 employees of the Bulgarian special services for training in intelligence specialties.

At least twice a year, business meetings were held between the heads of the security agencies of both countries in Moscow and Sofia, during which the necessary adjustments were made to joint work and new frontiers of interaction were outlined. To resolve current issues of intelligence and operational activities, regular contacts were maintained at the level of chiefs and employees of departments of all links of the central offices. In necessary cases, coordination and joint actions were taken by the foreign apparatuses of both sides.

To summarize a brief story about the cooperation between the intelligence agencies of the countries of the socialist community at the initial stage of the Cold War, it is quite appropriate with an excerpt from the report of the Deputy Chairman of the KGB, the head of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR at one of the last multilateral meetings of their leaders:

"In the post-war years, intelligence cooperation between fraternal countries has gone through a long and difficult path of formation and development, from simple forms of information exchange to complex forms of interaction in all major areas of operational activity. It has become more

deep, purposeful and mutually beneficial. Its operational efficiency has increased.”

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Alexander Mikhailovich Sakharovsky

The second half of the 1950s was the height of the Cold War. On the one hand, it is the activation of the military-political blocs NATO, SEATO, CENTO created at the initiative of the United States; crisis situations in the Middle East in 1956-1967; the Hungarian events of 1956, the prolonged Berlin crisis; the Caribbean crisis of 1962; Czechoslovak events in 1968. On the other hand, during the same period, approaches to defusing international tension were being formed.

It was at this time, in May 1956, that A.M. Sakharovsky was appointed head of the First Main Directorate of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (foreign intelligence). He has served in this position for over 15 years.

He was born on September 3, 1909 in the village of Bolshoe Ozhogino, Palkinsky district, Kostroma province, in the very Russian outback. Parents are peasants. My father was also engaged in seasonal work in the Kostroma province, and then found a job at one of the factories in St. Petersburg.

In October 1931 A.M. Sakharovsky was drafted into the Red Army, and a year later he became a student of the courses of the evening department of the Military-Political Academy. In October 1933, by decision of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, Sakharovsky was sent as secretary of the VLKSM bureau of the 63rd separate construction battalion to the Sovetskaya Gavan of the Far Eastern Territory. Here he went through a school of working with people in difficult conditions.

Demobilized in December 1934, he returned to Leningrad. A year later, he was elected secretary of the Komsomol committee of the Kanonersky ship repair plant, and in June 1935 he was transferred to the Baltic State Shipping Company, where he worked as an instructor in education youth.

In February 1939, according to the party recruitment of A.M. Sakharovsky was sent to the Leningrad Directorate of the NKVD for a position

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deputy head of the department of the Water Intelligence Department. In 1940, he was at sea for almost seven months as a pompolit of a passenger ship. I visited several countries of the Adriatic. Thus began his operational work.

The Leningrad department of the NKVD lived a busy life. The city felt the breath of war... The war with Finland had just ended in March 1940, but already in April the Nazi armies captured Denmark and Norway. After the defeat of France, the Nazis sent troops into Finland.

Alexander Mikhailovich at that time headed the First (intelligence) department of the UNKVD, created on the eve of the war. The department was engaged in the training of reconnaissance and sabotage groups (in parallel with the 4th Directorate of the Center) and operations to capture German paratroopers and other saboteurs.

A veteran of foreign intelligence, retired colonel Boris Yakovlevich Nalivaiko, who worked with Alexander Mikhailovich at that time in Leningrad, recalled this period as follows: “I went to the front voluntarily and was part of the 276th separate artillery and machine gun battalion . In the fall of 1941, Stalin issued a decree on the return of fifth-year students of a number of technical universities to study. At that time I was a student at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute. Since May 1942, in the direction of the district committee of the Komsomol, I began to work as an operational

authorized in the intelligence department, the head of which was Major Sakharovsky. When I decided to get married and reported this to Sakharovsky, he asked me who my bride was, asked how old I was. I was then 24 years old. "Well," said Alexander Mikhailovich, "perhaps it's time."

Congratulating me on my decision, he wrote a note to the head of the economic department, according to which I was given 300 grams of fat, half a liter of vodka and 1 kg of black crackers. Royal gift for the wedding!

The left bank of the Neva was the front line of defense of Leningrad. From there, groups were organized to withdraw to Shlisselburg, to the rear of the Germans. With the direct participation of Sakharovsky, more than 40 reconnaissance and sabotage groups were created and sent, causing significant damage to the invaders in terms of manpower and equipment. Sakharovsky also performed other tasks related to the defense of Leningrad and the breaking of the blockade of the city, encircled by the Nazi invaders. Alexander Mikhailovich led and personally participated in operations to liquidate the enemy SD residencies operating on the territory of the USSR and a group of enemy intelligence officers from the Abwehrkommando-204.

In 1946, Alexander Mikhailovich Sakharovsky was assigned to Moscow to the central office of the USSR Ministry of State Security In 1947-1948

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he was the head of the department, and in 1948-1952 he was the deputy head of one of the intelligence departments. During this period, he repeatedly traveled to Finland to perform special assignments and for two years was on a business trip to Romania as an adviser. Leading the foreign grants subordinate to him, he invested all his life and operational experience in this.

In the description on A.M. Sakharovsky, compiled in 1952, states: "... During special trips abroad, he correctly solved the tasks assigned to him, skillfully led agents in influencing socio-political circles in the direction the USSR needed. Working as an adviser to the Ministry of State Security of the USSR under the security agencies of Romania, comrade. Sakharovsky provided significant assistance in organizing the work of these bodies. With his direct participation, the Romanian colleagues uncovered and liquidated a number of residencies of American and British intelligence services, as well as Zionist and other underground organizations that were actively operating on the territory of the Romanian People's Republic.

Upon his return from Romania in 1952, Alexander Mikhailovich was appointed to the post of deputy head of the First Main Directorate, and in 1956 he became head of foreign intelligence at the KTB.

In his book "Intelligence: Faces and Personalities", retired Lieutenant-General V.A. Kirpichenko writes: "The head of intelligence must be aware of all more or less significant events taking place in the world, and even anticipate these events, feel different trends, evaluate them and, if necessary, propose possible solutions to emerging political problems. Working as the head of intelligence leaves practically no time for personal life, no matter how high the organizational talents of this or that leader may be."

These words fully apply to Alexander Mikhailovich, who worked as head of intelligence until mid-1971. During the time during which Alexander Mikhailovich was the head of a large team of Chekists, significant changes took place in the life of our country, in the foreign policy situation. The volume of reconnaissance tasks has increased significantly. The geography of its activities has expanded and covered the whole world.

The natural mind of Alexander Mikhailovich and his talent as a scout, the experience of a competent organizer, the ability to see the main thing, to correctly arrange personnel contributed to the decision

the most complex reconnaissance missions. It was under Sakharovsky that such lines of intelligence work as counterintelligence, scientific and technical, and illegal were actively developed.

Veterans of the Foreign Intelligence Service, who knew Alexander Mikhailovich from their joint work at PGU, characterize the chiefs

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intelligence officer: "Sakharovsky was distinguished by external and internal severity. He treated people demandingly, but without petty pickiness. He took care of veterans, honored people, and supported them in every possible way ... Alexander Mikhailovich worked until late, he tried to delve into everything himself. He spoke simply, clearly, expressed his thoughts clearly and concisely, which is why his words for a long time remembered."

In critical cases, A.M. Sakharovsky did everything possible to return his comrades who were in trouble to their homeland. Suffice it to recall William Fisher (Rudolf Abel), Conon the Young (Lonsdale), as well as the spouses Morris and Leontine Cohen (Peter and Helen Kroger), who later became Heroes of Russia.

Intelligence officer Major General V.A. Dozhdalev, who at one time took part in operations with K. Molody, said: "After the arrest of the latter, not knowing the whole essence of the matter, I went to the office of the head of intelligence and took all the blame for the failure on myself. Sakharovsky listened to me carefully and said that it was not my fault, the reason was completely different. After that, not only was I not punished, but, on the contrary, I was promoted."

Another intelligence veteran, Major General Vladimir Pavlovich Burdin, recalled such an incident.

Somewhere in 1963-1965 - and at that time he held the position of deputy head of the Office of the Plenipotentiary of the KGB of the USSR under the Ministry of State Security of the GDR - they brought him an operational document for signing. He refused to endorse it because he did not agree and considered the event wrong. After some time, on the table A.M. Sakharovsky, a paper was laid down, in which the names of those responsible for the failure of this operation were indicated, including the name of V.P. Burdin.

Seeing this name, Sakharovsky, with the words: "He refused to sign this document," struck Burdin off the "black" list.

A veteran of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Major General Vladilen Nikolayevich Fedorov, recalled how, being an ordinary worker, he came from Ankara on vacation to Moscow in 1957. Before leaving Ankara, the resident handed him a letter in a sealed envelope asking him to hand it over to Sakharovsky. He was overloaded with business, and it took Fedorov ten days to get to the head of intelligence. Every day he was "fed with breakfast" until Vladilen Nikolayevich asked the authorities for permission to call the head of the CCGT himself. He was allowed. He briefly explained to Sakharovsky the reason for the call and heard a laconic answer: "Come in."

In the office, the head of intelligence immediately opened the letter addressed to him. I read it, smiled and asked:

— Did you read?

- No.

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"Do you know what is written here?"

- No.

Alexander Mikhailovich handed Fedorov a letter:

- Read...

In the letter, the resident spoke in very flattering words about Fedorov's work in Ankara, which confused Vladilen Nikolayevich. And in conclusion, he asked to help allocate an apartment to the employee.

Alexander Mikhailovich talked with Fedorov about his work in Turkey, recalled his early years when he sailed the famous straits... And soon V.N. Fedorov received an apartment in Moscow.

Major General F.A. Skryagin, the former head of the PSU Information Service, said: "I was struck by the way Alexander Mikhaylovich talked to the employees. He always listened without interrupting, even if it was a question that was not related to the topic of the conversation... Alexander Mikhailovich often led our conversation about improving information work to the question of personnel. I spoke in detail about people, because he was interested not only in business, but also in personal qualities. He himself talked with ordinary workers - informants, translators. Invited executors of documents for the report. We had a common point of view that it is possible to deeply understand the issue set out in the document, to find reserves in the work, by talking with the executor himself. It is difficult to overestimate the benefit brought to the executor by a conversation with the head of intelligence. At the same time, Alexander Mikhailovich had the opportunity to go deeper into the problem, to get to know the interlocutor better.

With all the workload, the head of intelligence did not disregard the old, experienced employees. In this regard, one of the intelligence veterans said: "I took care of veterans, meritorious people, especially when they were worked out. About one of these, he once said to me: "They are pecking at him now from all sides, please don't give him offense and don't offend him yourself!"

Intelligence Veteran Lieutenant General S.A. Kondrashev at the jubilee evening dedicated to the 90th anniversary of the birth of A.M. Sakharovsky, describing him, recalled the following incident: "An experienced and strong intelligence agent N.S. worked in one of the leading NATO countries. Deryabkin. Under cover, he held a modest position as a technical officer of the Soviet embassy. And in the line of intelligence, he was entrusted with the responsible tasks of maintaining communication with the most valuable agents. Once, after the regular congress of the CPSU, held in Moscow, the embassy received two packages with diplomatic mail. One of them contained portraits of the newly elected members of the Politburo, and the other contained spare parts for the embassy radio transmitter. Moreover, the package with parts for the radio was damaged during transportation, and Moscow instructed

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return her. Due to the fact that the diplomatic couriers were going back, Deryabkin, who took part in receiving the mail, quickly wrote a cover note ("Return as unnecessary") and asked his colleagues to hand over the package to the diplomatic couriers, and he went to the operational event.

A few days later, the ambassador ordered to hang portraits of the new Politburo in the assembly hall, but they were not found... And a scandal erupted. It turned out that it was they who were accidentally returned to Moscow "as unnecessary". A telegram was sent to the relevant units of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB, in which the ambassador demanded that Deryabkin be recalled from his business trip. Sakharovsky's reaction was immediate. The reply telegram reported that N.S. Deryabkin was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and that he (Sakharovsky) hopes that the leadership of the embassy will join in congratulating the residency officer on this occasion. The incident was over, and N.S. Deryabkin worked in the country for several more years."

As head of intelligence, Alexander Mikhailovich Sakharovsky often met with our ambassadors in different countries, often together with intelligence residents in these countries, to discuss topical issues.

Alexander Mikhailovich always followed the requirement of F.E. Dzerzhinsky that callousness is incompatible with work in the Cheka. He combined modesty and strictness towards himself at work and at home with attentiveness to people and the ability to empathize. Sakharovsky's wife, Vera Alekseevna, worked only until the birth of her first child, and then, as Alexander Mikhailovich once said, "the house was on her shoulders." She and her children, worrying about her husband, spent many days alone: before the war, in evacuation, in post-war Leningrad, in Moscow, when her husband was on business trips in Finland and Romania. And then, when he became the head of the head office, he managed to spend rare hours with his family. "The upbringing of children is her merit," said Alexander Mikhailovich.

No wonder the well-known writer and intelligence officer Zoya Ivanovna Voskresenskaya-Rybkina believed that monuments should be erected to the wives of our workers during their lifetime. By the way, at one time, when Zoya Ivanovna was the head of a department at PSU, Alexander Mikhailovich was with her deputy.

A.M. Sakharovsky devoted a lot of time and energy to the training of personnel at vocational schools. He knew many intelligence officers well, their abilities, did not suppress them from the height of their position, but encouraged them to think, take initiative, and knew how to create a calm and businesslike atmosphere around him. He was a genuinely modest, accessible and exceptionally decent person. In the rare hours of rest, he liked to go hunting and fishing.

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For more than 16 years, from the end of 1953, Anna Ivanovna Mushnikova worked as a secretary and at the same time as a typist-stenographer for Alexander Mikhailovich Sakharovsky. Anna Ivanovna worked in the NKVD since 1939. On July 5, 1941, as part of the 29th Army of the NKVD troops, she went to the Kalinin Front and was surrounded. In 1943 she took part in the Battle of Kursk. This courageous woman was awarded two Orders of the Patriotic War of the 2nd degree, many medals. She remembers Sakharovsky with great warmth.

"Alexander Mikhailovich," she says, "behaved modestly at work, had equal relations with all employees. Sometimes he returned to his office after meetings with the Chairman of the KGB ~ first with Serov, and then with Andropov - in a bad mood (as Anna Ivanovna says, "cloud cloud"). But when he called a delinquent employee to himself, he never shouted at him, he analyzed this or that mistake on the merits. He was always attentive to female employees.

"Sakharovsky," Mushnikova later recalls, "often came to solve certain personal issues, and he, if possible, helped to fulfill their requests, especially on the housing issue. By nature, he was, in essence, a gentle person, but when the service demanded, he was firm and principled. He never scolded me, although there were moments when it was necessary to scold me, and he would simply say that I did it wrong.

"But once," Anna Ivanovna laughs, "he taught me a lesson. A former resident from Bulgaria gave me a half-liter bottle of Bulgarian rose oil to give to Alexander Mikhailovich. This cosmetic product cost a lot of money. I gave Sakharovsky this bottle. Having found out what it was, Sakharovsky told me very sternly that I would never take anything from anyone in the future, no gifts.

I returned the bottle, and since then no one has given me gifts for Alexander Mikhailovich.

Let us turn again to the memoirs of V.A. Kirpichenko, who worked with Alexander Mikhailovich for a long time: "He was tall, stately, imposing, and intelligence officers, translators, typists, secretaries, meeting him in the corridor, especially in the first years of his command, escorted him admiringly. - with different views: the head of intelligence was good-looking.

When Alexander Mikhailovich left the reconnaissance, saying goodbye to his colleagues, he said: "I left everything here - health, friends and my favorite job!"

From mid-1971 to January 1975, A.M. Sakharovsky was a senior consultant of the Group of Consultants under the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR. On February 1, 1975, he retired.

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Having gone on vacation, until his last days, overcoming a serious illness, he did not break ties with the intelligence team, he devoted all his strength to the formation of the young generation of intelligence officers.

For services to the Motherland, Honorary State Security Officer Colonel-General Sakharovsky was awarded three Orders of Lenin, Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of the Patriotic War [degree, Red Banner of Labor, Red Star, Badge of Honor, and many medals. His selfless work and honorably fulfilled international duty were also awarded 16 high awards from foreign countries.

Rarely did anyone see Alexander Mikhailovich in a general's uniform during his lifetime, although he was very walked.

Alexander Mikhailovich Sakharovsky died on November 12, 1983. He was buried at the Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow. There is a marble monument on the grave. His name is forever inscribed on the Memorial plaque of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation.

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Ivan Ivanovich Agayants

In the complex of buildings in Yasenevo in the Cabinet of the History of Intelligence, on the Memorial plaque, among others, the name of Ivan Ivanovich Agayants is engraved in gold letters. In the galaxy of famous Soviet intelligence officers I.I. Agayants occupies a special place. Throughout his operational life, he was proud of the achievements of foreign intelligence, and she, in turn, has the right to be proud of the fact that such a person as I.I. Agayants.

His biography and path in intelligence were closely intertwined with the life of the country, international political events of a historical scale, which filled the 30-60s of our century. He was a man endowed with a multifaceted talent as a scout, politician and diplomat, organizer and leader.

Here is what is said about him in the Armenian Encyclopedia:

"Soviet intelligence officer, major general, member of the KISS since 1936. Born on August 28, 1911 in Elizavetpol (then Kirovabad, now Ganja) in the family of a priest. From the beginning of the 1930s, he worked in the security agencies, actively participated in the disclosure of Nazi Germany's plans of aggression against the USSR. During the Great Patriotic War, he headed the work of a number of Soviet intelligence units against Nazi Germany. In the post-war years, he organized and led activities to expose the secret operations of the special services of the imperialist states against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner of War and Labor, the Order of the Patriotic War, two Orders of the Red Star, many medals, the Bulgarian Order of September 9, 1944, first degree. He died on May 12, 1968 in Moscow.

Let's try to look beyond these mean, laconic lines and tell about Ivan Ivanovich Agayants on the basis of archival materials of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service and the memoirs of people who knew him.

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In September 1930, I.I. Agayants was accepted into the OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR as a senior clerk in the department for combating economic sabotage. In the official characteristics of 1931-1932, it was noted: "an enterprising, energetic and intelligent worker",

"well developed, conscientious, devoted, active." In 1937, unusual words were even used: "extremely conscientious worker."

On the formation of the personality of I.I. Agayants was greatly influenced by his brother Alexander Ivanovich Agayants, an employee of the OGPU, and one of the well-known Chekist leaders Artur Khristianovich Artuzov, a sincere person and a principled, demanding boss who had vast experience and extensive knowledge. Communication with them was a school of professional skill and ability to work with people.

OH. Artuzov read a series of lectures to young employees of the OGPU, the notes of which I.I. Agayants kept for many years. What did A.Kh. Artuzov and what did he instruct the young employees? He spoke of determination, loyalty and professional honor. He emphasized that "in our profession there are successes and failures, but more often those who fail are those who are indecisive, who do not have a developed sense of intuition, observation, the ability to think logically, the ability to get used to someone else's image, who do not understand and poorly perceive the characteristic features information work. He explained: "Resoluteness implies quick and prompt action, especially in information work, because any information is fraught with intrinsic value, which decreases over time."

OH. Artuzov also emphasized: "The Secret Intelligence Service has existed for 150 years, we have been for ten. This is her advantage. But we have our own advantages: a clear goal, incorruptibility, conscientiousness, and most importantly, devotion to the Fatherland." Isn't his words still relevant today that "when putting forward new tactical ideas, we must not forget the old ideas and concepts, plans and techniques that brought success to our intelligence and counterintelligence, which are values accumulated by our generation in battles with numerous enemies"? About professional honor, he said this: "Our profession is in the shadows, and not because it is not honorable. It's just that our work is not advertised. Often our victories and our tears are not visible to the world ... Most often, the heroism of the Chekist lies not in a single feat, but in everyday hard, painstaking work, in that sublimely significant struggle that knows no respite or indulgence, in which he gives everything that has."

These are the values that were laid in the spiritual baggage of the young OGPU employee I.I. Agayants, and he remained faithful to them until the end of his life.

In 1936, he was transferred to the foreign intelligence apparatus and the following year he was sent to intelligence work in France.

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He happened to be baptized by fire in Spain. Work in France and Spain taught the young intelligence officer a lot and polished his operational skills. I.I. Agayants spoke several languages. He loved and knew French literature, read works in the original. The Second World War found Ivan Ivanovich in Paris, where he was deputy resident. He was then 28 years old.

Upon his return to Moscow in 1940, he was appointed head of a department, and then deputy head of one of the departments of the First Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR (foreign intelligence). In this position, he worked, however, for a very short time. In August 1941, he was summoned by intelligence chief P.M. Fitin. He studied the tall, fit man with intelligent, lively eyes, then asked: "Do you mind a business trip to Tehran? There are big things to do there. The area is extremely complex in all respects, but, most importantly, it is of paramount strategic importance."

The road trip was short. "On November 20, 1941, having packed all our things in a suitcase," recalled Elena Ilyinichna Agayants, Ivan Ivanovich's wife and fighting friend, "we got into an old bomber that was supposed to take us to Tehran. Since I was expecting a baby, I settled down on a chair that kind pilots put in the bomb bay. Ivan was sitting Turkish-style over the bomb bay, which caused a lot of jokes and enlivened the flight. Over the Caucasus

our plane was fired upon, but everything turned out well." In Iran, I.I. Agayants headed the residency until 1946.

It was an exceptionally tense and responsible period in the biography of Ivan Ivanovich. Much has been written about his work in Tehran. There is no need to repeat, but still it can be said that the main Tehran residency and residencies in other cities of Iran solved complex multifaceted tasks. They not only collected important political information, but also managed to undermine and largely paralyze the activities of the German intelligence services in Iran, where they occupied strong positions, to liquidate, together with the British allies, German illegal residencies, pro-fascist Iranian nationalist organizations, collaborators who worked with German intelligence, to prevent sabotage actions of German agents in the Soviet Transcaucasia, to identify channels for the transfer of German agents to the USSR from Iran, to make a significant contribution to ensuring the security of the trans-Iranian railway, along which Allied military cargoes provided by the under Lend-Lease. Much attention had to be paid to I.I. Agayants and maintaining official contacts with the British partners, who did not always behave in an allied manner. In 1941-1945, Iranian residencies under the leadership of I.I. Agayants prepared and carried out a set of reconnaissance measures that made it possible to acquire new, well-informed

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controlled sources in important objects of the Iranian state. The center assessed the work of the Tehran residency succinctly, but succinctly: "Important operational intelligence information received by Soviet intelligence officers in Iran played a significant role in the adoption of certain political and military strategic decisions by the military command and leadership of the country." It was a high appraisal: we must not forget that it was given in harsh times.

From November 28 to December 2, 1943, the Tehran station worked around the clock. A meeting of the leaders of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, I.V. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill. As is known, American President Roosevelt lived on the territory of the Soviet embassy during the conference: information was received about the plans of the Germans to carry out a terrorist act against the "Big Three" and it was necessary to take additional security measures. There were daily meetings with agents and confidants, intelligence information worthy of attention was immediately reported to the Soviet leadership. Lists of persons subject, for security reasons, to detention and isolation until the end of the conference were prepared and handed over to the Iranian authorities in advance. The efforts of the operational staff of the residency and personally I.I. Agayants on ensuring the security of the Tehran Conference were highly appreciated by the Center.

According to the memoirs of intelligence officers who worked with him in Tehran, I.I. Agayants worked literally to the point of wear and tear and did not spare himself, despite the disease that crept up on him - pulmonary tuberculosis. No one ever heard him complain about feeling unwell, for his subordinates he was always in uniform.

House I.I. Agayantsa was open to everyone, but noisy feasts were never held there. He organically could not stand anyone's addiction to alcoholic beverages. He himself did not drink strong drinks, sometimes he allowed himself to drink a little wine, and even during meetings with foreigners he was interested in, he limited himself to a cup of coffee or tea. But he was a very interesting conversationalist, knew how to keep up the conversation, and his partner usually did not notice that he was drinking cognac alone. I.I. Agayants, in conversations with subordinates and other people, was always patient and attentive, correct and tactful, did not raise his voice to anyone, and behaved evenly with everyone. However, his warm and even affectionate eyes suddenly turned cold and aloof if he encountered dishonesty, lies and demagoguery. Any of his remarks or dissatisfaction were perceived by subordinates as a punishment, although he never humiliated anyone. He could only with subtle irony warn the employee against rash actions. He was a kind person, he could not, for example, refuse anyone

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in the expressed request, but when he saw the employee's dishonesty, he applied drastic measures of influence against him.

Amazing capacity for work, human wisdom, friendly attitude of Ivan Ivanovich towards his employees, ability to inspire them to fulfill the tasks assigned to the residency earned him the authority, respect and love of the intelligence officers who worked with him. In the teams of residencies, which he led, an atmosphere of solidarity and mutual assistance always reigned. The mere thought of the need to report to Ivan Ivanovich on the results obtained from the fulfillment of his task made the employees work better. If the deed was done carelessly, then Ivan Ivanovich built a conversation with the offender in such a way that the latter was painfully ashamed of it.

In August 1943, I.I. Agayants was instructed to take part in the organization of the USSR representation at the French Committee of National Liberation (FKNO). In carrying out this mission, he held several meetings in Algiers with General de Gaulle and his closest assistants. Ivan Ivanovich was familiar with de Gaulle from Tehran and managed to establish good relations with him. All this helped Soviet intelligence to obtain the necessary information about the situation in the FKNO, as well as about the machinations in Algeria by the Anglo-American special services, which were negatively disposed towards de Gaulle.

I.I. Agayants regularly traveled from Iran to Algeria, then to Egypt, then to Iraq and other countries of the region to carry out operational activities against Nazi Germany. He was characterized by the ability to single out the main link in the work and focus all his attention on it. He also had a chance to work with the Iranian Kurds, he visited their mountain villages and there he found friends of the USSR among the Kurdish leaders. There are cases when foreigners agreed to cooperate with Soviet intelligence only thanks to the charm of this person, because they saw in him a worthy representative of - face of the country.

In 1946 I.I. Agayants is back in Paris: it was deemed necessary to strengthen the activities of our residency in post-war France. In 1946-1947, major international conferences were held there to conclude peace treaties with the countries that were Germany's former allies and to demilitarize it. "Like in Tehran," recalls former residency officer A.I. Alekseev, - Ivan Ivanovich had to organize the work to provide assistance to the Soviet delegation headed by V.M. Molotov and A.Ya. Vyshinsky. Upon arrival in Paris, I.I. Agayants, taking into account the rather favorable situation in the country and the wide opportunities for conducting intelligence activities from an official position, set the task for the residency staff to establish trusting relations with members of various delegations, participate

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who attended the conference ... and suggested ways to establish contacts with them. He himself maintained extensive relations both with the French and with other representatives. "Repeatedly we were received by V.M. Molotov, - says A.I. Alekseev, - and not only thanked for the useful work, but also set tasks to cover certain issues that were of interest to the Soviet delegation."

The residency as a whole solved them, and its activities received a positive assessment from the Center.

With the help of reliable agents, the residency managed to obtain a secret version of the "Marshall Plan", which gave the Soviet delegation the opportunity to expose the mercenary policy of the United States in Europe. Only these results achieved during the year of work by I.I. Agayants at the head of the residency would be enough to evaluate him as a major intelligence officer who made a great contribution to strengthening the positions of the USSR in the international arena.

The Paris station under the leadership of Ivan Ivanovich sharply increased its work: the circle of sources was expanded at the expense of well-informed people, and several people from the old agents, on the instructions of the station, were able to get important government posts. So, for example, our intelligence was aware of the activities of the French counterintelligence and, most importantly, knew the plans and affairs of the department dealing with the USSR. This made it possible to prevent the failures of our agents and to thwart a number of planned provocations against Soviet workers in France.

I.I. Agayants was not only a talented intelligence officer, but also a politician and diplomat, he never closed himself within the framework of narrow departmental interests. He always encouraged those workers who actively worked under the cover line, and he himself set an example in this regard to subordinates. On the initiative of Ivan Ivanovich and with his personal participation, 50 paintings by the famous artist P.P. Konchalovsky, who ended up in Paris. To do this, he agreed with V.M. Molotov, who allowed the use of his plane, on which the paintings were delivered to Moscow. P.P. Konchalovsky expressed great gratitude to intelligence for the return of his paintings. Also on the initiative of I.I. Agayants received and sent to the USSR the archives of the composer S.V. Rachmaninov, the diaries of the writer R. Rolland, etc. He personally organized all this work.

In September 1947, Ivan Ivanovich returned from Paris to Moscow and headed one of the departments of the Information Committee under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (foreign intelligence was then undergoing a period of reorganization), having worked there until 1952. The radically changed international situation required the Soviet intelligence to revise many of its former forms and methods of activity. Time dictated the need to pay special attention to the promotion of external

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her policy of the USSR. Now the issue of actions of influence (at that time they were referred to by the term "active measures") was posed much broader: it was about disrupting the anti-Soviet plans and intentions of the Western countries, about which the intelligence was or became aware.

However, the process of practical reorganization of intelligence activities in the field of active measures was slow. Finally, in 1959, a special subdivision was created in intelligence (Department D), which was supposed to play the role of organizer and coordinator of all the work of foreign intelligence in the development and implementation of active measures. I.I. was appointed head of the department. Agayants. According to his experience, range of knowledge, state thinking and ability to put forward innovative ideas, I.I. Agayants was at the "right time in the right place." In essence, taking into account the new tasks, it was necessary to start from a zero cycle, but soon an important intelligence agency was created by his hands, designed to help solve many problems of Soviet foreign policy.

I.I. Agayants had a pronounced gift for selecting and skillfully placing personnel, setting tasks for them, taking into account the business and personal qualities, abilities and capabilities of this or that employee. Another gift was the ability to establish interaction, to organize the optimal solution to the problem. While working in the "D" department, he was in contact with the staff of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU and a wide range of representatives of foreign ministries. All of them treated Ivan Ivanovich with great respect.

Most of the "actions of influence" prepared by the department yielded significant results. It can be said without exaggeration that a new stage of intelligence activity in the field of "actions of influence", other active measures is inextricably linked with the name of I.I. Agayants. It was under him that the most effective form of active measures was born - complex actions that acquired a pre-emptive, offensive and long-term character.

At the end of 1965, the work of I.I. Agayants as the head of department "D" received the following assessment: "Colonel Agayants I.I. has been working in intelligence for more than 30 years, since 1940 he has been in senior positions, three times he was on long-term business trips in capitalist countries,

and twice as a resident of the KGB. Recruited several valuable agents who are currently sources of very important documentary information.

Since 1959 he has been working as the head of department "D". Thanks to the correct organization of work, the department successfully carried out a number of active measures aimed at exposing the plans of the United States and influencing the positions of the governments, general staffs and intelligence agencies of the enemy on political, economic and military issues. He took part in fulfilling the tasks of the authorities to disrupt the aggressive plans of the United States against Cuba, as well as the Congo and Laos ...

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I.I. Agayants possesses extensive knowledge, is exceptionally initiative and hardworking, enjoys great authority in the team as one of the most qualified and honored intelligence officers.

At present, I.I. Agayants holds a position that, according to the list of positions, cannot be replaced by generals. However, taking into account the merits and long-term activity of I.I. Agayants in the intelligence agencies, as well as the fact that for many years he held positions to be replaced by generals, we consider it possible, as an exception, to submit him to the rank of major general. On December 16, 1965, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the assignment of I.I. Agayants with the rank of general. There is no doubt that he deserved this title much earlier. He has never been a "Parquet General".

Ivan Ivanovich was deeply convinced of the importance of intelligence activities for our state. His dedication to the cause was truly immeasurable, as was his conscientiousness and diligence. He said: "If it were possible to objectively and impartially weigh and compare the achievements of our intelligence and other intelligence agencies that are unfriendly to us, then a breathtaking general picture of the amazing and outstanding successes, the collective feat of Soviet intelligence officers, would appear."

In 1954-1959, Ivan Ivanovich worked as the head of the department of special disciplines at intelligence school No. 101 (now the Academy of Foreign Intelligence). He was, as always, the "driving force" in the teaching staff of the school. It was under Ivan Ivanovich that the first textbook of political intelligence was published, which became the main manual for students. He took an active part in improving the urban practical training of future scouts and achieved the inclusion of a group of teachers in outdoor surveillance in the department. He knew that a reconnaissance officer needed the ability to notice surveillance and, if necessary, escape from it like air.

He highly valued objectivity and impartiality in people's assessments. The beneficial effect of Ivan Ivanovich on his subordinates was enormous. Without superfluous words and pompous phrases, he was able to inspire a clear understanding of the importance of the cause they serve. He strove to develop their independence, giving both guidelines and scope for their own ideas. I.I. Agayants believed in the ability of operatives to successfully solve problems without prompting and intervention "from above", since he took into account the qualities of the performer and the features of the set task.

His resolutions on operational documents have always been clear, concise and exhaustive. He argued that operational letters and other documents should be, firstly, specific, in

they are not

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there may be places of ambiguity, they are obliged to answer the questions posed by the residencies, and secondly, they must contain thoughtful instructions and recommendations from the Center. In these documents, he believed, the thought of the operative who prepares them must also be present, so that he sees in them not only the implementation of the leadership's resolutions, but also his own ideas.

I.I. Agayants work planning. His plans were concrete and, most importantly, real. It was always clear who, when, where, how and what would be done and what the expected result would be. He knew how, without pressure, but rigorously, to control plans for their execution accurately and on time. He structured the discussion of any issue in such a way that the operatives themselves could correct, supplement or change their own proposals.

At meetings and conferences I.I. Agayants never uttered loud phrases, he spoke in a businesslike manner. Usually he did not read from a piece of paper during speeches, but he kept pre-prepared notes in his hand, looking at them from time to time. Erudite and well-read, Ivan Ivanovich knew history well and often used examples from it, confirming this or that position. He always had at hand a lot of books on topical political and economic issues, problems of international relations.

A thin, tall man, with a quick and easy gait, radiant, lively eyes, with a very expressive face, speaking in a low voice - tuberculosis progressed, and after the operation he lived with one lung - I.I. Agayants to those who knew him. He was distinguished by innate modesty, he never stuck himself out in front of others, he did not demand privileges for himself. When receiving junior employees in his office, Ivan Ivanovich invariably left the table and greeted them, and if he could not receive them right away, he apologized for the delay. In some way, he was the herald of a new style in dealing with people. He replaced the commanding tone, which still remained from the wartime in relations with subordinates, with a polite, correct and certainly business-like address. He called hundreds of people by name and patronymic, possessing in this sense a phenomenal memory. At times this gave food for people who knew him little to say that he was not demanding enough of his fellow workers. But this was a deeply erroneous opinion: his exactingness was manifested in a tactful but clear form, and not in the form of a shout, humiliation, or pounding the table with his fist. He knew that showing trust entailed a response in the form of doing things faster and better. A respectful approach to employees allowed Ivan Ivanovich to "extract" the maximum from the apparatus of executors.

possible.

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I.I. Agayants was an ardent opponent of foul language, he himself never resorted to "strong" expressions. If he needed to respond to the negative behavior of one or another employee or to his wrong actions, he limited himself to the words: "This is a peculiar person!" or "Oh, it's a great original!". He dressed simply but neatly, and lived with a family of five in a small three-room apartment, furnished without any frills.

Such was this wonderful person, intelligence officer, politician and diplomat. Ivan Ivanovich Agayants died on May 12, 1968 in the prime of his creative powers - a long-term illness affected. He lived in intelligence, gave it all his strength and health, everything in him was subordinated to the service of the cause: both Spartan self-discipline, and the will brought up by a harsh historical era, incomparable endurance, self-control, initiative and diligence, multiplied by excellent human qualities. Buried I.I. Agayants at the Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow.

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In the service of the Motherland

In 1949, a new student appeared at the Higher Intelligence School of the Committee of Information - Ivan Anisimovich Fadeikin. Came with a brilliant performance after graduating from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze: "In his work, he is principled, consistent, and knows how to complete the assigned task. He has a strong character and a sense of the new in his work. I learned the program of the Academy with excellent marks. Passed the state exam ahead of schedule with the highest scores in all disciplines. He was awarded a diploma with honors and a gold medal.

In the first post-war years, many front-line soldiers who went through the war and gained life experience and hardened came to foreign intelligence. Many of them showed up later.

talented intelligence officers, leading the most complex areas of intelligence activities. Ivan Anisimovich stood out among them for his extraordinary character and abilities bestowed by nature. Here is what is said about him in one of the published memoirs:

"Until the age of 13, Vanya Fadeikin, together with his parents, brother and sister, lived in his native village of Monastyrskoye, Bednodemyansk district, Penza region, and was almost no different from his barefoot peers. But one quality distinguished him - a heightened sense of perception of everything new, curiosity and an indomitable desire for science, for knowledge. It was this desire of the boy that made him leave his father's house at an early age and go to work in one of the regional centers. He became an accountant, not only in order to earn a living, but also in order to be able to continue his studies. To the surprise of many, Ivan Fadeikin passed the matriculation exams as an external student, and passed them brilliantly, and left for the city of Kuibyshev, where he entered the Communist University of Journalism."

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Ivan Fadeikin studied only with excellent marks. He turned out to be the only student who received a Stalin scholarship. In 1939, before the war, he went to serve in the Red Army without hesitation and completed courses for military commissars. The attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union caught him at the post of editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Kontakt" - the press organ of the military aviation school in the city of Chkalov.

From the first days of the war, Ivan Anisimovich was on the front, first on the Western, and at the end of the war - on the 2nd Baltic. Chronology of his front-line biography: deputy head of the political department of the 352nd rifle division, commissar of the regiment of the same division, commander of the 94th, and after being wounded - the 98th rifle regiments of the 30th Red Banner Guards Rifle Division, after another wound - chief of staff of the 30th division, and at the end of the war - the commander of this division with the rank of lieutenant colonel. Three wounds and two contusions. On the chest - two orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Alexander Nevsky, the medal "For Courage". By this time he was only 27 years old!

Ivan Anisimovich recalled: "The war very early placed on the shoulders of our generation a heavy burden of responsibility for the fate of entrusted people, for the fate of our Motherland. I started the war as a political commissar, and in November 1942 I was appointed commander of a regiment. I was then 25 years old. And at the age of 26 - the commander of an infantry division. To be honest, it was unpleasant when they asked me about my age. In the very question, there seemed to be some doubt about the ability to command a rifle regiment, and even more so a rifle division.

However, his fighting friends did not doubt him. When Ivan Anisimovich turned 60 in 1977, he received congratulations from the Council of Veterans of the 10th Guards Army. Here is how fellow soldiers assessed their former commander:

"The subdivisions and units led by you successfully fought offensive battles near Smolensk, were the first to enter Belarusian soil near Lyady and distinguished themselves in the bloody battles near Orsha in 1943.

In blizzards and cold, across snowy fields and copses, you led the units of the regiment near Novosokolniki and Pustoshnaya into battle, in slush and impassable mud you fought on the bridgehead on the Velikaya River near the city of Novorzhev.

In offensive battles in the summer of 1944, the Guards Regiment under your command fought fearlessly near the city of OPOCHKA, crossed the Velikaya River, and was among the first to enter the territory of the Latvian SSR.

The warriors of the regiment and division covered themselves with unfading glory while overcoming the Luban lowland, in heavy battles on the Vidzeme Upland, during the liberation of the prisoners of the Salaspils concentration camp.

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rational camp, in the battles for the liberation of the capital of Latvia – the city of Riga”.

With such baggage Ivan Anisimovich came in 1949 to foreign intelligence, to which he devoted his whole life. Life experience and brilliant studies at the Higher Intelligence School, apparently, were the reason that almost immediately after graduating from it in the fall of 1950, with no experience in the central office and behind-the-cord conditions, with still insufficient knowledge of the German language, Ivan Anisimovich was sent to work residency in Berlin. Arriving there as an ordinary operational officer, a year later he actually began to fulfill the duties of a deputy resident for political intelligence, and in 1952 he headed the intelligence department of the Office of the Commissioner of the USSR Ministry of State Security in Germany.

The following year, 1953, Fadeikin was appointed deputy commissioner. The Commissioner's Office had important tasks to carry out operations against the intelligence services of the West. Under the leadership and direct personal participation of Ivan Anisimovich, operations were carried out in 1953-1954, as a result of which a large number of Western intelligence agents were arrested, and important documents were seized and exported from the American intelligence center in Germany.

During the period of work in Berlin, Ivan Anisimovich was characterized in personnel documents as a "growing and promising intelligence officer." It is no coincidence that upon his return from a business trip in 1954, Fadeikin was entrusted with a very important area of intelligence - the post of head of the department for Germany of the First Main Directorate. Later, Ivan Anisimovich recalled: "The department at that time, both in significance and in number, was the largest in PSU... The department had important tasks: to carry out activities that would help strengthen the foreign policy positions of the USSR in preparation for the meeting of foreign ministers in Berlin, the signing of the State Treaty with Austria, preparations for the arrival of Konrad Adenauer in Moscow and the conclusion of an agreement between the USSR and the FRG ...

Negotiations with the German Chancellor took place in a difficult atmosphere. We experienced great difficulties in obtaining information about the plans of the West German delegation, since Adenauer himself prepared all the documents himself ... In order to obtain information from the circles of the FRG delegation, we brought two sources to Moscow ... A number of other events were carried out. All this in combination made it possible to regularly inform the Soviet government about the plans and intentions of the opposing side."

Fadeikin worked in the central apparatus until 1966 and rose to the head of one of the important departments of the KGB - military counterintelligence. Repeatedly went on short-term business trips abroad, where, as always, he personally took part in

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nenie special operational tasks. Evaluation of this work - the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star.

In 1966, Ivan Anisimovich was again sent to Berlin, where for eight years, until 1974, he headed the Office of the Commissioner, which was then transformed into the Representation of the KGB of the USSR under the Ministry of State Security of the GDR. During this period, important events took place in Europe and in the FRG in particular. political processes. They were characterized by a tendency towards detente in relations between the states of two opposite socio-economic systems, towards the establishment of cooperation. In Germany, the autocracy of the CDU / CSU ended and political forces came to power, realizing the need for a more flexible and realistic "Eastern policy". This development of the situation posed the tasks for the Soviet foreign intelligence agencies in Germany to carefully monitor and analyze the situation in the FRG and to influence the positions of the country's socio-political circles. The Center highly appreciated the activities of Fadeikin. "Correctly and purposefully," said the Center's conclusion after the end of Fadeikin's business trip, "directed the work of the Apparatus in penetrating enemy targets.

He was directly involved in the organization of undercover and operational activities. The Apparatus led by him has achieved concrete results in recruitment and information work, important information on political, economic and military issues has been obtained regularly and in a timely manner."

Since 1974, Ivan Anisimovich has again been in leadership work at the Center, and in March 1978 he was sent as a resident to one of the Middle Eastern countries. He actively began to work at this new foreign intelligence sector for him, but in November of the same year he was forced to return to Moscow due to a serious illness and in October 1979 he passed away.

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Under the sign of time

The fates of many prominent intelligence officers who made a significant statement during the war and the difficult post-war period reflected the signs of an era that quickly advanced people, requiring self-sacrifice, risk and, of course, skill from them. These were the features of a whole generation that replaced those who opened the way for foreign intelligence of the Soviet state. Among them there were fewer people with higher education, especially with underground experience. Most had to gain experience and knowledge already under fire, in practice, correct their shortcomings on the go. The biographies of these people reflected the wide geography of the country. Few were born in the capital. Here is the Volga region, the Far East, and the former Soviet republics, which are now listed as states of the "near abroad". They came out, as a rule, from the peasants, workers, from the working people. And they reached the heights of intellect, having developed the mind and abilities inherent in them by nature.

In the essay, we will touch on the fate of three of them: Vladimir Ivanovich Vertiporoh, Andrei Makarovich Otroshchenko and Pavel Matveevich Zhuravlev.

Shortly after the formation of the State of Israel, Vertiporoh organized a residency in Tel Aviv and completed his activity as a representative of foreign intelligence at the security agencies of the People's Republic of China. Otroshchenko worked in Iran after the war. Zhuravlev headed residencies in Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Italy, acted in a number of countries of the Near and Middle East, was one of the leaders of the intelligence information service. However, we will talk about them in order.

well well

Vladimir Ivanovich Vertiporoh was born in 1914 in Berdyansk (Zaporozhye province) in the family of an employee. In 1930, no windows

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After graduating from high school, he became an apprentice fitter at a factory, and in the evenings he went to a school for working youth. In 1933 he went to Moscow and entered the Moscow Institute of Chemical Technology of the Meat Industry.

In 1938, after graduating from the institute, he was recommended to the security agencies and sent to the Main Economic Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR. At the beginning of his work in the NKVD, V.I. Verti-gunpowder went headlong into mastering the "wisdom" of the new work. Soon he was sent to the Far East, where the facts of criminal conduct of business in the fishery were established. Together with his colleagues from the Far East, in 1939 he managed to eliminate the threat of disruption of fish supplies from the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk and save stocks of a valuable product worth many millions of rubles.

By 1941, Vladimir Ivanovich was already a well-formed counterintelligence officer, he had an exposed seasoned Japanese intelligence agent on his account.

At the beginning of the war, Vertiporoh was sent to the Special Group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs for the formation of reconnaissance and sabotage detachments in the rear of the Nazi troops.

Work as part of the Special Group, and then the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes (OMSBON), brought Vladimir Ivanovich together with scouts. Assertive and business-like, skillfully recruiting and training reconnaissance and sabotage detachments, he attracted the attention of foreign intelligence officers, who at that time were in dire need of personnel. Vladimir Ivanovich found himself in a new area of work. He had to deal with Iran.

Starting the war against the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany gave this country an important place in its plans. The government of the USSR on the basis of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 in August 1941 temporarily sent its troops to the territory of Iran. At the same time, British troops were brought here, and at the end of 1942, US military units. The available work experience allowed Vladimir Ivanovich to quickly master the assigned area, and in 1942 it was decided to send him to Mashhad as a resident. Together with the staff of the residency, he actively participated in the implementation of measures to neutralize the Nazi agents. The skillfully organized work of the residency made it possible to obtain valuable intelligence information.

He mastered the Farsi language and soon began to use it when establishing contacts with the local population. Resident officers recalled how once, when the only artesian well in Mashhad broke down, seeing that there was no specialist in the city who could take on the elimination of the malfunction, Vladimir Ivanovich came to the rescue and, to his amazement,

the local population is restored

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pitchfork well. Needless to say, how the authority of the Russian diplomat, who saved the city from thirst, rose!

During the Tehran conference of the heads of government of the anti-Hitler coalition, Vertiporoh was involved in the important task of ensuring the safety of its members.

The first foreign business trip of V.I. Were gunpowder. At the Center, he was already regarded as an experienced foreign intelligence officer who could handle complex tasks.

It is no coincidence that in 1948, after the formation of the State of Israel, he was instructed to organize a residency in Tel Aviv. In a short time, Vertiporoh coped with the task assigned to him, and the necessary intelligence information began to arrive at the Center. Under his leadership, an effective agent network was created. He attracted a number of valuable sources to cooperate with Soviet intelligence. The residency brought several agents to the USA. For successful work, the resident was awarded a state award.

After five years of work in Israel, in 1953, Vladimir Ivanovich returned to Moscow, where he headed the foreign intelligence unit responsible for intelligence activities in the Middle East. His experience of working at the forefront, his benevolent and attentive attitude towards his subordinates made a favorable impression on the newcomers who came "under the wing" of Vertiporoh.

Here is how Vadim Alekseevich Kirpichenko, a veteran of intelligence, the former first deputy head of the First Main Directorate, described his first impressions of a meeting with an imposing-looking head of the department:

"IN AND. Vertiporoh was probably the most prominent and interesting man in intelligence. Very tall (almost two meters), powerful physique, blond curly hair,

with a well-groomed mustache and a smiling face, he resembled a picture and epic hero - some kind of Mikula Selyaninovich.

And further: "I did not have long to work with him, but every visit to his office left a feeling of satisfaction and joy. "Lucky with the boss"!, - I thought.

Heading the department, Vladimir Ivanovich did not forget young employees, passing on his rich operational experience to them. Work without fuss, a measured, outwardly unhurried approach to the consideration and elaboration of any problem was accompanied by the depth and thoroughness of the decisions made.

In 1957, Vladimir Ivanovich was sent to the responsible post of representative of foreign intelligence at the security agencies of the People's Republic of China. This was a completely new field of activity for him. Nevertheless, he was able to penetrate into the complexity of the processes taking place in the PRC leadership and the personal characteristics of the leader of the Chinese revolution. The information coming from Vertigunpowder helped to anticipate

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predict future difficulties in the relations between the two socialist powers.

Sudden death overtook V.I. Vertiporokha in 1960 in the prime of his creative powers.

The leadership of the country highly appreciated the merits of Vladimir Ivanovich Vertiporoh. He was awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Red Star, many medals. He was awarded the military rank of major general.

well well

Andrey Makarovich Otroshchenko stands among the glorious names of scouts. His many years of work are mainly connected with Iran.

Andrey Makarovich was born in Tashkent in 1902 in the family of a railway worker. His father, a landless peasant from near Putivl, retired from the railway in 1909 and moved to the village of Spassky near the town of Mirzachul, where immigrants from Russia and Ukraine lived.

A.M. Otroshchenko was actively involved in the work of the local Komsomol cell and was elected secretary of the volost committee of the Komsomol. In 1920, famine in Russia drove refugees from starving provinces to Turkestan. There are many homeless children and teenagers in the city. An orphanage was formed. The young activists had to work hard, but they fed the orphans.

In 1923, the Komsomol leader was accepted into the party.

The peoples of Turkestan experienced a difficult time. Bai and the reactionary clergy raised people against the Soviet regime. They assigned the main role in this struggle against the Soviet power to the Basmachi, the main center of which was the Ferghana Valley. Detachments of the Basmachi offered fierce resistance to the establishment of a new order. The Bukhara and Khiva khanates intensified their actions against Soviet Turkestan. The Republic found itself in the ring of fronts.

In those years, in order to organize work in Central Asia, the OGPU deployed the Office of the Plenipotentiary Representative in Tashkent. That was the name of the Central Asian KGB body then. In 1924, Andrei Makarovich Otroshchenko was sent to operational work.

He had to work in various positions. A.M. Otroshchenko, for example, took part in the implementation of the first land and water reform in Turkestan, which began to be implemented as early as 1921.

In 1931 Andrei Makarovich was sent to work abroad. He went to the Consulate General of the USSR in Mashhad, where there was a small residency for intelligence work.

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in the border regions of Iran. The residency had connections with Moscow, Tashkent and Ashgabat.

In those years, there were active operations against the Soviet Union by British and Japanese intelligence officers. The White émigré centers that settled on the territory of Iran were also active.

In 1934 Andrey Makarovich changed the resident. Under his leadership, Soviet intelligence officers managed to create good opportunities in Mashhad and practically controlled the activities of the British and Japanese intelligence stations. He ended his trip as a seasoned and experienced scout.

Upon returning to the Soviet Union in 1936, Andrei Makarovich was offered to go to work in the Foreign Department, and he began to work in the sector that led intelligence activities in the countries of the Near and Middle East. And the following year he was sent as a resident to Tehran.

He knew the country well enough and immediately got involved in the work. The times were troubling. Italian fascism tested the power of arms in Abyssinia, there was a war in Spain, Japan was testing the strength of our borders, Hitler had already begun to implement his aggressive plans in Europe.

The main danger to our country came from Germany and Japan. Once Andrei Makarovich had to solve the problem of introducing his agent into the Japanese intelligence network. An analysis of information about the activities of the Japanese in Iran allowed him to suspect the firm, in which the Japanese engineer worked, of belonging to Japanese intelligence. A simple combination was carried out: this engineer was introduced to one of the immigrants from Central Asia who lived in Iran. He was among those who were looking for work at a company where a Japanese engineer "worked". As soon as it became clear to the Japanese that the new employee of the company was related to the Soviet republics of Central Asia, the "engineer" openly declared that he was a Japanese intelligence officer and "recruited" an agent of our residency. And then everything developed according to the laws of the detective genre.

Either the matter was urgent, or the team from Tokyo was pushing, only the Japanese intelligence agent began to persuade his new ward to quickly go to Central Asia, get to Ashgabat, and then get in touch with a Japanese intelligence agent who turned out to be without communication.

Needless to say, Moscow approved the plan of the Japanese "engineer", helped to carry out the successful withdrawal of his envoy to Central Asia, get to Ashgabat and find the one who carried out hostile activities on the territory of the Soviet Union.

We emphasize that this is only one small episode of the active intelligence work that Andrei Makarovich Otroshchenko conducted in Tehran.

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Obviously, he would have continued to fruitfully manage the work of the residency, if not for an urgent call to Moscow in 1938 and an arrest that was completely unexpected for Otroshchenko. Worked slanderous denunciation. For eight months, investigators tried to extract a confession in his connections with enemy intelligence. Not having obtained a confession of imperfect sins, Andrei Makarovich was released and sent to work in Odessa, where he was first appointed head of the department, and then head of the counterintelligence department of the regional administration.

In Odessa, he was overtaken by the Great Patriotic War. Odessa security officers actively participated in the heroic defense of the city. Andrei Makarovich left the besieged Odessa with the last boat.

A.M. Otroshchenko arrived in Kuibyshev, where part of the central apparatus of the NKVD was located. He asked to be sent to the front, but the leadership decided otherwise. Otroshchenko was appointed to the post of head of one of the departments of the central apparatus of foreign intelligence. The department was engaged in the organization of intelligence work in Asian countries, in particular in Iran, where the activity of Hitler's agents posed a great danger.

When the decision was made to hold a conference of the leaders of the countries-members of the anti-Hitler coalition in Tehran, the responsible task of ensuring the security of the summit meeting fell on Soviet intelligence. Moreover, intelligence received information about the preparation by the Nazis of a sharp action against the heads of delegations.

A few days before the start of the Tehran conference, a group of senior officials of the USSR Ministry of State Security left Moscow for Iran by special train. Andrei Makarovich was also a part of it.

Many years later, already on a well-deserved rest, Otroshchenko recalled many episodes of that tense time. We will mention here some of them.

The train delivered a group of Chekists to the Astara station, and then they had to get to Tehran in cars that were delivered by the same train. Andrei Makarovich was driving in a car destined for I.V. Stalin. On the way, already on the territory of Iran, something happened to the car, it became uncontrollable. Only the skill of the driver made it possible to avoid an accident. As it was established later, there was a breakdown in the steering. What caused it remains a mystery. There was no noise about this, the malfunction was eliminated, and the car served its purpose.

In Tehran, Otroshchenko plunged headlong into activities to ensure the security of the conference. In addition to efforts aimed at neutralizing and disrupting the subversive actions of Hitler's intelligence, the residency also had to deal with the allies.

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Reliable information was received about the intention of British intelligence to launch active undercover work against the Soviet missions in Iran. Therefore, those of our intelligence officers who happened to observe Churchill's behavior during the conference noted with surprise some kind of obsequiousness of the "British lion" towards I.V. Stalin.

And yet, the main impression that the Tehran Conference made was a feeling of deep satisfaction that the Allies were forced to recognize the outstanding role of the Soviet people, who assumed the brunt of the struggle against Hitler's fascism.

The intelligence officers also experienced satisfaction from the fact that they managed to thwart the plans of German intelligence to carry out a subversive action against the heads of government of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in a timely manner.

Otroshchenko's memory was imprinted with an episode connected with the conference. According to the regulations, I.V. Stalin, on behalf of the English king, a commemorative sword as a sign of the victory won by the Soviet troops near Stalingrad. The presentation of the sword was held in a solemn atmosphere in the presence of the entire composition of the delegations of the USSR, USA and Great Britain.

The sword was handed over to Stalin by Churchill. Stalin knelt down, accepted the royal sword from the hands of the British prime minister, kissed it and handed it over to the security officer. When Stalin took the sword, the hilt of the sword turned out to be slightly tilted down, and from the tilt the sword came out of the sheath by twenty centimeters. A slight noise ran through the hall. Someone whispered: "A bad sign, the sword falls out of hand"

Stalin." But the Soviet leader noticed confusion in the hall, straightened his sword and got up from knee.

After the solemn ceremony, the heads of the delegations went out to the veranda of the Soviet embassy, where they took pictures.

Many interesting and important things were on the combat account of Andrei Makarovich. He did a lot while abroad. But where the accumulated experience and knowledge of the peculiarities of intelligence work were especially useful, it was in Iran.

The defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan served as a powerful impetus for the development of the democratic anti-imperialist movement in Iran. In March 1951, the Iranian Majlis attacked the Westernizers on their most painful point - it adopted a law on the nationalization of the oil industry. In April of the same year, a government was formed headed by the leader of the Iranian National Front, Mosaddegh.

In 1953, the US CIA managed to prepare and carry out a coup d'etat in Iran, as a result of which Mossadegh was removed from the post of prime minister, and on the throne was restored check.

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Otroshchenko was sent to Tehran to organize work in the current crisis situation in the country. In those years, seven scouts worked in the residency. These were young employees gaining experience in practical work. The knowledge and experience that Andrei Makarovich possessed were a good help for the residency.

During this period, unfortunately, health began to fail. In 1955, due to illness, Otroshchenko returned to Moscow, and the following year he retired.

The intelligence officer's work was awarded the Order of Lenin and many other state awards.

well well

Pavel Matveyevich Zhuravlev began his career in intelligence back in 1924. He was born in December 1898 in the Volga region in a peasant family. He managed to finish the gymnasium in Kazan, which was not easy for a peasant son. In 1917 he entered the medical faculty of Kazan University. But studies were interrupted by the Civil War. In 1918, Pavel Matveyevich joined the Red Army. A competent fighter was noticed and assigned to the Special Front Department.

What Pavel Matveyevich had to do: he was the head of the military censorship of the Special Department of the Army, worked as an authorized representative of the Secret Department of the All-Tatar Emergency Commission, then headed it, and soon was put in charge of the counterintelligence department. His fate also connected him with the Crimea, where he worked as deputy head of the Secret Operational Unit of the Crimean GPU, then head of the Sevastopol district department of the GPU, and finally, deputy head of the Special Department of the Black Sea Fleet.

In 1922, Pavel Matveyevich was awarded the badge "Honorary Chekist". Certificate No. 152 was signed by Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky.

In 1924, Pavel Matveyevich was sent to work in the Foreign Department of the OGPU. The next year he left for Lithuania. There he began his intelligence activities. For three years of work in Kovno, the then capital of Lithuania, Pavel Matveyevich acquired the necessary experience. In 1927, Zhuravlev was transferred to Prague, where he headed the residency until 1930. Significant information was regularly received from Prague in those years, testifying to the intense and fruitful work of the residency.

In 1930, Zhuravlev became a resident in Turkey, then in Italy.

In January 1932, Dmitry Georgievich Fedichkin replaced him in the Roman residency. As Fedichkin recalled, Pavel Matveyevich always very specifically and clearly set the task for the operational

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botnik. He was a master of undercover combinations and carefully planned each operation.

The residency team managed to create intelligence capabilities, and Moscow received important information from Rome. Suffice it to say that the residency succeeded in getting regular mail from the British embassy. And from the Italian special services, lists of the agent network in the Black Sea ports of our country were obtained, as well as data on the use of Ukrainian nationalists for subversive purposes against the Soviet Union.

At the end of 1939, P.M. Zhuravlev headed the first (German) branch, the most important in intelligence at that time. The following year, he began to summarize materials on Hitler's preparations for an attack on the USSR, highlighting them in the Facts file, which he personally led. On the eve of the war, he was one of the first to raise the issue of creating an information unit in intelligence, and in the spring of 1941 he created it within the framework of his department. Together with the famous intelligence officer 3.I. Rybkina, on the basis of data from the Red Chapel, prepared a message for Stalin about the imminent aggression of the Nazis.

In 1942 he was sent to Iran. Ivan Ivanovich Agayants headed the Tehran residency. When Ivan Ivanovich Agayants was sent to Algeria in 1943 to maintain contact with de Gaulle, he was replaced by Pavel Matveevich.

The Tehran residency worked actively and efficiently, and in 1944 the intelligence leadership decided to send Zhuravlev to Cairo. In Cairo, Zhuravlev acted as Charge d'Affaires. During his work, he also had to travel to Lebanon and Syria to carry out reconnaissance missions. In November 1945, Pavel Matveyevich returned to Moscow.

The undoubted contribution of P.M. Zhuravlev in information work was appreciated, and from 1947 to 1950 he headed the information service of foreign intelligence.

In the description dated April 25, 1946, compiled at the Center for P.M. Zhuravlev, it was stated: "<... while abroad, he did a great job, in 1944, in difficult conditions, he created a new residency of the USSR Ministry of State Security, supplied the Center with valuable intelligence materials... Comrade. Zhuravlev is an experienced scout and leader.

In April 1945, P.M. Zhuravlev was awarded the title of Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank, and soon he was awarded the Order of Lenin.

In the post-war period, for some time, foreign intelligence was withdrawn from the MGB system and transformed into the Information Committee under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For a number of years, Pavel Matveyevich Zhuravlev was deputy chairman of the Information Committee. He served as deputy head of foreign intelligence until his retirement in 1954.

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D.G. Fedichkin wrote that Pavel Matveyevich was "a gentle, polite and self-possessed person. However, he did not tolerate laxity and indiscipline, he was demanding, but his exactingness was not mere administration, he acted by methods of explanation and persuasion. I don't know of a case where he ever raised his voice or behaved rudely. He did not lose his composure during the period of complications and failures.

In 1956, Pavel Matveevich died. Name P.M. Zhuravlev is listed on the Memorial plaque in the Cabinet of History of the SVR.

! Kirpichenko V. From the archive of a scout. - M., 1993. - S. 135.

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Ivan Ivanovich Zaitsev

On August 4, 1920, a great event took place in the family of the locomotive driver of the Kashir station, Ivan Zaitsev: a boy was born, who, like his father, was named Ivan. Ivan Ivanovich Zaitsev graduated from the secondary school at the Kashira station in 1936 and the following year he entered the Moscow Institute of Land Management and Geodesy Engineers.

Who knows, if not for the war, maybe he would have become a surveyor. But 1941 dramatically changed his fate. In July of the first war year, Ivan was drafted into the Red Army and after six months of study in the Tula military camps, having received the rank of lieutenant, in January 1942 he was sent to the 62nd Army of the Don Front. It was here that his professional fate was determined: he began his path as a scout.

Upon arrival at the headquarters of the 62nd Army, Ivan Zaitsev was appointed instructor of undercover courses of the intelligence department of the headquarters. He served in military intelligence throughout the war, going all the way from Stalingrad to Berlin, taking part in the battles on the Don, Stalingrad, 3rd Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian fronts. Ivan Ivanovich was distinguished by outstanding personal courage. During the fighting near Stalingrad, he once faced one on one with a lost motorcyclist - a German officer. He managed to capture him. The officer had maps containing important information about the movements of German troops. Zaitsev's military merits were awarded two Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, and seven medals, the last of which was "For the Victory over Germany."

The war is over. Ivan Zaitsev was sent to the Intelligence School of the GRU of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, and a year later, in 1946, he became a student of the intelligence department of the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze. Upon completion of his studies at the academy, given his

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Gained experience, Zaitsev was sent to work in foreign intelligence, to which he devoted the rest of his life.

I.I. Zaitsev belonged to a galaxy of front-line soldiers who came to foreign intelligence immediately after the war. These were people who had received life hardening and experience in the war, and therefore, without hesitation, they got involved in a new job for them. Ivan Ivanovich was no exception among them. After graduating from the Higher Intelligence School and having worked for two years in the central office, he showed himself sufficiently prepared to be sent on a long-term business trip to such an important country from the intelligence point of view as Israel.

In April 1951, Ivan Ivanovich arrived in Tel Aviv and started working in the local branch of the Russian-Palestinian Society. This society was created even before the revolution and had a non-governmental character. The situation during the five years that he had to spend in Israel was extremely difficult and unfavorable for work. Relations between the USSR and Israel left much to be desired, and in 1953 their aggravation reached a climax, as a result of which diplomatic relations between the countries were terminated. I.I. Zaitsev remained in Israel because the society where he was employed was not a state institution. The strict police regime that existed in Israel before that has become even more intensified. In the Israeli press, persecution of the Russian-Palestinian society and I.I. Zaitsev. Members of the Israeli public were afraid to maintain contact with him.

Meanwhile, the leadership of foreign intelligence before the residency operating in Israel were assigned diverse tasks, and the main one was the organization of work from Israel against the then main enemy of Soviet intelligence - the United States. From the very first days of his stay in Israel, Ivan Ivanovich began to prepare for this task with his characteristic thoroughness. As noted in one of the conclusions of the Center, at the very first stage he "got well acquainted with the country and the intelligence situation, studied Yiddish and established a wide range of contacts."

Despite the difficult conditions, during the first two years of his work in Tel Aviv, Ivan Ivanovich managed to establish useful contacts in the scientific, political and business circles of the country and acquire several sources of information. The workload was exceptionally heavy, especially since management of the property of the USSR in Israel was added to his former official duties. But one had to know the character of Ivan Ivanovich. And in this environment, he successfully conducted operational work; acquired sources of military-political information, which were then brought to the USA and France.

In 1957 I.I. Zaitsev returned to Moscow. A little more than a year passed, and he received a new task - to head the residency in Bonn. And here he showed himself as an experienced and active leader.

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Tel. He clearly organized the work of the residency, took personal part in many operations. So, he was involved in the cooperation of a US military intelligence officer. Documentary materials were received from him, by which it was possible to judge the degree of awareness of American military intelligence about military facilities on the territory of the USSR and which of these facilities were planned to be subjected to an atomic attack in the event of hostilities.

By his personal example, benevolence, combined with exactingness, Zaitsev won great respect in the team, which created a healthy working atmosphere and contributed to the achievement of positive results in work. It is no coincidence that the work of Ivan Ivanovich in Bonn was awarded the Order of the Red Star and the sign "Honorary State Security Officer".

In 1963 he returned to Moscow. In the professional life of Ivan Ivanovich, a new stage has begun, connected with the education and training of intelligence officers. The organizational skills he showed, and his many-sided experience in practical intelligence work, apparently, served as the basis for his appointment as head of the faculty for the improvement of the intelligence school. For several years he was engaged in the retraining of leading intelligence personnel and the organization of scientific research in it. For the successes achieved in this work, Ivan Ivanovich was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. All his later life, except for one more business trip to Bonn, turned out to be connected with the Red Banner Institute of Foreign Intelligence.

On September 21, 1969, Ivan Ivanovich again arrived in Bonn as a resident, where he worked until October 1972. This was an extremely important period in the life of the FRG, where there was a sharp political struggle over the ratification of the Moscow Treaty between the USSR and the FRG on post-war borders in Europe. The residency faced difficult tasks not only in obtaining information about the alignment of political forces in the country, but also in exerting beneficial influence for the USSR on the leading figures of the FRG.

How the residency led by Ivan Ivanovich coped with these tasks is evidenced by the conclusion of the Center on its work: "During this period, he managed to achieve positive changes in the information work of the residency... the most urgent problems of foreign and domestic policy of Germany. The residency was especially effective in covering the situation in the FRG during the period of ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, as well as in connection with early elections to the Bundestag."

In 1970, in connection with the successful work, Ivan Ivanovich was awarded the rank of Major General, and in 1973 he was awarded the third Order of the Red Banner. In the Western press repeatedly

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but reports were published about his belonging to the Soviet foreign intelligence and directly indicated his position - a resident. However, it is characteristic that the authors of these publications have never been able to provide any specific data to confirm his intelligence activities.

The last 13 years of his service I.I. Zaitsev headed an institute that trained personnel for foreign intelligence. He suited this position like no other. Goodwill towards people, patience, humor and kind irony bestowed on Ivan Ivanovich by nature and life experience created a healthy atmosphere around him, he enjoyed indisputable authority among the students and teachers of the Institute. He showed paternal concern for his listeners. Graduates of the Faculty of Improvement of the intelligence school still recall the case when Ivan Ivanovich once sat up with them at the graduation party. It was already a late hour, and before leaving, he informed the participants of the evening, somewhat heated by the feast: "Well, guys, I know you - you'll still get behind the wheel. Therefore, I instructed the school duty officer to close the front doors and not let anyone out until five in the morning.

Everyone who came into contact with Ivan Ivanovich through study or work kept the memory of him as a good comrade and friend. An intelligence veteran who worked side by side with him for many years said: "He was a wonderful person, intelligence officer and teacher."

I.I. died. Zaitsev on May 6, 1986. His military and labor path was marked by many orders and medals of the USSR and foreign countries.

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Nikolai Petrovich Lysenkov

Nikolai Petrovich Lysenkov was sent to work in the state security agencies in 1938. After completing operational courses at the Higher School of the NKVD of the USSR, thirty-year-old Lysenkov found himself in the cadre of foreign intelligence, where he went through a relatively short but bright path of serving the Motherland and managed to make a worthy contribution to intelligence affairs.

Nikolai Petrovich was born in November 1909 in the city of Balakovo, Saratov Region, in the family of an employee. His father was an accountant. After graduating from a nine-year school with a pedagogical bias in 1927, Lysenkov began working first in an orphanage, and then as an elementary school teacher in school.

In 1930, Nikolai Petrovich entered the historical and economic department of the Saratov Pedagogical Institute. After three years of study at the institute, he was appointed to the position of head of the educational department of the pedagogical technical school in his hometown.

The craving for knowledge led Lysenkov in 1935 to postgraduate studies at the Moscow State Pedagogical Institute in the department of modern history. The young graduate student worked on the program of the candidate minimum, persistently studied German and French, all passed the exams with excellent marks.

Lysenkov worked hard to replenish and expand his theoretical knowledge. An inquisitive mind, diligence, a wide range of interests and great abilities distinguished Nikolai Petrovich, so it was not by chance that he was chosen when selecting candidates for work in the foreign intelligence of the state security agencies.

The time was tense, the approach of a military storm was felt, and intelligence had to solve complex problems that were put forward by life itself. After a short training at the Center, Lysenkov went to work in Latvia in 1939. The young scout immediately felt the complexity of the situation, which was typical at that time.

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for Latvia, where the pro-fascist government of Ulmanis was in power.

As soon as Nikolai Petrovich got used to the specifics of working in Latvia, he was transferred to work in Finland, where the situation was even more difficult.

Being a correspondent for TASS, Lysenkov also solved the operational tasks assigned to him. Purposefulness and perseverance allowed the young scout to establish interesting contacts. At the Center, Lysenkov's work was assessed as productive.

During his work in residencies in Latvia and Finland, Nikolai Petrovich became a scout.

As his comrades-in-arms testified, the key to his success, not least, was his sociable, open character, the ability to have an interesting conversation. People were drawn to him.

Lysenkov worked in Finland right up to its entry into the war on the side of Nazi Germany.

Being an employee of the central apparatus of foreign intelligence in the anxious everyday life of the first, most tragic period of the Great Patriotic War, Nikolai Petrovich rushed to the front, but he was loaded with new and new work.

In 1943 he was sent to the Tehran residency. There he took part in solving the tasks of ensuring the security of the work of the Tehran Conference of the leaders of the three powers - members of the anti-Hitler coalition.

In Tehran, Nikolai Petrovich went through a school of work under the guidance of such intelligence officers as Ivan Ivanovich Agayants, who was a resident in those years, and Pavel Matveyevich Zhuravlev, who at first was Ivan Ivanovich's deputy, and after Agayants' departure he headed the residency.

Having a dozen and a half sources in touch, he widely used them to obtain intelligence information and exert beneficial influence on the Iranian government circles for the USSR.

In the Tehran residency, Nikolai Petrovich also developed recruiting skills, using cover opportunities. And he then held the post of head of the consular office in Tehran.

embassy department.

For the successful completion of reconnaissance missions in Iran, N.P. Lysenkov in November 1944 was awarded the Order of the Badge of Honor.

In 1945 he was appointed Deputy Resident in France. At that time, Ivan Ivanovich Agayants was at the head of the Paris residency. There was a friendly and efficient leading tandem.

In Paris, the talent of Nikolai Petrovich was clearly revealed. Having studied the situation in post-war France well, he skillfully built the work

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with foreigners and achieved positive results in operational work.

After Agayants left for Moscow, Lysenkov headed the Parisian residency. His personal active work in creating agent positions in Paris served as a good example for young intelligence officers, and the team worked very fruitfully.

The prestige of the Soviet Union was high in the post-war years, and the composition of the Paris residency created good opportunities that made it possible to regularly obtain valuable information, including documentary information.

One of its former employees recalled how, thanks to skillful work with one of the sources, he was able to complete an urgent task of the Center - to obtain important documents relating to the "Marshall Plan".

"The joy of Nikolai Petrovich was natural, joy for me," the scout recalled. "But the resident warned against arrogance and suggested that we study the source's connections more deeply." And work in this direction brought new successes to the residency.

Returning to Moscow in 1950, Nikolai Petrovich was appointed to the post of deputy head of one of the foreign intelligence departments. This was a recognition of his merits and experience.

So, promotion. But shortly before that, Nikolai Petrovich, in one acute situation that did not allow him to hesitate and consult with the Center, made a decision at his own peril and risk. The intelligence leadership reported this to the then Minister of State Security, and Beria suggested that "Lysenkov be kicked out of his job." But life has shown the correctness of this decision. The scout provided the state with a channel for obtaining important and necessary information for many years.

In the post-war years, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America developed very uneasy. At the Center, it was decided to strengthen residencies in America, and in 1952 he was sent to New York by resident N.P. Lysenkov.

For the new resident, the United States was in many ways an unfamiliar country in terms of intelligence. He began to persistently study the situation in the country, improved his knowledge of the English language. And, as always, N. Lysenkov paid great attention to the rallying of the team, the creation of a normal working atmosphere. In New York, he enjoyed great respect not only from the staff of the residency, but also from the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the UN. Even Vyshinsky, who then headed the Representation and was distinguished, to put it mildly, by a peculiar character, imbued with respect for Nikolai Petrovich.

N. Lysenkov was a man of action, all his energy was aimed at ensuring the successful work of the entire staff of the residency. At the same time, he was ardently worried about the daughters who remained in Mo

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well. In one of the letters, Nikolai Petrovich noted that the daughters' overcoming of the difficulties they had in their studies pleased their father and mother: "Now I have complete confidence in your successes. The point is that you have to work hard. I told you before - the soul does not rust in work, it remains clean!"

Nikolai Petrovich had poor health, he never really took care of it. In September 1954, he felt pain under the shoulder blade, and after a while it became difficult for him to eat. A medical examination in an American clinic, and then in Moscow, showed that he had a serious illness. Hard work told.

In the files of official correspondence, there is evidence that for Lysenkov, work was in the first place, and only in the most critical situations, when he was apparently completely unbearable, did he raise the question of some kind of rest.

So, in July 1948, a telegram was received from Paris, in which Nikolai Petrovich noted that since 1938 he had never taken a vacation, and asked the leadership of the Center to allow him to rest on the spot for ten days, since cover work would not allow him to go to the Union.

This request was for really good reasons. Asya, an employee of the residency, noted in a letter to the Center that the staff of the residency feared for the health of the resident. Nikolai Petrovich often began to show obvious signs of a stomach ulcer. Therefore, she considered it necessary to bring this to the attention of the management of the Center, since the resident, due to her modesty, would not report this. And in Paris, he assured everyone that he was feeling well.

But there came a time when the disease manifested itself seriously. The operation and treatment for some time restrained the development of the disease. Nikolai Petrovich courageously endured trials, but, being a man of duty, he understood that he could no longer devote all his strength to work. In 1955 he retired.

Nikolai Petrovich was a passionate bibliophile and collected an excellent library. In his spare time, he discovered another hobby - painting. Apparently, nature generously endowed him with talents, and friends noted the high quality of the landscapes that came out from under the brush of Nikolai Petrovich.

In 1956, the disease began to progress, and Lysenkov died, and he was only forty-seven.

Nikolai Petrovich Lysenkov traveled a short path in intelligence, a shamefully short one. But he left a good memory of himself. Until now, some of his operations are examples of professional skills, on which a new generation of intelligence officers should learn.

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His attitude to people, the ability to listen and hear a person is a gift from above, and this, unfortunately, is not given to everyone. The ability to win people over, to interest interlocutors who fell under the charm of his personality, his sincerity in communication - this, after professionalism, is an important and valuable quality of a scout.

The Cabinet of History of the SVR has a photocopy of the title and last pages of the book "Son of the People" by Maurice Thorez, who for a long time was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party. (By the way, after his death, the then president of the country, General de Gaulle, called Maurice Thorez the great son of France.)

So, Maurice Thorez presented his book to Nikolai Petrovich in Paris with the following inscription: "To my friend Nikolai with brotherly feelings," and a signature.

Nikolai Petrovich had many friends. They all treated him warmly. Some of them knew that he was a scout, others guessed, and still others simply saw in him an open, charming person.

This is how he was preserved in the memory of those who knew him during his lifetime, this is how he was imprinted in the minds of young people who embarked on the difficult, but interesting and necessary path of a scout for the Motherland.

The name of Nikolai Petrovich Lysenkov is immortalized on the Memorial plaque of the Cabinet of History of the SVR

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They helped create the atomic shield of the Motherland

The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 has long died down, the ice of the Cold War has melted, but the memory of those people who defended their Fatherland is still preserved in people's hearts.

from the fascist invasion. Until now, grateful descendants carry flowers to the graves of heroes.

Our story about the heroes of the war and the first post-war years. They did not go on the attack, did not rush to the bunkers, did not capture the "tongues". They wore hats and ties and sometimes wore tuxedos. But just like the heroes on the battlefields, they risked their lives in the name of the Motherland and humanity. They were also given orders and medals... But only by the end of the 20th century, their military work was duly noted - unfortunately, for some, posthumously.

On June 15, 1996, the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on conferring the title of Hero of Russia was published:

1. Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov (posthumously).

2. Yatskov Anatoly Antonovich (posthumously).

Z. Kroger Helen (posthumously). (Her husband, Peter Kroger, ~ Morris Cohen was awarded the title of Hero of Russia on July 20, 1995).

4. Barkovsky Vladimir Borisovich.

5. Feklisov Alexander Semenovich.

Who are they, these heroes, for which they received this high title? All of them are foreign intelligence officers. All of them received the title of Hero of Russia for helping Soviet scientists create the atomic bomb, thereby depriving the United States of America of its monopoly on deadly weapons.

It is not difficult to imagine the consequences this had for the entire international community.

A little background. By the end of 1939, scientists came to the conclusion that uranium-235 is the element on the basis of which it is possible to create

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a weapon of great power. But then this idea seemed to be a matter of a very distant future.

However, in the same 1939, Soviet scientists Kurchatov, Flerov, Khariton, Zeldovich and others came to the conclusion that the creation of atomic weapons is an idea of the not too distant future. Employees of the Institute of Chemical Physics Yakov Zel'dovich and Yuli Khariton carried out calculations of chain reactions and determined the order of the critical mass of uranium-235. It was about 10 kilograms. In the laboratory of nuclear physics at the Physico-Technical Institute, headed by Academician A.F. Ioffe, Georgy Flerov and Konstantin Petrakov in 1940 registered spontaneous fission of heavy uranium nuclei without neutron irradiation.

In this regard, the Academy of Sciences decided to consider nuclear physics as one of its cardinal directions.

Soon in Chicago, physicist E. Fermi, who emigrated from Italy, managed to carry out a nuclear reaction. The scientific and technical intelligence of the USSR - then a very small unit, headed by Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov - noted that scientists from the USA and England began to deal with this problem. And when the war began in Europe, Kvasnikov drew attention to the fact that, as if on cue, the names of prominent scientists who had previously regularly published articles on problems of nuclear physics disappeared from the pages of American journals. It became clear that research on uranium was classified for military reasons.

At the end of 1940, Kvasnikov was the initiator of sending directives to residencies in the United States, England and Germany with instructions to begin obtaining information about the creation of atomic weapons.

The German attack on the USSR made this task even more urgent. The possession of new weapons could significantly change the course of hostilities. The allies of the USSR had the most complete information on the fission of the atom, but were not going to share it with the USSR. That is why intelligence officers who had the necessary scientific knowledge were sent to England and the USA

technical knowledge.

well well

The first in the Decree on conferring the title of Hero of Russia is the name of Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov. He was born on June 2, 1905 in the family of a railroad worker at the small station Uzlovaya in the Tula province. He began his career at the age of 17 as a worker. In 1926 he graduated from the railway technical school in Tula and became an assistant driver, and then a locomotive driver.

In 1934 he graduated from the mechanical department of the Moscow Institute of Chemical Engineering (MIKhM). For a year he worked at the Chernorechensky chemical plant in the city of Dzerzhinsk, Gorky region, and after that he entered the postgraduate course of the Moscow Institute

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chemical engineering. In 1938, as a graduate student, he took part in the work of a special commission of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry to inspect factories that produced ammunition. He made several proposals for the automation of operations for the production of artillery shells, which were introduced into production.

L.R. Kvasnikov, according to his data, could become a prominent scientist or engineer. But in September 1938 he was sent to work in the state security agencies.

Kvasnikov began his career in intelligence as a senior operative of the department of scientific and technical intelligence (NTR). At that time, he repeatedly went on business trips to Germany and Poland. In the period from 1939 to 1942 he was deputy, and then head of the department of scientific and technical progress. According to eyewitnesses who knew L.R. Kvasnikov for joint work at that time, by nature he was a taciturn, somewhat reserved person, but caring and fair in relation to his comrades.

Kvasnikov did not break his connection with science and followed the emergence of new scientific achievements. This allowed him to give timely direction to intelligence searches.

In September 1941, one of the members of the "Cambridge group" handed over to the London residency a collection of documents sent by the "uranium committee" to Prime Minister W. Churchill. It followed from the documents that Great Britain and the United States were beginning practical work on the creation of an atomic bomb. The research center was moved overseas. Therefore, it was decided to send L.R. Kvasnikov on a business trip to the United States so that he could directly set up work there to obtain information about atomic weapons, heading scientific and technical intelligence in New York.

In January 1943, the new leader of the Scientific and Technical Revolution left for America. In New York, Kvasnikov showed high professionalism and a deep understanding of the whole range of problems that his employees worked on. From the station, the Center received a large amount of documentary information and samples of equipment on aviation, radar, chemistry, and medicine, which were of considerable interest to the domestic industry working for the needs of the front.

Kvasnikov often had to make decisions, guided by common sense and believing that he knew better on the spot than someone else tens of thousands of kilometers from New York. The atomic problem became the main concern. Under the leadership of Kvasnikov, important materials were obtained on the use of atomic energy for military purposes. The New York residency informed the Center in advance of the upcoming test of the atomic bomb. When an atomic explosion mushroom rose over the New Mexico desert on June 16, 1945, the main data regarding the design of an atomic

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bombs, the materials used in their construction were already at the disposal of Soviet scientists.

After the successful completion of the business trip, Kvasnikov left the United States in November 1945 on the American ship Nathan Towson. A.I. was officially appointed as a resident of the NTR. Raina. But he returned to Moscow in the first half of 1946. Instead, as acting. A.A. remained a resident. Yatskov.

Returning to his homeland, Kvasnikov continued to work in the central intelligence apparatus. From 1948 to 1963 he was the permanent head of the scientific and technical department. It was in this position that his brilliant organizational skills were manifested. Kvasnikov was the first in intelligence to clearly define and formulate the goals and tasks facing the scientific and technical intelligence of the Soviet Union. Under his leadership, the scientific and technological revolution has achieved significant success in solving these problems.

L.R. Kvasnikov, unfortunately, had to spend a lot of time fending off the incompetent instructions of the then KGB leadership, which did not always understand the specifics of scientific and technical tasks, and sometimes even the requirements of secrecy. Beria, for example, demanded that he be presented with lists of all agents of the department, indicating the names and places of work of the agents. Kvasnikov, having received an order, dragged it out in every possible way with its implementation, gave other lists, as if he did not understand what was at stake.

In 1953, Beria ordered Kvasnikov to reduce the scientific and technological revolution apparatus by 50%, then the remaining half - by another 50%. The "dismissed" employees, however, at the request of Kvasnikov received their salaries according to a separate list, and not at the cash desk. As a result, it was possible to save 70% of the unique personnel of the NTR.

As one of Kvasnikov's subordinates recalled, "Leonid Romanovich never cut his shoulder. He gave the offending employee time to correct himself. There were cases when a dismissed employee who was able to work well, he helped to get a job in civilian life.

The same opinion about Kvasnikov was also expressed by other employees who came with him to the department of scientific and technological progress.

When implementing intelligence information, Kvasnikov maintained close contact with nuclear scientists, as well as with ministers and heads of specialized enterprises. Characteristically, they all treated him with the greatest respect.

In 1963-1966, Kvasnikov worked as a senior consultant to the head of the KGB PGU for scientific and technical intelligence. In December 1966 he retired.

For achieving high results, Colonel L.R. Kvasnikov was awarded the Order of Lenin and other orders.

Kvasnikov died on October 15, 1993 and was buried with military honors at the Vagankovsky cemetery in Moscow.

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well well

Anatoly Antonovich Yatskov was born on May 31, 1913 in the city of Akkerman (now the city of Belgorod-Dnestrovsky in Moldova).

In 1914 the family moved to live in Central Russia. Anatoly Yatskov continued his studies in Bolshaya Gribanovka, in the Tambov region. He worked at a local sugar factory, and then

moved to Moscow, where he got a job as a laborer. He lived in barracks on Nizhniye Kotly, built garages on the Khamovniki parade ground, worked as a fitter in a workshop and studied at the same time.

In 1937 A.A. Yatskov graduated from the Moscow Polygraphic Institute and worked as an engineer-technologist at the Moscow Cartographic Factory. Dunaev. Actively engaged in parachuting.

In 1939 he was recommended to work in the state security agencies. After graduating from a special intelligence school, he worked for some time in the central intelligence apparatus, and before the start of World War II he was sent as a trainee to the foreign intelligence residency in New York.

Yatskov arrived in the USA in February 1941 and was appointed to the Consulate General of the USSR in New York. As Anatoly Antonovich himself said, "I had to deal with nuclear issues with end of forty-two - beginning of forty-three.

It was difficult to work on nuclear issues due to the very strict regime at the facilities. A number of specialists believed that it was necessary to help the Soviet Union, with which the Allies had an agreement on military cooperation. This point of view of theirs did not change even after Germany was defeated. They feared that the US monopoly on atomic technology could cause a military conflict, while the presence of atomic weapons in the USSR would create the necessary counterbalance.

When asked whether it was scary when they obtained documentation on the atomic bomb, Yatskov replied: "We compared our risk with that which our peers were exposed to on the fronts of the war against the Nazis, in partisan detachments. Yes, there was care, anxiety, so that there would be no breakdowns, failures. There was satisfaction from the fact that they coped with this case, despite some desperate moments that our liaisons, who transported classified materials, rather experienced."

Concerning the controversy in the media regarding the role of intelligence and scientists in the creation of Soviet atomic weapons, A.A. Yatskov said: "Of course, the closeness of the topic gave rise to a number of bewilderments. When Academician Aleksandrov, who did not deal closely with these problems at that time, assured that the scientists did everything themselves, then, apparently, he was not aware of the circumstances, which were completely

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volume were known only to Academician Kurchatov, who was in charge of the so-called laboratory No. 2 and who received what we obtained at his request.

"On the other hand, it would be an exaggeration," Yatskov said, "to say that intelligence itself created the atomic bomb is, of course, nonsense. The bomb was made by scientists, specialists, technicians, relying on the scientific and economic potential of the country."

"It was important, of course," added Yatskov, "that the information obtained by intelligence corresponded to the degree of preparedness of Soviet scientists. Of course, if some developing country had received the same information, the effect would have been different. But in general, it is unlawful to oppose Soviet intelligence officers and scientists.

To the question: "What is your attitude to atomic weapons?" - Yatskov answered: "I have such a feeling: this weapon appeared much earlier than when it should have appeared. Society on our sinful earth is still arranged in such a way that it was too early to trust him with such a terrible force. And his appearance is rather not a source of joy, but an additional anxiety. There is a danger of atomic blackmail, a threat that you will be overtaken, they will come up with something even more sophisticated. And a human mistake is simply possible, accidents of a fatal kind.

On a business trip, Yatskov was given the task of providing activities for the extraction of top secret information on the creation of atomic weapons, an operation that received the code name Enormous.

On April 25, 1945, the US Secretary of War presented the then President with a note stating: "In four months we will complete work on a weapon that mankind has not known." The owner of the White House knew: it was about the atomic bomb. However, not only the President of the United States knew about this. The persons to whom this story is dedicated were also well aware of this, and, consequently, the persons responsible for the condition of the Soviet armed forces and the security of the country.

After Anatoly Yatskov's business trip abroad, the heads of the department drew up a service reference for him, in which they wrote:

"In rather difficult conditions, he quickly and competently solved the tasks of the Center assigned to him. Modest, intelligent and self-possessed. He knows his job well and loves it. Knows how to recruit and educate his assistants. Independent. Dedicated to the cause of the Motherland.

Taking into account that during the six years of work in the New York residence Yatskov was not deciphered by the enemy special services, was beyond their suspicion, it would be possible, taking into account the knowledge of English and French, to use him from now on at work in one of the foreign grants.

Thanks to the NTR residency, which included Yatskov, Soviet intelligence received key calculations, diagrams and features in the United States.

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zhi on the Manhattan project (the production of the atomic bomb by the Americans).

Yatskov, upon his return from the United States, worked for some time in the central office, and then was sent to work as a deputy resident in France.

Returning from Western Europe, Yatskov headed the faculty at the Red Banner Institute of the KGB of the USSR. Yu.V. Andropov (now the Academy of Foreign Intelligence). He enjoyed exceptional respect from students and teachers for his honesty and directness in his judgments.

In 1985, Colonel Yatskov retired. However, he continued to maintain close ties with the team, often spoke to young intelligence officers. His articles, memoirs and reviews appeared in the press.

"Our bomb," Yatskov wrote in one of his articles, "was created by scientists, engineers, workers, and not intelligence. In incredibly difficult conditions and in a short time they managed to create an atomic shield for the Motherland. The information obtained by intelligence only accelerated this work.

For a great contribution to the cause of security, Colonel A.A. Yatskov was awarded the Order of the October Revolution and many other orders and medals.

Anatoly Antonovich died on March 26, 1993, and was buried at the Vagankovsky cemetery in Moscow.

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There is also a woman on the list of heroes. Her real name is Leontina-Teresa Petke. She was born in Massachusetts (USA) on January 11, 1913 in the family of Vladislav Petke, a native of Poland. Early began to take part in political activities. She joined the US Communist Party and was a trade union activist.

She met her future husband Morris at an anti-fascist rally in New York. Morris had by that time returned from Spain, where he participated in the fight against the Francoists and was

injured. The brave American won the girl's heart, and in 1941 they got married. Having learned about her husband's connections with Soviet intelligence, Leontina agreed without hesitation to help him in secret activities.

During the war years, she began working as a liaison agent for the New York residency. Morris was drafted into the US Army and sent to Europe to take part in the fighting. At the end of the war, he was demobilized, and both continued to cooperate with Soviet foreign intelligence. Beginning in 1943, the residency in New York began to collect information about the so-called "Manhattan Project", about the work of the Los Alamos nuclear center to create an atomic bomb. Even before June 16, 1945

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the first test was carried out, Moscow already knew about the basic data regarding the design of the bomb, which helped Soviet scientists create their own atomic weapons. It was a risky job, and Leontina showed amazing resourcefulness and self-control.

On numerous occasions, the work of the Coens was threatened with exposure. I had to temporarily cut off contact with them. In 1948, they were included in a group led by illegal intelligence officer V. Fischer, who became known as Rudolf Abel. In 1950, in connection with the betrayal in his group, the Cohens were taken to Moscow. Here Leontina received special training to work as a radio cipher operator. And in 1954, the couple with New Zealand passports in the name of Peter and Helen Kroger arrived in London, where they began working in an illegal group led by K. Young (pseudonym "Ben"). From 1955 to 1960, Ben's residency received and transferred, with the help of the Coen-Krogers, to Moscow, a large amount of top-secret material relating to British weapons programs, including rocket weapons.

In connection with the betrayal, the group was discovered, and the Krogers were arrested. On March 13, 1961, the court sentenced Helen Kroger to 20 years in prison, despite the fact that during the process her involvement in Soviet intelligence was not proven.

Helen-Leontina was kept in especially difficult conditions, subjected to the most severe humiliations. Her health was seriously damaged. But nothing broke her resilience, dedication to the cause and the people she worked with.

In 1969, Leontina and her husband were released: they were exchanged for an agent of the British special services, D. Brooke, and on October 25 they arrived in Moscow. Here they met with V. Fischer and K. Molody.

Leontina and her husband continued to work in the illegal intelligence department. She was awarded the Orders of the Red Banner and Friendship of Peoples.

December 23, 1993 Leontina passed away. Morris passed away on June 23, 1995. The couple were buried at the Novokuntsevo cemetery in Moscow.

well well

On June 15, 1996, Vladimir Borisovich Barkovsky became a Hero of Russia. He was born on October 16, 1913 in the city of Belgorod, Kursk province, in a family of employees.

After graduating from high school in 1930, he worked as a mechanic at a factory and studied at the evening workers' faculty. In 1934 he became a student at the Moscow Machine Tool Institute. Actively
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He trained in gliding and parachuting at the Moscow Student Flying Club. He graduated from the OSOAVIAKhIMAA flight school and as a pilot was assigned to the Moscow Air Defense Fighter Regiment.

In 1939, after graduating from the institute, he was called to serve in the state security agencies and sent to a special intelligence school. And already at the end of 1940 he was sent to work in England as an operational officer of the London residence in the line of scientific and technical intelligence. Here is how he talks about the circumstances of that time:

"In 1937-1938, the state security agencies suffered significantly from the repressions that spread to them. Entire residencies were liquidated, many intelligence officers became victims of arbitrariness, agents began to be suspected of double-dealing. In a word, on the eve of the war with Germany, intelligence was significantly weakened.

The understanding that it was impossible to wage war without effective intelligence led to the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party on measures to strengthen intelligence activities in the Axis countries and other leading capitalist states, to replenish intelligence with personnel from the party and the Soviet apparatus and the transition to stationary training of intelligence officers. This is how the Special Purpose School was born. This made it possible to start gathering the forces necessary for the intelligence service to enter the war fully armed. These forces were replenished with graduates of the 1939 and 1940 recruitment of the SHON, among whom was the author of these memoirs, who was sent to work in the English department of the 5th department of the NKVD GUGB.

In the mood not to make a mistake, I left for London at the end of November 1940 after a short internship in the English department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A remarkable moment before leaving Moscow was a conversation with V.M. Molotov. In a benevolent tone, although somewhat dry due to his inherent character traits, Molotov spoke about the situation in England, the state of Anglo-Soviet relations, and the political tasks of our embassy in Great Britain. He pointed out that there was serious work to be done, given the traditional unfriendly policy of its ruling circles towards the Soviet Union.

I arrived in London at the beginning of February 1941. The European route was then closed due to the outbreak of World War II, and they had to go through Japan, the Hawaiian Islands, the USA and around Ireland to Liverpool. Here I happened to be baptized by fire in the full sense of the word. After we were arranged at the hotel to wait for the night train to London, a German air raid began on the port of Liverpool. Even in the afternoon we walked around the city, and the sight of the ruins made a depressing impression. Now, from the roar of anti-aircraft guns and explosions of bombs, the howling of sirens, I will say frankly, to a person who is accustomed to the world

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my life, it became scary, but I involuntarily succumbed to the surprisingly calm attitude of the British to this event and realized that they were characterized by stoicism, courage and, as I later became convinced, patriotism and a constant readiness to stand up for their country and take risks in the face of danger. I also understood that from now on this "noise orchestra" would be an inevitable companion of my life and work in England, which I would have to reckon with when conducting intelligence work. Oddly enough, it was reassuring.

Unlike the New York residency, the London one began its work practically from scratch, because at the beginning of 1939, at the direction of Beria, it was liquidated, and the agent network was left to fend for itself. It had to be revived, and in November 1940 a new resident arrived - Anatoly Veniaminovich Gorsky. He began his work by reconnecting with the "Cambridge Five".

The exit to the first meeting with the agent was remembered for a lifetime. Having received the address, information about the agent and the password, I arrived at his place of residence, but half of his house did not exist - the day before there had been a raid on London by German bombers. I took it upon myself to help an elderly woman get her belongings out of the rubble. In the ensuing conversation, she said that in their house lived

several Europeans who were moved to a house in a neighboring street. It was there that the object of my interest was found.

This agent was followed by others, the experience of conducting reconnaissance in difficult conditions began to accumulate.

The London residency was a pioneer in the exploration of the problems of creating atomic weapons, which can be considered an entire epic in scientific and technical intelligence, and participation in it is, in fairness, a source of pride for all those who obtained the necessary information for the country.

Resident Gorsky entrusted the execution of this task to one of the members of the "five". In September 1941, he gave Gorsky a selection of materials. From them it was clear that the creation of the atomic bomb in England had taken practical shape. The selection included detailed information about the creation and activities of the "uranium committee", about the technology for the production of uranium-235, about the design of the atomic charge of a cannon-type atomic bomb, about the research and industrial centers of the country. With the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the atomic bomb was to be built within two years.

Having brought this information, Gorsky, taking into account its saturation with technical terminology, instructed me, as an engineer, to prepare a review telegram for the Center. This was my first contact with the problem of atomic weapons, perhaps not yet realized in terms of its importance. Later I got in touch with an agent, not

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a mediocre participant in studies conducted in England. At the very first meeting, he animatedly began to explain to me the importance of accurately determining the value of the cross section for neutron capture by uranium-235 atoms for a successful fission reaction. Finding that all this is beyond my understanding, he asked how I think to build my work with him further. I offered to forward the questions of our specialists to him, and he would prepare the answers. He said that he would prefer in my person to deal with a person who is able to meaningfully participate in the discussion of the information transmitted by him. And he offered me to buy an American textbook "Applied Nuclear Physics". I had to "sit down". This study was worth the sleepless nights, but we were both pleased when one day he said that now I can deal with.

Later, there was a need to create an agent network of direct participants in the relevant studies. One of them, on his own initiative, went through his acquaintance to Gorsky and in December 1941 transmitted his first material. After studying and testing, he was recruited in 1942. The second agent worked in the "uranium committee" system. The third agent was recruited by me. Thus, a compact but effective agent network of this profile arose.

In general, the intelligence network of the London residency, as it developed in the prewar years, consisted of people who were close to us ideologically and politically, who began and continued to cooperate with us on the basis of moral considerations, people who were punctual, enterprising and courageous.

I remember how the resident once decided to reward an agent who obtained exceptionally valuable information about radar. Knowing this man, I understood that he would not take money or valuable gifts. Stopped for lunch. In the restaurant, he was clearly angry, he ate and drank almost nothing, and when I asked what explains his behavior, he answered: "Now you have a battle for Stalingrad, we supply you with military equipment and materials, you pay for the supplies. ki currency, and you spend money on such trifles as this dinner. I ask you to refrain from such actions in the future.

Work in the London residency was a good school for gaining experience in intelligence activities. Both residents played an important role in my development as an intelligence officer: Anatoly Veniaminovich Gorsky (in 1941-1943) and Konstantin Mikhailovich Kukin (in 1943-1946). In 1946, my business trip ended and I returned to my homeland.

After returning to his homeland, V.B. Barkovsky was in senior positions in the central apparatus of the scientific and technical

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intelligence. Then he headed the residency in New York, having gone from an ordinary intelligence officer to a resident, and later becoming the deputy head of the scientific and technological revolution.

Subsequently, he devoted himself to teaching, being a professor at one of the departments of the Academy of Foreign Intelligence. Candidate of Historical Sciences. In 1984, Barkovsky retired due to age.

Barkovsky was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, three Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order of the Patriotic War II degree, the Order of the Red Star, the Badge of Honor, and many medals and signs.

In the galaxy of Heroes of Russia, who received this title in 1996, there is Alexander Semenovitch Feklisov. He was born on March 9, 1914 in Moscow in the family of a railway switchman.

After seven years, he studied at the factory school, then at the workers' faculty and at the same time worked at the factory.

In 1939 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of Communications Engineers and was called to work in the state security agencies. In January 1941, he was sent to the United States as an operative worker of the New York residency.

During this time I was on long business trips three times. Feklisov worked in the state security agencies for 35 years.

The first time he was in the United States on a business trip from January 1941 to September 1946. In the initial period, Feklisov was used to set up the operation of the station's radio receiver and establish a direct connection with Moscow. Then he carried out two recruitments and after that he was included in the work of the scientific and technological revolution.

At the same time, the Americans began to create production facilities for the manufacture of the atomic bomb. For five years of work in the USA, Feklisov managed to fulfill a number of important tasks of the Center for obtaining secret information through scientific and technical intelligence.

From September 1947 to April 1950, Feklisov was at work in England. He managed to obtain secret documents regarding the creation of atomic weapons, as well as information about the work on the creation of a hydrogen bomb.

Feklisov's third trip abroad was again to the United States, it lasted from August 1960 to March 1964. This time Feklisov headed the residency in Washington. These were the years of fierce anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda, the dangerous Caribbean crisis of 1962.

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In 1974, Alexander Semenovitch Feklisov retired with the rank of colonel, remaining to serve in intelligence as a consultant until mid-1986.

Colonel A.S. Feklisov was awarded many orders, medals and badges.

well well

Such, in brief, are the fates of the atomic intelligence officers, who, each in his own place, made an invaluable contribution to the creation by Soviet scientists of the domestic atomic bomb, which became a reliable shield for the security of the state. Their names will be preserved in history.

APPLICATION

Declassified documents from the archive of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service relating to the first two post-war decades of its activity (1945-1964)

Published for the first time

Documents are given with the preservation of the style, spelling and punctuation of copies stored in the SVR archive. The editing of the first copies of the documents sent to the addressees may differ somewhat from them. The names of intelligence officers, pseudonyms of sources, official notes, as well as data related to the operational activities of intelligence, are omitted.

#1 Top secret

SNK of the USSR - Comrade STALIN I.V. USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs - Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV NKVD USSR - Comrade Beria L.P.

November 6, 1945

At the same time, the NKGB of the USSR presents, translated from English, the report "On the Security of the British Empire" dated 06/29/45, compiled by the post-war planning headquarters under the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of Great Britain.

The report mainly discusses the potential threat to Great Britain from the USSR and measures to prevent it.

APPENDIX: according to the text on 68 sheets*.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR (V. Merkulov)

Top secret

June 29, 1945

*

The application is published with abbreviations. - Approx. comp.

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Chiefs of Staff Committee

THE SECURITY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Post-war planning staff report!

1. According to the instructions we received, we compiled a survey of the problems of imperial security throughout the world for the period 1955-1960. We have reviewed the regional studies already presented by the Chiefs of Staff. The review is in the form of a draft for presentation by the Chiefs of Staff to Ministers.

2. We did not find it possible to give anything more than the very formulation of the objectives of the general strategy. This note should serve as a strategic guide for the ministry

foreign affairs and the strategic background needed by the military, naval and air ministries to plan our post-war Armed Forces. In order for this planning to ensure the most effective use of our capabilities, it is necessary:

a) Carefully study and assimilate the provisions set forth in the report drawn up by a committee headed by Henry TIZARD and devoted to the problems of scientific and technological development in relation to war;

b) Analyze the main strategic and technical lessons learned from this war, taking into account the role of all branches of the armed forces.

3. We have touched very briefly in paragraph 28 of the attached note on some of the most important issues relevant to determining our readiness for war. Some of these issues are already under consideration in the relevant committees and we recommend that these bodies be made aware of this note.

4. As is clear from the note, the question of the threat posed by the USSR, which is hostile to us, occupies a large place in our analysis of the entire strategic problem of Great Britain. However, we do not say that a war with the USSR is probable. We have given up any form of political forecasting. Our emphasis on the threat from the USSR is based solely on the fact that, if we exclude the USA and former enemy countries, the USSR remains the only country capable of posing a serious threat to the security of the empire.

In the near future, decisions must be made providing for the implementation of measures relating to the security of the empire, and we consider it important to prevent the possibility of underestimating the military consequences of the threat from the USSR, if there ever was one.
will arise.

5. The Chiefs of Staff may wish to draw the attention of Ministers to the fact that the attached note is based on the assumption that the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India will pursue a coherent strategic policy in peacetime, taking into account the interests of protecting the empire as a whole.

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Appendix SECURITY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE Table of contents

Introduction.

Main conclusions. The tasks of imperial security. Imperial General Strategy. The scheme of the imperial defense.

Further conclusions. Section [- GERMANY AND JAPAN Section P - USSR Part I - Threat. Part II - Offensive countermeasures. defensive measures. The order of defense tasks. Section III - Minor external threats and internal security. Section [U - International Organization. Section U - Cooperation of the Dominions.

Introduction

General remarks.

1. This note is an overview of imperial* security problems. It aims to determine the strategic goals of our foreign policy and outline the basis on which our long-term plans for the defense of the empire should be built.

2. The review covers the period 1955-1960. If we take an earlier period, then our interests in the more distant future could be influenced by the tasks of our security in

the period immediately following the defeat of Germany and Japan.

3. We have considered the security problems of the British Empire as a whole. If a coordinated strategic policy cannot rely on the resources of the entire empire, according to a coordinated imperial plan, then the influence and security of each of its individual parts will be seriously weakened.

4. The main tasks of imperial security are:

a) maintaining the integrity of the British Empire against external and internal threats;

B) ensuring the security of sea and air communications, on which the solidarity of the empire, its access to the main types of raw materials and its production capacity depend.

5. Imperial security is essentially the problem of preventing and being able to impose on us by other powers

* For the sake of brevity, we used the expressions "British Empire" in the note.

And "Empire"; they are to be understood to mean the United Kingdom, the DOMINIONS, India and the colonial empire.

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mi of your will. This requires political activity and military might. Diplomacy can prevent some threats and reduce others; it can facilitate the acquisition of allies whose armed assistance or territory is important in times of war. However, diplomacy in itself cannot be successful unless it relies - and if it is not known that it relies - on military force sufficient to convince both our friends and our potential enemies of our ability and determination to fulfill our obligations. . Since the international situation can deteriorate much sooner than military forces can be built up, military preparedness is essential, however reassuring the international outlook may look. Military power, of which compulsory military service would be an important indicator, thus becomes necessary to ensure the success of diplomacy and prevent its failure.

Potential Enemies

6. Below we consider the powers that, either alone or in association, could pose a significant threat to the security of the British Empire.

7. Germany and Japan. Provided that Germany and Japan are disarmed, and that effective measures continue to be taken against their rearmament, neither of these countries can pose a threat to the British Empire. We cannot, however, be sure that control over these countries will still be as effective in the period 1955-1960. By that time, the occupying forces may already have been withdrawn, and Germany and Japan may have been able to largely re-arm, fomenting tensions between the great powers. Although it will be our business to prevent their unauthorized arming by timely offensive action, yet we must reckon with the possibility of a serious threat from any of these countries during the period under consideration.

8. France. It is doubtful that France by 1955 had acquired the might of a great power. The strategic interests of France and the British Empire are intertwined throughout the world, and it is to be hoped that France will realize that it is best for her interests to work closely with the British Empire. If she does not cooperate with us, then she will become a strategic obstacle, although she alone cannot pose a serious threat.

9. China. Although China has sufficiently large manpower reserves, it will hardly have the political stability and industrial resources that would allow it alone to seriously threaten our interests.

10. USA and USSR Both the USA and the USSR have sufficient potential to pose a serious threat to the security of the British Empire. With regard to the United States, we consider ourselves entitled, given the common heritage and common language of this country with ours, to exclude the possibility of war as a result of any differences or conflicts of interest. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that the British Empire and the United States will maintain the same unity in the field of basic defense issues that is observed now. We have no such ties with the USSR. It would be frivolous to try to predict the nature of the relationship that will exist between us and the USSR ten years from now, but the fact is that the USSR

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proved that he had a military potential that could pose a serious threat to the British Empire. Therefore, in assessing the tasks of imperial security, we are obliged, out of simple caution, to fully take into account the potential capabilities of the USSR. A certain policy aimed at ensuring our military readiness may well turn out to be the most effective deterrent for the USSR if it plots aggression.

Responsibilities of our armed forces

11. In order to meet the basic requirements of imperial security, our strategic policy must take into account:

- a) the possibility of war with the USSR;
- b) the need to prevent the possibility of a resurgence of Germany and Japan;
- c) the possibility of armed conflict with small powers;
- 4) the need to maintain internal security;
- f) obligations to place the armed forces at the disposal of the International Organization.

Main conclusions

Our main findings are as follows: Imperial Defense Responsibilities

17. The nations that in 1955-1960 will have sufficient military power to pose the most serious threat to the British Empire are the USA and the USSR But since the possibility of war with the USA is eliminated, our first duty in the field of defense is to protect the empire from the possibility of hostility towards us from the USSR.

18. To ensure the security of the empire, our armed forces will be required to perform the following duties:

- a) protection of British territories and imperial communications from Soviet aggression;
- B) exercising control over Germany and Japan and ensuring the impossibility of the revival of these countries;
- c) safeguarding British interests against minor external threats;
- 4) maintaining internal security;
- f) participation in the International Organization.

19. The military forces of the British Empire must be sufficient to enable all members of the Empire to exercise their due influence in international affairs and to serve as a warning to any potential aggressor.

General imperial strategy

20. a) The hostile USSR, provided that it retains its political cohesion and military power, will pose such a great threat to the British Empire that the primary goal of our policy

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there should be a collision warning with it; the stronger we are and the stronger we are considered, the more surely we will achieve this goal.

b) It is essential that the USSR should not unite with Germany against us.

c) The members of the British Empire must act in unison if they want the empire they form to enjoy a position of great power analogous to that of the United States or the USSR. Now more than ever, it is important that a coherent strategic policy be pursued, drawing on the resources of the entire empire, taken into account in a coordinated imperial plan.

4) A united British Empire alone, without the help of strong allies, will not be able to secure the interests of a world scale against Soviet aggression.

f) We should promote a close partnership between the British Empire and a strong France for the realization of our common interests throughout the world.

+) An international organization can promote international cooperation; therefore, we have a strong strategic interest in its success. However, the International Organization will not release the British Empire from the responsibility of taking steps to safeguard its security.

5) In order for the International Organization to develop in the direction of providing the maximum assistance to imperial security, we must:

1) to encourage the idea of regional security treaties, which would provide that each great power has the primary responsibility for maintaining world peace in the area where its interests dominate;

2) persuade the United States to assume certain military responsibilities in areas of our common interest.

21. The relative importance to be given in peacetime to areas that could be seriously threatened by the USSR is as follows:

a) First place must be given to the defense of the United Kingdom, which is the center of the empire, its main base of operations, and is the main reservoir of white manpower and industrial base, as well as the protection of the most important sea lanes and air routes in the Atlantic Ocean.

B) The defense of the Indian Ocean region is second only to that of the United Kingdom. It is an essential link in the chain of imperial communications; India has great potential value as a base and as a source of manpower and industrial resources.

c) The Middle East will be directly threatened during the war, and the oil fields in Iraq and Persia, which constitute our main strategic interest in this area, will not be able to be defended. Sea and air communications in the Middle East are less important than those in the Indian Ocean and, moreover, may be interrupted by operations in Europe. Therefore, the defense of the Middle East should not come at the expense of the security demands of India and the Indian Ocean.

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4) The defense of the Pacific region must come last (after Western Europe, the Indian Ocean region or the Middle East), since the threat in the Pacific Ocean will be relatively distant.

Imperial defense scheme

22. The armed forces of the empire must be ready to carry out the duties of protecting the empire in accordance with the general strategy outlined above.

23. Since the Soviet Union, which is hostile to us, poses the greatest threat to the empire, measures must be taken to ensure that we can:

a) play our part in localizing the initial Soviet offensive;

B) protect essential areas, bases and communications, and then

c) to deploy fully our resources in cooperation with our allies and meet the requirements of a long war.

The readiness of the armed forces and the military economy of the empire should be based on the current assessment of the nature of the Soviet threat.

24. The measures taken to counter the Soviet threat would at the same time cover, in general, the measures to fulfill our defensive requirements with respect to a resurgent Germany or Japan. However, adequate forces must also be kept ready for timely offensives to deal with the illegal armaments of these countries and reoccupy them if required.

Further Findings Our further findings - by district - are:

Western Europe, North Atlantic Ocean and Western Mediterranean

29. (a) The security of the United Kingdom and its essential communications would be seriously affected if any power hostile to us were to gain a strong foothold in Western Europe or on the Atlantic coast of North West Africa.

b) Germany's ability to wage war must be eliminated. Its illegal armaments must be counteracted by timely offensive actions and, if necessary, reoccupied its territory.

c) In order to counteract the threat from the USSR or a newly armed Germany, we must:

D) to increase the depth of our defense by creating, in cooperation with the Allies, an air defense belt in Western Europe; o) to be ready to defend the United Kingdom against air and sea invasion;

PT) ensure decentralization and industry protection Connected

New Kingdom;

GU) to be able to provide prompt assistance to our continents

distant allies and to take measures already in peacetime to receive reinforcements from the United States in the United Kingdom and France;

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U) to achieve the possibility of using the system of naval and air bases on the islands of the Atlantic Ocean, in particular on the Azores, in Western Europe and Scandinavia in time of war;

UG) control the Strait of Gibraltar and prevent the enemy from entering Seva

ro-West Africa, Sicily and Sardinia.

4) We must take the initiative to form a Western European group of countries, intended initially to exercise control over Germany. In addition to the United Kingdom and France, this group should include: Eire?, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and, if possible, Spain and Italy. The effectiveness of this group in the face of the Soviet threat would depend on immediate US assistance.

f) Although the above measures are the most effective we can think of, we must not underestimate the danger that the USSR may acquire a foothold in Western Europe and gain access to the coast of the North Sea and the Atlantic ocean.

India and the Indian Ocean

30. a) The immediate threat to India lies in an air or airborne attack from the northwest. Although the difficulties associated with the movement of large units should limit the scale of the Soviet land attack on northwestern India, the presence of the threat of ground or airborne invasion makes it necessary to provide a large force to prevent this threat.

B) The air defense system on India's land borders should be primarily designed to counter the threat from the northwest. It is necessary to prepare civil defense and provide for the decentralization of industry and the preparation of bases.

c) Forces intended to defend India against ground or airborne invasion must be highly mobile. To increase the strategic mobility of these forces, it is necessary to improve the dirt roads leading from Central India to the Afghan and Persian borders, as well as to Burma.

4) Protecting our sea lanes and air routes will require a whole system of naval and air bases throughout the Indian Ocean, including the main base of operations in Ceylon.

f) We must prevent the spread of Soviet influence in Afghanistan.

+) Of great strategic importance is the development of the military potential of India so that she is able to make the maximum contribution both to her own defense and to the military efforts of the empire as a whole.

5) We are highly interested, from a strategic point of view, in maintaining internal security in India and Burma; therefore it is very important that conditions of political stability and contentment reign in these countries.

Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean

31. a) The oil fields in Persia and Iraq will be extremely vulnerable in the event of war with the USSR, and even the Suez Canal region cannot be considered safe.

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B) Therefore, it is essential to take steps in peacetime that will reduce our strategic importance in time of war:

D) oil resources of Iraq and the Persian Gulf region;

P) our maritime communications and air routes in the Mediterranean;

PT) of our main military bases in the Middle East, i.e. in Egypt.

c) Nevertheless, it is essential that in times of peace we maintain our dominant position in the Middle East and that our military strength in the area is adequate for this purpose. The Middle East, in any case, is the most convenient place for an imperial strategic reserve. The slightest indication that we are ready to retreat from our present positions will undermine our prestige and invite Soviet infiltration. Such consequences are unacceptable both for strategic reasons and for political and commercial reasons.

4) We must try to get the United States to assume military obligations to defend the Middle East, as this would serve as a powerful warning against Soviet aggression.

f) In order to be able to delay the advance of the Soviets, we must strive to:

D) increasing the depth of our defense system, as far as possible, in a northerly direction;

P) providing depth in the rear of our defense through a system of reserve bases in safer areas. These activities will limit the development of the threat to the Indian Ocean and North West Africa through the Middle East.

D) We must maintain our traditional friendship with Greece. We must try to prevent the USSR from threatening the independence of Turkey and Persia.

Southeast Asia and the Pacific

32. a) The strategic interests of the British Empire require the constant suppression of Japan. For this purpose, we must be ready to provide the necessary forces, together with our allies.

b) The threat to British interests from the USSR in Southeast Asia and the Pacific is relatively remote. In addition, we can count on an immediate reaction from the United States to the Soviet aggression in this area.

c) The defense of the interests of the British Empire against aggression by the USSR or a newly armed Japan will be best achieved by setting up, in cooperation with the USA and China, a system of forward naval and air bases, from Formosa, through the Philippines, the Carolines and the Marshall Islands. skies to Midway Island.

4) If Formosa cannot be held, then the strategic importance of Indo-China will greatly increase. The French should be encouraged to cooperate with the US and the British Empire in taking steps to protect Indo-China.

f) We must try to ensure that China's enormous potential resources, especially human resources, are more available to the US and us than to the USSR. In any case, the USSR must be prevented from acquiring more influence in China than the US and ourselves have. .

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D) It is important that Holland and Siam?, as well as France, cooperate fully with the British Empire in taking regional measures for the defense of Southeast Asia.

South Atlantic Ocean, Africa and the Caribbean Sea region

33. a) The capacity of ports on the way to the Cape of Good Hope and airfields on the trans-African air routes should be increased in peacetime so that they can serve as a suitable substitute for the Mediterranean routes in time of war.

b) Although the Soviet threat to the Caribbean Sea region is remote, it is in our interest that a regional defense system be established there in which the United States would play a dominant role. This would serve to protect sea routes to Australia and New Zealand through the Panama Canal and air routes through British Honduras.

Section I GERMANY AND JAPAN

34. The military revival of Germany or Japan would pose a serious threat to the security of the British Empire. Therefore, we have a very strategic interest in avoiding such a situation. The United Kingdom, backed by the Dominions, must follow this course, whether the task is taken over by the International Organization or not.

35. There are certain prerequisites for effective military measures which also apply to the control of Germany and Japan, namely:

a) the restrictions imposed should be simple and clear;

(b) A credible intelligence service, political, economic and military, focusing on scientific inventions in the field of new weapons is essential;

(c) At the same time, sufficient military resources must be available at all times;

4) there must be a political willingness to use military force in case of evasion of control. This presupposes that public opinion is prepared to support such military measures.

36. It is impossible to predict how effective control measures will be by 1955. It must be assumed that enforcement of the restrictions after 1955, when the occupying forces will very likely have already been withdrawn, will be increasingly difficult. Therefore, we must be prepared to cope with the consequences of insufficient control.

Control over Germany

37. A firm guarantee on the part of the British Empire, the USSR, the USA and France to take timely and decisive military measures against Germany is the surest way to ensure a permanent suppression of its military power. Economic sanctions imposed on Germ

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outside, some would have little value and would only speak against timely military measures.

38. Active cooperation with the British Empire of France in the first place, but also Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark will be of great importance, since it is very important to have adequate resources in both Western and Eastern Europe. Without active assistance from Western

European states, we could not properly play our role in the West without overstretching our resources. Further, it would be against our interests to allow the USSR to play a dominant role in the re-occupation of Germany, should such a role prove necessary.

39. It may happen that the USA or the USSR will refuse to cooperate with us. Such a failure may be either a cause or a consequence of the failure of the International Organization. As a result, the authority of the countries that continue to control Germany would be shaken, and Germany would be inclined to be more rebellious.

40. If the USA ceases to be interested in the control of Germany, then the USSR and the British Empire, acting together, will not encounter difficulties in preventing the resurgence of Germany. As long as these two powers are united in their policy towards Germany, the continued cooperation of the Western European group with this policy will in all probability be assured.

41. It is unlikely that the USSR will ever contribute to the armament of Germany, but it is possible that it will refuse to cooperate with us. If this be so, and even if the USA and the USSR do not help us, then the British Empire and the Western European group will still be able to prevent the resurgence of Germany, provided that measures are taken quickly enough.

Section II of the USSR

Part 1. Threat Introduction

50. If the USSR takes the path of an aggressive policy, it is likely that before resorting to armed force, it will do everything possible to weaken the strategic position of its future enemies by increasing its political influence in Europe, the Middle East, India and China. skimi means and by infiltration; along with this, he will try to sow suspicion between the United States and us. We will be faced with the constant problem of weighing the benefits to be gained by making concessions to the USSR in the hope of maintaining peace against the ensuing damage to our strategic interests.

51. An aggressive USSR may launch a lightning campaign to seize strategically important positions (for example, Persia or Iraq), hoping that we will not take measures to correct an already accomplished fact, not wanting to risk a general conflict for which we are not ready.

52. The USSR already has the largest army in the world. By 1955, he will probably have increased his striking power further by further developing his

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strategic aviation and its own fleet, although the latter may be associated with great difficulties for him in relation to the training of naval personnel. It must be remembered that a threat to the vital maritime communications of the empire, especially by submarines and aircraft, would force us to take defensive measures quite out of proportion to what it would cost the enemy to create such a threat.

53. The deployment of Soviet industry was mainly driven by strategic considerations. The USSR is largely independent of external sources of raw materials and has large manpower reserves*.

54. Below we consider, by area, the nature of the Soviet threat throughout the world and the question of how and where the USSR might jeopardize the security of the British Empire most seriously.

Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean

55. It is in this region** that Soviet interests are most likely to come into conflict with those of the British Empire and, to a certain extent, with US interests. The possibility of increasing the depth of defense for their own oil fields and acquiring valuable resources in the Persian Gulf and Iraq may make it very tempting for the USSR to control this area. Therefore, a military confrontation is indeed more likely in this area than anywhere else.

56. If the USSR fails to achieve such control as a result of certain political measures, then its decision to resort to force will probably depend on its assessment of the possibility of achieving success without being drawn into a world war against the British Empire and USA. But if the USSR is confident in its strength and attaches sufficient importance to its goals in the Middle East, then even the known risk of a general conflict may not deter it.

57. In any case, the USSR will be aware of the strategic importance for the military efforts of the British Empire and its allies of the oil fields*** of Persia, Iraq and Arabia, as well as the sea and air routes passing through the Middle East, and will also be fully aware of their vulnerability. Therefore, in the event of a world war, an attack on this area will in all likelihood be one of the first tasks of Soviet strategy, and the USSR will undoubtedly make full use of all means of propaganda to create internal disturbances there.

* It is estimated that in 1955 the male population of the USSR between the ages of 15 and 35 will be approximately 37 million. This does not include countries (such as Poland) that may be under the influence of the USSR. During this period, the white population of the same age in the British Empire will reach about 11 million, and in the USA - about 23 million. These figures, however, do not include the large colored manpower in the British Empire.

** This refers to the area that includes Persia, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Sudan and countries located on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, to the Strait of Sicily.

*** Preliminary calculations of probable production and consumption in 1955-1960 show that, in the event of a major war, the oil resources of the Middle East may prove vital to the full development of the combined war effort of the British Empire and the United States.

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58. In view of the disparity of forces which is likely to be observed in the first phase of hostilities in which the initiative will belong to the USSR, the oil fields of Iraq and the Persian Gulf will immediately come under a very serious threat. The Suez Canal area and the Mediterranean routes will also be in serious danger.

59. An advance by land through Persia or Turkey must be made through territory with limited communications and, moreover, difficult to improve in such a way as to satisfy the needs of large armies. However, calculations of the maximum force that can allegedly be maintained in areas with limited communications have often proved to be erroneous, and future developments, especially in the field of air transport, will significantly reduce the dependence of armies on land routes.

60. To what extent a serious setback in the Middle East will affect our ability to resist elsewhere will depend on:

a) how far we can reduce our dependence on Middle Eastern oil resources;

B) to what extent our tonnage reserves, and in particular tankers, will be sufficient to overcome the disadvantageous situation in which we will find ourselves in connection with the need to use the route around the Cape of Good Hope;

c) the size of our imperial air transport and the degree of development of additional air routes through Africa.

Western Europe, North Atlantic Ocean and Western Mediterranean

61. The main British strategic interests in the area are the security of the United Kingdom and the sea and air routes on the Atlantic Ocean. Of less importance is the security of our communications between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean through the Strait of Gibraltar.

62. The nature and extent of the threat posed by the USSR in this area will largely depend on the extent to which the influence of the USSR is spreading in Western Europe. In particular, the position of Germany will be of the utmost importance. If Germany manages to arm itself to some extent, and if the USSR succeeds in enlisting its full support, then a very powerful unification will threaten us.

63. The USSR will probably be inclined to use most of its armed forces for operations in Western Europe, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic. It is in Western Europe that vast Soviet ground forces can be deployed most profitably. Successful Soviet Campaign:

a) deprive us of the depth of our defense and assistance from our continental allies

And

B) will give the USSR access to bases beneficial for:

D) sea and air operations against the vital communications of the United Kingdom; and d) destructive air raids, including long-range bomber aircraft, on our industrial areas and ports.

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The capture of Scandinavia by Soviet troops would largely ensure the freedom of operations of the Soviet naval forces based in the Arctic and Baltic ports.

64. It is possible that the USSR, especially if it is known that our defense is insufficient, will at the initial stage of the war make an attempt to land an airborne assault on the British Isles, or complete its operations on the European continent by attacking these islands from the sea. The USSR will no doubt make every effort to undermine resistance and stir up internal unrest in the United Kingdom through propaganda and political warfare.

65. In the western Mediterranean and in the Atlantic, the security of our interests will largely depend on the fate of France and how long she can resist in North Africa. If Spain or Italy were to be in hostile hands, the threat to both French and British interests would be greatly increased.

India and the Indian Ocean

66. Sea and air routes in the Indian Ocean region are of the greatest strategic importance for the cohesion of the British Empire, whether the Mediterranean routes are closed or not. The value of India lies, first, in its value as the reservoir of forces required for the defense of India and our sea and air communications; secondly, India can be turned into the main administrative base of forces protecting our interests in the Middle and Far East during the war. Finally, India's huge manpower and raw material reserves, as well as the growing industrial potential of India, will enable her to make a great contribution to the empire's military efforts.*

67. Our maritime communications in the Indian Ocean will be under attack from Soviet aircraft and submarines, and if we lose the Middle East, then a threat from the Red Sea may arise. Both of these threats will greatly increase the strain on our resources.

68. India is located closer to the USSR than any other British territory and could be attacked by land and air from the north-west in the early stages of hostilities. In view of the difficulty of deploying large Soviet ground forces due to supply conditions, it is likely that the scale of ground operations against India in the early stages of the world war will be much smaller than against Western Europe.

69. Even air raids on the larger cities of India can greatly affect the effectiveness of the country's military efforts and contribute to the growth of internal unrest, which in all cases will be encouraged by the enemy.

70. The Soviet threat to India from the east is much weaker than from the northwest, and unless the USSR gains access to the Kunming region of China,

* The total population of India in 1941 was 389 million. You

numerically, that by 1955 it will reach 452 million and that the male population between the ages of 15 and 34 will be 79 million. India is one of the ten largest industrial countries in the world and ranks third among the industrial countries of the British Empire.

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Indo-China, Siam and the South China Sea, India or Burma will not be in serious danger.

Southeast Asia and the Pacific

71. In this area, we are only interested in the security of Australia, Canada and New Zealand and their communications with other parts of the empire*. Our interests here in general are in no way in conflict with the interests of the USSR. However, it is possible that in China and the Pacific, Soviet interests will come into conflict with US interests and that we will be drawn into this dispute.

72. An increase in Soviet influence in China would represent a potential danger, since the acquisition by the Soviet Union of bases in southern China would enable it to seriously threaten Burma and India. Our core interests in the Pacific would also be threatened if the USSR were able to gain control of the sea and air routes leading to the southwestern Pacific.

73. Unless the USSR has support from China during the war, or achieves significant control over it before the start of the war, the threat to the British Empire will be comparatively remote, especially since the US is likely to quickly respond to any sign of the USSR's transition to an aggressive policy in the area.

Summary on the issue of the threat from the USSR hostile to us

74. The Soviet Union, hostile to us, may, provided that it retains its political integrity and military power, pose an extremely serious threat to the British Empire. Before starting a war, he will probably make every effort to undermine our strategic position by political means, in particular by encouraging internal unrest, especially in India and the Middle East.

75. The USSR may launch a military action with a limited goal, namely: the rapid capture of some area of strategic importance, for example, oil fields in the Middle East, hoping that we will rather come to terms with the situation that has arisen than unleash a world war.

76. However, in a conflict of wide proportions, the USSR could have hoped for the most decisive results in Western Europe by attacking the United Kingdom and our vital communications in the Atlantic Ocean. The possibility of an airborne assault on Great Britain in the early stages of the war will have to be reexamined from time to time.

77. An attack on the Middle East, where our sources of oil and the Mediterranean sea and air routes are relatively easily exposed, will almost certainly be one of the objectives of Soviet strategy. In India and the Indian Ocean, the USSR can pin down large British forces without much effort. In Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the Soviet threat would be remote.

* The shortest route from the UK to New Zealand is via the Panama Canal, the shortest air route is via the British Gon

fool.

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Part P. Measures to counter the threat

78. In the following paragraphs, we first consider the possibility of offensive operations against the hostile USSR; then the question of how best to secure British strategic interests by geographical area against the Soviet threat, and finally the order of priority of regional measures designed to protect against this threat.

Offensive countermeasures Raw materials and industrial resources

79. The USSR satisfies from its own resources its needs for foodstuffs and basic raw materials necessary for the war economy. The resources of the USSR are located in various places and mostly at a considerable distance from its borders. The two exceptions are: the Ukraine, an important source of food, coal, manganese, and iron ore, and the Caucasus, from which the USSR currently receives about three-quarters of its oil. It is likely that the USSR will increase the security of its Caucasian oil sources by moving oil refineries to safer areas and will start developing other oil fields in less vulnerable areas. Industry in the USSR has developed and is likely to continue to develop in places remote from the frontiers and suitably scattered. Therefore, areas of economic importance will be little vulnerable to attack from land and will be largely inaccessible to decisive aerial bombardment. By 1955-1960, as a result of post-war reconstruction, the production capacity of the USSR and its raw material resources will be sufficient to make it completely independent in the war, assuming that the lack of such materials as, for example, natural rubber, will be replenished by stockpiling and the production of synthetic rubber.

Communications

80. The Soviet Union will, in all likelihood, seek to increase its merchant fleet, both for economic reasons and to enhance its prestige, but it will still be immune from the blockade, since its national economy will make it independent of sea communications during the war. Its land communications, especially in Central Asia and the Far East, are still only partially developed, but they will certainly be improved in

the process of industrial reconstruction and will probably be adapted to meet the needs of the USSR during the war. However, it will probably be many years before the USSR has built up such a vast system of communications that its military efforts cannot be weakened by concentrated and intensified air raids. However, given the vast expanses, such a plan of attack would require very large efforts, which may not give corresponding military results.

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Internal security of the USSR

81. It is difficult to say what results can be achieved by encouraging all sorts of internal divisions. If fundamental political changes do not take place in the USSR and the existing tight security measures are not significantly weakened, then the successful use of means of political warfare and the implementation of "special operations" * on Soviet territory will be very difficult. On the other hand, we must be prepared to make full use of these valuable resources in countries that are likely to be occupied by the USSR in the early stages of the war.

Summary

82. Summing up, we can say that the USSR will be invulnerable to the blockade; its industries and raw materials will be safe from land attack and comparatively inaccessible to decisive aerial bombardment. It is unlikely that we could disrupt the internal communications of the USSR with offensive actions. The defeat of the USSR could only be achieved as a result of a long war.

Defense measures

Western Europe, North Atlantic Ocean and Western Mediterranean

83. The security of the United Kingdom and our vital communications on the Atlantic Ocean will be greatly damaged if any hostile Power establishes itself with its forces in Western Europe or on the Atlantic coast of North West Africa. The development of air forces and long-range weapons creates the need to increase the depth of our defense, and in particular the defense against air forces and airborne assault forces. We must maintain our air superiority and have enough mobile ground forces to prevent any forces that the enemy can land in our country from achieving decisive results.

84. The necessity of creating a Western European group of allies has already been pointed out in connection with the forewarning of the possibility of a resurrection of Germany. Such a group will be even more valuable as a means of deepening our defense against the hostile USSR. However, in the face of grave danger, this group is unlikely to maintain its unity unless its members are assured of active support from the United States, as well as the British Empire. It is therefore essential that the United Kingdom take the lead in establishing a close military alliance with Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium, and especially France, and that this policy be supported by the United States. In view of the key position occupied by France in this group, the goal of our policy should be to prevent the possibility of France falling under the influence of the USSR.

85. In Germany, territories of great strategic interest to us make up the bulk of the country, but we will not

* "Special operations" are called in British intelligence acts of sabotage, sabotage and espionage. – Note of the NKGB.

attempts to restore any part of Germany against the USSR until our relations with the latter are irreparably damaged. One has to come to terms with the fact that by then it will be too late to make full use of German aid. However, it is essential that Germany does not unite with the USSR against us.

86. We must not underestimate the danger of the USSR gaining a foothold in Western Europe and gaining access to the coast of the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. It is very unlikely that the combined resources of ourselves and our European allies alone will be sufficient to successfully repulse the invasion of the Soviets through a disarmed Germany. The US is the only country that could have saved the day. Time will be the decisive factor if we do not want Western Europe to be conquered; therefore, it is essential that US aid arrive in time with a minimum of delay.

87. It is essential that everything necessary for the reception and deployment of US forces, and especially air forces, in the United Kingdom and France be available immediately after the outbreak of war.

88. Measures will need to be taken to reduce the vulnerability of industrial areas and ports in the United Kingdom. Arrangements that proved scarcely sufficient before 1945 will require drastic revision in order to fit the much larger scale of the attack. Further, for our air defense system to be effective, close cooperation between our air force and Allied air forces, and between our own and their ground defenses, is essential.

89. It may not be possible to adequately decentralize and protect industry and raw materials within the United Kingdom and will therefore need to be strategically decentralized throughout the empire. The industrial assistance of the Dominions, and especially of Canada, will be of great importance in supporting the operation in Western Europe.

90. In order to counter the threat to our Atlantic communications, especially if the USSR gains access to part of the coast of Northwestern or Western Europe, we will need operational naval and air bases on the continent, in Eyre, in Iceland, on the Atlantic islands. Wah and in Northwest Africa. In addition, it will be necessary to establish naval bases in Canada and Newfoundland, which will be less exposed to air raids than bases in the United Kingdom, and bases to protect transatlantic shipping and transatlantic airways.

91. It is very important to obtain, in time of peace, the consent of Portugal to the use of air and naval bases in the Azores in time of war. The friendship and co-operation of Spain is also of great strategic importance, since in time of war we will need bridgeheads in Spanish Morocco and Tangier to defend Gibraltar and the straits. A foothold in the Balearic Islands would also be valuable in protecting our shipping lanes in the western Mediterranean.

92. North West Africa, including Algeria and Tunisia, would be of great value as a base of operations against Europe in the event that France and Italy were in enemy hands, in addition to their value

in connection with the protection of the straits and the Atlantic. For the defense of North Africa, we will be dependent on funds that only France can provide. The security of our Mediterranean communications requires that Italy cooperate with us in the defense of the central part of the Mediterranean and in particular not to give up Sicily and Sardinia to the enemy.

93. It is thus obvious that the strategic value of the Western European group, as a defensive measure against the USSR, would be greatly increased if Eire, Iceland, Portugal and, if possible, Spain and Italy were included in it.

Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean

94. Our strategic interests in the Middle East will be very vulnerable to the threat from the USSR. In particular, the threat to the oil fields in Persia and Iraq will be extremely serious due to their proximity to the USSR. The Middle East consists of a number of weak and unstable independent states particularly susceptible to internal disturbances and remote from industrial resources. These factors increase the difficulty of protecting the area.

95. To enhance the security of our strategic interests in the area, it is necessary:

- a) increase the depth of our defenses, especially against air and airborne assaults, to the maximum extent possible in a northerly direction;
- b) receive prompt military assistance from allies and especially the United States;
- c) maintain significant reserves of highly mobile units in the Middle East in order to clearly show the USSR our determination to resist aggression by force, and in case of war, to delay the enemy and gain time before the arrival of help from our allies.

96. The danger of arousing the suspicions of the Soviets and other political considerations will severely limit our ability to carry out the necessary depth of our defense in a northerly direction. In Persia and Iraq, we will not be able, for reasons connected with the question of manpower, to maintain more than an ostentatious force, even if it were politically possible. Any increase in these forces during a period of strained relations will only accelerate the crisis.

97. Since the initiative inevitably belongs to the aggressor, it will probably be impossible for us to hold the oil fields in the event of an attack on a large scale. If we lose the oil fields, then our main strategic task in this area will be to secure the Suez Canal area, which provides the shortest sea and air routes from the United Kingdom to India and Australia. The successful defense of this area will be a less difficult problem than the defense of Persia and Iran. However, we must reckon with the possibility that we will be forced to evacuate Lower Egypt. Moreover, even if we succeeded in holding the Suez Canal area, our sea and air communications in the Mediterranean could be interrupted by the advance of the enemy into Turkey, Greece, Italy or Spain.

98. The organic weakness of our military position in the Middle East in relation to the USSR dictates the urgent need to reduce

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even in peacetime, the strategic importance of this area during the war as a source of oil, as a center of communications and as an administrative base. We will also need strong bases to the west and south on which to rely to contain the threat to the western Mediterranean, Central and East Africa and the Indian Ocean. On our ability to obtain such bases will depend the security of our trans-African air and land routes and the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope; their importance under such circumstances will rise considerably. The establishment of the necessary bases south of the region of the Middle East may run into insurmountable difficulties; on the other hand, to the west of it there are already some bases and communications along the North African coast and in French North Africa.

99. Although we may at worst be forced to evacuate the Middle East in time of war, political and commercial as well as strategic considerations require that in peacetime we continue to play a dominant role and hold a decisive position in all matters relating to internal and external the security of the area as a whole. Any sign of weakness will trigger an invasion by the USSR and complicate the internal security problems of the area. Therefore, our task must be to maintain sufficient forces there to maintain British prestige, to ensure internal security and to demonstrate to the USSR our readiness to counter aggression with force. The Middle East, in any case, is the most convenient place for the deployment of the imperial strategic reserve. The prospects for averting the threat from the USSR would be greatly improved if the United States took an interest in the Middle East as a whole and assumed, perhaps through participation in some regional security system, certain obligations to protect its security.

100. We should follow a policy aimed at developing friendship with Persia, Turkey and Greece, and ensuring the genuine independence of the governments of these countries from Soviet influence. Our relations with the states of the Middle East (ie Egypt, Iraq, the Levant states' and Saudi Arabia) must ensure their cooperation with us in times of peace and war. In accordance with such a policy, France should be encouraged to participate in measures to protect our common interests.

Southeast Asia and the Pacific

101. In this area, naval and air forces are the dominant factors in protecting our basic strategic interests; here the attack can be carried out by naval operations or from the air. Therefore, our defensive problems basically boil down to the creation of suitable bases for our naval and air forces and the denial of bases by the USSR for offensive operations.

102. The resources of the British Empire alone would not have been sufficient to successfully counter a Soviet offensive on a wide scale, given that in a world war operations would take place in Europe, the Middle East, India and the Far East. Therefore, the cornerstone of our defensive policy in the Pacific should be the provision of full and rapid assistance from the United States, whose strategic interests in this area are also very great.

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103. Our interests require a strong and friendly government in China, ready to cooperate in the defense of all of Southeast Asia. It is important that China's large potential resources in manpower and raw materials be provided by us and the USA, and not by the USSR. In any case, the USSR must be prevented from gaining more influence in China than the USA or we have.

104. France, Holland and Siam, whose interests would also be threatened by Soviet expansion to the south, should be encouraged to cooperate with us in the regional defense system of Indo-China and the South China Sea.

105. The task of our defensive policy in the southwestern part of the Pacific should be to control the sea lanes leading from the Soviet bases to the south. To this end, the British Empire and the United States must jointly hold in their hands a chain of advanced naval and air bases - from Formosa, through the Philippine, Caroline and Marshall Islands to Midway Island. We attach great importance to using Formosa and the Pescadores as an operational base for offensive operations against the USSR and for controlling communications along the Chinese coast. Hong Kong will be a valuable support base, but we should not assume any obligation to control any bases on the Chinese mainland. If China had come out on the side of the USSR and Formosa would have been impossible to hold, then the allies

must be prepared to retreat to Indo-China, the strategic importance of which would then be greatly increased.

106. The policy recommended above for the defense of our interests in the region of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean against the Soviet Union, which is hostile to us, is also applicable to the newly armed Japan. Therefore, we will be able to implement the necessary security measures against the potential threat from the hostile USSR without endangering our wearing with it.

India and the Indian Ocean

107. In order to counter the threat of Soviet air attacks in this area, an air defense system must be established on India's northwestern and western borders. It would be desirable to extend this system to Persia and Afghanistan, but this would arouse the discontent of the USSR and lead to counter-demands on its part. Further, in India it will be necessary to maintain a certain contingent of civil defense troops and ensure the decentralization of industry.

108. The threat of an invasion of India by land and air will oblige us to maintain a considerable force here to avert this danger. It is unlikely that in the event of an attack on India from land, through Persia or Afghanistan, we will be able to provide adequate support to these states. Nevertheless, it would be important to take advantage of the mountainous terrain of these countries, especially Afghanistan, where, in all likelihood, the Afghan forces themselves would put up some resistance to a Soviet attack.

109. In peacetime, our policy towards Afghanistan (as well as towards Persia) should be directed towards counteracting Soviet influence in Afghanistan, towards strengthening its independence and developing economic and cultural ties with it.

110. The question of military measures aimed at averting a more distant threat to India from the east has been elucidated by us above, in section

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le about the threat to Southeast Asia. If a threat arises in this area, then India and Burma will have to provide forces and assistance to the defense of Indo-China, Siam and the Malay states, as well as to protect Burma from invasion by land or from the air, from South China.

111. We will need a system of bases to protect our sea and air communications in the Indian Ocean against the threat of submarines and aircraft, and these bases must be adapted to the performance of large tasks that may be entrusted to them if the USSR capture the Persian Gulf or the Suez Canal, or gain bases in the Southwest Pacific. Ceylon will need to be held as the main naval and air base of operations in the area for the protection of imperial communications; it must be adapted like a large naval base.

112. Land communications leading from Central India to the borders of Persia and Afghanistan are insufficient, and from Bengal to Burma are very primitive. Both must be improved and meet our strategic requirements. On the other hand, the construction of land and air routes in the countries bordering India and Burma must, for strategic reasons, be slowed down.

113. If we are to avoid having to maintain large forces in India and Burma to deal with internal disturbances, it is essential that these countries prosper and be happy. Providing such conditions would also be the best countermeasure against Soviet propaganda.

114. Finally, of great strategic importance is the development of India's overall military potential in every possible way so that she can defend herself against the attack of a major power and participate in the military efforts of the empire as a whole.

South Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea region

115. South Atlantic Ocean. In a war against the USSR, the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope and the trans-African air routes are likely to replace the Mediterranean routes as the main lines of communication between the United Kingdom, India, the Far East and Australia. Therefore, it will be important to maintain and improve, for the protection of the sea route, the system of bases on the West African coast that was established during this war. The French should also be encouraged to develop ports, air stations and airfields in their West African dominions. It is also desirable to increase the capacity and improve the repair facilities of ports such as Freetown, Capetown and Simonstown, so that these ports can serve the large number of ships that will have to use the Mediterranean route in time of war.

116. The trade routes between the South American countries and the United Kingdom will be of great importance to us in time of war. The British Empire will need bases on the east coast of South America in time of war to protect our shipping throughout the South Atlantic.

117. Region of the Caribbean Sea. The threat to this area is distant. It follows from this that the sea and air routes leading through the Caribbean Seas Av

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Australia and New Zealand would be less vulnerable than the Mediterranean routes or the routes around the Cape of Good Hope. However, measures must be taken to protect these sea and air routes. As regards the defense of this area, the United States can be relied upon to a large extent, since their interest in the approaches to the Panama Canal is greater than ours, and they will use the bases handed over to them by the War on British territory.

The sequence of defense measures against the USSR by region

118. In order to be ready to meet the Soviet threat, it will be necessary to use the limited military forces that are available in peacetime for the following activities:

a) the defense of those areas whose holding is vital to the security of the empire and which we will obviously be able to hold at the first stage of an attack by the USSR with the help of our allies;

B) protection of sea and air communications of the empire.

119. Based on this, we give below the relative importance for the empire as a whole of those areas that will be threatened by the USSR hostile to us.

a) Western Europe. The concentration of white manpower and industrial potential in the United Kingdom, and the importance of the latter as a base of operations, makes holding the British Isles essential if we are to keep the empire together. Therefore, the interests of the empire require that the first place in defense measures should be given to Western Europe and the vital maritime and air communications on the Atlantic Ocean.

b) Indian Ocean region. Measures against the Soviet threat to India and the Indian Ocean are second only to Western Europe. The Indian Ocean region is an important link in the chain of imperial communications, whether or not

mediterranean routes or not. India is of great importance as a source of manpower and for its industrial potential, as well as as a base. Further, the problem of defending India is less complex than the problem of securing our interests in the Middle East.

c) Middle East. The Middle East will be under immediate threat. The oil fields of Iraq and Persia, which determine our main strategic interest in this region, will not be able to be defended, and the Suez Canal region must be considered unreliable. Sea and air routes through the Middle East are less important than those through the Indian Ocean, and, moreover, may be interrupted by operations in Europe. For these reasons, in defense measures designed to prepare against a Soviet attack, the demands of the defense of India and the Indian Ocean must be given precedence over the demands of the defense of the Middle East. In peacetime, however, our military forces in the Middle East must be sufficient to underpin our policy of maintaining our dominance in the area.

4) Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Here the threat to British interests would be comparatively small. In addition, we can count on an immediate reaction from the United States to Soviet aggression in this

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area. Therefore, the implementation of measures for the defense of this region is less important than for the defense of Western Europe, the Indian Ocean region and the Middle East.

120. The priority provided for in defense arrangements is based on our current assessment of the potential Soviet threat and will therefore need to be subject to periodic review in the light of future Soviet policy.

Section III

SECONDARY EXTERNAL THREATS AND DOMESTIC SECURITY

121. In addition to the threat to the British Empire from the major powers, a threat to the security of British interests, which may require the use of British military forces, is possible as a result of:

- A. Aggressions by small powers against British territory.
- B. Wars between small powers affecting British interests.
- C. Internal unrest.

122. The need to take into account the peculiarity of these complications, especially the threat of internal unrest, will require the planning of a significant part of the armed forces. The activities under points A. and B. will be undertaken under the auspices of the International Organization, when it is established, but this will have little effect on the tasks that will be faced by our armed forces.

women's forces in general.

- A. Aggression by small powers against British territory.

123. The following are examples of where our armed forces may be required:

- a) in Sudan, Kenya and British Somalia - in case of aggression from Abyssinia;
- (b) in the Aden Protectorate, from Yemen and neighboring Arab tribes;
- c) in North-West India - from Afghanistan

4) in Burma and the Malay states - from China and Siam.

124. Our goal should be to ensure that the forces mobilized on the ground can cope as far as possible with these threats.

B. Wars between small powers affecting British interests.

125. Our armed forces may have responsibilities in connection with:

a) our agreements with Egypt, Iraq or Portugal;

B) wars between the Balkan states;

(c) Obligations that we can assume towards any independent State resulting from the solution of the Palestinian question.

126. It is to our advantage that every State in which we have strategic interests should maintain an armed force sufficient to defend itself against petty aggressions, but not large enough to constitute a threat to its neighbors.

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C. Inner morning commotion.

127. The existence of different races and religions in the British Empire, and especially in India, will be a constant threat to internal security. This menace is likely to increase in the period under consideration, owing to the economic and social hardships that will arise as a result of the present war, and it may not be limited to the colored races. The use of colored troops for internal security purposes will in many cases be impossible for political and religious reasons, so that this burden will probably fall to a large extent on the white troops of the empire. Internal security problems, serious in times of peace, become twice as serious in times of war, when the enemy is likely to try to make the most of potential causes of unrest.

128. The problems of internal security that we are likely to face in 1955-1960 are discussed below by area:

Middle East

129. The most likely factors that could cause unrest are already now:

a) Arab nationalism, which is constantly growing in all Arab countries, and especially in Egypt;

B) the Jewish-Arab problem in Palestine;

c) French policy in Syria and Lebanon.

While the last factor may be gone by 1955, the first two are likely to remain.

130. British strategic interests, British lives and property, are more threatened by disturbances in the Middle East than the interests of any other great power. In addition, such unrest may have serious repercussions in India. Therefore, we must continue to play a dominant role in maintaining internal security in the area.

131. The responsibility for maintaining internal security in the Middle East will require our armed forces to carry out extensive duties. We must strive to make the Arab States share this responsibility with us. It follows from this that they should maintain sufficiently powerful armed forces. However, it is highly probable that in

the area would have to be kept permanently by British ground forces. Air and naval forces must be deployed in such a way that they can quickly arrive in time.

India and Burma

132. In India, our armed forces will probably have to bear constant internal security duties, both from civil unrest and from tribal warfare on the northwestern frontier. In Burma, internal security responsibilities also appear to have to be fulfilled, but they are likely to be small compared to India. While our aim should be that the Indian and Burmese troops eventually assume full responsibility for maintaining internal security, it is nevertheless

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The governments of these countries will probably need British troops to fill this role for several years. In India, whatever her legal position, one cannot ignore the possibility of such a collapse of her political and economic system, which will require our intervention with considerable forces.

Far East and Pacific Ocean

133. The consequences of the Japanese occupation of the British territories and mandated countries in the Far East and the Pacific, as well as the consequences of the development of nationalist aspirations in these areas, cannot be taken into account. What internal security problems we will face in the future cannot be determined until these territories are liberated. There is no reason to expect serious internal security problems here for other reasons, except perhaps in the Malay countries.

Other British territories

134. Potential responsibilities for our armed forces will exist in many other areas, such as West and East Africa, Ceylon, the West Indies, Cyprus, Malta, Aden and St. Mauritius. Together, the forces permanently stationed in these areas will constitute a significant portion of our peacetime ground forces.

United Kingdom and dominions

135. Even in the United Kingdom and the Dominions, armed forces may be required to maintain civil authority.

Section [U INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Introduction

136. The significance of the International Organization for the security of the British Empire in 1955-60 will depend primarily on the prestige it can win over the next ten years. For an organization to be effective, its evolution must be a gradual process based on the development of mutual trust among its members.

137. An international organization in the form in which it was approved at San Francisco" can be defined militarily as an alliance of five great powers, aimed at ensuring, firstly, the prevention of aggression on the part of small powers and, secondly, the constant suppression of Germany and Japan. The International Organization will assume responsibility for the fulfillment of the last task only after it has been decided to liquidate the control apparatus created by the great powers.

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138. Below we consider the significance of the International Organization in terms of:

A. Protection from the USSR hostile to us

B. Control over Germany and Japan.

C. Ensuring the security of British interests from minor external threats.

A. The extent of the duties to be entrusted to our armed forces.

A. Protection from the USSR hostile to us.

139. An effective international organization will contribute to our security on the part of the USSR in the sense that:

a) cooperation between the USSR and other great powers will be facilitated and it will be easier to achieve recognition of our claims to bear the main responsibility for maintaining peace and security in those areas where British interests prevail. This cooperation may also facilitate the resolution of conflicting claims to dominance in areas where both the British Empire and the USSR have strategic interests;

(b) The United States will take over military duties with its forces not only in the Pacific, but also in Europe and the Middle East, insofar as this is in keeping with their obligation to participate in the maintenance of world peace. It is unlikely that the United States could be persuaded to undertake such a commitment, except through a world organization, given its prejudice against "entangling alliances." Such obligations assumed by the United States would serve as a deterrent for the USSR if it planned aggression;

(c) A regional security system would help us to forge defensive alliances, for example, in Western Europe, which could be maintained even after the International Organization disintegrated;

4) some bases are needed to protect British interests in certain areas, such as in the Middle East and in the Strait of Gibraltar, can only be obtained on the basis of an agreement protected under the auspices of the International Organization.

140. However, the existence of the International Organization creates certain potential dangers for us. First, it will be necessary to educate British public opinion in such a way that it understands that the presence of an International Organization does not provide a final guarantee against aggression on the part of the USSR or another great power. A misjudgment of the ability of the International Organization to avert a serious threat to our security may lead to a demand for the reduction of our armed forces. If such views prevail, the existence of an international organization will become a threat to our security. In addition, it will be difficult to resist the participation of the Soviets in the regional defense system in the Middle East, and possibly in other areas dominated by British interests. If the USSR decides to use the influence it has thus acquired to undermine our position, with a view to aggressive actions against us in the future,

then our

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our ability to defend our interests in such areas would be greatly weakened.

B. Control over Germany and Japan.

141. If control over Germany and Japan is taken over in due course by the International Organization, then the required measures will remain the same as described in the previous section. Since the existence of an effective International Organization presupposes the unanimity of the great Powers and the presence of adequate forces at the disposal of the Security Council, the task of exercising control will be made easier.

D. Our military obligations.

143. The need to place forces at the disposal of the Security Council is likely to entail obligations. It can also mean the intervention of British forces in petty wars that do not directly affect British interests. These commitments, however, will add very little to our common tasks, as they can be carried out to a large extent by forces that would be in one way or another suitable for our own security.

Ultimately, it is to be hoped that an effective International Organization will create more stable conditions throughout the world, engendering faith in the possibility of settling disputes through negotiation. It is very unlikely that by 1955-1960 the International Organization will have made sufficient progress in this respect for the Great Powers to agree to accept any general disarmament plan.

conclusions

144. The British Empire is extremely interested, from a strategic point of view, in supporting the establishment of an effective International Organization, since it will contribute to:

- a) the implementation of the primary goal of our policy, namely: avoiding a collision with the USSR;
- b) closer cooperation with the United States, which is vital to our security.

#2 Top secret

January 1948

MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE OF ONE OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

I am sending the document received by the residency on the policy of England in the matter of creating a Western European federation.

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MEMORANDUM

Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs for the Council of Foreign Ministers and Adviser for United Nations Affairs

JEBBA H.M.Ge to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of England
SARGENTH Orm' dated 01/13/1948

"I have seen a copy of the Foreign Secretary's note of January 12, setting out the general principles of the foreign policy of the British Government, and, in this regard, I consider it necessary to bring to your attention the following comments:

It seems to me that before we can make any real progress, we must be very clear about our objectives, and I understand that the Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks of them as follows:

a) Our ultimate goal is the creation of a Western European federation based on the United Kingdom and France with their respective imperial colonial possessions. This federation should include the western part of Germany, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, Italy, Portugal and, if possible, Spain. This target is unlikely to be reached before the next five years. Nor can it be achieved until the Americans, the French and ourselves are ready to evacuate Germany. However, in this preparatory period this federation may gradually be built up, and if it is possible to organize a kind of customs union between Great Britain and France, this should be of very substantial assistance in achieving our ultimate goal;

c) our immediate aim is to maintain the spirit of unity among the Western European democracies and, in connection with this, to expand the Anglo-French alliance to include Belgium and, if possible, Holland.

It will be clearly stated publicly that this particular purpose is entirely in harmony with the MARSHALL PLAN in that the purpose of the MARSHALL Plan is to allow the Western European democracies to stand on their own feet. It - this goal is based on the belief that democracy as such has some inherent virtues, and therefore it is only natural that Western European democracies, in case of difficulty, will be helped by overseas democracies and especially the United States.

Apparently, it is very important that this immediate goal should not be realized through any open anti-Soviet step. The extension to the Netherlands of a treaty which merely provides for defense against Germany cannot be interpreted as a move directed against the Soviet Union, but, again, unless it is clearly stated that there is a real intention to support each other in case of any difficulties and that all will unite to resist Soviet aggression, little progress will be made towards genuine solidarity. It is to be expected that this question will arise when we tell the French that in the event of a Soviet attack on Western Europe we will not agree to send British troops to the Continent. Based on this, it seems to me that for all

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In most cases, the most important prerequisite for achieving our immediate goal is the assurance that the United States is ready to resist Soviet aggression in Western Europe, even using force of arms if necessary.

There appear to be three possible ways in which this kind of assurance can be given:

a) The US itself can give guarantees to Western European countries or some of them. However, this seems to be an extremely unlikely procedure that could be recommended to the American Congress. Besides, this may greatly offend the French, who still regard their country as a great power;

B) a tripartite guarantee agreement could be signed for Germany or, most likely, West Germany. This treaty will, in fact, protect West Germany, and consequently the Western European countries, from Soviet aggression;

(c) In accordance with Article 513 of the Charter of the United Nations, a general convention could be signed which, although available for signature by all countries wishing to accede to it, would not in reality provide the required security.

The advantages of the second path are that, firstly, it will not outwardly be particularly directed against the USSR (although in reality it is directed precisely against it), and secondly,

it provides for a procedure that, in principle, the United States seems inclined to accept, and, third, it is relatively simple to implement.

Its shortcomings are that, firstly, it will obviously not provide for the possibility of Soviet aggression against the Scandinavian countries or Italy, and, secondly, it is possible that no matter how the article is formulated, it may be difficult to avoid trouble in the event that the Soviet Union unexpectedly expresses a desire to accede to this treaty.

The advantages of the third way are that in this case the convention will be universal and we hope that it will practically be signed by all potential victims of Soviet aggression, namely: the Western European states, including the Scandinavian countries, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Iran, China, and also, no doubt, the United Kingdom and the United States. Therefore, this path will apparently correspond to the general goal of establishing the closest cooperation between the Western European democracies with the common support and protection of the United States. It will also avoid the possible difficulty of negotiating agreements that effectively oblige the United States to support the countries of the Middle East, although, as we know, private assurances have been given that they (the United States) can do so.

The disadvantages of this third path are that the signing of such a general convention may be perceived as a loss of all faith in the effectiveness of the United Nations and, moreover, it may even (although this may be unlikely) lead to that the Slavs will leave the United Nations.

However, despite my great respect for the benefits of the third way, I don't think they have already been given the full attention they deserve. I hope that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the revision, will mention

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the above document will be able to agree with us. This, at least, is a course that should be discussed with the Americans in the near future.

In any case, as far as I can see, there is nothing in this path that could interfere with the achievement of our immediate or final goals. On the contrary, there is much in it that will stimulate the achievement of both goals.

13.1.1948" Gladwyn Jebb Resident of CI at the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3 Top secret

March 1948

To Comrade VYSHINSKY A.Ya. To Comrade Malik Ya.A. Comrade Zorin V.A.

Are we forwarding in English the text of the memorandum drawn up by Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs GEBBOM? January 26, 1948, in connection with the discussion of the five-power treaty and the international military convention, the drafts of which were sent to you earlier.

APPENDIX: according to the text on 10 sheets.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov K. Rodionov March 1948

documented

Translation from English

MEMORANDUM SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE

The security of the Western European states against possible aggression, and in particular against aggression on the part of the Soviet Union, can theoretically be ensured and strengthened in various ways, in addition to the procedure imposed in Chapters VI and OC of the UN Charter.

a) Agreement under Article 52 of the Charter.

2. "Regional agreement".

This type of agreement may be signed by all Western European states, or by such of them as may be deemed suitable for the purpose, but in fact this agreement can only imply defense against Germany, since such agreements, according to Article 53 of the Charter, can provide for "violent action" only against former enemy states.

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Therefore, the Anglo-French treaty, and any similar treaty that may be concluded with Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, can be said to fall within the general scope of Article 52; but it is obvious that such agreements, while useful in the sense of emphasizing the common unity of purpose of Western European democracy, are completely inadequate.

6) Treaty of three powers on the guarantee of Germany.

3. The main purpose of such a document (the draft of which is given in Appendix A!) will be to guarantee the territorial, political and economic integrity of the three western zones of Germany in such a way that in the event of Soviet aggression against these parts of Germany, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, as well as to France itself (see Article IV), support was provided by the signatories (USA, UK, France). In addition to this, the treaty will provide for the demilitarization of Germany and the establishment of a control commission on the basis of the general provisions of the original "Birn's Treaty".

In order to prevent a renewal of German aggression, or in order to preserve the independence and integrity of the western parts of Germany, if necessary, action will be taken by a majority of the signatories, although a requirement for simultaneous action by all signatories may be included, if so desired.

The terms of accession to the treaty (Article IX) allow for the possibility of accepting the Soviet Union, but only on terms that the Western Powers will satisfy. A treaty based on these provisions would seem to give the Netherlands and France sufficient assurance that the intention of the United Kingdom and the United States is to protect also Germany, and therefore the said states, from any Soviet aggression; but it is also true that France will not have absolute certainty that the aggression she has defined will be treated in the same way by her two allies.

But no treaty by itself can fully determine the SAZI-EOSHEK., and it is obvious that the United States, if it signs such a treaty, will in principle be fully obliged to defend the greater part of Western Europe against possible Soviet aggression. On the other hand, it is clear that Scandinavia will not be more subject to this treaty than Italy or Greece.

c) Express Warranty.

4. Without any connection with Article 51 of the Charter! (which will be discussed below) a guarantee to Italy or the Scandinavian countries from other Western European powers and America, even if it be mutual, does not seem very desirable, since it is doubtful that it was in accordance with the Charter. In any case, it will clearly be directed against the USSR.

For these reasons, it is doubtful that the Scandinavian countries would accept it, although it may be welcomed by the existing Italian government. However, as far as Italy is concerned, this guarantee must presumably be connected in some way with a peace treaty which has only very recently entered into force, and the Italians can naturally

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declare that they will not be able to fulfill any obligations arising from these guarantees unless their armed forces are increased beyond the limits established by the treaty.

d) Regional action under Article 51.

5. An illustration of such an action can be provided by the Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty signed in Rio de Janeiro in September 1947?. In this document, the United States and the Latin American republics establish (Article 3 (1)) that "an armed attack by any state against any American state shall be considered an attack against all American states and, consequently, each of the said of the contracting parties undertakes to assist in repulsing the attack, using the inalienable right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Under Article 3(2) "each of the contracting parties may then determine "immediate measures which each party may take on its own". (This is perhaps the most important condition, as it entitles the United States, if it wishes, to assist any American victim of aggression with all its might, simply at the request of the victim.)

These individual measures, if taken, would then be investigated by a "consultative body of the inter-American system", which would seem to involve a meeting of the foreign ministers of all the signatory states, or pending the convening of such a high body by the governing council of the Pan-American Union. The Authority will also "decide on the measures of a collective nature to be taken".

In any case, the body takes its decisions by a two-thirds majority of the signatory states that have ratified the treaty. Consequently, under the terms of this treaty, neither of the signatories is really obliged to do anything in the sense of providing assistance to the victim of aggression, unless it is instructed to do so by a body that makes its decisions by a two-thirds majority. Even so (Article 20) "no State shall be required to assist with its armed forces without its

consent."

But in essence the situation in South America is quite different from that in Western Europe, the Middle East, and especially the Far East. For America, the threat of Soviet aggression is remote and virtually unrealistic as long as the US remains a first-class power. The main purpose of the treaty signed at Rio de Janeiro is, therefore, to prevent the outbreak of local wars and, under the guise of general protection provided by the armed forces of the United States, to emphasize the legal equality of all signatories. Hence the rather complicated functions assigned to this body, and the conditions stipulating that none of the signatories is obliged to use their armed forces if they do not wish to do so.

6. For these reasons, it is unlikely that the Rio de Janeiro treaty, despite some of its useful features, could fully serve as a model for any security system in Western Europe, and, by the way, if the United States should enter into any any Western European security system, the latter can hardly be regarded as "regional" except on the dubious assumption that

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that Western Europe, all the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States are "area". On the contrary, if the US is not going to be included in the regional Western European scheme, then it seems unlikely that one will be created in any way.

e) Simple action under Article 51.

7. However, the necessary security of Western Europe and the necessary support of the United States can be achieved through a convention seemingly universal in its scope, but in reality one that is unlikely to be signed by the Soviet Union or the totalitarian states of Eastern Europe, or even other states that are not vital. interested in the area. If such action is envisaged, it is important to avoid, if possible, the complicated procedure that characterizes the Rio treaty, as well as any suggestion that the acceptance of action should conditionally depend on any majority

signatories.

In practice, this can only be done if the determination of the CASOS EOOEREKIS (that is, the decision whether or not an "armed attack" has occurred) depends not on the collective, but on the individual decision of the signatories. Apparently, it is also necessary to keep in mind the assumption that the Americans will not agree to a too rigid scheme and that they will probably want to be sure rather that the United States will not necessarily have to go to war with the Soviet Union in the event of an attack on Afghanistan, or even Xinjiang or Tibet, and will only be required to declare their disapproval.

In order to compensate for such a broad interpretation (Article II), the draft must be categorical and solemn enough to impose on the United States a very strong moral responsibility to take some action in order to restore the situation in the event of a clear aggression against countries such as Scandinavian, Italy, Greece or Turkey (Article 1).

8. Article II also provides for the convening of a conference in the event that any signatory declares that it has been the victim of an "armed attack". This measure would probably be desirable if the small states voluntarily accede to the treaty, but it could be criticized as providing an alternative to the modalities set out in the Charter.

The answer to this would presumably be that the whole mechanism would only be activated in case of outright aggression and that nothing would prevent any member from engaging in it if desired.

REMARKS

The most promising general lines are those outlined in paragraphs "b" and "e". There is nothing to prevent their joint application, although in the event that all countries interested in forming a majority in Western Europe sign something in the spirit of "e", the question may arise whether the "6" line is really necessary. ", of course, separately from the treaty on the demilitarization of Germany.

In our general approach, of course, we must be guided by the extent to which the Americans are actually ready to take part in the defense of Western Europe.

January 26, 1948 Gladwyn Jebb 540

No. 4 Top Secret

Comrade STALIN I.V. To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade VYSHINSKY AY. To Comrade ZORIN VA.

We report undercover information received in Washington and London:

1. A credible source in Washington reports that the British Ambassador to the United States, INVERCHAPLE, received urgent instructions from BEVIN to "hand over to MARSHALL? a proposal to open urgent negotiations on the creation of a North Atlantic security bloc, which would include England, the USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Ireland and Iceland. BEVIN's proposal excludes Sweden.

All these countries will have to sign a "defensive pact" based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which will be part of the projected "common security system", including the Western European pact, as well as the proposed pact of the Mediterranean countries, the issue of which, however, according to source, BEVIN is not yet prepared.

BEVIN justifies the urgency of his proposal by the fact that the Soviet Union will soon allegedly try to expand its spheres of influence in various directions, and Norway will be one of the first objects of Soviet pressure.

On BEVIN's proposal, these negotiations should be held in Washington between a representative of the British Foreign Office and the State Department, with the participation of military experts from both countries.

On March 12, MARSHALL informed the British embassy that the US government agreed to begin such negotiations the following week.

2. In the light of the foregoing, intelligence information received in London is of interest.

The British government is spreading rumors through various channels that Norway is becoming "another victim" of Soviet diplomatic aggression. The head of the information service of the English office, Philip JORDAN, stated this in the affirmative to the London correspondents.

The British also spread these rumors through foreign diplomatic missions. For example, the Minister of State McNeil at one of the official receptions told the Swedish envoy BOGEMANN "confidentially" that "Russia is trying to impose on Norway the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact in the spirit of the pact she proposed to Finland." The content of this conversation was reported to the Swedish Foreign Ministry by BOGEMANN.

The British Ambassador in Oslo reported to the British Foreign Office that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Norway had told the British and American Ambassadors that they had decided to recommend to the Cabinet that the Soviet and the American governments on this issue.

After receiving this telegram, a correspondence took place between BEVIN and MARSHALL. Both agreed that the decision of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Norway should be approved and told them that the British and American governments would give Norway full control.

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support and assistance, including military assistance, if the USSR decides to force it to conclude a pact. The British ambassador in Oslo has already told the Norwegian government about this, and the State Department has instructed its ambassador to make a similar statement.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov

K. Rodionov March 18, 1948

#5 Top secret

Comrade STALIN I.V. To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade VYSHINSKY AY.

We are reporting intelligence data received by our resident in Berlin on the meeting of German leaders with representatives of the British and American military administrations, held on March 2, 1948 in Frankfurt am Main, with the participation of representatives of the Benelux states, on the issue of creating a West German state.

The meeting was attended by the German side: Vice-President of the Economic Council of the United Anglo-American Zone Gustav DARENDORFF, Minister-President of Schleswig Holstein Hermann LUDEMANN, Second Chairman of the Board of the CDU Party of the English Zone Friedrich HOL-ZAPFEL and others.

Representatives of the American and British military administrations at this conference reproached the German representatives for not having the courage to assume political responsibility in West Germany.

The West German state, as the Anglo-Americans declared, must be politically organized in such a way that not only the eastern but also the French zones would be forced to join it. At the same time, the need was emphasized to distinguish between the demands on the part of German politicians to the occupation authorities and to the German parties.

At the invitation of the British and Americans to speak out on the issue of creating a West German state and on the principles of its organization, the representative of the German side, DARENDORF, on behalf of the German representatives, stated that the creation of a West German state does not make sense without resolving the issue of establishing in it own sovereignty. However, in the opinion of the German representatives, the supreme power can be exercised only if the occupation statute is immediately established by the Allies. In addition, the German representatives ask that the Allies officially announce the terms for concluding a peace treaty with the West German state.

At the same time, DARENDORFF put forward the following conditions that will contribute to the success of propaganda among the German population of the idea of creating a West German state:

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Giving guarantees for the provision of credits and raw materials to the West German state on the basis of economic agreements.

Reorganization of the Economic Council into a parliament elected and approved by the National Assembly of West Germany.

Expansion of the Governing Body by adding Directors for Justice, Home Affairs, Trade and Reconstruction, with the subsequent reorganization of the Governing Body into a government cabinet.

Development and adoption of the electoral law for parliamentary elections.

A positive decision on the issue of admission of the West German state to the membership of the UN.

In response to this statement, the representatives of the American and British military administrations replied that they had no objections to the measures listed above, but it would be desirable that the four large parties of West Germany, with the exception of the Communists, would come out with a joint a unified declaration of the creation of a West German state.

When asked by the German representative whether the Benelux States would make territorial demands on Germany and whether they would receive support from England and America, it was stated that England and America categorically rejected the territorial claims of the Benelux States against West Germany. .

A representative from the CDU party announced its readiness to present to the allies the plan they demanded in a few weeks.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov K. Rodionov April 9, 1948

#6 Top secret

Comrade STALIN I.V. Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV Comrade Zhdanov AA.

We are reporting, translated from English, extracts from two secret minutes of the meeting of the British Cabinet of March 5 and 15, 1948 on the question of British foreign policy in Europe.

Presenting to the cabinet (sitting of 5 March) the memorandum drawn up in connection with the latest events in Czechoslovakia and the memorandum on the "Soviet threat to Western civilization", Foreign Minister BEVIN declared that the recent actions of the Soviet government, especially taken by him in connection with the events in Czechoslovakia and Finland, exclude any hope of reaching a satisfactory agreement between the four powers among themselves by agreement or through the organization of the United Nations. By proposing that the ongoing negotiations for a treaty between

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England, France and the Benelux countries and, at the same time, enlist the support of the countries that are members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, as well as other countries, in particular the countries of the Western Hemisphere, BEVIN demanded that special efforts be made to "save the parliamentary form of government" in Italy, which is currently "the weakest link in the chain of non-communist states".

During the ensuing discussion, with "unanimous approval" of all the proposals of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the following points were noted:

1. The Cabinet must realize the importance of the armed forces necessary to back up diplomatic actions in accordance with the policy proposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as the defensive measures envisaged in case this policy fails to avert war.
2. Should India and Pakistan withdraw from the British Commonwealth of Nations, Ceylon and Malaya may follow suit. The difficulty of keeping these countries within the framework of the Commonwealth is due to the "ideas of abstract republicanism", which are adhered to in these countries by the "mainstream political parties" and in which it is difficult for the latter to recognize the principle of loyalty to the English crown. Consequently, it is necessary to "think up some new constitutional form" in which India, Pakistan and the like could obtain a "new kind of independence" while remaining within the British Commonwealth of Nations.
3. In order to make full use of all the means of "political warfare", it is desirable to create an organization similar to the previously existing "Political Warfare Executive Committee", which would function under the leadership of a minister and would be in close contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. The Labor Party, more than the government, could be an effective tool in the conduct of propaganda, as well as in strengthening the social democratic parties of Western Europe.
5. Through the International Council of Christian Churches, use the various congregations to work together to "defend Western civilization."

6. Provide greater economic assistance to the Scandinavian countries on the basis of long-term trade agreements.

At the meeting held on March 15 this year, the draft five-power treaty was discussed. Minister of State Hector McNeil gave an explanation on the points of the draft.

During the discussion of this project, members of the cabinet expressed the hope that the government of the United States would "find a way" for joining the "defensive alliance" of the Western European powers as a guarantor. At the same time, it was especially emphasized that treaty obligations on mutual assistance should be clearly limited to cases that may arise as a result of unprovoked aggression. On this basis, the Cabinet suggested to the Minister of State that the Mutual Assistance Clauses be reconsidered, but without losing sight of the need for these Clauses not to "appear weak."

The Cabinet was assured that Article IV of the treaty also provided for the case of a possible armed attack on Gibraltar and Malta.

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In conclusion, the Cabinet drew particular attention to the need for the widest possible advertising of the five-power treaty, both within the country and abroad, making full use of all means of propaganda for this purpose: the press, cinema, radio, speeches by ministers and prominent public figures at gatherings and rallies.

From an examination of the attached documents it is clear that the British government, greatly concerned about the strengthening of the international positions of the Soviet Union, the growth of democratic forces in Europe and the possible secession of India and Pakistan from the British Empire, would be ready to take "the most decisive measures against the Soviet threat", but Realizing the precariousness of its economic and political positions at this stage in the development of international relations, it is forced to limit itself to advertising hype around the five-power treaty in order to disguise its impotence from the public attention of the whole world.

APPENDIX: according to the text on 10 sheets.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov K. Rodionov

April 9, 1948

Documentary Translation from English

EXTRACT

from the secret minutes of the meeting of the British Cabinet of March 5, 1948

FOREIGN POLICY IN EUROPE

The Cabinet considered the memorandums presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the question of the crisis in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet threat to Western civilization.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the actions of the Soviet Government, which reached their climax during the recent events in Czechoslovakia and Finland, showed beyond any doubt that there was no hope of reaching a satisfactory agreement through an agreement between the four powers or through the United Nations. 'of the united nations and that decisive action must be taken against the Soviet threat to Western civilization. Accordingly, he proposed that we urgently conclude ongoing negotiations for economic, cultural and defense pacts between the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries. At the same time, we must strive to strengthen the defense of Western civilization by enlisting the cooperation of the countries that are part of the British

the Commonwealth of Nations, as well as all other friendly countries, including the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Special efforts must be made to strengthen

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parliamentary government in Italy, which is currently the weakest link in the chain of non-communist states.

Further steps towards economic cooperation in Europe will be discussed at the meeting of the Committee for European Economic Cooperation due in March. However, in addition to this, cooperation must also be sought in other areas of activity, which should be negotiated with the governments of the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations and, through diplomatic channels, with the governments of other countries. If the Cabinet expresses general approval of the policy it has set forth, the Minister will report from time to time on the measures being taken to carry out that policy.

During the ensuing discussion, the policy outlined by the Foreign Minister received unanimous approval. Moreover, the urgent need to strengthen the forces of democratic socialism in France and Italy and to counteract the weakening of the British Commonwealth of Nations as a result of the falling away of India and, possibly, Pakistan was especially emphasized. Resistance to further Soviet expansion cannot be successful if we cannot achieve a high material standard of living both at home and in the countries on our side; but it is also necessary that our campaign be carried out on the basis of the higher moral and spiritual values of Western civilization. Under the present conditions, no country is in a position to achieve the level of mobilization of manpower and material resources that was achieved during the last war, and yet the need for an even higher level of unification of defense assets now seems inevitable. . In all circumstances, however, it is highly desirable that the Cabinet be aware of the importance of the armed forces necessary to back up diplomatic actions in accordance with the policy proposed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as the defensive measures envisaged in the event that this policy does not war can be prevented. The weapons of propaganda must be fully utilized, and, obviously, for this purpose, the creation of a special apparatus will be required. Propaganda should vary depending on the country for which it is intended. It should not embarrass a minister who deals with other foreign states through

diplomatic channels.

During further discussion, the following points were noted:

a) The financial measures of the French government proved to be ineffective, and the economic situation in France became very tense. The position of the government is fragile, and if it falls, then, in all likelihood, either a far-right or far-left government will take its place.

B) If India and Pakistan move away from the British Commonwealth of Nations, then Ceylon, and later Malaya, may well follow their example. The difficulty of keeping these countries within the British Commonwealth of Nations will arise mainly on the basis of constitutional forms, since the dominant political parties are bound by the ideas of abstract republicanism, and this makes it difficult for them to recognize the principle of allegiance to Corot.

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Not. It is possible that this difficulty may be overcome by some new constitutional form of association which will enable these and similar countries to establish a new kind of independence within the British Commonwealth of Nations. Consideration should also be given to the need to provide India and Pakistan with special assistance for their economic development.

(c) The experience gained during the war showed the value of waging political war. The Soviet government and its satellites used this means to the limit. The main aim of any propaganda campaign should be to provide proper leadership to the peoples of the countries of Western Europe whose governments have so far failed to do so themselves; but this campaign must be carried out on an international scale. It would be desirable to set up an organization along the lines of the Executive Committee for Political Warfare that existed during the war, under the leadership of a Minister and in close contact with the Foreign Office.

4) The Labor Party, more than the government, could prove to be the most effective instrument in the conduct of propaganda, as well as in the strengthening of the social democratic parties of Western Europe.

f) It is possible that the Christian Churches may be ready to take common action in defense of Western civilization, and this can be done through the International Council of Christian Churches. In recent years, among the leaders of the Catholic Church, a feeling of benevolence towards social democratic principles has significantly strengthened.

+) Communism thrives in primitive conditions. Therefore, there is reason to believe that it will not succeed with the same success in gaining a foothold among the peoples of more highly developed countries. Therefore, it is especially important that every effort should be directed towards organizing propaganda in the countries of Eastern Europe, which are closest to Western Europe.

5) Until now, when concluding bilateral trade agreements with the countries of Eastern Europe, they were guided by purely economic considerations. Is it now necessary, for political reasons, to offer more generous terms or use more aggressive methods?

No) The possibility of providing more economic assistance to the Scandinavian countries should be discussed, possibly on the basis of long-term agreements.

Cabinet -

1) Expressed general agreement with the proposals set out in paragraph 7 of the memorandum S.R. / 48/72 on countering the Soviet threat to Western civilization.

2) Noted that the Prime Minister would consider what kind of inter-ministerial organization would be required to effectively implement some of these proposals.

3) Took note of the memorandum S.R. /48/71.

Documentary Translation from English

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EXTRACT

from the secret minutes of the meeting of the British Cabinet of March 15, 1948

FOREIGN POLICY IN EUROPE

1. The Cabinet considered the note submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs /j.ÿ./48/83/ with the annex of the draft Five-Power Treaty, previously agreed with the diplomatic representatives of the five Contracting Governments on March 12 in Brussels.

The Minister of State (Hector McNeil. - note of the Information Clerk) gave an explanation on the points of the draft. The preliminary approval of this project met with no special

difficulties, and the Treaty, apparently, will be ready for signing by March 17 in substance in the form in which it is presented to the Cabinet.

During the discussion, the following comments were made:

(a) The Chiefs of Staff shall study the content of the articles of the Treaty relating to defense, with all the consequences that follow from them. There is great hope that the Government of the United States will find a way for the Western European Powers to join this defensive alliance as a guarantor.

(b) It would obviously be desirable if treaty defense obligations would only come into play in the event of unprovoked aggression against a signatory to the Treaty. Is it sufficiently clear that the content of Article [V] of the draft Treaty would limit these obligations to cases of unprovoked aggression only? The Cabinet suggested that the Minister of State review this clause, while keeping in mind the importance that the clauses of the Defense Treaty should not appear weak.

(c) The Cabinet was assured that Article IV also provided for the possibility of an armed attack on Gibraltar and Malta.

(a) Article 1 is designed to enable the overseas possessions of the Signatory Powers to contribute to the economic recovery of Europe.

f) In the process of preparing the draft Treaty, communication was constantly maintained with the Governments of the Dominions.

+) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take special measures to ensure the wide publicity of the conclusion of this Treaty. The British Broadcasting Corporation is to make a special announcement of the signing of the Treaty, both for domestic broadcasting and for overseas transmissions; newsreel films should also be widely used for this purpose. Following the initial publication of this message, further promotion of the Western Union should be organized. There is some danger that public attention may be focused mainly on the defense clauses of the Treaty; to neutralize this possibility, it is necessary to place special emphasis on the benefits of economic points. Mini

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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could take the lead in identifying the points to be emphasized in ministerial speeches and reports over the coming several weeks.

Cabinet -

Approved the draft Five-Power Treaty and authorized the Minister for Foreign Affairs to sign the Treaty in its present form, subject to the possibility of only minor changes that may be made as a result of the negotiations taking place in Brussels.

No. 7 Top secret copy. No. 2

Comrade STALIN I.V. To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade VYSHINSKY AY.

We present the text of the telegram of the French political adviser in Germany SAINT HARDOUIN to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France dated March 26 of this year. about the political maneuvers of the Americans and the British in matters of holding elections in Germany and establishing a German government.

SAINTHARDOUIN believes that the public statements of the Americans about the need to create an all-German government and the British-inspired speech of the Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia ARNOLD with a program for holding free elections throughout Germany to create the National Assembly and the German government are tactical maneuvers and pursue one goal - to deprive the Soviet Union of the initiative in the matter of German unity. At the same time, the Americans and the British expect that in the event of a general election, the anti-communist parties will get the majority.

SAINTHARDOUIN takes a negative view of the American plans to establish a German government in Frankfurt am Main in the near future, believing that the formation of such a government will be used by the Soviet Union as a pretext for the formation of a national all-German government in Berlin.

APPENDIX: according to the text on 3 sheets.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov K. Rodionov

April 1948

Documented Top Secret Translation from French

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TELEGRAM

French political adviser in Germany SAINT-HARDOUIN to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated March 26, 1948

"The proximity of the points of view expressed in the statement of General CLEY on the need to form a German government in the near future and in the memorandum of the Prime Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, Dr. ARNOLD, published this morning, on the convening of a National Assembly elected by universal suffrage, sheds light on the tactics used by our Western allies in Germany.

General CLEY's assertion that he wants an all-German government and not a government for West Germany only, and ARNOLD's demand for free elections in all four zones have the same goal - to deprive the Russians of the initiative they still have. preserved in the question of the unity of Germany.

One of the politicians of North Rhine-Westphalia, in a conversation with one of my employees, described the current situation as follows:

"By demanding free elections throughout Germany, we are pushing the Russians to the wall. After their refusal, we will be able to carry out in the West what we want, because the responsibility will be removed from us. On the other hand, if West Germany obtains a statute of occupation or a provisional peace statute, hopes will be rekindled among the masses, and the West's dominance over the East will be secured for many years to come.

These words are too obviously consistent with the plan proposed to us and the statement made this morning to be deceived in the meaning of the maneuvers undertaken by General CLAY and already known, it turns out, to public opinion. We must always bear in mind the significance of these maneuvers, considering the aims they pursue. Their main condition is the holding of a general election, from which the Anglo-Americans expect - and not without some reason - a major success for the anti-communist parties.

In conversations that I have had in recent days with MURPHY and LICHFIELD, I have tried to convince the Americans that, in essence, they are playing into the hands of the Russians by taking the initiative in

striving to "go fast" at any cost.

In their activities in recent weeks, the Russians have indeed made very clear their desire to shift the responsibility for the breakdown of the four-party talks onto the Western Allies and present their actions only as retaliatory strikes. They use every occasion for this. I do not think that the Russians intend to be the first to establish a German government, although they have prepared everything for this purpose. However, as I have already tried to explain to the Americans in Berlin, the Russians are only waiting for an excuse - and this excuse for them will be the creation of a government in Frankfurt, which the Russians will accuse of "collaborationism" - to form a "national government" in Berlin. .

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No. 8 Top secret Ex. No. 1

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

We present the text of the telegram of the French political adviser in Germany SAINT HARDOUIN to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated April 2 this year. In the telegram, SAINT HARDOUIN communicates his point of view on the policy pursued by the Soviet Union towards Berlin. He believes that the Soviet government, by its step in the Control Council on March 20 of this year, began the implementation of a detailed plan to oust the Western allies from Berlin, with whom the municipality of Greater Berlin, oriented towards the Western powers, would be removed.

SAINT-HARDOUIN expresses the opinion that "the Russians should be persuaded that the destruction of the bridge they still have in Berlin for contact with the West is not in their interests."

APPENDIX: according to the text on 2 sheets.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov K. Rodionov April 1948

Documented Top Secret Translation from French

TELEGRAM

French political adviser in Germany SAINT-HARDOUIN to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs of April 2, 1948

"As I noted in my telegram of March 20, the Soviet government is directing its main efforts precisely to Berlin, with the aim of forcing its partners in the Control Council to admit that their desire to remain in this city in conditions when quadripartite cooperation has actually ceased, encounters obstacles, involves risk and that the game is not worth the candle.

According to information received from the Germans close to the Russians, the latter are still convinced that, despite General KLEY's fanfare, Berlin will not be a pretext for war, especially if they (the Russians) skillfully demonstrate that they remain within the framework of the quadripartite agreements. , and will be satisfied with the adoption of measures that can be presented as a response to the actions of the Western powers.

We are witnessing the implementation of a detailed plan. The pretext for its implementation was the London conference of three

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powers, which, no doubt, caused the decision and choice of the Russians, providing them with an opportunity to begin the implementation of the plan and led to the disruption of the work of the four powers at the meeting of the Control Council 20

Martha. The main goal of this plan is to destroy the abscess, which is Berlin in the Russian zone. Under these conditions, it is difficult to think that it will be possible to suspend the implementation of this plan by means (omission for technical reasons. - Our note).

In fact, the Russians should be convinced that the destruction of the bridge they still have in Berlin for contact with the West is not in their interest. It is possible that this is not absolutely impossible until a German government is established in Frankfurt.

However, it is quite clear that after the recent State Department statements to the press, the Russians see the establishment of such a government as a necessary evil and are unwilling to tolerate in the center of their zone not so much the presence of allies, but the presence of the municipality of Greater Berlin, which (the municipality) would be ready to put yourself at the disposal of that government."

No. 9 Top secret Ex. No. 1

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

We present the secret French reports on the work of the trilateral Anglo-American French conference on the question of Germany, which took place in London from February 23 to March 6 of this year.

As you know, the meeting was of a closed nature, and official information about it is limited to a small communiqué.

The agenda of the meeting included the following items:

- A) Accession of the Benelux countries to the policy towards Germany.
- C) The place of occupied West Germany in the European reconstruction program.
- C) The role of the German economy in the economy of Europe and control over the Ruhr.
- 2) Security in relation to Germany.
- E) reparations.
- E) The political and economic organization of Germany.
- C) Temporary territorial arrangement.

The discussion of the last item on the agenda, due to lack of time, was postponed to the next meeting, which is scheduled for April this year.

The main points of discussion and decisions taken at the meeting under the agenda items are as follows:

1. On the first item on the agenda, the American, British and French delegations adopted the following decisions:

a) to invite representatives of the Benelux countries to all meetings on the German question, which will take place in the same order as the first London meeting;

6) to support "as far as possible" the request of the Benelux countries for their participation and discussion by the four powers on the preparation of a German

the first peace treaty, "considering, in particular, the request of many other countries to be allowed to participate in this discussion";

c) close cooperation between the military administrations of the three Western powers in Germany and the representatives of the Benelux countries in Germany.

At this meeting, the Benelux countries were represented by a single delegation, which took part in the discussion of all issues on the agenda, with the exception of issues B, E and partially issue E

2. On the second item on the agenda of the meeting, did the American, British and French delegations reach an agreement on the inclusion of "Bizonia" and the French zone of occupation of Germany in the "MARSHALL plan"? and the participation of representatives of the federal administrations of these zones, accompanied by German experts, in the plenary session of the Committee for European Economic Cooperation.

3. On the question of the control of the Ruhr, the conference approved an agreement drawn up by a specially created working group on the principles that should form the basis of an agreement between governments.

Basically, this agreement boils down to the following:

a) international control will be established over the Ruhr, and this must be done before the establishment of a provisional German government;

b) this control will be carried out by the "International Control Agency" consisting of representatives of the USA, England, France, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany;

c) the functions of the "International Control Agency" will include full control over the Ruhr coal, coke and steel, including control over the management of the industry of the Ruhr and over the distribution of Ruhr products between domestic consumption and export;

d) in the event that the German government fails to comply with the decisions of the "International Control Agency", the latter may, by a majority of votes of the representatives of the allied states, state this fact and recommend the adoption of the necessary sanctions, which should be carried out during the period of occupation by the relevant occupation authorities, and after its completion - in accordance with the peace treaty.

It should be noted that the American representatives objected to the establishment of "too strict control" in the Ruhr and insisted on the need to prevent the participation of the Soviet Union in this control even if the USSR agreed to the establishment of international control over Silesia.

The French delegation formally abandoned the previous French demand for the political separation of the Ruhr from Germany, but demanded the immediate establishment of international control over the Ruhr.

The question of the "socialization" of the Ruhr coal industry at the request of the American representatives was not discussed.

4. On the issue of security, the meeting had an exchange of views between the delegations:

a) the American representatives questioned the expediency in the present situation of returning to the draft "BIRNS treaty," considering BEVIN's proposal for the creation of a union of the countries of Western Europe to be more appropriate;

b) The representative of the Benelux made a proposal to link the security system with regard to Germany to the charter of the United Nations.

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tions; The French delegates, in this regard, noted that the actions envisaged in agreements concluded within the framework of the United Nations can only be taken by decision of the Security Council, in which the right of veto is applied, and expressed the opinion that in this case it is necessary to take appropriate "precautions"; the Benelux delegation suggested using Article 107 of the UN Charter and the cases of automatic operation of agreements concluded within the UN for this purpose;

c) the French representatives expressed their point of view on the need for a long-term occupation of Germany and the permanent occupation of certain areas, in particular, the Rhine and Ruhr regions;

d) the meeting emphasized, especially by the American and French delegations, the need for guarantees against the "danger of creating communist Germany" and Germany's alliance with the USSR; The French and representatives of the Benelux consider one of these guarantees to be the implementation of the maximum decentralization of Germany with the concentration of the main powers in the hands of the lands; The Americans expressed the opinion that the danger of German aggression was far away and that the greater danger was that "Germany might in a short time become an instrument of another power."

The discussion on safety was postponed until the next meeting.

5. On the issue of reparations by US Representative DOUGLAS?! two proposals were made:

a) to revise the lists of plants to be dismantled in order to reduce the number of German plants to be dismantled;

6) stop reparation supplies to the Soviet Union.

English representative STRANG?? noted that both American proposals had serious consequences and could be a violation of the Potsdam Agreement.

No decision was made on this issue and it was referred to a tripartite commission of experts.

6. The question of the political organization of Germany was subjected to the widest discussion.

After the speeches of the heads of all four delegations, who presented their views on this issue, the discussion was referred to an ad hoc working group.

An agreement was reached in the working group that the future German parliament should consist of two chambers: an upper chamber, which would include an equal number of representatives from each state, and a lower one, elections to which would take place in proportion to the population. The question of the method of electing both chambers remained uncoordinated. Questions about the procedure for appointing ministers and their responsibility to parliament, about the head of state, about the detailed distribution of powers between the federal government and the governments of the lands also remained uncoordinated. The French, in particular, object to the election of the head of state and the lower house through direct and universal elections.

The French and Benelux delegations reacted negatively to the American proposal to establish a federal supreme court as the highest court of appeal above the government.

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With regard to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, it was decided that it should be preceded by a territorial reorganization of the lands and that it should be elected to

on the basis of harmonization of the principle of equal representation of the lands and the principle of proportional representation of the population.

The constitution drawn up by the Constituent Assembly must be approved by a majority of votes in most of the states.

The question of the date for convening the Constituent Assembly at the meeting remained open: the representatives of Britain and the United States suggested that it be convened before the end of 1948, the delegations of France and the Benelux announced that their governments intended to consider this issue during the break between meetings.

It should also be noted that the French delegation objected to the inclusion in the communiqué of the conference of a definite reference to the annexation of the French zone to Bison in the near future, making the solution of these questions dependent on the solution of the problems of the Ruhr and the political organization of Germany; the communiqué only stated that the economic policies of the three zones would be coordinated.

Thus, on the basis of the attached French reports, one can make the following main conclusions:

- 1) on a number of issues, the meeting did not make decisions, due to differences between the various delegations, in particular, on the issues of the timing of the merger of the three western zones, the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the establishment of international control over the Ruhr, reparations, security;
- 2) the Western allies are intensively engaged in questions of the future state structure of Germany, and they all agree that Germany should be decentralized, and develop their projects based on the principle of federation (USA and England) or confederation (France and Benelux countries) lands; the Western allies are specifically concerned with the question of how to organize elections to the Constituent Assembly in such a way as to ensure the adoption of a federal constitution;
- 3) the French object to speeding up the solution of the questions of the unification of West Germany, the convocation of the Constituent Assembly and the creation of a German government;
- 4) the proposal put forward by the Americans at the meeting to stop reparations supplies to the Soviet Union was not accepted;
- 5) Western allies are trying in every possible way to prevent the creation of prerequisites for an alliance between the USSR and Germany in the future.

The meeting agreed to continue developing the agenda items in the working groups in Berlin.

From the very beginning of the work of these groups, the Americans, with the support of the British, began to speed up the solution of questions about the political organization of Germany, proposing that they immediately start discussing the plan he had developed for creating a West German government in the near future. The French representatives in the working groups, referring to the program of work adopted by the London meeting, are trying to delay the solution of this question until their demands are met with regard to the Ruhr and on a number of questions of the political and economic organization of West Germany.

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Materials on the meeting of these working groups in Berlin were presented to you earlier.

APPENDIX: according to the text on 267 sheets*.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov K. Rodionov

April 18, 1948

No. 10 Top Secret

Comrade STALIN I.V. To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV Comrade BERIA L.P.

We report the content of telegram No. 3996 dated April 10 this year. British Foreign Minister BEVIN, addressed to the British Ambassador in Washington.

Document received by our resident in London.

In the telegram, the British Ambassador is invited to urgently discuss with the US Department of State the issue of concentrating in the ports of the Mediterranean Sea, near Italy, as many ships of the US and British navies as possible in order to assist the Italian government, if the latter asks about this in the case of open action by extreme left parties against the government.

BEVIN expresses the opinion that it would be inexpedient to use the French navy for these purposes, since this "may cause a negative feeling in Italy."

APPENDIX: according to the text on 4 sheets.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov K. Rodionov

April 1948

Documentary Translation from English

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp.

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Contents of telegram No. 3996 dated April 10 this year British Foreign Minister BEVIN, addressed to the British Ambassador in Washington

"Telegram repeated for information to Rome under No. 894.

To your communication No. 627 of April 1 and Roman telegram No. 596 addressed to me of April 3 on the political situation in Italy.

1. On the basis of my conversation in Paris with the Count of Sforza? I had the clear impression that the Italian government had decided to stubbornly resist communist pressure. However, at the slightest weakening of this resistance on the part of the Italian Government, or at any hesitation on the part of the President, we must naturally be prepared to apply strong pressure.

2. The question arises as to what steps we should take in the future to strengthen the government against any illegal attack by the communists.

I applaud the intention of the State Department to provide the Italian government with enough equipment to deal with communist unrest. I fully agree that our aim should be to assist the Italian Government in its independent action in the event of any possible disorder.

The latest news from Italy is no doubt more encouraging. However, we are not yet out of our difficulties, and it seems to us that it would be a prudent precaution to have in the Mediterranean ports, close to Italy, as many ships of the Royal Navy and the US Navy, ready to go to the main Italian and

Sicilian ports, if disturbances arise and if this is found desirable by the governments concerned. The ships will, at any rate, be useful in the protection of British and American citizens, and we believe that their presence will assist the forces of law and order.

It is true that many of the main centers of possible unrest are far from the sea, but any increase in resistance to the Communists in the main ports cannot fail to help the government deal with unrest elsewhere.

3. We believe that under the present circumstances the Italian government will make a request for the courts.

4. The presence of British and American ships in Italian ports can, of course, be used by the Yugoslavs as a pretext for a concentration of troops on the Italian frontier, and such a concentration can possibly be supported by Russian air formations. However, we believe that we can reasonably use the possibility that the Yugoslav Government will send troops across the border into Italy; it seems to us that the Italian Government can afford to ignore any concentration of Yugoslav troops, and it may be strongly advised to do so.

5. Discuss this matter urgently with the Department of State, emphasizing that we mean only precautionary measures and that we do not propose sending ships to Italian ports unless the extreme left launches an open attack on the established power in Italy and, in all - in any case, only at the request of the Italian government.

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6. If the State Department agrees to this, it will no doubt arrange for a consultation between the US and British naval authorities with a view to drawing up
agreed plan.

7. The question arises as to whether it would be appropriate to link the French government to the proposed action. There may be some practical advantage to this, as the French navy may provide a certain number of naval units, but it seems to me that the use of French ships may well create a negative feeling in Italy, and on the whole I am inclined to say nothing. speak to the French government at this stage."

No. 11 Top Secret

To Comrade VYSHINSKY AY. To Comrade Malik Ya.A. Comrade Zorin V.A.

We are reporting a telegram from the English ambassador in Washington dated March 24 of this year, translated from English.

1. According to additional information received in London, the negotiations currently taking place in Washington between the British representatives, Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs GEBB and the senior staff officer under the Secretary of Defense, Lieutenant General HOLLIS, and the US Department of State are considered to be of particular importance and extremely secret. . Are the recommendations contained in the text of the attached telegram drawn up by the British and will be presented by the American negotiators to TRUMAN? and MARSHALL?, The latter approved these recommendations in principle.

2. The head of the American group of negotiators, US Ambassador to London, DOUGLAS, assesses these recommendations as "going too far" and, believing that they can be regarded as a direct provocation of war, speaks out in favor of softening them.

In the opinion of the responsible circles of the British Foreign Office, the draft recommendations, with minor changes, will be accepted by the Americans. In particular, it is expected

delete the word "anti-communist" from paragraph 8.

3. At this stage of the Washington talks, it is considered undesirable to invite Italy to join the Brussels treaty. De Gasperi? asks to postpone the discussion of this issue until the end of the elections.

The British believe that the United States is acting too quickly and tends to make no distinction between the Brussels Treaty and the proposed North Atlantic Pact, which, in the opinion of the British, may create inconvenience for some countries, in particular Sweden, to join the pact.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov

K. Rodionov April 1948

Documentary Translation from English

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TELEGRAM

British Ambassador in Washington to the British Foreign Office under No. 1428 dated 24. Sh.

"In connection with my previous telegram. The text follows.

The purpose of this document is to recommend a course, the adoption of which will be sufficient to implement the declaration of the President of the United States of March 17 in support of the free nations of Europe?"

As far as the US government is concerned, the proposed recommendations would require it to carefully consult with the political leaders of both parties so that, whatever form this policy takes, it could be truly bipartisan American politics.

Recommendations.

1) The US Government should take diplomatic approaches to the signatories of the Brussels Pact⁸ in order to obtain their approval to expand this pact in the manner described below, and to inform them of plans for - the inclusion of a security pact for the Atlantic region, the details of which are given below.

2) The United Kingdom and France, with the consent of the Benelux countries, should then immediately ascertain through diplomatic channels whether Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland would be ready to accede to the Brussels Treaty, provided that the President of the United States makes a declaration in the manner recommended below in paragraph 4.

3) A simultaneous approach should also be made to Mr. de GASPERI in order to ascertain whether his government would welcome (in the light of paragraphs 1 and 2 above) an immediate invitation to join the Brussels system.

4) The President of the United States will then make a declaration (in the light of the commitments made by the signatories to the Brussels Pact and pending the conclusion of the security pact referred to in paragraph 6 below) regarding America's intention to consider an armed attack against one of the signatories to the Brussels Pact. pact as an armed attack against the United States, in connection with which the United States will take action in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. This declaration of support may include an expression of willingness to discuss whether any particular case of indirect aggression should be considered an armed attack.

The presidential declaration will state that similar support will be extended to any of the free democracies of Western Europe, whose accession to the Brussels Pact will also be approved by the US. The declaration should not rule out the possibility of providing similar support from the United States to any other Western European democracy that falls victim to an armed attack and defends itself resolutely.

5) Simultaneously with the declaration of the president, a joint Anglo-American declaration must be made that these two countries cannot

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allow any attack on the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey or Persia, and that in the event of such attempts and until such time as possible negotiations for the establishment of some kind of common system have been concluded, they will consider themselves bound in accordance with in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, to provide the said States with all possible assistance.

6) The United States should send invitations to the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ayre, Switzerland, Italy and Portugal to attend a conference with a view to concluding a security pact for the North Atlantic region, based on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and containing the following main provisions:

(a) Preamble, incorporating certain features of the preamble of the Treaty of Brussels and making it clear that the main purpose of this treaty is the preservation of Western civilization in those geographical areas covered by the pact.

Reference must also be made in the preamble to the desirability of concluding further security pacts under Article 51 for the purpose that eventually all free nations should be covered by such pacts.

(b) Conditions to the effect that any armed attack by any State against any of the countries party to this pact is an armed attack against all those countries, which, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, each party to the pact undertakes immediately provide any other party that is attacked by any state, any possible military, economic and other assistance and assistance.

(c) An agreement to consult between all these parties in the event that either side considers that it is threatened by an armed attack or indirect aggression.

a) The right to establish such agencies as may be necessary for the effective execution of this treaty, including the drawing up of plans for taking prompt and effective action in accordance with paragraph B above.

f) Valid for 10 years, with automatic renewal for five years, provided that the treaty is not denounced.

7) When circumstances permit, Germany (or the three western zones), Austria (or the three western zones) and Spain must accede to the Treaty of Brussels and to the security pact for the North Atlantic region. This goal, which should not be publicly announced, can be secured by including in the security pact a suitable article for the accession of these countries.

8) Political and military negotiations must be started immediately with the signatories of the Brussels Treaty, and in due course with the parties to the security pact, with a view to coordinating their military and other anti-communist efforts and strengthening their collective security."

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No. 12 Top Secret April 1948

MESSAGE FROM THE CI RESIDENCE

Documents received by the British Foreign Office relating to the Washington talks allow the following conclusions to be drawn:

1. The British are strenuously seeking official American support for the Treaty of Brussels and the projected security pact for the North Atlantic region as well. They are clearly concerned about the desire of the Americans to limit their guarantees only to a presidential declaration, which, without the support of Congress, will not bind the US government to any obligations.

pledges.

2. In a conversation with the British Ambassador in Washington, Deputy Secretary of State LOVETT stated that the US government in an election year would not be able to go beyond the President's declaration and recommended that the parties to the Brussels Treaty begin to develop plans to strengthen their own security.

3. BEVIN objects to the American proposal to put pressure on the Scandinavian countries with a view to the latter's immediate accession to the Brussels Treaty and proposes a thorough discussion of the best tactical approach to these countries. He fears that quick action and brute pressure on those countries may lead to undesirable obstinacy on their part and a possible refusal to join the Brussels Treaty.

BEVIN recommends that the British negotiators take their time on this issue in order to avoid "accepting insufficiently considered American proposals."

The new draft security pact for the North Atlantic region developed by the British defines the USA, Canada, England and France as the main participants. The project also provides for the accession to the pact of any state that has joined the Brussels Treaty.

It is clear from the correspondence that the question of the Pacific security system is also raised in the course of the Washington talks. BEVIN advocates that this issue should be dealt with entirely separately after the negotiations on the North Atlantic Pact, and that Europe "would not play too big a role" in this. According to BEVIN, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa should be involved in these negotiations as directly interested countries.

CI Resident

No. 13 Top Secret April 1948 MESSAGE FROM THE KI RESIDENCE

During the past two weeks secret Anglo-American negotiations have taken place in Washington. The first stage of negotiations ended on April 1 this year.

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The purpose of the talks was to work out (without any commitment by either side) a plan to unite the US and Canada and all the non-communist states of Europe in a defensive alliance or alliances."

April 1 this year such a plan was worked out by the negotiators. According to this plan, negotiations should begin (if possible in secret) between the representatives of France, the Benelux, the US and the UK in Washington, if possible within 1-2 weeks.

At the opening of negotiations, the Americans will propose the following course of action:

1. The governments of the USA, Great Britain and France will have to inform the governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and, if de GASPERI? wins the election, Italy, that the President of the United States is willing to send an invitation to participate in a conference to discuss the conclusion of an agreement on the collective defense of the North Atlantic area at the base reported below, and also to guarantee full American support until the conclusion of this agreement countries that signed the pact in Brussels on 17 March this year. and any other European country that will join this pact. The American, British and French governments will ask the governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Italy whether they are willing to join the pact signed in Brussels and accept the invitation to participate in the work of the conference with a view to concluding a north

Atlantic agreement.

2. Upon acceptance of the invitation by all countries, the President shall publicly send invitations to participate in the North Atlantic Conference to the following countries: Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Eire, or or rather, those who agree to accept such an invitation during the preliminary negotiations. Simultaneously with the issuance of official invitations, the President will publicly give guarantees to the countries that signed the pact in Brussels and those countries that will join the Brussels pact, before the conclusion of the Atlantic agreement.

The US President, the British government and possibly the French one, will also have to give some kind of guarantee to the group of countries like Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark and Italy that may decide not to join the Brussels Pact.

3. The President of the United States and the British Government will simultaneously have to publicly guarantee full assistance in case of aggression against Greece, Turkey and Iran, in order to avoid creating the impression that the "independence" of these countries is given less importance than "independence" of European countries.

4. The President's public statement will also indicate the nature of the proposed Atlantic agreement. The main reference will be made to Article 51 of the UN Charter and this agreement will oblige each country to consider an armed attack on any other country as an armed attack against its own country and as a result of this each country will have to come to the aid of another country.

This condition will apply to the following countries: USA, UK, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Eire.

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But this agreement will formulate one of the articles in such a way that at a later stage Spain, the three western zones of Germany and Austria will be allowed to join. (Switzerland is omitted from this list because the Americans and the British believe that Switzerland will not, under any circumstances, depart from its traditional policy of neutrality.)

The agreement will be extended to the following territories: the US continent (including Alaska, but excludes Hawaii and the American islands in the Pacific Ocean), Canada, the continental territories of European countries, as well as all islands and dependent territories in the North Atlantic (New Foundland, Greenland, Iceland, Bermuda, Azores, Spitz Bergen, Faroe Islands).

This agreement will also come into effect in the event of an attack on the armed forces located in Europe: in the western zones of Germany, Austria, Trieste and Greece.

The US President will explain that it is hoped that other parts of the world will conclude similar agreements in due course, namely the countries of the Pacific and the Middle East.

Although the agreement may contain some vague articles on the economic and social cooperation of countries, however, in essence it will be a purely military agreement.

This agreement will have a clause regarding military cooperation in peacetime and the president will publicly announce that there is a proposal to start military negotiations.

In contrast to the agreement signed in Rio de Janeiro?!, this agreement will not have a constitutional body, according to which participation in collective action against the aggressor will depend on the vote.

The common language of the agreement will be taken mainly from Brussels and Rio de Janeiro pacts.

This agreement will preferably avoid reference to Articles 52, 93, 54 of the UN Charter in order to avoid the suggestion that this agreement is a "regional arrangement" in the sense of Article 52 of the Charter and that the application of action under that Article is subject to prior the consent of the Security Council, as referred to in Article 53 of the Charter. Therefore, the emphasis will be placed on Article 51 of the charter.

The foregoing is the plan of action on which agreed decisions were made during the Washington talks.

During the negotiations, the British and Canadian delegations consulted with their governments. Although the British and Canadian governments did not commit themselves to the details of the negotiations, these governments declared their agreement on general issues. The position of the American government, however, is different.

In the negotiation process HICKERSON? did not have the opportunity to get acquainted with the point of view of MARSHALL and LOVETTAZ. Therefore, HICKERSON stated on April 1 this year that his first task would be to consult with LOVETT and MARSHALL. If MARSHALL and LOVETT agree to the decision of the meeting, LOVETT will then have the consent of the President and FORRESTAL."

If all of the aforementioned agree to the meeting's decision, then LOVETT will secretly consult with Senators VANDENBERG and CONNELLY, and possibly with some other leaders of the congress.

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gressa. If the latter also agree to the proposal of the meeting, then invitations should be immediately sent to the governments of England, France and the Benelux countries to begin immediately the initial negotiations. HICKERSON believes that he can get the consent of all the above-mentioned American politicians, at best, by the end of next week, but more plausibly - in two weeks.

HICKERSON pointed out, as was obvious from the beginning of the negotiations, that the issue still remains open, since it is not yet known whether the above-mentioned American politicians will agree to proposals for Americans to assume certain treaty obligations to European countries. There is a significant risk that American politicians will consider it sufficient to give the countries that signed the pact in Brussels and some other countries only a presidential guarantee.

HICKERSON agrees with the view of the British and Canadians that certain treaty obligations should be obtained from the United States, since only such a treaty, ratified by the Senate, is valid for delivery to governments.

Therefore, the next step will be a secret consultation of the State Department with leading American figures.

The purpose of this plan is to contain the further "expansion" of the Soviet Union in two directions, and exactly:

a) Encourage the countries of Europe to hold out to the end against communist pressure from within and pressure from the Soviet Union from without.

It is believed that Norway, Denmark and Italy need such encouragement immediately. It is assumed that Sweden may refuse to join the Brussels pact or the proposed North Atlantic agreement, but that Sweden's position on this issue must be clarified. The same applies to Iceland and Eyre, although for completely different reasons.

6) Warn the Soviet government that any significant move on its part to further communize any country mentioned will entail military action by the US (and other signatories of the agreement).

It should be especially noted that Finland is tacitly left to be "eaten" by the Soviet Union.

Another major issue is that of so-called indirect aggression. During the negotiations there was repeated discussion of the most pressing practical problem, namely, whether the agreement would apply if, for example, the Communists gained control of the Italian or French governments by ordinary electoral procedure and without the use of armed force. All representatives answered in the negative. They agreed that there is no weapon against this, except for the use of political and economic means, such as the Trieste Trieste Declaration and the MARSHALL Plan. But all participants in the meeting agreed that the armed action of the communists in Italy against the Italian government could be regarded by any country as an armed attack. In such a case, military measures may be taken, in accordance with the proposed agreement.

GEBB stated that the British understood the Brussels Pact in this sense, although the French, thanks to the strength of the Communists in France, refused

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during the talks in Brussels from discussing the question of possible actions against indirect aggression. Therefore, GEBB strongly recommended not to include a clause on indirect aggression in the proposed agreement or in the presidential statement. At the last stage of the negotiations, this was withdrawn.

All these measures are a diplomatic offensive against the Soviet Union. Anglo-American-Canadian staff talks will be held in the next few weeks, which may be of even greater interest than the talks just concluded in Washington.

The military staff talks will have as their aim the working out of joint plans:

A) For an unknown indefinite event, namely, in case of war within the next few weeks or months;

C) In case of war in 1955-1956.

The Anglo-Americans believe that by that date the Soviet Union will have sufficient atomic bombs and can consciously risk war.

General HOLLIS is making arrangements to participate in these negotiations. The participants in the staff talks will be members of the United Planning Staff of England, the USA and Canada.

So far, it is not known that representatives of the three countries will come to a joint decision during the staff talks that in the event of war, the first object against which an atomic attack will be carried out will be Baku and the oil regions surrounding it.

Resident of KI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 14 Top Secret April 1948 MESSAGE FROM THE KI RESIDENCE

Reported talks STETTINIUS? dated April 5, 1948 in Algiers with representatives of the French and British governments on the issue of Franco-Anglo-American military cooperation in the Mediterranean basin.

After a meeting between STETTINIUS and representatives of the French government on April 2 this year. in Dakar, April 5 this year. STETTINIUS held a meeting in Algiers with former French Prime Minister RAMADIE and British Minister of War SHINWELL on the issue of Franco-Anglo-American military cooperation in the Mediterranean basin:

April 8 this year STETTINIUS continued negotiations in London with the participation of the President of the Union of British Industrialists, Sir Frederick Bain, and the President of the Union economic cooperation.

Similar negotiations with FRANCO? TRUMAN's personal representative in the Vatican, Myron TAYLOR, led the French Foreign Minister BIDO, on behalf of the Pope, negotiated with the FRANCO representative in Paris on April 7, 1948.

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The reservations of the British Minister of War SHINWELL did not prevent the implementation of American intentions in these negotiations, both in relation to Spain and in general in the Mediterranean basin.

As a result of negotiations, an agreement was reached that the STETTINIUS group would begin its activities in France, using its agent LAZAREV (the publisher of the newspaper France Soir) for this. In this direction, RAMADIEUS, on behalf of Prime Minister SCHUMANN, gave STETTINIUS full guarantees.

In accordance with the views of US Secretary of War FORRESTAL regarding the use of private capital to carry out US military plans, it was decided at the meeting to give all ongoing military activities a private character. STETTINIUS at the same time guaranteed the participation of American private capital in the amount of 250 million dollars so far directed to the construction of air bases in the Mediterranean basin. Work begun last year on the construction of these bases will now be intensified.

As a result of the talks, it is also planned this year to create in Europe the so-called "security areas", which, while formally under the joint control of European countries, will in fact serve as a cover for American garrisons, both ground and air.

The American diplomatic representatives in Europe, CAFFERY, DOUGLAS, DEWEY, and MURPHY, received detailed instructions in this direction.

Resident of KI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 15 Top Secret May 1948 COMMUNICATION FROM THE CI RESIDENCE ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY PACT

The implementation of the planned activities for the conclusion of the North Atlantic Security Pact has undergone some changes in recent times. The American government has come to

decision that he should not seek Senate approval of the proposed measures and, in any case, Senate approval cannot be obtained during the current session of Congress.

KENNANUYA, who was in Japan during the discussion of the arrangements for the conclusion of the North Atlantic Security Pact, stated privately to BALFOUR (the British envoy in Washington) that he personally doubted the necessity of concluding a formal pact at this stage. He argued that the Soviet government, as well as the governments of the Western European countries, are well aware that the United States will enter the war in the event of an armed action by the Soviet Union against any Western European country.

KENNAN also added that the conclusion of a formal pact could unnecessarily provoke the Soviet Union and anticipate

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on his part an attack on the Western European countries, which we are trying to avoid. In the same spirit, SICK? spoke to Balfour. MARSHALL pointed out to INVERCHAPEL® that he was of the same opinion as KENNAN.

The British embassy in Washington suggests that the reluctance of KENNAN and BOHLEN to "provoke" the Soviet Union may have been caused in part by the fact that at that time the Americans were waiting for Moscow's response to SMITH's statement. regarding the advisability of concluding a formal pact, VANDENBERG, with the support of the State Department, submitted, as can be seen from the press, his resolution to the Senate, which provides the basis for the conclusion of the North Atlantic Security Pact or other regional pacts, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter as planned during the talks in Washington on this issue.

State Department officials told the source privately that the State Department intends, as soon as this resolution is passed by the Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee, to begin negotiations in Washington between representatives of the United States, Britain, France and the Benelux countries, as was the case. planned.

During these negotiations, the following issues may be discussed:

1. Possible conclusion of a North Atlantic security pact.
2. Expanding the number of participants in the Brussels Pact by including Italy, Norway and Denmark.
3. Coordination of military policy, especially the policy of supplying and equipping the armed forces of England, France and the Benelux countries.

The Standing Military Committee, which was recently organized in London by the five countries participating in the Brussels Pact, has just drawn up a document on the present plans for military cooperation between these countries.

This document sets out:

Problems of a common command, a coordinated supply and equipment program for the armed forces, common strategic intentions in the event of an immediate war with the Soviet Union and manpower reserves.

This document is written in very general terms for the following two reasons:

1. The British are faced with the fact that the French, Belgians, Dutch and Luxemburgers have insufficient joint precautions against communist infiltration. That's why

The British cannot yet take the risk of handing over any military information of a secret nature to their colleagues.

2. Since the main purpose of the document is to convince American politicians and especially Congress about the efforts that are being made by the countries that have signed the Brussels Pact, it was not possible for this document to present any information of great secrecy.

It should be noted that the second major issue for the British at the beginning of the work of the military committee of the five countries was to convince the French, Dutch and Belgians to take concerted action, equivalent to the actions of the British MI5 to check the integrity of the personnel of all relevant military circles and not allow the penetration of the communists into these circles. The British also insisted on the need to standardize measures for the classification and preservation of secret documents.

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A particularly important security problem is that the ciphers of the French, Dutch and Belgians are not sufficiently secret, since the British have been reading the cipher correspondence of these countries for many years.

In this regard, the British faced the following facts:

1. Leave these countries with the ciphers they have now and be able to read them, assuming that the ciphers of these countries are also readable by Russians, or

Recommend these countries to introduce new secure British encryption methods, but this will lead to the fact that they will lose the ability to read the cipher correspondence of these countries, along with this, the Russians will be deprived of the opportunity to read this correspondence as well.

The British decided to recommend these countries to change the encryption method. But the Americans, with whom the British consulted on this matter two weeks ago, disagreed with the British decision, declaring that the Communists in these countries had penetrated so deeply that the introduction of new cipher systems would not save the situation, since the ciphers could be handed over to the Russians, and England and the United States would lose the secrecy of their correspondence with France, Belgium, and Holland, while not gaining any advantage from the change in encryption methods.

Resident of KI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

There is a mark on the document: "Reported by com. Stalin I.V., Molotov V.M., Vyshinsky A.Ya. - Approx. comp.

No. 16 Top Secret May 1948 MESSAGE FROM THE KI RESIDENCE

A telegram is reported from Paris to the British Foreign Office.

Urgent Secret

Western Union.

Tonight, Mr. BIDO? gave me a copy of the memorandum he had just delivered to the American ambassador concerning the French government's concern about the international situation, the need for the United States government to take urgent measures to strengthen the position of the Western states and, in particular, France (see my immediately following telegram) .

2. Mr. BIDO said that, in the opinion of the French Government, bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Government would be unsatisfactory and that the three Powers should continue close cooperation. He also reaffirmed his decision that there should be no change in the policy of firm opposition to Soviet pressure and the continuation of the reconstruction of Western Europe. French rule

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The Government, however, wishes to emphasize the real need for the Government of the United States to take concrete measures of assistance. It believes that now is the time for direct consultation between the three Governments.

M. BIDO declared that this memorandum, which he had just given me, concerning the tripartite negotiations on Germany (see my telegram No. 686), reveals another side of the same concern of the French Government. The greatest precautions must be taken to ensure that tripartite action in Germany does not give the Soviet government the opportunity to hasten the crisis at a time when the Western Powers will be ill-prepared to deal with it.

Resident of KI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 17 Top Secret

May 1948 MESSAGE FROM THE KI RESIDENCE

A telegram is reported from Paris to the Foreign Office on May 20, 1948.

Repeated in Brussels The Hague Washington

Urgent Secret

Western Union.

The participation of France in the conclusion of the Pact of Brussels and in the negotiations on the question of the military organization of the five powers, as well as the messages sent on several occasions by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. international situation and his conviction of the need to take urgent action in the face of the dangers threatening the Western powers.

The French Government knows that the Government of the United States shares its feelings and, for its part, has taken concrete steps in this direction, among which the program of European reconstruction is of particular importance.

It has no doubt that the latest Soviet-American talks in Moscow were inspired by the same anxiety. The current and coming years are indeed especially dangerous for the Western world, because the efforts made to organize their defense have barely entered their initial phase, and it will take several years before they begin to bear fruit. The risk resulting from this state of affairs is especially dangerous for France, in view of its geographical position, and French public opinion is fully aware of this fact.

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Therefore, the French Government fully appreciates the advantages that will result from an eventual easing of the tension that exists between the Soviet Union and the Western world.

At the same time, it seems to him that it is of paramount importance to preserve the unity of policy and action between the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom

and France. It believes that this unity of policy and action should be based on the following principles:

1. As pointed out by the Secretary of State at his press conference on April 13, the method of separate negotiations is not in principle satisfactory. The three powers must continue to be in close contact, both in discussion and in decisions.
2. The firm policy of the opposition in relation to all Soviet measures and the further building of Western Europe in the political, economic and military fields must remain unchanged.
3. The organization of the defense of the Western world must be carried out steadily and without delay. The Government of the United States is aware of the appeals made to it on this matter by the Western Powers signatories of the Brussels Pact, and is aware of the uneasiness with which they, in particular France, await concrete measures to help.
4. At the same time, and in the absence of any contradiction to the foregoing, we must avoid as far as possible such a course of action (such a procedure) that could give the current policy the impression of a challenge in the eyes of the Soviet government.
5. The program of action currently under consideration in London raises, from this point of view, a number of observations, which are set out in another document.

Finally, the French Government, in view of all the foregoing, considers, in accordance with the opinions expressed in the messages of the Foreign Ministers to the Secretary of State of the United States, that the present development of the international situation makes direct consultation between the American, British and French Governments urgently necessary. in whatever form is most appropriate.

Resident of KI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 18 Top Secret May 1948 MESSAGE FROM THE KI RESIDENCE

We are transmitting the contents of the telegram of the British envoy to the USA, Balfour, sent from Washington to the Foreign Office on the issue of security talks.

Urgent Owl. secret

To your telegram 5364 - security talks

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Together with MCNEILOM, and acting on your behalf, I conveyed your message to BOHLEN* and KENNAN today to convey to Mr. MARSHALL? and discussed it with them in detail. HICKERSON* was also present.

2. Both BOLEN and KENNAN, and especially the latter, have shown perhaps a greater receptivity to your argument in favor of the North Atlantic Pact than I had supposed from previous conversations with him.

3. But they touched on difficulties already known to us, such as the possible consequences of isolating Sweden if we succeed in involving Norway and Denmark, and the risk that, in the event of a pact, there might be too sharp a distinction between countries belonging to the Atlantic territory and not belonging to it, generally in the north. Here I thought it appropriate to point out that there is also a danger that Norway and Denmark may be drawn into the Swedish mousetrap.

and that, with regard to willingness to join the pact in general, the United States should not underestimate its power of attraction.

4. They said that they themselves had not yet reached definite conclusions as to the impact that the opening of negotiations on such a pact would have on the Soviet Government.

5. By pointing out that there could be no question of the Senate ratifying the pact at this session of Congress, they touched, though without much emphasis, on the internal impediments that stand in the way of starting real negotiations in an election year. They did not dispute that the matter would be somewhat facilitated in this respect if—as they firmly hoped—the resolutions of the Senate Commission would pass through the Senate itself and the corresponding action would be taken by the House.

6. They understand and agree with the conclusion in your message that, leaving aside its effect on the Russians, the cause of the North Atlantic Pact depends to a large extent on its psychological value for the North Atlantic countries. Declaring that, by virtue of things, America would now automatically be involved in the event of Soviet aggression against any Western European country, they readily admitted that this fact may not always be known or inspire sufficient confidence abroad.

7. We have said that if no positive action follows the expected decisions of Congress, or if these actions are delayed, say, until next January, then doubts about American intentions can easily spread and that, in any case, it is wise to forge iron while it is hot. We also pointed out that if there were quadripartite talks, then the rest of the participants might consider this a perigee, unless the American representatives themselves were authorized to propose some kind of multilateral treaty obligations that would include the United States.

8. By the end of the conversation, KENNAN said that he personally welcomed the arrival of your message at this very moment, that it would be communicated immediately to Mr. MARSHALL, and that this confirmation of your views would be invaluable to the State Department in its further consideration. all this business. He repeatedly emphasized that his and BOLEN's failure to give a more positive response to our arguments should not be construed as signifying a negative decision.

9. I believe that KENNAN and BOLEN, at the very least, have not yet taken a final decision on the start of negotiations on a pact in the near future. But I am convinced that all "for" and "against" the North Atlantic Pact will now be weighed again in the highest authorities and what

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in the light of your message, the argument in favor of it will be heard fairly and completely.

10. With regard to the quadripartite talks, KENNAN personally clearly did not understand that the government was already committed to them, just as he did not understand what the agenda was originally intended for them. HICKERSON, who clarified these points to him, seems to think that while the United States is unable at this stage to commit itself to negotiating the pact, other negotiators could take advantage of this opportunity to express their views on the matter. Together with a discussion of the ways and means of coordinating the military plans of the powers that signed the Brussels Treaty, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, this could, in his opinion, be sufficient, at least as an event to gain time.

11. As things stand, it would seem far better, it seems, not to attempt to proceed with the quadripartite negotiations until the Government has properly discussed again whether it may or may not venture into the first round of pact negotiations. I am aware that further delay may cause complications with France and the Benelux countries, and that in the event of an unfavorable decision by the Government on the question of the pact, negotiations will obviously

would have to be carried out on the basis of something like the limited agenda proposed by HICKERSON. Still, a delay seems to be the right tactic. If you agree with this, then I will talk to HICKERSON in this spirit. I would be grateful for instructions from you.

Resident of KI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 19 Top secret

May 1948 MESSAGE FROM THE KI RESIDENCE

We are transmitting the contents of the telegram sent from Washington to the Foreign Office on the issue of security negotiations.

Urgent Sov. secret

Security talks.

Together with a letter from LOVETT® explaining that in Mr. MARSHALL's absence he is forwarding it to you, I received today the following message from Mr. MARSHALL to you:

"Secretary of State MARSHALL got Mr. BEVIN's message? dated 14 May and am grateful to him for expounding his views on the question of the Defense Pact for the North Atlantic region. He recognizes the importance that Mr. BEVIN attaches to further progress in uniting free nations in the face of the aggressive positions of other countries, and the important role of a possible North Atlantic Pact in solving this problem. Mr. BEVIN is aware of the fervent desire of the American government

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to help strengthen the forces of the free nations in Europe to resist aggression and to be sure that they can do so successfully, and to help ward off aggression by making it clear that it will respond immediately and vigorously to any armed attack affecting his national security.

Mr. BEVIN probably drew attention to the resolution adopted unanimously on May 19th by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which recommends the participation of the United States, in accordance with constitutional procedure, in such regional and other collective agreements as are based on permanent self-help and mutual aid and which are relevant to their national security. He certainly noted the significance of the paragraph of that resolution recommending that the United States make clear its determination to exercise its right of individual or collective self-defence if any armed attack affecting its national security were made. The commission's report emphasizes that the lessons of the First and Second World Wars show that the best means of deterring aggression is the certainty of the use of immediate effective countermeasures, and that the United States, having made it clear in advance that such an attack will be promptly followed by an American response, "does an important step towards eliminating any kind of dangerous uncertainty that could mislead would-be aggressors."

This resolution reflects the development of public opinion in the United States on these matters, and the seriousness and goodwill with which they are being studied in Washington. Secretary of State MARSHALL believes that the importance of these matters, and the need to gain wide and complete public support in the United States, require the utmost foresight and caution, and the full development of the facts. Hasty or ill-prepared action can easily cause division instead of unity both in the United States and among European countries. It would be clear to Mr. BEVIN that it would not be possible to complete the necessary negotiations on these matters in time to enable Congress to discuss them at the current session. However, the time interval

between the imminent end of the current session of Congress and the opening of its new session in January could be well used to explore the issues and negotiations that would be necessary in any case. The United States will, of course, carefully study the views of England, France and the Benelux countries in the process of these negotiations.

Resident of KI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 20 Top Secret

June 1948

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade VYSHINSKY AY.

We report the text of the telegram from the British Ambassador in Washington, Oliver FRANKS, to the British Foreign Office dated June 14, 1948.

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"This morning I finally got the opportunity to see MARSHALL. He began the conversation with regret that he could not receive me earlier due to the need to attend the meetings of Congress. During a very friendly conversation, I had the opportunity to convey to him your point of view on the following unresolved issues:

2. Negotiations on the issue of security. I delivered to MARSHALL in writing the message contained in §§ 3-5 of your telegram no.

Having outlined the content of this document and stressed the need to avoid worsening the European situation, I mentioned the answer to the LOVETT? questionnaire. MARSHALL immediately said that he congratulated the author, whose answer inevitably raises questions that should be discussed again in detail during the negotiations.

3. MARSHALL then remarked that in setting the date for the quadripartite talks, the position of Congress and the reaction from the Russians must be taken into account. He pointed out that last week's adoption of the VANDENBERG resolution? cleared the way for the organization of military negotiations. The position of the government will be strengthened if the House of Representatives makes the same decision before it adjourns its work at the end of this week. But even if the House of Representatives does not do so, as MARSHALL assured me, the government will organize military negotiations in the very near future.

4. After that, I declared the desirability of postponing such negotiations, which would include consideration of the conclusion of something like a pact. MARSHALL noted that the Russian factor is especially important in determining the moment for the start of negotiations on concluding such a pact. He believes that if we force the pace extremely fast in this area, then we can cause the very consequences that we are trying to avoid.

KENNAN, who was present at this conversation, also stated that the political side of this matter must be approached with caution, since some interested Powers may be

unclear aspects of the conclusion of the pact.

5. From what MARSHALL and KENNAN have said, I have inferred that although the Government is inclined to take part in negotiations for a pact in the not too distant future, it has yet to decide on the form and exact date of these negotiations. At the same time, MARSHALL left me in no doubt that the US government was ready in the very near future to take part, as he put it, in "calm military negotiations" with the participants in the Brussels Treaty. This is, of course, a new concept, but it seems to represent the direction in which American thought is working.

6. Your letter of 3 June. Omitting what is stated in the first two §§ of your letter, since I have already said this before (see § 2 above), I conveyed your comments to MARSHALL. He treated them favorably. Turning next to your remarks on the program of European reconstruction, I told him that I had previously had a satisfactory conversation with THORPE.

7. Former Italian colonies. I presented your point of view to MARSHALL, and after I drew his attention to the calculation of the time that we must adhere to in our work, I asked him to arrange a meeting in the near future.

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time for an exchange of views between the official authorities. He stated that he welcomed the organization of the discussion as soon as possible, and, in his opinion, it would be useful if Michael Wright (Advisor to the British Foreign Office) took part in the exchange of views here (in Washington).

I hope to let you know the timing in a day or two.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov K. Rodionov

#21 Top secret

June 1948

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade VYSHINSKY AY.

MESSAGE FROM THE CI RESIDENCE

We are reporting the contents of the telegram from the British Foreign Office to our representatives in 22 countries dated June 10, 1948.

western union

1. The Standing Committee has held 10 meetings so far.

2. Much time was devoted to preparing the necessary security conditions under which secret military and political work could be carried out without fear. Although this task is very difficult, given the poor security conditions in the military ministries of some of our allies, significant progress has been made towards its resolution.

3. At the meeting of the Standing Committee on 1 June, the representative of the United Kingdom made a statement on the question of Palestine, setting out the position of His Majesty's Government and expressing the hope that the other four Powers would take a similar position.

On 3 June the discussion of this problem continued, and the Belgian representative announced his government's readiness to send observers to the Armistice Commission.

4. At the meeting of the Standing Committee on 3 June, it was considered desirable to convene a meeting of the Advisory Council in the near future. It was proposed that it take place in The Hague before 17 July. This proposal is subject to further discussion and approval. It seems likely that this meeting will take place at the end of July.

5. The delegation of the United Kingdom presented a paper containing proposals for the implementation of the social decisions contained in Article 2 of the Brussels Treaty.

It will take two or three weeks before the views of the other four governments are known and before further negotiations on this issue resume.

6. The Military Committee continues to work slowly but persistently. No response has yet been received to the message sent to the US Ambassador on May 14, in which

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the Military Committee's preliminary replies to American questions were kept. In anticipation of Washington's response to this message, the committee continued its activities and significantly advanced work on the calculation of military resources, as well as on the preparation of the issue of standardization of weapons.

It is expected that a proposal will soon be made to create a kind of "management of military reserves", which will coordinate production and supply.

None of the foregoing is intended to be communicated to any of your colleagues, and the information contained in paragraph 6 must be treated as top secret.

Resident of KI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 22 Top Secret June 1948

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV, To N.A. Bulganin

MESSAGE FROM THE CI RESIDENCE

The State Department has certain obligations to Britain, France and the Benelux countries to open any "negotiations" for American military assistance to the countries that have signed the Brussels Pact. Therefore, under any circumstances, negotiations between the US and the countries of the Western bloc must take place.

The disagreement in the State Department, which the source reported earlier, relates to the question of what the Americans should offer the countries involved in the negotiations or what they should agree to during the negotiations.

According to the plan developed in March of this year. JEBBOM, HICKERSON, and PIERSONOMIEOW (representative of Canada), the talks in Washington should have been aimed at working out a certain list of political actions aimed at creating an Atlantic pact. IS ILL? and, to a lesser extent, KENNAN, who did not take part in the March talks, are, however, skeptical about the advisability of concluding such a pact. Differences in the State Department remained unresolved, pending the passage of the VANDENBERG® resolution by Congress and the adjournment of Congress.

Until June 25 of this year. disagreements in the State Department were not yet resolved. But despite this, negotiations will open in Washington on June 29 or 30 and are expected to take place within two weeks. LOVETT*! already informed the press about these talks, but did not name the date of their opening. The talks will be known to the public, however, an attempt will be made to keep the content of the talks secret.

The negotiations will be attended by: the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and, possibly, the envoy of Luxembourg, as well as employees of the respective embassies. Canada will also take part in the talks and it is expected that for this purpose from Ottawa to Washington with

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will be PEARSON. (Source note: Canada's participation in these talks is a change to the March plan for negotiators. According to the March plan, Canada was excluded from the lists of countries that would have to take part in the talks). From the side of the Americans, the following will take part in the negotiations: LOVETT, BOLEN, KENNAN,

HICKERSON and ACHILLES?. The observer will be General GRUNTER from the FORRESTOLAZ apparatus. Military representatives of other countries will not take part in the negotiations.

Conference agenda:

1. The current situation in Europe and especially the question of Russian intentions there.
2. Steps already taken by Western bloc countries on the issue of defense.
3. The possibility of developing relations between the countries of the Western bloc and other European countries (the accession of Italy, Norway and Denmark to the Western bloc).
4. The attitude of the USA and Canada to the European powers.

Based on the agenda, during these negotiations the plan worked out in Washington in March of this year will be discussed.

The real difference between these negotiations and the negotiation plan outlined in March this year is that the Americans will take part in them without having specific instructions about their position.

It is assumed that after these talks there will be military talks between the US and the countries of the Western bloc.

A date for military talks has not yet been set.

Resident of KI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 23 Top secret

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade N.A. Bulganin To Comrade VYSHINSKY AY.

We are reporting the content of the telegram from the British Ambassador in Washington to the British Foreign Office dated June 23 of this year. and a report from our resident in Washington regarding the negotiations on the North Atlantic Security Pact.

1. Negotiations between the United States and the countries of the Western Alliance on the issue of the North Atlantic Pact, scheduled for June 29-30 this year, at the insistence of the American military authorities, were postponed to 6 July.

2. The US government has already worked out a plan for negotiating this pact. According to the plan, issues of military cooperation between the United States and Western European powers will not be discussed at the first stage of negotiations, and only the political aspects of the pact will be considered. The British Ambassador expresses satisfaction that the Americans agreed to return to the original plan of political negotiations worked out in Washington in March of this year.

The military representatives of the countries of the Western Union and Canada will not participate in the talks, however, at the insistence of the US military circles, the representative of FORRESTOL*, General GRUNTER, will take part in the talks.

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The first meeting will be chaired by US Under Secretary of State LOVETT®. The Americans intend to create a working group for negotiating, which will include the head of the European department of the State Department HICKERSON% and the head of the Western European department ACHILLES.

The US State Department attaches great importance to the fact that the negotiations take place in the strictest secrecy, and suggests that the British not inform the French and representatives of the Benelux countries about the previous security talks held in March this year.

3. The Americans intend to resolve issues of a purely military nature through bilateral negotiations, which they plan to hold after the presidential elections. HICKERSON told the British on this occasion that he foresaw the need for "separate talks" later this year on military cooperation, focusing on issues such as the standardization of armaments.

HICKERSON, in a conversation with the British envoy in Washington, BALFOUR, warned the latter that some senior officials of the State Department still needed to be convinced of the expediency of concluding a pact. He said that the US government was of the view that whatever form the pact took, it should be drafted in such a way that it could be expected to be ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. HICKERSON went on to point out to BALFOUR that the American government was faced with the task of convincing the Senate and public opinion of the country that the other parties to the agreement would be prevented from shifting their military obligations onto the shoulders of the United States.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov K. Rodionov

July 3, 1948

#24 Top secret

Comrade STALIN I.V. To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade N.A. Bulganin

Comrade Zorin V.A.

Directive letter of the British Foreign Office No. 301 dated July 23 to its diplomatic representatives in 22 countries

"In connection with my letter no.

Second meeting of the Advisory Board.

Generally speaking, the meeting was a great achievement and the communiqué reflects the Council's determination to make further progress on the Western Union.

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The following is an overview of the discussions on the principal issues. This review should be sent to a limited number of your staff.

Negotiations in Washington

It was obvious that the French and, to some extent, the Belgian delegations were embarrassed by the sluggishness of the American procedure.

It was pretty clear that they did not understand the difficulties inherent in any form of American guarantee. They are inclined to argue that the only elements of the current situation are, on the one hand, the physical presence of American troops in Germany and, on the other hand, the recent arrival of American and Canadian military experts in London to participate in the work of the standing military committee. . Both delegations furthermore believe that any "Atlantic" defense scheme is likely to be over-extended, especially in view of the fact that, in their opinion, there will be tendencies to be the operational clause of any agreement made with the Americans. on this basis, in accordance with

principles of the Rio® treaty, making such a scheme too weak for any practical purpose.

2. Generally speaking, I tried to dispel these doubts and fears and received vigorous support from the Dutch. I admitted, of course, that the American technique of conducting these negotiations is tedious, but still we must remember that now it is all up to them and that, in any case, the Americans definitely want to buy time. I believe that there are many theoretical ways to get around the difficulties highlighted by BIDOTT and SPAACOML, we can, for example, have in mind some ways for the United States to join the Brussels Pact powers, while at the same time not objecting, and in fact even encouraging, some parallel system that can cover at least part of the North Atlantic region. I did not press the idea, however, and in the end it was decided that the Standing Committee would take the next opportunity to draw up an agreed directive to our five representatives in Washington.

I also suggested, and was ultimately agreed upon, that the objectives set out in this directive be as follows:

a) Try to find out exactly how much the Americans are interested in their idea of an Atlantic defense agreement and whether they put forward this idea with really serious intentions.
idea.

6) If that is the case, then we should then give her heartfelt support, as it would be reckless to discourage the Americans in any way. In fact, our main goal will be to obtain from the Americans a commitment that they will take part in the defense of Western Europe in one way or another.

c) At this stage, present a united front, insisting as soon as we can on the inclusion in any treaty that may be drawn up of some obligation which is more binding than the obligations contained in the Rio Treaty.

German question

3. I took the opportunity to explain to my colleagues the prehistory of the German question and the steps by which we gradually came to a real impasse.

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I told them that our intention was to take a firm stand in Berlin, but that in connection with the drafting of the answer to the last Soviet note, I came to the conclusion that the Western Powers had made such great progress lately that we could afford to be moderate in tone.

I therefore put forward the idea that we should propose that the discussion of the Berlin question between the four powers should be expanded as soon as possible in such a way as to cover not only the German but the whole European situation. Such pressure on us in Berlin was removed. There was general agreement on this line.

The meeting served well in that it helped the five Foreign Ministers to reach agreement on a common position to be taken with regard to the situation in Berlin and in Germany.

military matters

4. The Ministers were informed by a special report of the activities of the Standing Military Committee and expressed their satisfaction with the progress made.

It was felt, however, that the time had come for the Minister of Defense of the Five Powers to take a decision on the question of organizing the defense of the Five Powers, and also on the question of a strategic concept for the defense of Western Europe.

To this end, it was proposed and agreed that recommendations should be sent to the Ministers of Defense of the five Powers that, in order to carry out this task, they should meet at the end of August.

Economic and financial issues

5. The main discussion was in connection with the resolution, the meaning of which is that the Council will welcome the convening of a meeting of the Ministers of Economy and Finance in the near future with the aim of:

a) Studying the results of economic and financial cooperation between the five powers since the signing of the Brussels Treaty.

6) Exploring what further action can be taken to harmonize the long-term policies of the respective governments.

c) Consideration of the question of the desirability of cooperation in matters outside the scope of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, provided that such consideration does not in any way duplicate the work done by that organization.

6. This resolution was mainly the result of sentiment on the part of the Benelux countries, supported by the French. All these delegations emphatically maintained that, in spite of all the difficulties, and in view of the undeniable fact that within the Organization for European Economic From an economic and financial point of view, try to determine in what aspects a closer alliance between the powers of the Brussels Treaty should be encouraged.

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7. With regard to the Dutch proposal to jointly explore the possibilities of economic cooperation in the overseas territories, I stated that I would prefer to postpone the discussion until after the British Commonwealth Conference in October. In the meantime, the Standing Committee may consider this matter, but I am interested in being able to reconcile the interests of the Brussels Treaty with those of the countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations. BIDO agreed. Like us, he is against increasing the number of committees, and he also fears a psychological reaction in the colonies. It was decided that this issue should be discussed at the next meeting of the Advisory Council and in the meantime there should be no propaganda on this issue.

Social and cultural issues

8. The Council adopted the resolutions without discussion, which are now published.

European federation

9. BIDO raised this question rather unexpectedly. He made two specific proposals:

a) The establishment of a European Assembly, consisting not only of delegations from the parliaments of the five powers, but also from the parliaments of any other states interested in participating. This proposal should be submitted to the standing committee for study.

6) Creation with the participation of five powers (or with the participation of some of them) of a customs and economic union, to which other powers can later join. This

the proposal must be considered by a special committee, which must consist of representatives of the five powers participating in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. This committee should be assisted by other powers interested in following the same course.

10. BIDO demanded a decision before the next meeting of the Advisory Board, at least on matters of principle related to this problem. I replied that while I agreed with the ultimate aims of the BIDO, I felt that the issue needed further study in view of the danger that any such assembly could be used by communists and fellow travelers to defeat the very aims for which we are working.

11. I was supported by SPAAKOM, who defended the proposal that, at least for the time being, such an undertaking should be left in the hands of private initiative rather than being acted upon by governments. He also pointed out the difficulties that would arise in deciding the basis of national or party representation in the proposed assembly.

With regard to the second proposal, SPAAK believed that first of all further rough work should be done and he suggested that before the next meeting the governments now consider the BIDO proposal and try to formulate more specific proposals.

12. In the end, it was decided that the Advisory Council should take note of the proposals of the BIDO that member governments should

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We are going to consider them now and that we should try to formulate practical proposals before the next meeting of the Council".

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov

K. Rodionov July 1948

No. 25 Top Secret

To Comrade N.A. Bulganin

We present the information we received in Washington on the course of negotiations on the North Atlantic Security Pact.

Negotiations opened on July 6 this year. in Washington. On the US side, LOVETT?, KENNANZ, BOLEN, HICKERSON? and ACHILLES are involved in the negotiations. England is represented by Ambassador FRANKS, Ambassador MILLAR, Embassy Counselor ALLEN and Second Secretary of the Embassy HENDERSON. Canada's representatives are Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs PEARSON and Canadian Ambassador to the United States RONG. France, Belgium and Holland are represented by their ambassadors in Washington.

The participants in the talks began a direct discussion of the issues on the agenda. Thus, at the meetings on July 5, 7 and 8, the following issues were considered:

a) The situation in Europe and the intentions of the USSR.

6) Measures taken by the countries of the Western Union in the field of defense.

c) Relations with other European countries in terms of security.

2. At the insistence of the Americans, the discussion of these issues was purely preliminary. On the first issue, the negotiators agreed that although

The intention of the Soviet Union may not be to start a war, but its goal in the future is the "communization of the world", primarily Western Europe.

3. Consideration of the second item on the agenda was reduced to information from FRANKS about the organizational structure of the military bodies of the Western Union, about their plans and activities. The American delegation took note of FRANKS' information.

4. On July 8, discussion of the 3rd item of the agenda - "Relationships with other European countries in terms of security" was to take place.

FRANKS received instructions from the British Foreign Office to persuade the United States to join the Atlantic pact on the basis of the recommendations worked out at the first stage of the talks in Washington in March of this year. The British believe that, in addition to the United States and Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and Portugal may also be involved in the Atlantic pact. As for Sweden, Spain, West Germany and West Austria, they may be included in this pact in the future.

According to our information, the State Department had not yet reached a final decision as to whether the United States should join the North Atlantic Pact by the start of negotiations. State Department refers

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Considering the question of concluding such a pact with great caution, due to the fact that State Department advisers KENNAN and BOLEN are not yet convinced of the need for a pact and because of the uncertainty of the position on this issue of the leaders of the Republican Party DEWEY and DULLES. It is considered likely that the Atlantic pact will be concluded only after the presidential elections and submitted for ratification to the new congress.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov K. Rodionov July 23, 1948

No. 26 Top Secret

Comrade STALIN I.V.

We are reporting the information received by the CI on the Washington military-political talks on the North Atlantic Pact.

July 6 this year Negotiations on the North Atlantic Pact resumed in Washington. Taking part in the negotiations from the USA: LOVETT, "KENNAN", BOLEN, HICKERSON® and ACHILLES:; the governments of England, France, Canada, Belgium and Holland are represented by their ambassadors in Washington (the ambassador of Belgium simultaneously represents Luxembourg). 10 September, the negotiators decided to present their governments with an agreed text report.

The report sets out the following questions:

1. The situation in Europe in terms of security.
2. Territorial scope of the North Atlantic Pact.
3. The nature of a possible North Atlantic pact.
4. A statement of the general provisions that may be included in the North Atlantic Pact.

I.

The first section notes that as a result of the Second World War and the defeat of Germany, the military power of the Soviet Union began to surpass the forces of Western Europe, which created, according to the authors of the report, a threat to the security of not only European countries, but also Northern Europe.

America. The authors of the report proceed from the premise that the Soviet ideology is allegedly expansionist and that, according to this ideology, the peaceful coexistence of Soviet and non-Soviet states is impossible. The Soviet troops are grouped and organized in such a way that they can take the initiative of hostilities into their own hands on demand. "On these factors rests the Kremlin's program of intimidation, calculated to achieve dominance in Europe."

The participants in the Washington talks came to the conclusion that under these conditions the main concern of their government should be the solution of the question of how to unite for mutual assistance against the "Soviet danger".

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P.

The territorial scope of the North Atlantic Pact is supposed to extend not only to the USA, Canada and the countries of the Brussels Treaty, but also to Denmark (especially Greenland), Norway, Iceland, Portugal (especially the Azores), Ireland and other European countries.

All countries included in the scope of the North Atlantic Pact are supposed to be divided into three categories depending on the degree of their obligations.

The countries of the first category, or full members, include the USA, Canada, the countries of the Brussels Treaty.

At the time of the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact, the full members will make a joint statement providing their guarantees to the countries of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (including West Germany, Austria and Trieste).

Bringing Spain and West Germany into the pact is considered only a matter of time.

PI.

The negotiators believe that the North Atlantic Pact (except for military articles) should be open in nature, ratified by the parties participating in it through the constitutional procedure and be within the framework of the UN Charter. The pact must also provide for reciprocal obligations and determine the zone in which mutual assistance in defense against aggression will be applied. It is planned to create an appropriate mechanism for coordinating the military efforts of the parties to the pact.

At the meeting, it was noted that some of the military issues of the future pact are already being studied in the Military Committee of the Western Union.

Representatives of European countries during the negotiations expressed their extreme interest in the pact providing for emergency measures to provide assistance to the victim of an armed attack by all parties to the pact, including individual military assistance from each of the members.

The U.S. representative on the matter stated that "the pact must be based on continued effective self-help and mutual assistance" and that U.S. assistance must "complement, not replace, the best efforts of other nations to help themselves and each other."

The note notes that the North Atlantic Pact should be the center of rallying all forces against the communist world.

GU.

During the Washington talks, the main articles of the future North Atlantic Pact were formulated. The preamble to the pact will include provisions from the preambles of the UN Charter and the treaties concluded in Rio de Janeiro and Brussels*?.

Articles 1 and 2 of the Covenant provide for the obligation not to resort to threat or violence and to resolve differences and disputes by peaceful means. According to the participants in the talks, these articles could deprive Soviet propaganda of the opportunity to assert that the North Atlantic Pact was spearheaded against the Soviet Union.

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During the discussion of the draft Article 5, which provides for mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack, two different versions of the article were introduced.

The US representatives insisted that the terms of mutual assistance should be similar to those contained in the treaty concluded in Rio de Janeiro, namely: "Each party undertakes to assist in resistance."

Representatives of European countries believe that the article on mutual assistance should specifically state that the parties "will render all possible military and other assistance and assistance to the party subjected to such an attack."

As a result, a compromise formulation was reached, which states that in the event of an attack on one of the contracting parties, the rest, "in accordance with their constitutional procedure, will help in repelling the attack by all military, economic and other means."

When considering draft Article 6 on collective measures in the event of an armed attack, the US representative expressed the wish that this article should also be drawn up on the model of the Rio de Janeiro treaty, and introduced the following option: "Each side will determine the direct measures that it will take individually ... at the same time there will be immediate consultation with a view to reaching an agreement on the adoption of collective measures."

U.

The accompanying letter to the document indicates that the representatives of the countries expect their governments to urgently consider the report and provide guidance for negotiations at a more critical stage in the creation of the North Atlantic bloc.

It is expected that the foreign ministers of the countries of the Brussels Treaty will discuss the issues raised in the document at the upcoming October session of the Advisory Council of the Western union.

I present herewith the text of the report on the preliminary negotiations on the North Atlantic Pact.

Vice-chairman

KI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov October 1948 No. 27 Top secret

December 1948

Comrade STALIN I.V. To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade N.A. Bulganin

SESSION OF THE WESTERN UNION ADVISORY COUNCIL

The present document is the English version of the minutes of the meetings of the Western Union Advisory Council, with

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held on October 25-26 this year. in Paris. The document bears the inscription: "In view of the special measures taken to preserve the security of the documents of the Western Union, it is very important that the existence of this British record should under no circumstances become known to the other powers of the Brussels Treaty, and even to the representatives of the United States and the Dominions."

The session discussed a large group of issues, of which the issues related to the Atlantic Pact and the activities of the Western Union are of the greatest interest.

I. The attitude of Western countries to the Atlantic Pact

1. The Advisory Council discussed the report of the Committee of Ambassadors in Washington on the subject of the Atlantic Pact.

The general opinion of the participants in the meeting about the difficulties connected with this question was expressed by BEVIN*, who stated that the conclusion of the Atlantic Pact is "a delicate matter, since it may be difficult to reconcile the views of the European powers with the views of the United States and Canada." BEVIN believes that before talks with the US can begin, the countries of the Western Union must be clear about what they want to achieve in the Washington talks.

2. The main goal, according to BEVIN, should be to mobilize the wealth and productive capabilities of the North American continent for the defense of Western Europe.

3. Along with the military and materiel resources of the USA and Canada, the British government is striving to mobilize the human and material resources of the continental countries for a future anti-Soviet war in Europe. Intimidating his partners with Soviet aggression, BEVIN warns them that Great Britain, with modern air forces and rocket artillery, will not be able to play the role that she played in 1914, when England, together with her allies, held the front, and in 1940 . when she alone held back the front. With modern air power and missiles, England can be quickly put out of action. Therefore, it is important that everyone enters the war at the same time. The Western powers will be able to resist aggression in Europe only if they are united economically and militarily. BEVIN emphasized that there is an urgent need, first of all, for the creation in Europe of an organized group, which would be well led and which would ensure that all available resources are used as far as possible.

Thus, England is trying to convince the countries of the Western Union that they need, first of all, English, and not American leadership, and that negotiations with the USA can only be successful when "the assembled five powers will talk to the USA. as an organic whole, and that therefore they must insist on organizing their own distinct group."

4. There are significant differences between the United States and Britain on the question of the participants in the Atlantic Pact. The United States seeks to involve as many countries as possible in the Atlantic Alliance. Dutch Foreign Minister STIKKER explains this by saying that "the United States and Ka

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Nada tend to pay great attention to the defense of the territory of Western Europe itself.

It should be added to this that the United States, in seeking to expand the number of participants in the pact, is apparently trying thereby to reduce the role of Britain in the leadership of the Atlantic bloc.

The countries of the Western Union in this matter take the position of the British government, which consists in striving to limit the circle of participants in the Atlantic Pact at the initial stage to only seven countries: the USA, Canada and the Brussels powers. According to BEVIN, "the form of the pact and its framework can be developed in Washington, but the question of future participants should be left open."

5. The participants in the meeting attached great importance to the problem of delimiting the geographical area in which the Atlantic Pact would operate. The SPAAK* demanded an unequivocal answer to the question of whether the Soviet Union's action against the USA in the Far East would automatically apply the pact and make it necessary for the Western powers to come to the aid of the USA. BEVIN pointed out that this issue should be within the framework outlined in the annex to the report of the Committee of Ambassadors, ie. limit the military obligations of the parties to the pact only to the area to which it applies.

Thus, as a result of the discussion of the report of the Committee of Ambassadors in Washington, the foreign ministers of the countries of the Western Union, firstly, expressed their governments' agreement in principle to start negotiations with the United States and Canada on the conclusion of the Atlantic Pact, and secondly, assured BEVIN that the representatives countries of the Western Union in Washington will jointly defend the British point of view in negotiations with the USA and Canada.

P.

Western Union Military Command

and geo! rafical areas of his responsibility

1. The session of the Advisory Council approved the report of the joint meeting of the ministers of war and the Standing Military Committee of the Western Union.

2. From the discussion of the report, it is clear that the governments of the countries of the Western Union intend, by creating a Committee of Chiefs of Staff and reassigning the Committee of Commanders in Chief to the latter, to extend the sphere of military responsibility of the Western Union not only to the organization of the armed forces of Western Europe, but also to the distribution of troops, equipment and materials for other geographical areas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will develop a strategy for all theaters of war.

3. With regard to the limits of command responsibility, the joint meeting of the Ministers of War and the Standing Military Committee determined that, in the first stage, the Committee of the Commanders-in-Chief would exercise operational control over the troops of the Western Alliance occupying Germany, Austria and Trieste. The military leaders of the Western Alliance believe that at a later stage it will become necessary to divide the world into separate theaters of war (North African, North Eastern, etc.).

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Fi van yh moves of the Western Union

1. Financing military spending is considered one of the most difficult issues. According to the British, there is a danger of a mismatch between the military needs of the Western Union and the program of European reconstruction.

2. According to SPAAKA, the Council does not yet have an agreed plan or cost estimate, and therefore it is not possible at this stage to say what the military fund-raising plan will look like. SPAAK believes that such a plan can only be worked out after

The Defense Supply Directorate will present to the next session of the Advisory Council a comprehensive report on the military needs of the Western Union.

4. The Council decided to establish a finance and economic committee to serve as the working body of the meeting of the five finance ministers of the Western Union and to work in parallel with the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Supply Department.

GU.

in "subversion"

1. The Council considered the memorandum of the Secretary-General on cooperation in the fight against "subversive activities". The Standing Committee was instructed to develop as soon as possible a plan for the creation of a body that would be in charge of counterintelligence and the fight against "subversive activities."

BEVIN considers it essential that this body be staffed by professional intelligence officers.

2. It was also decided to practice periodic meetings of persons responsible for ensuring internal security in each of the countries of the Western Union.

U.

On the ideological aspect of defense

1. On the General Secretary's memorandum on the ideological aspect of defense, the session recognized the need for governments to provide each other with information that could be used against Soviet and communist propaganda.

According to BEVIN and SCHUMANN, this information, on the one hand, should propagate the successes of the Western Union, and on the other hand, emphasize the facts unfavorable for the Soviet Union and its friendly states. In order to help his partners in the last part of this task, BEVIN promised to make available to the governments of the countries of the Western Union the reports and the memorandum of the Committee on Russia at the British Foreign Office.

2. The Council recommends that when organizing propaganda, avoid coordinating it from a single center. This would be, in the opinion of the Council, "copying the methods of the Cominform and defeating its own purpose. Propaganda should be carried out by each country according to its own national needs and circumstances."

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UT. European Assembly

The lengthy debate over the report of the Standing Committee on the European Assembly can be summed up in the following points.

1. The USA continues to put pressure on the countries of the Western Union with the aim of accelerating the political, economic and military unification of Western Europe against the Soviet Union. A wide variety of organizations, institutions, politicians and individuals are used to propagate federalist ideas.

2. Following the demands of the United States and seeking to take the propaganda initiative of "United Europe" out of the hands of private individuals, the governments of France and Belgium raised the issue of convening a so-called European Assembly. In SCHUMANN's opinion, the creation of such an assembly would be of the greatest importance for propaganda.

3. The Government of England, while not expressly speaking against the creation of a wider union, considers it premature to convene a European Assembly. According to BEVIN, "The US is oversimplifying the problem." Referring to US pressure, BEVIN stated that "the British government is used to it and believes that one should not fall too much under their influence."

4. BEVIN explained that England was opposed to the so-called "unification of sovereignty". At the same time, he noted that when considering this issue, it is necessary to take into account the relations of England with its dominions.

The Labor Party, according to BEVIN, cannot bind itself to any form of federal union of Europe, for it will have to answer to its constituents for this. BEVIN scares his partners with the prospect of a possible defeat for Labor in the upcoming parliamentary elections. "If we are a defeated party," he declared, "it will be a terrible defeat for the very unity we are all striving for."

5. BEVIN proposed to consider the issue of convening not a parliamentary assembly, but a government "Council of Europe" in a narrow format.

The Consultative Council did not come to a final decision and approved the regulation on the Committee for the Study of the Problem of Establishing European Unity, the task of which would be to consider the Franco-Belgian proposal to convene a Consultative Assembly and the English proposal to convene a "Council of Europe" composed of the ministers of the countries concerned .

Thus, this time too, the British government succeeded, by creating a special committee, in postponing the solution of the question of the so-called European Union.

UP.

The role of overseas territories in the military-political plans of the Western Union

1. When discussing the role of overseas territories in the military-political and economic plans of the Western Union, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands STIKKER admitted that as a result of hostilities in Indonesia, Holland found itself virtually without troops in Europe, and its financial situation worsened to the extreme.

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STIKKER considers that the Western Powers should harmonize their positions on the issue of overseas territories and take the most urgent measures to prevent the further development of the national liberation movement not only in Indonesia, but throughout Southeast Asia. He contends that the situation in the area threatens world peace.

Agreeing with STICKER in assessing the problem of Southeast Asia as extremely difficult, BEVIN spoke out against a broad discussion of this issue between the Brussels powers. Such a discussion, BEVIN pointed out, would inevitably require a mention in the communiqué, which would have the opposite effect of what was expected, since the Far Eastern countries would see their fate being decided without them and behind their backs, and this in turn "would encourage the growth of nationalist sentiment in Southeast Asia and will provide the communists with a weapon for propaganda".

USh.

In addition to the problems connected with the Atlantic Pact and the Western Alliance, the session of the Advisory Council also considered questions about the situation in Berlin, about the Italian colonies, about Palestine, about Spain and about Indonesia. The information provided in the document on these

specific questions do not contain anything essentially new in comparison with the previously received information. The following provisions deserve to be noted:

1. Persuading his partners in the Western Union of the need to link their foreign policy more closely with that of England, BEVIN frightens them, firstly, with the danger of "Slavic expansion."

BEVIN stated that he considered it important to bear in mind that the expansion was not only communist but also Slavic, and that he could not tolerate further Slavic expansion to the West.

Second, he raised the danger of submitting to American pressure. Attributing all the blame for the delay in resolving the issue of the fate of the Italian colonies to the United States and accusing them of an inept approach to the Spanish question, BEVIN called on the governments of the Western Union "to support Western solidarity and prevent US pressure, which is actually aimed at undermining the Western European front" .

APPENDIX: according to the text on 74 sheets*.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov

December 10, 1948

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp.

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#28 Top secret

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade VYSHINSKY AY.

THE POSITION OF ENGLAND ON THE QUESTION OF "EUROPEAN UNITY"

The telegrams submitted by BEVIN* and the British Ambassador to Italy MALLET set out the position of the British government on the question of so-called European unity, which consists in the fact that it continues to oppose the Franco-Belgian proposal for the convening of a European Assembly and defends the proposal of BEVIN on the establishment of the Council of Europe.

The content of BEVIN's telegrams basically repeats already known provisions. The following points are of interest:

1. Describing the advantages of the English proposal, BEVIN argues that, firstly, it enables the British to involve in the "cause of the consolidation of Europe ... many countries that are now outside the Brussels group", and thus extend their influence to the rest - new Western European countries; secondly, it will serve as "a means to strengthen the French government."

2. The British government is concerned about the differences between it and other members of the Western Union on the issue of creating a European federation. In order to prevent further deepening of these differences, BEVIN instructs British diplomatic representatives abroad to use the contents of the telegram to dispel the impression that the British are "indifferent and even hostile to the movement for closer European unity."

3. MALLET's telegram shows that the British are seeking support for their proposal to establish the Council of Europe by other countries, in particular Italy. Italian Foreign Minister SFORZA assured MALLET that the Italian Government would support England if Italy was invited as one of the main members of the Council of Europe from the very first days of its existence.

This information was sent to ZORIN, GUSEV and GROMYKO without specifying the source of its receipt and without an appendix.

APPENDIX: on 9 sheets*.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov

January 1949

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp.

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No. 29 Top Secret

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade VYSHINSKY A.Ya.

TO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT

In a telegram dated December 11, 1948, the British Foreign Office informed its diplomatic representatives abroad that before the start of negotiations between the representatives of the USA, Canada and the Brussels powers on the North Atlantic Pact, which opened on December 10, 1948 in Washington, the State Department warned negotiators that he considers it premature at this stage to attempt to draft a final text of the North Atlantic Pact.

According to the State Department, "the representatives of the seven states should only try to outline the main provisions on which this pact should be based. The matter must then be submitted again to the consideration of the governments, after which an appeal will be made to other powers, whose accession to the pact will be considered desirable.

Although the British agreed to the procedure proposed by the Americans, they continue to insist that, before approaching other countries with an invitation to join the pact, the seven powers should not only outline the main points on which the Americans insist, but also "draw up have a clear idea of what articles they would like to include in the pact."

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov

January 5, 1949

No. 30 Top Secret

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV Comrade Zorin V.A. Comrade GROMYKO A.A.

ON THE SECRET ARTICLES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC PACT

1. Czechoslovak Chargé d'Affaires in Italy MATOUSHEK in a report dated January 21 of this year. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia reports, referring to French sources, that along with the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact, it is planned to sign a special secret protocol obliging the governments of the countries participating in the pact to take vigorous measures against

national communist parties in the event of a war against the USSR

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2. According to the materials available in the CI, the original draft of the North Atlantic Pact did not provide for the inclusion of an article on the so-called "indirect aggression".

In the course of further negotiations, it was decided to include in the text of the pact a special article providing for actions against "internal aggression".

The meaning of this article is that the speeches of the communist parties of the countries participating in the pact against the regime existing in these countries will be considered as "indirect aggression", and such "indirect aggression" should entail appropriate responses from all participants. pact.

3. The above communication by MATOWSZEK indicates that at present the participants in the negotiations on the North Atlantic Pact apparently consider it undesirable to include an article directed against the Communist Parties in the text of the pact that will be published, and prefer to conclude on this issue a special secret agreement.

I would consider it expedient to expose in the foreign press and via radio the intention of the Anglo-American bloc to conclude a secret agreement against the communist parties of the Western European countries.

Deputy Chairman of the CI under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Fedotov

February 19, 1949

No. 31 Top Secret

Tov. STALIN I.V. Tov. MOLOTOV V.M. Tov. BERIA L.P., Tov. MALENKOV GM,

Tov. MIKOYAN A.I., Tov. KAGANOVICH L.M., Tov. Bulganin NA. Tov. KOSYGIN AN, Tov. VASILEVSKY A.M. Tov. GROMYKO A.A., Tov. SHTEMENKO S.M., Tov. ZAKHAROV M.V.

I present the review "The Atlantic Pact", addressed on March 5, 1949, to the Minister of National Defense of France, RAMADIE, by the director of the Institute for the Study of National Defense and the War Economy of France, General of the Army MAST.

This Institute was established in November 1948 to train major specialists in the field of military strategy. Students of the Institute are selected from among the highest military and civil officials of the relevant ministries and the General Staff of France.

Considering the question of the conditions for France's participation in the North Atlantic Pact (a month before its signing), the authors of the review proceed from the fact that France is extremely weak militarily and economically and does not have sufficient funds to defend its territory. This takes into account that, in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, the United

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The United States of America and England will not provide France with such military assistance as could prevent the occupation of French territory.

The review further states: "If France is again subjected to foreign invasion and occupation, the Americans will free only a corpse after such a catastrophe."

In order for France to be able to use its participation in the North Atlantic Pact with the greatest benefit for itself and not to become completely dependent on the United States and England in military-strategic terms, the Institute recommended the French government to uphold the following conditions for France's participation in pact:

1. France must not assume military obligations under the North Atlantic Pact which would provide for her automatic entry into the war unless French territory becomes the direct object of aggression. The Institute believes that France is not

must bear such military obligations under the Brussels Pact and recommends that the government take appropriate steps to amend Article 4 of the Brussels Treaty. "We should not forget," the authors of the review point out, "that the real adversaries are the United States and the Soviet Union. France can only be hit by a ricochet.

2. France must ensure that Italy, Spain and Portugal are included in the North Atlantic military alliance, as this will allow it to rely in this alliance on the continental countries of Europe and act as their leader. France must seek the participation of these countries also in the Brussels Pact in order to prevent England from using the military organs of the Western Alliance in her own interests.

3. France is not interested in the fact that the Scandinavian countries and the countries of the Near and Middle East join the North Atlantic Alliance, as this is due to the expansion of military obligations and the increased threat of France's involvement in the war. The Scandinavian countries and the countries of the Near and Middle East should form separate military blocs that will receive weapons from the United States, as is already the case with respect to Greece and Turkey.

As a result of this, the question of creating a separate Mediterranean pact, which, in the opinion of the authors of the report, is unfavorable for France, should disappear, since the command in this area would pass into "foreign hands."

4. By signing the North Atlantic Pact, France must receive assurance that it will be provided with weapons of new systems. France should not agree to the allocation to her only of armaments for the ground forces, as this will make France dependent on the air and naval forces of England and the United States.

5. France must not agree to the provision of military bases in peacetime for other countries party to the pact. France can only take upon itself the obligation to build in peacetime the appropriate military installations envisaged by the strategic plan of the North Atlantic alliance.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the content of this document:

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1. Among the influential government and military circles of France, it is widely believed that in the event of a war between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the USA and England, on the other, France should strive to maintain the position of a non-belligerent country. This would give France some free hand and the opportunity to determine its position depending on the further course of events.

Among the influential government and military circles of France, there is a desire to lead the continental countries of Western Europe in order, relying on them, to strengthen their role in the military bloc of the Western powers.

Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR P. Fedotov

May 31, 1949

Documentary Translation from French

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY PROBLEMS
ECONOMY

Place Geoffre, 13 (7) Paris, March 5, 1949

Message from the Director of the Institute General of the Army MASTA to the Minister of National Defense RAMADIA.

Subject: Atlantic Pact

In addition to my communications of 22 January and 14 February of this year, which contained reviews compiled by the institute on European federation and the German problem, I have the honor to forward to you a new work concerning the negotiations of the Atlantic Pact.

Sending you this material, I consider it necessary to draw the attention of the government to the conclusions reached by the leading staff and students of the institute. These conclusions point out the inappropriateness of carrying out sensational measures against the Soviet threat at the present time, given that Europe has been destroyed.

The Institute for National Defense Studies came to the unanimous conclusion of the urgent need to ask the United States for immediate military assistance, which should be consistent with national interests in the field of moral and military revival.

Signed: MAST 595

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND MILITARY PROBLEMS
ECONOMY

Paris, March 3, 1949 Top secret

ATLANTIC PACT (Review of the work of the Committees)

Institute for National Defense Studies,

having carried out, on the basis of the information available to him, an in-depth study of the draft Atlantic Pact;

Considering that the defense of France requires, first of all, measures to ensure the inviolability of its territories;

Mindful of the lack of funds at the present disposal of our country;

Considering the need for urgent American assistance, combined with our own gigantic and immediate efforts for moral, political, economic and military revival;

Bearing in mind the link that must unite policy and strategy, and the need to adapt our diplomatic action to the harsh demands of the times,

came to the following conclusions:

Contents of the Atlantic Pact

1. In order to be effective, any defensive alliance pact must contain, either in the text itself or in the agreements (official or secret) attached to it, articles of a military nature.

From a European point of view, the Atlantic Pact cannot be an exclusively political instrument. He must be armed and armored. It must determine the joint strategy. It must contain, in one form or another, in addition to defining the general policy, certain military articles providing for the following:

the effective defense of Europe by means appropriate to any circumstances;

material and financial assistance to enable the implementation of national armaments programs;

activities of the General Staff aimed at unifying armaments and developing a joint strategy.

Measures to ensure the inviolability of French territory

2. First of all, in our policy, we must strive to ensure the inviolability of our territory, because if France is again subjected to foreign invasion and occupation, then the Americans will release only a "corpse" after such a catastrophe.

In any defensive pact, the parties give mutual guarantees, but in practice it turns out that there are states that must be defended and states that must be defended. If a war breaks out between a third country and one or another strong state, then automatic entry into the war may be inconvenient for weak states.

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The Atlantic Pact makes it clear that, whatever the legal gimmicks and constitutional doubts, and despite some vestiges of isolationism, the United States will come out in support of one or another of its attacked European partners and will fight alongside it. But should partners do the same? Will not, on the contrary, non-automatism make it possible to take into account all circumstances?

One out of two:

either the United States is ready to participate, starting today, in the battle of the European continent by mass sending ground and air assets - and then we can agree to complete solidarity,

or the United States cannot do it. In the latter case, it should be expected that the Soviet troops will reach the Pyrenees, and possibly Gibraltar in the shortest possible time.

Based on this assumption, it is necessary to obtain the consent of the Americans so that the cooperation of France in the event of aggression that does not concern its territory could be expressed in a non-military form.

Our at least temporary non-participation in hostilities (which other European states could join) will be beneficial to the United States, whose every effort is aimed at preventing the Soviets from settling on the shores of the Atlantic. An ally without means is more dangerous than a sympathetic non-combatant partner. History gives many examples of this.

Our non-participation in the war would also be to the advantage of Great Britain for the same reason if she were to participate in the American war effort. It could also spread to the Benelux countries. In the event that England decides to go to the aid of the United States in accordance with the terms of the Atlantic Pact, then non-participation in hostilities will in no way violate the obligations assumed by the participants in the Brussels Pact. In the event that England should turn out to be the object of aggression herself, it would be possible, and at that now, by means of an exchange of public or secret messages, to soften Article 4 of the treaty of March 17, 1948, in order to take into account the hypothesis expressed above.

As for the Russians, it seems that they must be seriously tempted by the sudden advance to the west and southeast*. The motives that can make them act in this way are as follows:

a) the sensational effect of initial successes;

6) the occupation of the entire Atlantic coast from the North Cape to Cadiz for the purpose of waging an offensive or defensive war, air and submarine;

- c) bringing the British "aircraft" under the impact of projectiles of the V-1 and V-2 type;
- d) neutralization of the Mediterranean Sea through Gibraltar;
- e) seizure of industry in order to compensate for the destruction in domestic industry caused by atomic bombs;
- f) hostage-taking to prevent the mass dropping of atomic bombs on Soviet vital centers.

* So in the text.

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But there are other considerations that may have the opposite effect:

- a) Russia's traditional devotion to defensive strategy;
- b) increase in the territory under control and dispersal of forces;
- c) the neutralization of the Mediterranean Sea not through Gibraltar, but through Suez or some other place in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, since the Near and Middle East can play the role of the main theater of military operations in a future war;
- d) the absence of oil in Europe - one of the few products that Russia does not have in sufficient quantities;
- e) hope for the creation of communist or pro-Soviet governments in Western Europe.

Non-participation in the war gives some chances. If they are small, and they are small, then we will not lose anything by making this move. If it fails, we will end up in the worst possible situation, namely, an armed conflict in which we will be drawn into without any means to defend ourselves.

It may happen that our non-participation in hostilities will only give a delay, but such a delay, however short-lived, is of the utmost importance. It will enable us to mobilize. And in every war there are surprises.

It should not be forgotten that the real adversaries are the USA and the Soviet Union. France can only be hit by a ricochet. The non-automatism of guarantees, written into the draft Atlantic Pact, allows non-participation in hostilities within the framework of realistic cooperation with the United States.

This non-participation in hostilities must now be explored in highly confidential negotiations on a joint strategic plan to be adopted in the event of war. In order not to interfere with its implementation, it seems necessary to avoid any unnecessary confusion of French forces on the one hand, and British and American forces on the other. If it is decided to proceed exclusively by continental means, not only must the British and American forces in Germany be limited to the numbers strictly necessary to produce the necessary destruction at the right moment, but every means must also be used to ensure a speedy evacuation which will prevent a retreat. to French territory.

These considerations will be valid until Europe is able to hold the Eastern Front. They are conditioned by the fact that the Russian danger is actual, while American assistance is conditional. They presuppose the same precautionary measures within the country as in the case of participation in hostilities. They start from the premise

agreement with our American and possibly British allies, for France would commit suicide by separating from them.

Conditions for effective military assistance

3. With regard to military assistance in the form of supplies and loans, it will be necessary to achieve:

on the one hand, fixing in the pact itself the fundamental obligation of the Americans to start their own rearmament and the rearmament of their European partners, indicating the scope of measures to be carried out;

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on the other hand, the reduction of time to a minimum, and the French government must insist that the lend-lease project be submitted to Congress simultaneously with the draft law on the ratification of the pact.

The material supplied to us must be new and not obsolete. The risk of this material falling into the hands of the enemy cannot serve as an obstacle excluding the possibility of its supply, since otherwise no results can be achieved. The precautions that must be taken will greatly reduce the risk involved.

In addition, if specialization of individual contributions to collective security is required, then a harmonious balance must be created. As for France, she could not agree to an almost exclusively land armament.

Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Strategy

4. As regards the activities of the General Staff, it is essential that France participate on an equal footing in the work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (which could be the permanent supreme body of the Atlantic Pact) just as she will participate in the body of political leadership, which will be created. In this regard, it must be emphasized that the strategy cannot be either purely American or purely Anglo-Saxon. Continental interests must be represented, otherwise Europe will face

invasion.

The various committees of the Brussels Pact could be retained.

Provision of bases

5. It is likely that the benefits arising from the pact will not be granted without compensation.

As for the provision of bases, this is not possible either on the territory of the metropolis or on the territory of the French Union. Regardless of the sovereignty issues, such a concession seems completely inappropriate. It is impossible before the start of hostilities, as this is associated with the risk of setting fire to gunpowder. But France can take it upon herself to create, with the help of her allies, the necessary structures, based on the needs of the future.
coalitions.

On the participation of Spain, Portugal, Italy, North Africa and West Germany

6. The Atlantic Pact was originally conceived as an extension of the Brussels Pact to include the United States and Canada.

In these two alliances, continental influence must be strengthened if we do not want Europe to be doomed to invasion and if France and the Benelux countries want to be able to build their defenses on powerful
rears.

Spain, Portugal and Italy are such rear areas. In the desperate situation in which Europe finds itself, these countries, on the one hand, must gather with all their forces, however small they may be, to withstand the oncoming storm. On the other hand, the French armies, in the event of hostilities, would need room to maneuver; strategy must be up to date

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and the eventual evacuation of all that is necessary for our renewal involves the use of territorial depths. Finally, in case the European continent is invaded, it is necessary to ensure that the three Latin powers - France, Spain, Italy - are represented in the coalition by the governments settled in their North Africa, which, by the way, is another reason why we must seek the return of Tripolitania to Italy.

Considering the seriousness of the present situation, it seems necessary to put our relations with Spain in order as soon as possible: strategy prevails over politics.

The same considerations apply to Italy, whose inclusion in the Atlantic Pact is envisaged.

In addition, it seems appropriate to duplicate the participation of the three peninsular powers in the Atlantic Pact by their participation in the Brussels Pact, by virtue of the automatic guarantees provided by the latter, and in order to strengthen continental influence in the modern five-power organization. If this is not possible, one should comment on this with a number of bilateral obligations.

North Africa, represented, of course, by France, should also be included in the Atlantic Pact and, if possible, in the Brussels Pact. It is part of the same strategic zone. The point is not only that it runs the risk of becoming the object of direct aggression in the first place. It is also the deep rear of the European coalition. North Africa will increase French influence in this coalition; its participation will automatically give France the role of leader representing European continental interests. France would not be in danger, as is now the case, of witnessing the inclusion of its North African rear in the Mediterranean theater of operations, the leadership of which would be in the hands of a foreign command. In addition, it is very important that North Africa receive military assistance.

Finally, the inclusion of Germany is only possible if her sovereignty is returned to her. It would be futile to try to force West Germany to join the Atlantic Pact or the Brussels Pact through the intermediary of the commanders-in-chief. As long as there is an allied occupation, every occupation zone in Germany, as well as in Austria, participates on the same basis as the occupying power on which it depends.

However, it is necessary to prepare Germany's participation in the defense of Europe by creating an effective European federation in which this country can be included.

In any case, it is necessary that the various territories in the same strategic position, such as the Benelux, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and possibly the French zones of occupation, take the same position in the event of war. They should form a single political and military bloc.

Other intercontinental pacts

7. The Atlantic Pact should not apply to states belonging to different strategic zones.

There is no advantage in the fact that the countries of Western Europe, in the proper sense of the word, were automatically bound by border states, such as the Scandinavian countries or the countries of the Near and Middle East.

It is clear that the US would have to conclude a separate pact with Norway and Denmark. It would even be useful for the United States to reconsider its attitude towards the Scandinavian pact, backed up by the supply of weapons. There is no benefit in adding fuel to the fire. The main thing is to achieve your goals, avoiding any unnecessary sensational actions.

As far as the Mediterranean Pact is concerned, there is no point in talking about it. The Mediterranean Sea is a road connecting two theaters of war. This is not a separate strategic zone.

The western part of the Mediterranean Sea is an integral part of the Atlantic zone. It has already been said that the states and territories adjacent to this part of it should be included in the Atlantic Pact.

The eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea is closely connected with the countries of the Near and Middle East. Here it is possible to conclude an intercontinental pact, but this pact must be separate from the Atlantic one, so that the states of Western Europe, in the proper sense of the word, do not assume any guarantees in respect of these regions. In order to avoid needlessly exacerbating the current tensions, it would be preferable to create an independent bloc to which the United States would supply arms, as they are already doing with respect to Greece and Turkey.

Conditions for the signing of the pact by France

8. Compliance with the above conditions seems to be mandatory. France cannot make concessions on:

a) the need for a joint strategy to prevent an invasion of French territory;

6) inclusion in the pact of the principle commitment of the Americans to participate in the material and financial resources of the required amount in rearmament and to shorten the time period for the implementation of this principle;

c) French participation in the work of the joint group of chiefs of staff.

It seems that with a firm will not to make concessions on these main points, our transatlantic friends will agree with our arguments.

The absolute need for the rearmament of France

9. Europe is looking for protection, she asks for weapons to defend herself. Until she rearms, her diplomacy must be extremely modest.

But rearmament is absolutely and urgently necessary, for our country is now exposed to great danger. The economic recovery is on the mend. Continuing to build up strength, we must resolutely begin to restructure the military apparatus, which in the final analysis is the decisive instrument of our defensive policy. It is also necessary to create a certain mood, to show our moral strength and to influence American public opinion in our interests. Finally, it must be shown that the French nation was determined to use the weapons that would be provided to it.

The key to American assistance, or at least to its continuation after the first loans have been made, is to carry out a strong European collective effort that will prove to our transatlantic friends that the burden of joint defense will not be entirely dumped on them.

No. 32 Top secret

Comrade STALIN I.V. To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade GROMYKO AA.

A resident of one of the European countries reported that in mid-April of this year. The head of the US Central Intelligence Agency, Rear Admiral HILLENKETTER, had a conversation with the Turkish ambassador in Washington on the issue of the North Atlantic Pact.

During the conversation, the Turkish ambassador expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Italy is included in the North Atlantic Pact, while Turkey is left out of the pact. As a result, the Mediterranean basin was divided into two spheres, with the eastern sphere left outside the security system.

HILLENKETTER replied that the American attitude towards Turkey had not changed and that the National Security Council had recently decided that aid to Turkey and Greece should continue. Italy was included in the pact, against the will of the British, at the insistence of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

HILLENKETTER also stated that the US military considers the Mediterranean to be a single entity and that the security system does not end with the conclusion of the Atlantic Pact. The issue of the Mediterranean Pact will certainly be raised in a few months through negotiations between Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, Spain, England and the United States.

Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR P. Fedotov

May 1949

No. 33 Top Secret

Comrade STALIN I.V. To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV Comrade GROMYKO A.A.

I present a document obtained by a CI resident in London on the content of BEVIN's conversations? with Turkish Foreign Minister SADAKOM (February 14 this year) and Turkish Ambassador to London ACHIKALKOM (March 10 this year).

During the talks, the issue of concluding the North Atlantic Pact and the prospects for creating other military blocs were discussed.

SADAK informed BEvin that the Turkish Government considered it necessary to recommend that in concluding the North Atlantic Pact

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A declaration was published in which the countries participating in the pact would declare their intentions to support the security of Greece and Turkey. SADAK expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that Italy would join the North Atlantic Pact, while Turkey would remain outside the pact. SADAK expressed fear that Turkey might find itself behind the demarcation line, which, as a result of the conclusion of the pact, would be drawn from Scandinavia to Italy. BEVIN told SADAKU that the issue of a declaration was being discussed and that the US was proposing to extend such a declaration not only to Greece and Turkey, but also to Iran. However, BEVIN did not recommend that the Turkish government insist on the publication of a declaration, since the United States, based on the fact that Turkey's security will be supported by all countries participating in the North Atlantic Pact, could reduce the supply of military materials. BEVIN expressed

the assumption that such a declaration could be published in a year. BEVIN informed SADAK that the British government intended, after the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact, to set about creating other military blocs stretching from the Mediterranean to India and Southeast Asia.

APPENDIX: according to the text on 14 sheets*.

Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR P. Fedotov

May 1949

No. 34 Top Secret October 1949

To Comrade I.V. STALIN, V.M. Molotov, Comrade, L.P. Beria, Comrade G.M. MALENKOV, N.A.

I present the correspondence obtained by the Committee of Information from the British Foreign Office with its Ambassador in Washington on the question of the establishment of military, political and economic bodies and regional groups of the North Atlantic Alliance. The correspondence refers to the period of meetings of the working group, which prepared at the end of August and the first half of September of this year. the relevant documents for the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (pages 15-19), prepared by the working group, published in the form of a communiqué of the Council of Foreign Ministers of September 18 this year.

Of interest in the correspondence is information about the composition of regional groups and the creation of a military supply council.

I.

By decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance of September 17 of this year. countries that signed the North Atlantic Pact,

* The application is not published - Approx. comp.

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divided into separate regional groups that will plan and carry out military training in the respective areas of the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the European continent.

It can be seen from the correspondence presented that the position of the United States on the issue of full membership in the North Atlantic Pact is currently significantly different from the position it took during the preparations for the conclusion of the pact and when it was necessary to involve in participation in it includes countries such as Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Iceland and the Benelux countries.

In September 1948, a secret report on the general principles of the North Atlantic Pact, drawn up by representatives of the United States, Canada and the countries of the Brussels Treaty, stated that the United States, Canada and the countries of the Western Union would be the primary full members of the pact and would provide mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack against any other member. It was then envisaged that Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Iceland would only have limited military obligations, i.e. provide military bases in exchange for the obligation of full members to defend their territories.

A discussion in a Washington working group in the summer of 1949 about the composition of regional groups and the degree of membership in them again showed that contradictions continue to exist between European countries and the United States on the issue of military obligations. During these negotiations, American representatives repeatedly stated that the United States would enter as

as a full member only in the Canadian-American and North Atlantic groups and as a planning party in the European regional groups.

In this regard, the US proposed creating a North Atlantic group consisting of only three states (USA, Canada, England) and giving it a leading role in relation to other regional groups.

Representatives of European countries persistently sought to attract the United States of America to participate in the European regional groups as a full member, but the Americans shied away from this.

In connection with this position of the United States, the representatives of Denmark, France, Iceland, Holland, Norway and Portugal demanded that their countries be included in the North Atlantic group as full members, hoping in this way to receive American military guarantees. Then the Americans made a new proposal to divide the North Atlantic group into several subgroups, with the USA, Britain and Canada having the right to create a special leading subgroup.

The British ambassador, in his report to the British Foreign Office, characterizes the American proposal as a clever move designed to "permit all applicants to become full members, but arrange things so that the current work is divided among many subgroups in such a way that the actual Important work has been left to those countries that can make a significant contribution to the joint defense of the area, i.e. for Canada, England, the United States and possibly France."

The Americans, British and Canadians "did their best" to force the rest of the negotiators to accept this proposal, but it was rejected.

One can, however, assume that the Americans will eventually be able to break the resistance of the other countries participating in the North Atlantic

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pact and create within the framework of the North Atlantic Group a leading subgroup consisting of the USA, Britain and Canada.

P.

The session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the North Atlantic Alliance created a military supply council and entrusted it with coordinating the actions of the countries that signed the North Atlantic Pact to develop military and economic potential,

An analysis of the instructions of the British Foreign Office to its delegation in the working group (pp. 5-10) shows that the British government is striving to seize control over military production and military supplies in European countries and push the Americans into the background in this matter.

These instructions propose the creation of two areas in which all military supply activities will be concentrated - the North Atlantic with the center in Washington and the Western European with the center in London. In the opinion of the British government, the Americans and Canadians will direct military production and supply in their countries and, possibly, in Iceland, while coordinating the development of the military and economic potential of all Western European countries should be concentrated in the London supply organization of the Western Union, which is under the influence of the British.

PI.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the content of the presented documents:

1) The United States and Britain, not trusting the general military-strategic plans of the North Atlantic Alliance to all countries - members of the Union, seek to create a narrow, leading group of representatives of the United States, England and Canada and thus limit the activities of the other members of the pact in matters military planning only within the framework of regional groups. This exacerbates the existing differences between the Anglo-American group and the rest of the parties to the pact.

2) Between the Americans and the British there is a struggle for advantageous positions in the highest bodies of the North Atlantic Alliance. The British government seeks to preserve and expand the activities of the organs of the Western Union in order to consolidate its influence in European countries.

The Washington talks show that the US government does not intend to bind itself to certain military obligations with the European countries and, in this regard, refused to enter the European regional groups as a full member.

Information on the merits of these documents was sent to T.T. GROMYKO, LAVRENT'EV, STEMENKO AND ZAKHAROV.

APPENDIX: 20 sheets.

Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR S. Savchenko

October 7, 1949

Documentary Translation from English

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Correspondence of the British Foreign Office on the establishment of military, political and economic

bodies and regional groups of the Alliance?

Telegram No. 81 T August G from the British Foreign Office to its ambassador in Washington

"Your telegrams Nos. 4030, 4031 and 4032 of 23 August on the mechanism of the Atlantic Pact.

1. Below is our point of view on the American proposals regarding the political mechanism (Roman numerals refer to paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 4032).

D) We agree with the proposed work plan.

P) We agree that the regular sessions of the Council should take place at least once, at most twice a year. We also agree that one regular session of the Council be convened at the same time as the session of the UN General Assembly. At this session of the Council the need to convene a second session within the year shall be determined and, if so, the time and place of its convening shall be determined.

II) It follows that the first regular session of the Council should be convened in the same country as the session of the General Assembly. Obviously, in practice, Washington will almost always be the place to convene the session. We therefore believe that the second regular session, should it be convoked, should take place in Europe in turn in the capitals of the signatories to the pact. We agree with the Americans that one more session of the Council will probably have to be convened before March 31, and you can propose that this session be convened in London.

PG) We do not object to regular sessions of the Council being convened by the Chairman.

D) We agree that special sessions of the Council (presumably as opposed to sessions convened under Articles 4 or 5 of the treaty) should be called by the Chairman at the request of a majority of the members.

HS) We agree that sessions of the Council convened under Articles 4 or 5 should be called "extraordinary" and not "extraordinary", and also that it should be possible to convene them as soon as possible. Apparently these sessions will be convened in Washington, and we agree that the members of the Council, in the event that they themselves are unable to attend, authorize their ambassadors in Washington to take their place at such extraordinary sessions.

UP) We have no particular objection to the open nature of the session. However, as a rule, meetings should, of course, be closed.

UPT) We would not consider it necessary to draw up special rules of procedure. The Brussels Pact Advisory Council does just fine without such rules. Draft rules of procedure of the Organization of the European Economic

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of scientific cooperation is contained in document C/49/84 of the Council of the OEEC, although at first glance these rules seem to us inappropriate.

IX) We have no objection to the US Secretary of State presiding over the first meeting. We agree that thereafter the presidency should be given to countries in alphabetical order. We believe that in view of the large number of countries that have signed the pact, the chairs should change, say, not every year, but every session.

X) We agree that the official languages should be French and English with a minimum of interpretation and translation.

XI) As you may have already understood from our telegram No. 7903, we are not going to insist on the establishment of a permanent commission or a permanent secretariat and are quite ready to agree to the American proposal that the role of the permanent committee be performed by the diplomatic representatives in Washington of the signatory countries, those. working group, and the technique of work was provided by the State Department. We agree with you that the working group should be able to discuss political issues of interest to all participants. This is particularly necessary if the Council itself is to meet only once or at most twice a year. If the above system is adopted, there will obviously be no need for a special budget.

2. We hope that at the end of this week we will be able to send you further detailed instructions regarding the military mechanism.

3. We are also urgently considering the supply mechanism. We hope that you will be able to get the discussion on this subject to be postponed. The mechanism for supply, of course, should be built along the lines of a military organization, and we consider discussions on this issue at this stage premature.

4. We are consulting with the Treasury Department regarding the proposed Economic Advisory Committee and will provide you with the Ministry's opinion as soon as possible.'

P.

Telegram No. 8109 of 26 August 1949 from the British Foreign Office to its Ambassador in Washington

"Your telegrams Nos. 4041, 4042, 4052 and 4053 of 24 and 25 August about the mechanism of the Atlantic pact.

{ I agree that the meeting of the Council be held on 17 September and, if necessary, continue its work on 19 September.

2. I generally agree with the suggestion that the working group, and subsequently the Council, confine itself (as far as the organization of defense is concerned) to drawing up a broad plan for this organization, leaving the more detailed development of it to the defense committee.

3. It seems to me that the sequence of work should be as follows:

a) First, the Washington Working Group will decide on the general features of the defense organization and the general principles on which it should be based. My proposals on these matters, which will give you a clear idea of how far, in my opinion, should

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go working group, contained in my subsequent telegram, which was agreed with the chiefs of staff.

6) The Council will meet on 17 September, consider the report of the Washington Working Group, hopefully approve it, and invite the Defense Committee to meet in the near future to work on the general questions proposed in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 4041. I believe that at this meeting, the defense committee will establish a military advisory council, a steering group and new regional organizations, and appoint a secretary of the defense committee. I see no need for the Defense Committee to report back to the Council.

4. In order to serve the interests of the Americans, we believe that the Defense Committee should meet in Washington. You should continue to insist that the meeting be postponed until early October in order to have time to consider the results of the 17 September meeting of the Council. We are currently proposing October 5th, as most of the committee members, including the defense ministers, will in all likelihood wish to travel on the Queen Elizabeth, which will arrive in New York on October 4th."

PI.

Telegram No. 8143 of 27 August 1949 from the British Foreign Office to its Ambassador in Washington

"1. Your telegram No. 4042 of August 24 on the special organs of the mechanism of the Atlantic pact.

2. In our opinion, discussion of the American proposal for an "economic advisory committee on defense programs" should be deferred until the proposed defense production and supply council takes on a clearer shape. As a consequence, the working group should first study the establishment of a supply council. This telegram sets forth our views on a supply council, and my next cable concerns a proposal for an "economic advisory

committee."

3. We believe that there should be no doubt that the War Production and Supply Board should be an integral part of the organization that will be subordinate to the Defense Committee and that it should be responsible to the Ministers of Defense. In our opinion, the International Defense Supply Council should have the following functions:

- a) collect detailed information on the military needs of the Union;
- b) collect details of what is available to meet these needs;
- c) provide military experts and ministers with comprehensive data on the supply situation;
- d) recommend ways and means to increase available stocks in cases where they are not enough to meet needs. At the same time, special attention should be paid to cooperation and mutual assistance in the field of defense production.

4. Based on these considerations, we believe that in parallel with the North Atlantic Chiefs of Staff Committee or Military Advisory Council, a North Atlantic Defense Committee should be established

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the Atlantic Defense Supply Board, whose responsibility it will be to deal with all important matters under paragraph 3 of this telegram relating to the North Atlantic area as a whole.

5. We are not suggesting that this body should meet frequently or deal with any matters pertaining to any one area. We believe that, since each region will deal with military planning matters that concern it, it will first of all have to coordinate its arrangements for the provision of military supplies. Regional supply councils shall be set up, which within their own region will carry out the functions set forth in paragraph 3 of this telegram. We do not insist that official councils with numerous staffs and secretariats should be created without fail. We simply propose that each area, in addition to military planning, provide for the performance of the functions set out in paragraph 3 of this telegram.

6. In practice, this means that the military supply activities carried out by both the western Mediterranean area and the northern European area should be coordinated in Europe, preferably in London. The existing Western Union Military Supply Board will continue to function alongside the Western Union Chiefs of Staff Committee and, if necessary, representatives from Italy and Portugal can be included in it. The countries of the Western European region, which at the same time belong to the Western Mediterranean group, could coordinate their supply plans through their representatives in the Western European organization of the supply council. The representatives of the United Kingdom in the Western European organization of the supply council could also, together with the representatives of Norway and Denmark, deal with matters relating to the Nordic council. At the same time, we believe that supply issues relating to the North American and Atlantic regions should be considered in Washington.

7. We believe that the supply representatives in London could ensure the full coordination of the production efforts of the European countries that make up the Western European region. Nevertheless, it will be necessary to coordinate the activities of regional supply organizations in order to be able to provide the North Atlantic Chiefs of Staff and the Ministers with comprehensive data on the supply situation.

8. With regard to the organization in Washington, we believe that it should not be too complicated and should not necessarily copy all the instances of the military organization exactly. Nevertheless, we attach great importance to the formal establishment of a North Atlantic Defense Supply Board, which would ensure the coordination of matters relating to the entire North Atlantic area and which would have a position in relation to the ministers of defense analogous to that of the North Atlantic chesky committee of chiefs of staff.

We also believe that a standing committee or steering group of the North Atlantic Defense Supply Council, composed of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and possibly one representative from the Benelux, should be formally established. Representatives of European countries in this standing committee can also represent their countries in the military supply councils in London.

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In our opinion, there will be no need to send high-ranking officials to permanent work in Washington. However, there must be a standing committee, and there must be a representative from the United States.

In most cases, the Standing Committee will meet only when the need arises to hold joint meetings with the Standing Committee of the North Atlantic Chiefs of Staff.

9. However, there should be a small headquarters in Washington serving the council's standing committee on supplies and working closely with the headquarters or secretariat of the North Atlantic Chiefs of Staff. We attach great importance to cooperation in the work on military planning and military supply planning. The duties of this headquarters will include the collection of information from regional supply organizations and the constant monitoring of the general supply situation for the information of the standing committee of the supply council and the headquarters or the secretariat of the standing committee of the chiefs of staff.

10. Our point of view can be summarized as follows:

D) supply planning should begin on a regional basis and be coordinated within the North Atlantic area;

n) As a result, a regional supply organization should be established along with the regional military planning committee. As regards the European regions, it can function only in Europe and must be built on the basis of the existing Western Union supply organization in London;

ii) the coordinating military body to be established in Washington should be accompanied by an appropriate supply organization;

GU) we must press for the formal establishment of a military supply council for the North Atlantic region, in which the Americans and Canadians would be full members.

11. We do not think that, during the discussion of this question in the working group, it would be desirable to go too far into such details if it is possible to avoid them.

You should ensure that the military supply organization is an integral part of the organization subordinate to the defense committee and functions in parallel with the military organization. Therefore, defense ministers should be given as much freedom as possible in the formation of their military supply organizations. However, for the purposes of coordination, a North Atlantic Defense Supply Board should be established, responsible for the performance of the functions set out in paragraph 3 of this telegram for the entire North Atlantic area. This council should be responsible to the Ministers of Defense and should have a position similar to that of the North Atlantic Chiefs Committee.

headquarters. He will discuss only general matters and will be primarily responsible for coordinating the actions of the regional supply organizations.

We hope that the foregoing will help you at the meeting of the working group to resolve all issues that may arise during the discussion of proposals to establish a council for

supply. However, if along the way you feel that you need a consultant, the Department of Defense will do everything to send someone to you.

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GU.

Telegram No. 8144 of 27 August 1949 from the British Foreign Office to its Ambassador in Washington

"Your telegram No. 4042 of August 24, paragraph 5: on the mechanism of the Atlantic Pact.

1. The Treasury Department has not yet been able to seek the opinion of its minister on US proposals for the financial mechanism of the Atlantic Pact. For the time being, however, you should be guided by the following preliminary considerations from the Treasury:

D) We are favorable to the fact that the financial committee of the Atlantic Alliance should be created at the level of the defense committee. We believe that this committee should include ministers of finance and that no lower ranking persons can participate in it. Our experience with the Western Union is that economic and financial issues of paramount importance cannot be satisfactorily resolved by representatives below the rank of minister. As a consequence, we wish that this body be referred to simply as "Committee of Ministers of Finance" or "Finance Committee" and not as "Economic Advisory Committee on Defense Program Matters" (your telegram No. 4031).

P) We are convinced that the main work on military supply will be carried out at the regional level. As a result, it will be necessary to set up something like a financial and economic committee for each district, along the lines of the existing financial and economic economic committee of the western union.

P) Due to the fact that the work of the financial organization will be closely related to and dependent on the work of the supply organization, we believe that it would be premature to go into any details until the general features of the organization have been outlined. supply. Without knowledge of the structure of the supply organization and without a clear idea of the possible arrangements for the distribution of American aid, it is very difficult to predict whether there will be a need for the creation of any official central financial body, which is an intermediate link between the finance committee and regional financial institutions. committees.

We do not think that there will be a need for a committee of finance ministers to have a specific meeting place or a permanent secretariat.

We hope to complete these preliminary considerations early next week after consultation with the Minister of Finance.

2. This telegram does not take into account your just received telegram No. 4064. Our further considerations in the light of this telegram will be communicated later.

U.

Telegram No. 4183 dated September 2, 1949 from the British Ambassador to Washington, the British Foreign Office

"See my telegram No. 4169 on the mechanism of the North Atlantic Pact.

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1. In today's afternoon session, the working group returned to the issue of regional groups and reviewed the document on this issue, prepared by the drafting committee at its morning meeting today. This document, corrected by the working group, is set out in my immediately following telegram.
2. You will see that, with respect to all three European regional groups, this document contains the statement that "The United States has been requested and ready to take full part in the pact"⁸⁹. Supported by other countries, of course, we have repeatedly urged the United States to accept full membership, but they strongly shied away from it. We do not think that insisting in the drafting committee on any wording greater than that quoted above could serve any useful purpose.
3. With regard to the North Atlantic group, you will see that all countries, with the exception of Belgium and Italy, are included in it as full members. In previous working group meetings, we did our best to keep only Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom as full members, but we were not successful. On the contrary, we have only provoked persistent demands for full membership from Portugal, Norway, France and Holland and have not received support from the United States.

We, of course, could not get the working group to accept our point of view and therefore decided that it would be best to agree in the drafting committee with the opinion of the United States that the only way out of the difficulty was to resolve all applicants to become full members, but arrange things in such a way that the current work of the group is divided among many subgroups in such a way that the actual performance of important work is ensured for those countries that can make a significant contribution to the joint defense of the area, i.e. . behind Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and possibly France.

When this issue was discussed in the drafting committee this morning, we did our best to include a proposal that a steering group consisting of representatives from Canada, France, the United Kingdom should be established in order to coordinate the activities of the groups in the North Atlantic group. and the United States, and that this steering group, as well as any subgroup, should be responsible for planning joint military operations.

However, this proposal was not successful in the design committee. Although the representatives of the United States and Canada agreed that, in practice, all important work in the area should be carried out by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and possibly France, they expressed their belief that other Governments would not agree if we we will try to include this in the report of the working group. The Dutch and Portuguese, who were also members of the project committee, said that their governments would indeed take this position. We therefore decided that it would be best to adopt the proposed language, which, as you will see, leaves it up to the North Atlantic group itself to decide how it should best organize itself to ensure effective planning.

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4. During the discussion of the document in the working group this afternoon, the discussion was remarkably short, and only a few stylistic adjustments were made before the decision was made to refer the document to governments for consideration. The Portuguese reiterated that their government insisted on giving him a full member seat in the North Atlantic group, but they hinted that Portugal might oppose any participation in the Western European group until the Spanish situation. Therefore, the final position of Portugal, both in relation to this group and the Western Mediterranean group, remained unclear.

The Italian representative also repeated his Government's request for a full member's seat in the Western European group, on the grounds that it was indeed impossible to separate the defense of Western Europe from the defense of Northern Italy. He was supported by the French representative, but he did not meet with the support of other countries and did not insist on this proposal anymore.

5. Due to the holiday, there will be no meetings of the working group until 7 September. We would be grateful if you would let us know your opinion before the text contained in my subsequent telegram reaches you."

UI.

Telegram No. 4184 dated September 2, 1949 from the British Ambassador in Washington to the British Foreign Office

"See my previous telegram on the mechanism of the Atlantic Pact.

1. The following is the amended text of the document on regional groups, approved by the working group and proposed for the consideration of governments.

(Start)

Regional planning groups

The security of the entire North Atlantic region, as is clear from the treaty itself, is of great importance to all parties to the pact. On the other hand, it should be recognized that some parties to the pact are more interested in or can make a more significant contribution to the defense of certain territories of the North Atlantic region in comparison with other territories of this region. Therefore, it seems that the creation of certain regional planning groups will contribute to faster and more effective planning of the overall defense of the entire North Atlantic region.

Compound

The question of which of the parties to the pact should be a member of one or another group depends on geographical, political and military considerations. While some parties to the pact are not only directly interested in, but also able to contribute to the defense of the entire North Atlantic region, the contribution of other participants, for obvious reasons, must

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mainly limited to areas of their geographical location. In view of the difficulty of evaluating the political and military considerations involved in this matter, the composition of the various regional planning groups must be determined on a geographical basis. At the same time, the following must be provided:

D) before any of the planning groups proposes any recommendations relating to the defense of territories or providing for the use of troops, materials or resources of any party to the pact that is not included in this group, the latter will have the right to participate in the work of this groups to formulate these recommendations.

ii) Any group that considers that any party to the pact, outside of it, is in a position to contribute to the defense of the territory of that group may invite him to take part in its deliberations.

Provided that agreement is reached on the full implementation of the above provisions I and II, it is recommended, on the basis of a geographical principle, to establish regional planning groups with the following composition:

Nordic Regional Planning Group Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom

The United States has been requested and willing to take full part in the planning.

Other parties to the pact may be included in accordance with the above provisions.

Western European Regional Planning Group Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Holland, United Kingdom.

The United States has been requested and willing to take full part in the planning.

Other parties to the pact may, and in particular Canada, Denmark, Italy (and Portugal?) participate in accordance with the above provisions.

Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group France, Italy, United Kingdom.

The United States has been requested and willing to take full part in the planning.

Other parties to the pact can be (and in particular will Portugal?) be included in accordance with the above provisions.

Canadian American Planning Group Canada, United States.

Other parties to the pact may be included in accordance with the above provisions.

North Atlantic Regional Planning Group Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Holland, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States.

It is recognized that the responsibility for planning the defense of the North Atlantic region cannot be equally shared by all members of the group. With another

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On the other hand, this responsibility can to some extent be distributed along functional lines and assigned to those participants who are best able to cope with the relevant functions in the field of defense. Therefore, the North Atlantic Regional Group, when it meets, will have to set up a number of planning subgroups in accordance with certain defense functions.

The group should determine which group or subgroup each participant should be in, as well as provide for the necessary arrangements for coordinating the actions of these subgroups in the interest of quick and effective planning.

Powers

Each regional planning team will:

develop and recommend to the military committee, through the permanent group, plans for the defense of the area;

Collaborate with other regional planning groups to resolve conflicts and harmonize different regional plans.

Location

The Defense Committee should consider the location of the regional planning teams.

procedural issues

All procedural and organizational issues will have to be decided by each group on one's own.

2. This is the content of "Preliminary Document No. 4".

Copies follow diplomatic mail.

UP.

Ma No. 4 dated 2 1949 Strict trann of the NGLII to the Ambassador in Washington

"The Mechanism of the North Atlantic Pact

1. We discussed with the Chiefs of Staff the issue of accepting small countries as full members of the North Atlantic Regional Group. They said that from a military point of view, they see no point in this. The Chiefs of Staff indicated that these regional groups, in which detailed planning is to be carried out, should be as small as possible in order to be effective. They also firmly believe that we should try to limit the number of full members to those countries that are in a position to make a real contribution to the task of the area concerned - in this case, to provide air and naval forces for a possible battle in the Atlantic. In addition, the Chiefs of Staff indicated that security would decrease as the size of these groups increased.

2. We want to know whether the desire of small countries to become full members of this group is not based on a misunderstanding of what it will have to do. Therefore, you should clarify that this group will plan naval and air operations in the North Atlantic.

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It will not decide how to use the merchant fleet of sea powers during the war (this is a separate issue that will have nothing to do with this mechanism).

This group will also not consider the local maritime problems of countries such as Norway. All these issues will be dealt with by an appropriate group, just as the flag officer of Western Europe deals with local maritime problems within the current organization of the Western Union. The coordination of local maritime matters with the broader North Atlantic problems will be sufficiently ensured that all these nations participate accordingly in the North Atlantic group.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, we hope you will be able to convince France, Norway, Denmark, Holland and Portugal that their interests will be sufficiently safeguarded if they participate accordingly in the work of the North Atlantic group."

October 1949

No. 35 Top Secret To Comrade IV STALIN

I present the following information received from the CI resident in Paris.

The leadership of British intelligence has developed a plan for cooperation between the intelligence agencies of the countries of the Western Union.

According to this plan, the coordinating center of the intelligence and counterintelligence services of the countries of the Western Union should be located in London. In peacetime, these services should be given the right to freely exchange intelligence information with each other. From the moment the war broke out, the London center would unite all the necessary documentation of the intelligence and counterintelligence services of the countries of the Western Union.

The British also propose to establish a unified system for maintaining archives and a unified method for processing the information received.

This plan was handed over by the leadership of British intelligence to the leadership of French counterintelligence for study.

Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR S. Savchenko

December 14, 1949

No. 36 Top Secret To Comrade V.A. ZORIN

Among other materials, the CI received a group of telegrams from the correspondence of the British Foreign Office with its ambassadors in Washington and Paris regarding the conclusion of bilateral agreements with the United States on military assistance.

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The documents refer to the period November 15 - December 6, 1949.

The content of the telegrams received testifies to the existence of major disagreements between the United States and Britain on the question of bilateral agreements regarding military assistance. These disagreements assumed such proportions that the British Foreign Office even considered the importance of refusing to conclude such an agreement.

However, the documents received do not reveal the very essence of these disagreements. The correspondence states that England objects to the provisions on mutual financial obligations formulated in article 5 of the draft agreement, but the content of article 5 (as well as other articles) is not given, and therefore it remains unclear what exactly England objects to. The statements cited in the telegrams by British officials that, under Article 5, England may be forced to pay more to the United States as "retaliatory aid" than she receives from the United States as "direct aid" are completely incomprehensible, because data are also given that "retaliatory assistance" for England for the period up to June 30, 1950, will amount to no more than 1,400 thousand dollars, i.e. an insignificant amount.

Thus, the ambiguities that arose during the examination of the mentioned materials do not allow compiling exhaustive information on the issue of differences between the United States and Britain on the question of military assistance. In this regard, I would consider it expedient to instruct the residencies in London, Paris, Washington and New York to obtain additional information on the following questions:

The content of the American draft bilateral agreement on military assistance.

The content of the comments of the Permanent Commission of the Western Union to the American draft.

The essence of England's objections to the American project, and the true background of these objections. What counterclaims does England put forward.

Positions of other European countries that have turned to the United States with a request for assistance on the issue of the conditions for the provision of this assistance provided for by the draft bilateral agreement.

I ask for your instructions.

APPENDIX: Correspondence of the British Foreign Office with its ambassadors in Washington and Paris on 11 sheets.

Signature of the head of one of the departments of the CI under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs

December 1949

Documentary Translation from English

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Correspondence of the British Foreign Office with its ambassadors in Washington and Paris regarding bilateral agreements with the United States on military assistance

I.

Telegram from the British Ambassador in Washington to the British Foreign Office No. 5347 of November 15, 1949

"To your telegram No. 10734. Mutual military assistance. Bilateral agreement.

1. I fully understand the fears of the ministries in London that, if a bilateral agreement were signed, we might be asked to pay the Americans under Article 5 as reciprocal aid, amounts in excess of what we would receive from them in direct aid.

However, I must warn you that if His Majesty's Government should, for this reason, evade the conclusion of a bilateral agreement, it will, in my opinion, have a very unfavorable effect, not only on the US government, but also on American public opinion.

I fear that such a move will be taken as evidence that His Majesty's Government have not accepted the principle of unification of defense and material stockpiling provided for in the North Atlantic Pact and subsequent agreements relating to the organization of defense and supply.

I am afraid that we will be accused of joining the North Atlantic Pact not with sincere intentions of pooling our resources to achieve the common goal of strengthening the security of the North Atlantic area (even at the cost of our own sacrifices), but mainly for in order to get free help from the Americans to strengthen their own armed forces.

2. The idea of mutual assistance, the pooling of resources and the best use of available materials in our common interests is, undoubtedly, the main content of the North

Atlantic pact.

Along with this, it was envisaged that in strengthening the armed forces of the countries that signed this treaty, the task of economic recovery of these countries should be given priority.

This last circumstance will enable us to rightly state directly to the State Department that we can enter into a bilateral agreement only if we obtain prior assurance that the maximum amount that the United States expects to receive from us under Article 5 is not be so great as to jeopardize our

economic recovery.

As you know, the US Government has promised to communicate to us soon its views on the ceiling on this amount. If, in your opinion, it turns out to be too large, then I think that we could, based on the above reasons, insist that it should be reduced before we decide to sign a bilateral agreement. Such a demand on our part would be quite understandable and reasonable. But early refusal in principle to conclude an agreement would significantly weaken our position and, I am sure, put

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would place us in an extremely difficult position both before the American government and before American public opinion.

3. Therefore, I insist that we should proceed according to the plan proposed above, that is, we should accept the idea of signing a bilateral agreement in principle, but challenge, if necessary, the size of the Article 5 ceiling."

P.

Telegram from the British Ambassador in Washington to the British Foreign Office No. 5520 of November 26, 1949

"To my telegrams No. 5309, paragraph 2 (r), and No. 5391. Mutual military assistance. Bilateral agreement.

1. The State Department has communicated to us the limits on retaliatory assistance which the United States expects to receive from His Majesty's Government under Article 5 of the Bilateral Agreement for United States Administrative Expenses in the United Kingdom for the period up to June 30, 1950.

The amounts of the retaliatory assistance are expressed in the following amounts:

a) expenses incurred exclusively for the needs of the United Kingdom - an amount in pounds sterling equivalent to 200-300 thousand dollars;

6) expenses incurred for the needs of all European governments receiving assistance, such as the cost of maintaining the regional office of military assistance in London (which will be a kind of copy of the HARRIMAN? Office in Paris), warehousing and transshipment services in the ports of the United Kingdom and so on. - the amount in pounds sterling, equivalent to 750-1100 thousand dollars.

2. With regard to point b, the Department of State indicated that it would inform the other European countries receiving aid that it believed an agreement should be reached whereby these costs would be shared among all aid-receiving governments. .

3. We asked the State Department if it could provide us with estimates of the comparative amounts of retaliatory assistance for a period of 12 months beginning June 30, 1950. The State Department was unable to provide us with such information, but explained that the amounts of retaliatory assistance they indicated for the period ending June 30, 1950, were calculated on the basis of expenditures for 7 months. However, some of these expenditures will not be repeated, and therefore it cannot be assumed that the expenditure for the year will necessarily be 5/12 more than this.

4. The Department of State also expressed the opinion that you would be interested in knowing the total number of US officials it believes would need to be stationed in the United Kingdom in connection with the Mutual Military Assistance Program. The staffing, which includes officers of all ranks, seconded by the State Department, the Economic Cooperation Office and the ministries of the three branches of service, is as follows:

(a) Staff employed exclusively in aid of the United Kingdom, an initial staff of 15, which may be increased to a maximum of 29;

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6) the staff of supply-related services destined for all European governments receiving assistance (such as services such as the Regional Office for Military Assistance), ~ initially 84 people, maximum 124 people.

5. The State Department has reported in addition, as a point of interest to you, that the total cost of the program is expected to be between 0.3% and 0.5% of the total amount earmarked for assistance to Western European governments.

PI.

Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of England to its ambassador in Washington, No. 11114 of November 29, 1949

"To your telegram No. 5309 dated November 11 of this year. Mutual military assistance. bilateral agreement.

1. My next cable contains critical remarks on the draft bilateral agreement, which were prepared by the working group of the Permanent Commission of the Brussels Pact so that the governments of the five powers will be guided by them when negotiating bilateral agreements with the United States in Washington.

2. In expressing my agreement in principle with this document, Sir Gladwyn JEBB?! clarified that His Majesty's Government had not yet taken any decision as to the position it would take with regard to the bilateral agreement and that it would need some more time to consider this position.

Thus, the drafting of said document should be regarded - as far as His Majesty's Government is concerned - as a technical exercise designed to discover what follows from each article of the draft agreement as it stands.

Sir Gladwyn JEBB made it clear that the United Kingdom had to expect much less from mutual military assistance than the other countries in the Brussels Pact, and that the deal could be a net loss for the United Kingdom unless it exercised greater prudence. in the question of mutual obligations, etc. Therefore, while we fully understand that other governments would like to start negotiations immediately in Washington, we ourselves are not in a position to do so.

3. The French representative said that such a position of England would disappoint his Government, although, in his opinion, they would understand that the United Kingdom was in a slightly different position. The French Government has reason to believe (based on a conversation with Mr. BOLIN?? in Paris) that the US Government might be ready to conduct joint negotiations through the working group in Washington, but such negotiations will have of little importance unless his Majesty's Government take part in them. Even if negotiations were held with each country separately, the French would be greatly helped by the knowledge that His Majesty's Government was negotiating at the same time with them and would make similar criticisms of the American project. Unfortunately, the French government cannot wait. If it wants arms supplies to begin before spring, it must, for reasons of parliamentary procedure, conclude a bilateral agreement no later than a week or 10 days later.

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4. The position, therefore, is that the text of this document, quoted in my next telegram, constitutes agreed comments on the US draft and that the fact that we have accepted it does not mean at all that His Majesty's Government is thereby out of showed a willingness to negotiate a bilateral agreement at all. This fundamental issue is still under consideration by ministers. Meanwhile, the Foreign Secretary informed the US Ambassador on 26 November that the United States project posed very difficult problems for His Majesty's Government and appeared to be inconsistent with the agreement reached at Lancaster House in April of this year.*

Sir Gladwyn JEBB informed Julius HOLMES (Counselor at the US Embassy in London with the rank of Envoy - CI note) on November 28 that the powers participating in the Brussels Pact had jointly developed criticisms of the US project, but at the same time signaled that it would pass, probably a week or so before his Majesty's Government can give a definite opinion on the whole question. The Ambassador and Mr. HOLMES both seemed to agree that the proposed draft would have to be radically revised.

5. Mr. James BRUCE, Chief of the War Aid Administration, has now arrived in London, and we hope to have further conversations with him after the Ministers have decided. However, it is still understood that all negotiations will have to take place in Washington.

6. The comments contained in my subsequent telegram were outlined to the Italian embassy.

GU.

Telegram from the British Ambassador in Paris to the British Foreign Office No. 1306 of December 1, 1949

"To your telegrams to Washington, nos. 11114 and 11115. Mutual military assistance. Bilateral agreement.

1. Today, De MARGERY (Responsible Officer of the Department of External Relations of the French Foreign Ministry - CI note) notified one of my staff that instructions had been sent by plane to the French Ambassador in Washington, which will enable him to open negotiations tomorrow.

If other anti-Communist Powers are in a position to take part in these negotiations, so much the better, but the French will continue the negotiations alone, if need be, as they hope to conclude an agreement and have it ratified by the French Assembly before end of the month.

2. Overview of the instructions sent to BONNER" is contained in my next telegram.

Z. MASSIGLIA has been instructed to convey to you the sincere hope of the French government that the British government will also decide to conclude a bilateral agreement.

* Obviously, this refers to the meeting of the Political Commission of the Western Union, at which developed a joint appeal of the five powers to the United States for military assistance ~ Note CI.

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U.

Telegram from the British Ambassador in Paris to the British Foreign Office No. 1307 of December 1, 1949

"To my previous telegram.

The following is the overview I mentioned in paragraph 2.

The main points that determine the attitude of the French government towards the projected bilateral agreement on American military assistance can be briefly summarized as follows:

- 1) Should the agreement take into account the priority of the economic recovery of Europe, reflected in the MARSHALL plan? and the American law of October 6, 1949*.
- 2) The financial situation of France does not allow her at present to incur indefinite unlimited financial obligations.

Bearing this in mind, a bilateral agreement should be, in essence, an agreement on the receipt of military assistance and on the conditions under which this receipt will be carried out with the help of the French authorities. Costs directly attributable to such acquisition will be borne by the French Government.

All subsequent requests for mutual assistance shall be the subject of special agreements.

In the light of the above, the text of the draft agreement requires the following remarks:

The preamble is too heavy and too long.

Article 1 should not refer to assistance provided by governments that are not signatories to this bilateral agreement.

For psychological reasons, it would be preferable not to mention that the US Congress can change the content of the agreement at will.

Finally, deliveries within the framework of mutual assistance of equipment, materials, etc. must depend not only on an agreement between governments, but also on a defense plan adopted by the competent organs of the union.

The fourth paragraph of that section, requiring assurances regarding the use of products to be manufactured with United States-supplied industrial equipment (subparagraph "a"), and regarding the export of military equipment similar to that supplied (subparagraph "B"), requires significant stipulations.

The French Government would like to delete article 2, which is already contained in economic cooperation agreements, and article 7, the content of which should be the subject of special agreements.

The French government would like to coordinate with the US government on issues related to press information (Article 3). However, it would obviously be better not to mention this topic in the published text.

The article on patents (Article 4) is so confusing that it needs to be explained before the French Government can determine its position on it.

Article 5, in its present wording, may lead either party to unlimited financial obligations. She must be

* Law on military assistance. – Note CI.

agreements to life.

The privileges provided for in the second paragraph of the same article should be reciprocal and should be more precisely defined.

Similarly, Article 6 should refer to an additional agreement that would fix the status of the armed forces of each power in the territory of the other.

The wording of Article 8 needs to be harmonized with the constitutional requirements of the countries signing the agreement."

UT.

Telegram from the British Foreign Office to its Ambassador in Paris, No. 3290, December 6, 1949

"To your telegram No. 1306 of December 1, paragraph 3. Mutual military assistance. bilateral agreement.

1. On December 2, the French ambassador visited W. STRANG® to express his government's sincere hope that the British government would not decide not to conclude a bilateral agreement with the United States.

Any action in this sense, he declared, would have the most negative impact on the mentality of the governments of the countries of the Western Union.

2. We have informed MASSIGLI that we have not taken any decision not to conclude agreements, and that we are still studying this problem and hope to decide on the next step within the next few days.

The French Government has already become acquainted with our preliminary views, which are similar to those of other Powers that have concluded the Treaty of Brussels, and we have no doubt that during the negotiations in Washington they will do their best to ensure that any solution they reach took into account the results of a preliminary study of the American project, which was carried out by the Standing Commission*.

December 1949

No. 37 Top secret Comrade. STALIN I.V.

I send you the text of the document of the French Institute of National Defense and Military Economics "Development of the principles of the doctrine of the use of combined land and air forces in the defense of Western Europe."

The document was drawn up in August 1949 by a group of teachers and students of the institute under the leadership of General MASTA and presented to the then Minister of National Defense RAMADIE.

A summary of the document is as follows.

* This refers to the Permanent Commission of the Western Union - CI note.

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1) A new war will require the countries of the North Atlantic bloc to create huge armed forces. Only the strength of the "main forces" of the ground forces should be approximately 3-4 million men.

To bring these troops to readiness from Western European countries would require significant efforts and financial costs, the implementation of which will run into obstacles.

internal political nature: "the peoples will not give up their modern standard of living and plans for the reconstruction of their countries."

The experience of the last war showed that the future enemy of the Western powers in the war, the Soviet Union, has a first-class land army that can quickly defeat the army of its opponents and occupy European countries. In this case, the troops of the North Atlantic Alliance would later have to face the need to reconquer these territories and thus experience the full burden of the land WAR.

It is necessary to find a solution to the "strategic problem" in which the Western powers would be spared from significant expenditures of funds, from political risk and from a difficult land war. Any suggestion that it is necessary to create a decisive superiority of the ground forces of the Western powers over the Soviet Army, based on the experience of the Second World War, is a "conservative" and unsuitable solution for a future WAR.

2) In this regard, it became necessary to develop a new doctrine of the "defense of Europe", which "would allow using all the achievements of science and technology in order to achieve superiority over the enemy in the area in which the allies have every chance of being stronger", while taking into account that the atomic bomb is of little use for military operations. The Western powers are stronger in the field of aviation and military radio engineering. Therefore, the new doctrine should be based on the principle of maximum interaction between aviation and ground forces, as well as between aviation and the navy.

In this doctrine, methods should be developed that will allow the troops of the Western European countries to retain a significant part of the European continent, which in the future will have to be a springboard for preparing and launching an offensive against the Soviet Union.

To solve this problem, it is necessary to direct the war from the very beginning along such a path that it unfolds in conditions unfavorable for the USSR, that is, that it primarily takes place in the form of battles using those types of equipment in which the Western powers have a decisive superiority. .

The maximum use in the war of all technical capabilities would allow the Western European countries to significantly reduce the number of their ground forces, which "are easily influenced by the enemy's political agitation."

3) Due to the fact that the troops of the Western powers have almost no opportunity to retreat, they, and primarily the aviation, are tasked with defeating the enemy forces even before they

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money to fight. The conduct of such "territory interception" operations can only be successful if it is supported by all possible means: intelligence network, use of political conditions, attacks by ground forces and others. For the troops of Western Europe, "interception of territory" is such a form of maneuver, without which "no operations, even defensive ones, can end in victory."

The actions of the air force must be complemented by the actions of the navy, which will conduct operations on the flanks of Europe - in the Mediterranean, North and Baltic Seas in order to divert enemy forces and support the actions of ground forces on the continent.

Along with this, the ground forces will have to conduct containment battles with the aim of directing the enemy offensive into those zones where he will not be able to deploy his forces and where aviation can easily deploy his forces and where aviation can easily destroy him.

The defensive line should run as far to the east as possible.

The main battles of the ground forces should be deployed on the territory stretching from the Rhine to the borders of the countries of Eastern Europe, that is, on the territory of the North German Plain.

The ground forces, for their part, must render maximum assistance to aviation. The nature of this assistance is determined mainly by the fact that the ground forces are able to conduct continuous surveillance of the most important military objectives of the enemy, located both in the immediate vicinity of the front line and in the near and deep rear with the help of infiltrated agents and airborne paratroopers supporting communication with the command of air formations using radio.

4) During the conduct of offensive ground forces, aviation will be tasked with destroying all obstacles that may be encountered in the path of the advancing units.

Due to the fact that the offensive of the troops of the Western European countries should be as fast as possible, aviation will have to supply equipment and food so that the stretching of communications does not affect the pace of the offensive.

During this period, the airborne units should be tasked with disorganizing the Ural-Siberian rear of the Soviet Union by capturing vital areas of its military industry and centers of political leadership.

For the successful conduct of the war, all Allied combat air forces must be united.

under a single command.

APPENDIX: on 29 sheets*. Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin

April 1950

* The application is not published - Approx. comp.

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No. 38 April 1950 MESSAGE FROM THE KI RESIDENCE

The document of the permanent commission of the Brussels Pact received by the residency is sent in translation from English.

Translation from English Sov. secret

Do not make copies of this document

PERMANENT COMMISSION OF THE BRUSSELS PACT 8 SESSION OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL OF THE BRUSSELS PACT

Report of the working group on the "Establishment of the National Armed Forces"

1. The Advisory Council, at its plenary meeting held on 17 April at 10 am, decided to set up a Working Group to draw up a report on the "Establishment of National Armed strength."

2. This report was presented to the Council at its last plenary meeting, on 17 April at 4 a.m., and, after being amended, was approved.

3. The said report is attached to this cover letter.

2 Eaton Place London 18 April 1950

Document "Metrics" No. 433

Report of the working group on the "Establishment of the National Armed Forces"

The Advisory Council of the Brussels Pact, in joint session with the Ministers of National Defense and the Ministers of Finance, has drawn up, in agreement with the latter, the following recommendations, which it intends to submit to the five Governments:

1. After examining the plan for the organization of the armed forces, known as the Luxembourg Programme, the Council came to the conclusion that before any final decision was taken, this document, drawn up before the signing of the Atlantic Pact, should be subjected to detailed study in the light of more an extensive system of coordinated defense of Western Europe and the North Atlantic region, especially with regard to the balance of forces, the composition of large formations, the choice of weapons and cost estimates.

2. All Powers that have signed the Brussels Pact declare their determination to make every effort on a national scale to

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ensuring the security of Western Europe. Therefore, the study mentioned above should in no way interrupt or slow down the activities currently being carried out.

3. Whatever conclusions may be drawn from the study of the Luxembourg Agenda, it is clear that shortfalls in the armed forces cannot be met by increasing national military budgets to such a degree as to jeopardize economic and financial recovery. countries of the Brussels Pact, which is a factor of paramount importance for the security of the Western world.

For the reasons stated above, the Advisory Council considers it essential that the Chiefs of Staff Committee immediately communicate the contents of the Luxembourg Program and Infrastructure Plan in their current form to the Atlantic Pact Standing Group so that the latter is kept abreast of the activities carried out the powers of the Brussels Pact, and could promptly recommend any changes it deemed particularly urgent, based on the revision of the medium-term plan for 1954, in accordance with the recommendation of the Atlantic Pact Defense Committee.

5. The Advisory Council expressed its wish that the Atlantic Pact Permanent Group take into account the following considerations in this review:

a) The task is to bring Western Europe into a state that will enable it to successfully resist any possible aggression on the continent.

This task cannot be carried out without the use and standardization of the most modern and latest equipment in accordance with the latest technical developments.

Therefore, it is desirable to familiarize yourself as soon as possible with the nature and quantity of the materials and equipment indicated above, which are necessary for the fulfillment of the delivered tasks.

6) In order to achieve the desired results with minimal delay and expense, it is necessary, with a view to the intensification of the production of these materials and equipment, to use not only the production facilities of the five participating powers, but also American production facilities.

c) The Powers concerned should endeavor to coordinate and rationalize their production and orders.

The current production program must be constantly monitored to ensure that the individual efforts of individual countries, in

sense of correct sequencing and timing, have served the common interest in the best possible way.

On the basis of this arms and equipment program, the nature of the formations that will use it will be determined, and their organization will begin.

Resident of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

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No. 39 April 1950 MESSAGE FROM THE KI RESIDENCE

The document of the NATO Defense Committee on April 1, 1950 and the military session of the Advisory Council of the Western Union, received by the residency, is sent.

Documentary Translation from English Top Secret D.O./50/31 April 28, 1950

CABINET DEFENSE COMMITTEE

MEETING OF THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
HELD IN THE HAGUE ON APRIL 1, 1950 AND THE EIGHTH SESSION OF THE
WESTERN ALLIANCE ADVISORY COUNCIL, HELD IN BRUSSELS ON 16 AND 17 APRIL 1950

Report of the Minister of Defense

1. Following the practice established by my predecessor (see documents D.O./49/68 and D.O./49/79), I believe that my colleagues would like to have a better idea of the recent meetings of the Committee. defense of the Alliance and the Western Alliance Advisory Council than can be gleaned from the communiqués issued after the end of the meetings, as well as from my statements in the House of Commons on 5 and 20 April.

North Atlantic Alliance - Medium Term Plan.

2. The main purpose of the meeting of the Alliance Defense Committee was to review the medium-term plan drawn up by the regional planning groups and the Military Committee on the basis of the strategic concept approved in December 1949. (See document D.O./49/79 Annex A). In general, the plan for July 1954 pursues the following goals:

- a) Outline the nature of the operations that the twelve countries may have to carry out during the first phase of the war to stop the Soviet offensive, including the Allied air offensive initiative.
- b) Assess the capabilities of the Soviet Union and its satellites, as well as their probable strategy.
- c) Determine the strength of the armed forces necessary to hold back the offensive of the USSR and its satellites and at the same time undertake such offensive actions as will be possible.

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On the first two issues, the plan contains a realistic assessment of capabilities that is fully in line with the views of our own Chiefs of Staff. Of course, this assessment is made in rather general terms, but given the need to reflect the opinions of various national headquarters, it is a significant achievement. Those parts of the plan that attempt to determine more precisely the size of the armed forces needed to carry it out may be more critical.

The size of these armed forces, which at this stage is determined only by a simple summation of the estimates provided by the five regional groups, basically boils down to the following:

90 divisions, including 18 $\frac{2}{3}$ armored;

About 12,000 aircraft, including over 3,000 maritime aircraft

ation;

Naval forces, the main core of which is 29 cruisers, 31 squadrons

naval and escort aircraft carriers, 920 destroyers and escorts and 107 under

WATER BOATS.

3. These figures give only an approximate idea of the size of the armed forces required for the effective defense of the North Atlantic region and the approval of this plan by the ministers of defense does not constitute any individual or collective obligation of their governments to proceed with the creation of the planned for them in the plan. armed forces. The Military Committee, which drew up the medium-term plan for us, itself recognized that it was necessary to carry out a further study of the requirements with a view to revising them in the interests of economy. Nevertheless, these figures are useful in that they give an idea of what we need and what efforts are required to put in place a military force for the Alliance. They are a goal to be pursued and a basis upon which the Defense Production and Supply Board and the Finance and Economics Committee can carry out their work to study the practical measures needed to approach these figures. . It is for these reasons that the Chairman of the Defense Committee, Lewis JOHNSON, who is the US Secretary of War, proposed that the Committee approve the medium-term plan.

4. During the discussion, the Norwegian Minister of Defense drew the attention of those present to the economic consequences of the adoption of this plan and reminded the Committee that massively inflated military budgets would jeopardize economic recovery, which is the basis of the military strength of the participating countries. In the opinion of the Italian Minister of Defense, in order to study the problem as a whole, it is necessary to convene a joint meeting with the participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Finance.

5. It was at this point in the discussion that I took the floor for the first time. The purpose of my statement was, as far as possible, to dispel the doubts that my colleagues apparently had about the amount of appropriations that would be required to meet the military needs indicated in the plan, and to convince them of the need to begin to consider the practical needs of the moment. It is clear that some definite purpose was necessary, which was given to us by the Military Committee. But it would be inexpedient to convene a meeting with the Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Foreign Affairs without doing more serious preparatory work than that which has been done

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on us so far. While we must strive to ensure that the various bodies of the Alliance work closely together, it is equally important to avoid shifting responsibility to others. We, as Ministers of Defense, must realistically assess the situation and determine the needs of defense, taking into account political and economic factors. We should not be intimidated by the astronomically huge needs that our military advisers are talking about. First of all, we must begin to solve the problems before us, to the extent that they fall within our competence.

6. These considerations, as far as I can tell, were well received by the Committee; at any rate he approved the plan. This plan will now be presented to the North Atlantic Council

Union at its meeting in London in May of this year. together with a request that the Council:

a) agreed with the urgent need to take urgent measures, both in the national and in the all-Union framework, to accelerate the formation of the military forces required to carry out the planned plan, as well as to determine the financial and economic capabilities of the Member States of the Union in order to increase their military spending under existing agreements and to consider new economic and financial arrangements, in particular to secure a broad arms program, and

6) provide guidance for establishing closer interaction between the permanent bodies of the Alliance, since the coordinated action of these bodies is a necessary condition for the successful operation of the entire Organization.

Resident of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

No. 40 Top secret To Comrade VYSHINSKY AY.

The Information Committee has the following information.

1. During the period of preparation for the London meeting of the three Foreign Ministers, SCHUMANN instructed the acting representative of France to the UN, LACOSTE, to meet with the representatives of England and the USA, CADOGAN and GROSS, and to ascertain the positions of the British and American governments on certain questions relating to the UN.

CADOGAN told Lacoste that although he had received no instructions from his government, he still believed that the Security Council should not discuss important matters in the absence of the representative of the Soviet Union. For example, the question of admitting new members to the UN cannot be discussed in the absence of Soviet representatives, since such a step would be condemned by world public opinion.

In the opinion of CADOGAN, the post of Secretary General of the United Nations should be appointed to a person who is acceptable both to the Western powers and to the Soviet Union.

GROSS stated in a conversation with LACOSTE that the position of the American delegation was determined by the State Department and boils down to the following:

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a) Any question can be considered in the Security Council. If, in the absence of Soviet representatives, the Security Council discussed the question of Kashmir, the Council can discuss other important questions as well.

6) In the opinion of the US Government, it would be expedient to bring to the UN discussion such an important issue as the threat to Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union.

c) At the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, the question of replacing Trygve LI by another person should be raised. The American government is ready to support the candidature of a person who has greater administrative abilities and is "politically more reliable."

d) Did the American government disapprove of Trygve LI's trip? to Moscow and Europe and informed him that this trip was "undesirable".

e) The United States considers the question of the representation of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in the UN as the main unresolved problem and links the resolution of this problem with the question of admitting new members to the UN.

2. At the ACHESON London Conference? informed BEVIEN® and SCHUMANN that the question of the consent of the American government to the admission of the People's Republic of China to the UN was

for the United States it is a matter of prestige and they do not want to "make concessions to Russians who do not want to participate in the work of the UN".

ACHESON said this problem could be resolved over time. In the future, circumstances may arise that will allow the United States to reconsider its position regarding the representation of the People's Republic of China in the UN. Such a circumstance may be, for example, the loss of Formosa by the Kuomintang.

According to BEVIN, the British government is interested in having the question of admitting the People's Republic of China to the UN resolved immediately, despite the fact that Britain has unresolved issues with the Central People's Government of China.

SCHUMANN agreed with BEVIN, however, he stated that by recognizing HO CHI MINH "The government of MAO TSE-TUNG" created great difficulties for France in resolving this issue.

Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin May 23, 1950

No. 41 Top Secret To Comrade IV STALIN

I am reporting the following information about the position of the British and US governments on the Korean issue, received from a CI resident in one of the European countries.

1. The British Ambassador to the USA FRANKS brought to the attention of ACHESON the content of the conversation that took place between GROMYKO and the British Ambassador to the USSR KELLY.

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July 7 this year The US government, through its ambassador in London, DOUGLAS, sent the British government its proposal regarding the answer that England should give to the government of the USSR.

According to the American proposal, the British government should tell the Soviet Union that the solution of the Korean question is possible only in full accordance with the well-known resolution of the Security Council. The British government was supposed to consider the US proposal on July 8.

2. The Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East of the RASK, in an official conversation with FRANKS, stated that if the USSR government does not agree to this or a similar proposal, then the US government is determined to continue military operations in Korea until the troops North Korea will not be forced to withdraw beyond the 38th Parallel. At present, the US government does not intend to transfer the operations of its ground forces to the territory of North Korea.

The British government agrees with this position of the United States.

The United States will, wherever possible, try to localize military operations and prevent them from escalating into military operations on a large scale. According to RASC, the US government does not believe that the military actions in Korea are the beginning of a "big war".

3. ATTLEE believes that the Soviet Union is not waging a "big war" in Korea and that the USSR can use the opportunities presented in connection with the events in Korea to begin to put pressure, including military pressure, on Iran, Greece and the countries of Southeast Asia.

British Air Marshal TEDDER was instructed to establish contact with the US Chiefs of Staff and to consider in detail the question of the necessary joint Anglo-American measures to prevent possible actions on the part of the Soviet Union in relation to these countries.

4. England put MacArthur at his disposal! 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 3 frigates. At the same time, she demanded that these ships not be used for the "defense" of Formosa. Canada provides 3 destroyers. Australia provided 1 destroyer and 1 frigate, as well as a squadron of Mustangs. New Zealand was offered to provide 1 cruiser and 4 frigates.

The possibility of sending 1 squadron of Vampire fighters from Canada, one squadron of fighter-bombers from New Zealand, as well as one squadron of transport aircraft and one squadron of bombers from Malaya is being considered.

The British Chiefs of Staff decided in principle that, if requested by the United States, ground forces could also be sent to Korea, but on the condition that they be sent from England itself, and not from Malaya or other countries of the South East Asia.

The British Cabinet has not yet considered this decision of the Chiefs of Staff.

Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

August 1950 632

No. 42 Top secret

Comrade STALIN I.V.

I present, received from a resident in one of the European countries, the text of the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of England on the influence of the Korean events on the interests of Great Britain in the Far East. The report is dated July 7, 1950.

1. The chiefs of staff believe that the offensive of the North Korean troops was inspired by the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Soviet Union, according to the chiefs of staff, was guided by the following:

a) The situation in the Far East in connection with recent statements by American leaders regarding US policy in this region, as well as in connection with the insufficient success of the Communists in Southeast Asia, has developed in such a way that it required immediate action.

6) Given that Korea is one of the most sensitive areas for the Americans, the USSR decided to make a major sounding in order to test the strength and reaction of the Western powers, and especially the United States, so that, if successful, they would launch new actions in Korea. in other places.

In taking this step, the Soviet Union hoped to either divert the military and economic resources of the Western powers used in the Cold War in other areas, or force them to come to terms with the loss of Korea and the resulting loss of prestige.

2. However, the chiefs of staff, and also, according to their information, the Americans believe that the Soviet Union does not want the events in Korea to escalate into a world war, and that therefore the Soviet armed forces of direct participation in hostilities in Korea take will not.

3. The Chiefs of Staff believe that any outcome of events in Korea will induce the Soviet Union to undertake new actions in the Far East and Southeast Asia.

4. According to the Chiefs of Staff, China will not launch an attack on Formosa in the near future, given the US decision to provide military assistance to the Kuomintang. The Chinese troops concentrated in the Canton area and previously intended for action against Formosa can be used for other tasks. These troops pose a threat to Hong Kong,

although, in the opinion of the chiefs of staff, the Chinese government is unlikely to launch an attack on Hong Kong in the near future for fear of an open clash with England.

APPENDIX: on 12 sheets.

Vice-chairman

KI under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR S. Savchenko August 1950

documented

Translation from English

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Top secret

July 7, 1950 CABINET DEFENSE COMMITTEE

IMPACT OF KOREAN EVENTS ON ENGLISH INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST

Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

At the direction of the Defense Committee, we have compiled the attached assessment of the impact of the Communist invasion of Korea on British military interests and on British policy in the Far East and Southeast Asia.

We are compiling a separate report on the likelihood of further communist aggression in other parts of the world, especially in Persia.

(Signed) Fraser Slessor Brownjohn (Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff)

IMPACT OF KOREAN EVENTS ON ENGLISH INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST

Characteristic features of the former communist aggression

1. Since the end of the Second World War, the basic principle underlying the communist activity to expand the Soviet sphere of influence has been the desire of the Soviet Union to avoid any direct confrontation with the United Kingdom and the United States. The Soviet Union actually backed down in the face of a strong Anglo-American reaction in Berlin, Greece and Persia. As far as Korea is concerned, we believe that the speed and strength of the reaction of the United Nations, and especially the United States, came as a surprise to the Soviet leaders.

2. In addition to this basic principle, communist aggression also has the following characteristic features:

a) Despite the fact that there was no direct intervention of the Soviet armed forces, their proximity or presence in a neighboring country undoubtedly contributed to the creation of communist regimes (as, for example, in Eastern Europe).

6) Internal uprisings were led by strong local communist parties (as in China, Malaya and French Indochina).

3. Despite the fact that both sides in Korea belong to the same race, the offensive here is nevertheless a military aggression across the border established by international agreement. This form of aggression is a new feature of Soviet tactics.

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Invasion of Korea

4. Although there is no direct evidence that the North Korean actions were taken at the behest of the Soviet Union, it is almost unbelievable that North Korea would have undertaken this invasion had it not been provided with the necessary moral and material support from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union maintains a mission in North Korea that is estimated to be 4,500 men, but so far there is no evidence that any Soviet or Chinese communist troops are taking part in military operations.

It can therefore be assumed that the invasion of South Korea is a new example of the Soviet method of "war by proxy", and we believe that these actions are a deliberate act of the Cold War on the part of the Russians, which was undertaken by them now after following reasons:

a) From the communist point of view, the situation in the Far East called for immediate action, mainly as a result of the recent statements by American leaders regarding the Far East and because of the insignificance of communist successes in Southeast Asia;

b) Russia decided to make a major sounding to test the strength and reaction of the Western powers, especially the United States, so that, if successful in Korea, take new actions in other areas. Korea is one of the most sensitive areas for the Americans, and the Russians could not help but consider that any move they made there might provoke a reaction from the United States, although they could not foresee how fast this reaction would be, and that the Americans may therefore increase their aid to the Chinese Nationalists in Formosa;

c) This move would force the Western Powers to divert the military and economic means used in the Cold War elsewhere and to build up their main military forces, or force the Western Powers to accept the loss of South Korea and the resulting loss of prestige. .

6. We believe that the Soviet Union inspired the North Korean invasion in order to test the strength and reaction of the Western Powers, and especially the United States, in an area where, in the opinion of the Russians, there was little risk of provoking a world war.

Possibility of SHOI WAR

7. We believe that the Russians are currently seeking to avoid Korea from causing a world war, and that they will therefore not actively support North Korea with their armed forces. However, we believe that although the Russians will not use their military forces, they will support North Korea in every possible way.

8. The United States believes that the Russians are not preparing to enter a major war, that they are probably only making major soundings, and that there are some signs that they intend to save themselves an opportunity in time

stay.

9. We must therefore expect new Soviet steps in the Far East and Southeast Asia, because if the USSR fails in Korea,

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then he will be forced to take some action to restore his prestige, but if the USSR succeeds in Korea, then he will try to take advantage of the loss of prestige of the Western powers in the area.

10. Although we may expect to receive intelligence about Soviet intentions regarding the outbreak of a major war, we cannot be sure that we will receive warning of any deliberate aggression on the part of local communists. . At present, there are no signs of Soviet intentions to start a major war in the near future, and we therefore believe that any local communist aggression in the near future will be consistent with the tactics outlined in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.

Formosa

11. Another factor that may influence the position of the Russians is the reaction of the Chinese communist government to the American actions against Formosa.

An invasion of this island by the Chinese communist armies cannot be expected, even with the presence of Soviet support. This attempt is likely to be postponed indefinitely unless the United States becomes involved in major operations with the Soviet forces, as a result of which they will not be able to defend this island.

Communist armies destined to invade Formosa could be used for operations elsewhere. In an effort to restore its prestige on the Formosan issue, China can, with the encouragement of the Russians, support North Korean troops and intervene more actively in Southeast Asia. His attitude and actions towards British interests in the Far East and Southeast Asia may be significantly influenced by the decision of His Majesty's Government to support the American policy towards Formosa.

We now turn to the areas of concern in Southeast Asia.

Areas of Concern in Southeast Asia

12. Hong Kong. The Chinese Communists at the present time, in their policy towards Hong Kong, will be mainly guided by Soviet instructions, the outcome of the battle in Korea, and the attitude taken by His Majesty's Government towards Formosa. It is reasonable to assume that, on the advice of the USSR, the Chinese Communist Government will not miss an opportunity to create difficulties for us in Hong Kong or Malaya. American action against Formosa would cause resentment among the Chinese Communists, and any action taken by the British military to support the Americans in the area might induce the Chinese Communists to take action against Hong Kong.

At present, troops numbering 200,000-270,000 people are concentrated in Canton and the areas adjacent to it. These troops are formations consisting of infantry and artillery. To the best of our knowledge, most of these formations are intended to attack Formosa. It is possible that these troops will remain in

Cantonese

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area where they pose a threat to Hong Kong and maintain the morale of the fifth column in Hong Kong.

The Joint Intelligence Committee determined that the Chinese would not attack Hong Kong in the near future, one of the considerations on which the Committee's opinion was based was that the Chinese would first want to take Formosa. The American security guarantee for Formosa has introduced a new factor into the Committee's assessment and it is possible that the Chinese will want to use their troops against Hong Kong in order to save their prestige. On the other hand, the usual communist reaction to vigorous measures is to back down. In addition, the Chinese can understand that an attack on Hong Kong can not only bring retribution from

the United Kingdom, but that the United Kingdom can have the support of all Western powers.

No attempt has yet been made through diplomatic channels to secure the handover of Hong Kong, nor has there been any propaganda in this regard.

The Chinese Communists, in their attempts to create difficulties for us in the Far East and Southeast Asia, may well use their troops concentrated in the Canton region to threaten Hong Kong, without resorting to its implementation, in order to force us to bring troops from Malaya. Putting all of the above together, we conclude that the Chinese Communists are not likely to launch an attack on Hong Kong in the near future, although they will increase their efforts to create internal disturbances in that colony.

Indochina

13. There is a strong Communist Party in Indo-China, which is at present waging war against the French, who are going out of their way to restore order. There are at present no British or American troops in this country. Indo-China is an attractive target for expanding communist aggression, and there is a danger that Chinese communist troops, originally intended for Formosa, may help HO CHI MINH® by sending their military forces across the border.

On the other hand, the racial differences between the Indo-Chinese and the Chinese speak against the fact that HO CHI MINH will require the active participation of the Chinese communist armies. Moreover, we have no information about the intention of the Chinese to invade this country, and the difficulties of movement and supply of troops are very significant. It is likely that Chinese aid to HO CHI MINH will be stepped up, although this may be balanced by additional arms supplies to the French, especially from the United States.

Based on this, we conclude that we can expect an increase in communist pressure in Indochina.

14. Malaya. The firm line taken by the United States in Korea and by British troops in Malaya should have a stimulating effect on the opponents of the Communists in Malaya. Allied successes in South Korea will undoubtedly have a beneficial effect on all non-communist elements in Malaya, which in turn will have a beneficial effect on ongoing

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there are military operations. On the other hand, the success of the Communists in Korea will have the opposite effect.

15. Tibet. The Chinese communist government has already declared its intention to liberate Tibet. It is practically impossible to provide significant assistance to Tibet. We believe, therefore, that the Chinese, if they are looking for a quick and easy success in return for the expected victory at Formosa, will hasten the date of their advance into Tibet.

The impact of the Korean events on individual countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia

16. The impact of events in Korea on the countries of Southeast Asia will depend to a very large extent on the degree of success of American intervention. Communist supporters in Southeast Asia will be inspired by the success of the Communists in Korea, and the American armed intervention will have an even more encouraging effect on the opponents of the Communists. But if the United States fails to restore the situation, and South Korea is occupied by the communists, then this may have the most serious consequences for the entire Far East.

17. Formosa. In addition to what is stated in paragraph 11, the result of American action against Formosa may be that all operations of the Chinese Nationalist troops will be suspended and the blockade of China will be ended. It is likely that British trade

circles will try to take advantage of this situation. Although this is in accordance with British policy, nevertheless, under existing conditions, such a situation may lead to friction with the United States.

As a result of all this, British warships were ordered to stop patrolling the Yangtze River area.

18. Japan. The Japanese will welcome any failure of their traditional enemy, Russia; they hope that the Americans will succeed, on the basis of which a stable situation will be established in the North Pacific. On the other hand, they fear that Japan, as the main American base, will be drawn into a new war without the means to defend its territory.

Progress on a peace treaty with Japan depends on the Americans, and it is at present impossible to predict whether the American reaction to the Korean events will help hasten the convening of a peace conference, or whether it will result in a further delay in the drafting of a peace treaty for Japan for an indefinite period. If all of Korea falls, then Japan will be the only sufficiently reliable non-Communist region in all of East and Northeast Asia. The Japanese will no doubt feel that they have become even more indispensable to the Allies and that their position regarding the peace treaty has improved. The Japanese communists will be emboldened, although it is unlikely that the number of their supporters will increase. On the contrary, the general anti-communist sentiments of the majority of the Japanese people will increase even more.

19. Siam. The government of Siam is the only independent government in Southeast Asia that unconditionally took the side of the Western powers. The strong reaction of the United States to the invasion of South Korea dispelled many of the earlier doubts about the seriousness of

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American intentions, and was a strong encouragement to those who decided that Siam should join the Western powers.

20. Burma. The fears of the Burmese Government that one day the Chinese Communists will launch a direct attack on Burma are likely to increase. We believe that the Burmese Government will closely follow developments in Korea and adjust its policy accordingly.

The reason for the offensive is the presence of Nationalist Chinese troops in Burma, although the Burmese have expressed their intention to disarm them as soon as possible.

21. Indonesia. The desire of the Indonesian government to maintain a policy of neutrality in the conflict between the communist world and Western democracies will be further strengthened by developments in Korea. Indonesia will be inclined to follow whatever direction India and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan may give.

CONCLUSIONS

22. We came to the following conclusions:

a) The invasion of South Korea was inspired by the Soviet Union in order to test the reaction of the Western powers and especially the United States in an area where, in the opinion of the Russians, there was no great risk of causing a world war.

6) We must expect new actions inspired by the USSR in the Far East, and possibly in other areas.

c) The successful intervention of the United Nations, and especially the United States, in South Korea will have the most encouraging influence on all anti-communist elements in the countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia. Conversely, the failure of attempts to restore the situation in South Korea will have the most serious consequences.

d) It is likely that the Russians will provide all possible support to the North Korean forces, with the exception of the active intervention of their military forces. The Russians will hardly allow Korea to serve as a pretext for unleashing a world war.

e) An attempt by the Chinese Communists to invade Formosa is hardly probable at present.

f) Chinese communist troops originally intended for the invasion of Formosa may be used for other purposes.

g) The troops currently concentrated in the Canton region and South China pose a threat to Hong Kong and Indo-China. We believe that the Chinese Communists are unlikely to launch an offensive against Hong Kong in the near future, although they will increase their efforts to create internal unrest in that colony.

3) French Indo-China is an attractive target and we believe that an increase in communist pressure in Indo-China should be expected.

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No. 43 Top Secret

August 1950 COMMUNICATION FROM CI RESIDENCE New American air bases in England

During the stay in England of the Chief of the General Staff of the US Air Force, General VANDENBERG, he concluded a new agreement with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Marshal SLIM.

On May 30, the British Government finally ratified this agreement.

According to the VANDENBERG-SLIM agreement, American aviation, which has its bases in England, will have to increase the number of these bases. Construction will soon begin on: three permanent bomber bases in Oxford County; two new bases in Norfolk for F-84 and F-86 jet fighters (they will soon arrive in England in large numbers for permanent deployment).

As for the three bomber bases in Oxford County, their landing area will allow landing and take-off of B-36 aircraft ...

With regard to aircraft type "B-29". According to the SLIM-VANDENBERG agreement, all the bases of these bombers, as well as their materiel, aircraft, repair shops, etc. will be entirely at the disposal of KAE

American personnel will remain for some time to maintain these bases, and then will be partly evacuated to America and partly transferred to new bases for B-36 bombers.

As for the F-84 and F-86 jet fighters, they will be operated by 75% of the Americans and 25% of the British personnel.

Resident of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

No. 44 Top Secret August 10, 1950 COMMUNICATION FROM THE CI RESIDENCE Military preparations in Egypt

At the end of last year, the head of the British Department of Military Training, Percy Strength, was negotiating in Central and East Africa. The purpose of his mission is to coordinate the activities of the British political police in Africa.

At the end of November last year, British Minister of War Shinwell inspected the fortifications along the Suez Canal and announced that the construction of large barracks would soon begin. Shortly thereafter, the pace of the military builder

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stava along the channel accelerated. Underground halls are being built, similar to the underground structure under the Alexandrian cemetery, which was used during the war as a car park.

In the first half of December last year, negotiations were underway in London on the supply of weapons to Egypt, Iraq and Jordan.

In February of this year, many Americans arrived in Suez.

Resident of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

No. 45 Top Secret To Comrade IV STALIN

I present the texts of the report of the Chiefs of Staff of England on the question of British military policy and strategy of May 1 and the minutes of the meeting of the British Defense Committee of May 25 of this year.

The main content of the documents:

1. British military policy and strategy must be considered and planned in the light of the changes that have taken place since 1947. Chief among these changes are the creation of the Western and North Atlantic alliances and the discovery by the Soviet Union of the secret of the atomic bomb.

The current military and strategic situation is characterized by the fact that neither Britain nor the continental countries of Europe can wage a successful war against the Soviet Union without the help of the United States. In turn, the United States is not capable of waging war with the Soviet Union without the help of the British Empire. Therefore, the principles of the so-called "global strategy" should be taken as the basis for the development of military policy. the world strategy of the entire Western bloc as a whole, and not only of England.

2. The military policy of Western countries directed against the USSR must go through two interrelated phases in its development: the "cold war" and the "hot war".

The Cold War, in turn, is divided into three stages.

The first stage is the current "deterrent" stage, which is characterized by the superiority of the Soviet Union in the number of "conventional" weapons, which, from a purely military point of view, makes it possible for the USSR to easily advance to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean at any moment. The only thing holding back the Soviet Union from this step is the fear of war with the United States and the possibility of the latter using the atomic bomb.

At this stage, all the efforts of the Western powers should be directed to the creation of their own military relics.

Second stage. This stage will come when the availability of "conventional" weapons in the West reaches such a level that the seizure of Western Europe will no longer be an easy task for the Soviet Union.

In the second stage, the USSR will have a stockpile of atomic bombs that could decide the outcome of the war with England, but the USA, in turn, will have powerful atomic aviation, which

play the role of a deterrent.

The third stage is the stage of the latest military equipment, which will be created by the Western powers. The Western Powers will have to make every effort to create a radio-controlled bomber with

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supersonic speed, which makes it possible to "carry atomic weapons into the very heart of Russia, despite the latest scientific means of defense".

At this stage, complete military superiority of the Western powers over the Soviet Union must be achieved.

However, the Western powers may not have to reach this stage of the Cold War, as the success achieved in the second stage could force the Soviet Union to abandon its dream of a "Moscow-controlled communist world."

The goal of the Cold War should be to stabilize the anti-communist front, as far as possible without military action, and then proceed to intensify the offensive measures of the Cold War, aimed ultimately at the complete separation of the People's Democracies from the Soviet Union.

As the military power of the Western powers grows, they should move to more decisive action in the Cold War.

The Chiefs of Staff believe that "even now the Allies could afford to adopt a more offensive strategy in the Cold War."

The most dangerous form of offensive against the Western powers during the Cold War is the actions of the "fifth column". Based on this, it is recommended to apply extremely harsh measures against the communist movement both in the mother countries and in the colonies.

3. The task of the Western powers in the field of armaments production should be to create new types of weapons, and not to produce old types of weapons. This is necessary so that in a future war it would be possible to repel an atomic attack and the attacks of the latest Soviet submarines.
boats.

Military production centers should be located not only in the Western countries themselves, but also in overseas territories, in order to avoid their complete destruction in the event of an attack on Western Europe. The chiefs of staff speak out against any attempt to ban atomic weapons.

4. The goals of the future hot war should be as follows:

a) survive the first phase of the war;

6) prevent the capture of Western Europe, inflict a military defeat on the Soviet Union and cause the collapse of the Soviet system.

The use of the atomic bomb and the strategic air attack on the Soviet Union are decisive factors in the war against the USSR. In this regard, the defense of England, as the main base of the Allies in Europe, should be "the cardinal point of the policy allies."

5. The Chiefs of Staff characterize the three main theaters of operations in a future war as follows:

I. Western Europe

Since "European civilization will not be able to withstand the Russian occupation of all of Western Europe", then in the military plans of the Western powers, the main place, at least at the first stage of the war, should be given to the defense of the line east of the Rhine.

But the defense of the Continent must be chiefly the responsibility of the Continental Powers themselves, subject to the involvement of West Germany.

Only the Germans themselves will be able to effectively defend the territory of West Germany, therefore, industrial development should be immediately stopped.

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armament of West Germany and proceed to the creation of the West German armed forces.

In order to avoid a split in the Western Confederation on the question of the restoration of German military power, an independent West German army should not be created, but individual contingents of German troops should be included in the common army of the Western Confederation, in which the French army will play the leading role.

As for the extreme flanks of the European front - Norway, Italy and Greece - it will be difficult to prevent the fall of these countries; moreover, the capture of these countries will not have a decisive effect on the outcome of the war, although it will create additional difficulties.

The main area on whose preservation the outcome of the war will depend is the North Atlantic. Violation of communication lines in this area will lead to the complete paralysis of the Western European armies.

P. Middle East

The second most important theater of operations is the Middle East, which should serve as a base for an air offensive against the southern regions of the Soviet Union.

In order to ensure the defense of the Middle East, it is necessary to strengthen Turkey in every possible way, obtain Egypt's consent to the creation of a joint Anglo-Egyptian base in the Suez Canal area, and regulate Anglo-American relations in the Middle East.

It is essential to enlist the British dominions in the defense of the Middle East and pay special attention to keeping India and Pakistan in the anti-Soviet bloc.

In planning the defense of the Middle East, the Chiefs of Staff are counting on England to succeed in persuading the United States to dedicate some part of its air force to the defense of the Middle East.

However, in their opinion, the defense of the Middle East should not be built at the expense of the defense of Western Europe.

Sh. Far East

The third theater of operations - the Far East - will not be of decisive importance in a future war.

The goals of the Cold War in the Far East at present are to hold the Cold War front line now in Indo-China. If this front is broken, then the subjugation of Siam, Burma, Malaya and Indonesia to communist influence will only be a matter of time.

The main base for the spread of communist influence in the Far East is currently China and groups of the Chinese population scattered throughout the Far East. The goal of a cold war against the Chinese communist regime should be to force it to confine itself to its own territory.

The main threat to the interests of the Western powers in the Far East in the event of a "hot" war will come not so much from Chinese troops as from the deployment of a people's liberation movement in the colonial countries. Therefore, the main attention should be paid to the creation of local internal security troops and the strengthening of the administration in these areas.

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The Chiefs of Staff propose to consider two options for resolving the Japanese issue:

- a) the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan on favorable terms for the Western powers;
- 6) the conclusion of a bilateral Japanese-American agreement granting the United States bases on Japanese territory, and Japan the right to create its own army under the control of the United States.

The second option seems more acceptable to the chiefs of staff.

According to the chiefs of staff, the ability of the Western powers to hold their positions in the Far East will depend mainly on the unity of the actions of the Americans, British and French in this area.

6. In order to coordinate the military efforts of England and the United States on a global scale, the chiefs of staff propose to create a mechanism for developing a unified Anglo-American strategy and unified military plans. The central organ of this mechanism should be built approximately on the principle of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that functioned during the last war.

The chiefs of staff express concern that at present England's cooperation with her dominions is carried out less vigorously than, for example, with European countries.

7. In their report, the Chiefs of Staff identified the following military priorities:

- a) strengthening the air defense of England;
- 6) defense of only the most important communications between North America and Europe and the territorial waters of the allied powers;
- c) defense of the front in Europe;
- d) creation of sufficient strategic air forces and bases for them;
- e) maintenance of a minimum of ground, air and naval forces necessary to secure the positions of Western countries in the Cold War;
- f) the maintenance of a minimum of forces for the defense of the Egyptian base.

8. At the meeting held on May 25 of this year. The British Defense Committee considered and approved the main provisions of the Chiefs of Staff's report. However, during the discussion of the report, disagreements arose on certain issues.

In the report of the chiefs of staff there was a proposal to slow down the pace of work in the field of atomic weapons and accelerate the pace of work in the field of radio-controlled weapons,

intended for defensive purposes. This proposal met with objections from ATTLEE!“, BEVIN® and Minister of Supply STRAUSS.

Attlee pointed out that the issue of the pace of the implementation of the atomic weapons program is not a purely military issue and therefore a change in the program requires a comprehensive discussion.

BEVIN declared that he objected to slowing down the pace of work on atomic energy in England, because, in his opinion, England should not give the United States a monopoly on such a huge source of energy, on which the industrial power of England in the future might depend.

The Defense Committee decided to further discuss the issue of the pace of work on atomic energy and instructed the Ministers of Defense and Supply to prepare the necessary materials for this.

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9. The Defense Committee decided to instruct the Secretary of Defense to prepare a new version of the report for transmission to the "old" dominions and the US government.

Fulfilling the order, the Minister of Defense made the following changes to the report:

- a) The new version of the report omits the indication that the British consider it desirable for the US to participate in the planned regional Pacific bloc. (Paragraph 36).
- 6) An indication that the British consider it desirable to resolve the Japanese issue by concluding a bilateral Japanese-American agreement has been omitted (paragraph 42).
- c) The remark of the chiefs of staff that the British dominions are not actively participating in the military measures of England is omitted. (Paragraph 46).
- d) The remark of the Chiefs of Staff is omitted that as long as there is a legal Communist Party in England, the British Government cannot take harsh measures against the Communists in their country. (Paragraph 50).
- e) The proposal of the chiefs of staff to slow down the pace of work in the field of atomic weapons and to accelerate the pace of work in the field of guided weapons was omitted. (Paragraph 57).
- f) Omitted the suggestion of the Chiefs of Staff that greater attention be given to the establishment of a civil defense system in England.

The new version of the report was approved by the Prime Minister and sent to the US government, the governments of the "old" dominions, as well as the British commanders-in-chief in the Middle and Far East.

APPENDIX: on 1 sheet*.

Vice-chairman

KI under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR S. Savchenko August 15, 1950 No. 46 Top secret August 18, 1950

MESSAGE FROM THE CI RESIDENCE

Negotiations of the British General Slim in Cairo (August 18, 1950)

In July of this year. English General SLIM conducted military negotiations in Cairo. Reliable information about the negotiations has not been received. Despite this, there were rumors in Arab circles that the three Western great powers wanted to break the Middle East into 4 strategic lines:

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp.

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- 1) Türkiye - Cairo, under the supervision of the Turks and the British,
- 2) Marsa Matruh - El Arikh, under the supervision of the Egyptian army,
- 3) Port Said - Sudan Kartum - Lake Tana, under the supervision of Great Britain with the help of Egypt.
- 4) Tanganyika - East Africa, under British supervision.

The central strategic air base will allegedly be Fayed, which the British are constantly fortifying.

General Slim is said to have suggested that Britain would help train the Egyptian army by sending specialists and advisers to Egypt.

Resident of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

No. 47 Top Secret To Comrade IV STALIN

I report the following information received from one of the CI residents.

1. At a meeting held on July 14 of this year, the British Defense Committee considered the issue of exporting oil and strategic materials to China.

This issue was brought up for discussion by the Defense Committee in connection with the demand of ACHESON® to completely stop oil exports to China. ACHESON justified his demand by the fact that the oil exported to China is currently being transferred to the North Koreans.

In order to completely stop oil exports to China, the Defense Committee decided:

a) Detain and confiscate all oil on its way to China and requisition or buy up all oil reserves in Hong Kong on the grounds that this oil is required for the operations of "UN troops" in South Korea;

6) together with the Americans, achieve the inclusion of all petroleum products in the list of strategic materials prohibited for export to the USSR and the countries of people's democracy; measures have been taken to ensure that these materials cannot enter China via Hong Kong and Singapore. At the same time, the Defense Committee noted that the implementation of this measure will take some time, since a special decision of the OEEC will be required.

During the discussion of this question, the wish was expressed that the governments of England, the United States and the Netherlands should try to convince Indonesia to also stop exporting oil to China.

2. At a meeting of the Defense Committee, it was noted that, despite the prohibition of the export of strategic materials from England to China, the export of these materials still continues through Singapore and Hong Kong.

In order to stop these exports and not put England in a difficult position before the OEEC, the Defense Committee decided to stop further issuing licenses to China for strategic materials.

3. In evaluating the possible consequences of the implementation of these measures, the Defense Committee concluded that China's response at present will be

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a lesser danger to England than the Americans' displeasure if Britain had not banned the export of strategic materials to China.

Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR S. Savchenko

August 24, 1950

No. 48 Top Secret To Comrade STALIN IV.

I am reporting a summary of the minutes of the meeting of the Defense Committee of England on July 11 of this year.

1. May 25 this year The British Defense Committee considered the report of the Chiefs of Staff, which recommended slowing down the pace of work in the field of atomic weapons and focusing on work in the field of guided weapons.

ATTLEY¹°, BEVIN!! and Minister of Supply STRAUSS opposed this proposal, which is why the Defense Committee decided to consider this issue further at one of the following meetings.

At the meeting held on July 11 of this year, the Defense Committee again discussed the question of the order of work in the field of atomic and guided weapons.

ETTLI, who spoke at the meeting, stressed that when determining the priority of work on these types of weapons, work in the field of guided weapons should not be allowed to be carried out at the expense of reducing work in the field of atomic energy.

Secretary of Defense SHINWELL stated that his department's main interest at present was to see the implementation of the guided weapons research program as fast as possible. Guided weapons, according to SHINWELL, are now the only effective means of combating nuclear weapons.

attacks.

3. During the discussion, a proposal was put forward to abandon the planned work at the scientific and experimental center in Aldermaston (Berkshire) and to use the funds thus saved for work in the field of guided weapons. However, this proposal met with objections based on the fact that not only the most important work in the field of atomic weapons was being carried out at Aldermaston, but also scientific and experimental work on other new types of weapons. At the same time, it was pointed out that if the program of work in the field of atomic weapons were to be reduced even by half, then this would save less than half of all the funds allocated for Aldermaston, since a significant part of these funds was spent on work on other types of weapons.

At present, there is little hope of concluding an agreement with the Americans on atomic energy, in view of the fact that the United States government is now preoccupied primarily with the Korean question. In addition, due to the dissolution of Congress for the holidays, negotiations with the Americans on atomic energy cannot be resumed until the spring of 1951.

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In order to reach agreement with the Americans on the question of atomic energy, the British program of work in the field of atomic weapons must be as broad as possible. Moreover, if the Americans learn that the British atomic weapons program has been curtailed, they will immediately demand more raw materials, which will harm British interests in the field of atomic energy.

It was also noted at the meeting that in addition to expenditures on the implementation of programs of atomic and guided weapons, Britain must make significant expenditures on carrying out scientific and experimental work in the field of bacteriological and chemical weapons of war.

5. Summing up the discussion, ATTLEE pointed out that the general strategic principles adopted by the Defense Committee require that work in the field of guided weapons be accelerated as much as possible.

The British Defense Committee agreed in principle that the implementation of the program of work in the field of guided weapons should be accelerated as much as possible, and invited Minister of Supply STRAUSS to urgently submit to the Committee concrete proposals for measures to accelerate this work.

At the same time, the Defense Committee decided that the existing program of work in the field of atomic energy should not be changed for the time being.

Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR S. Savchenko

August 31, 1950

#49 Top secret

Comrade STALIN I.V.

I present the information about the conference of foreign ministers of the countries of the British Empire, which took place from 9 to 14 January of this year. in Colombo (Ceylon). The reference is compiled on the basis of the minutes of the conference meetings.

The conference was convened at the initiative of the British government to discuss the future policy of the countries of the British Empire in Southeast Asia.

The British government was forced to reconsider its policy in this part of the world in connection with the fact that the formation of the People's Republic of China and the growth of the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia led to a radical change in the situation throughout Asia.

The conference noted that the peoples of Southeast Asia were striving for political freedom and economic improvement, and that "the democratic powers, if they are to succeed in fighting the advance of communism, must make it clear that they are also strive to enable these peoples to achieve their goals." At the same time, it was stressed that the Western powers should switch to a policy of "neutralization" and disintegration of national liberation movements from within, to a policy of subordinating nationalist movements to their own goals.

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In defining their policy in the countries of South and Southeast Asia, the conference participants proceeded from the premise that "communism finds its fertile ground where hunger and poverty reign." Given the existence of such a situation in these countries, the conference came to the conclusion that the policy of the countries of the British Empire and the Western powers should be aimed at accelerating the economic development of the countries of South and Southeast Asia.

In the opinion of the conference participants, this measure can prevent the countries of this region from falling away from the capitalist system. Along with this, the use of the resources of the Western powers for the development of backward regions of the world will make it possible to overcome economic difficulties and prevent economic collapse in the West.

In order to determine measures for the economic development of Southeast Asia, the conference decided to recommend to the governments represented at it to create a Consultative Committee of the countries of the British Empire. The Committee should consider the possibility of drawing up some kind of unified plan and the creation of a special apparatus for the implementation of the economic development of the countries of South and Southeast Asia, as well as

to involve in the implementation of this plan various international organizations, the United States and other countries with interests in Asia.

The conference rejected the proposal to conclude a Pacific pact at the present time, arguing that in Southeast Asia "new states have arisen for which a formal union is unacceptable", and such a pact "would only increase the threat of aggression without increasing the ability to resist it."

When considering the issue of recognition of the People's Republic of China and future policy towards China, the delegates of Canada, Australia and New Zealand reproached BEVIN that the British government, ignoring the opinions of other countries of the British Empire, hastily decided to recognize the People's Republic of China. Such unilateral actions by the British government, in their opinion, are detrimental to the unity of the British Empire in the eyes of the rest of the world.

In justifying the actions of the British government, BEVIN stated that the issue of recognition had been agreed upon with the countries of the British Empire and with the United States. The latter approved of the actions of the British government and even asked England to take over the main part of their consular work in China.

As regards policy towards the People's Republic of China in the future, the delegates' statements were limited to opposing any interference by the Government of the People's Republic of China in the affairs of non-Chinese territories, to be cautious about its activities inside the country and to use every opportunity to prevent the break of the People's Republic of China from the Soviet Union.

The conference raised the question of ending the state of war with Germany. According to BEVIN, the solution of this issue is complicated by the fact that the presence of American troops in Germany and the large financial contributions of the United States to the economy of West Germany are justified only by maintaining a formal state of war. However, BEVIN hopes that the question of ending the state of war with Germany will be settled by the end of 1950.

In the course of the work of the conference, essential disagreements between BEVIN and NERU emerged!" In his speeches, NERU pointed out the need

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the feasibility of eliminating foreign domination in the countries of Southeast Asia and the withdrawal of foreign troops. He said that "any remnant of the colonial regime in Southeast Asia will be an inexhaustible source of constant friction and will be used by the communists." NEHU refused to agree to the recognition of the BAO DAI regime, which, as he pointed out, does not enjoy influence in the country. NEHU described BAO DAI as an undisguised puppet of France and as a person with a dark past.

APPENDIX: on 16 sheets*.

Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR S. Savchenko

September 16, 1950

No. 50 Top Secret

Comrade MENSNIKOV MA.

The Information Committee has the following information.

The US government proposed to the British government to take steps to stop the Soviet Union from purchasing strategic materials from the countries of the British Empire.

The British government considers it inappropriate to impose official restrictions on such purchases at the present time, however, in the near future it intends to take informal measures to control the export of strategic materials from the countries of the British Empire. Control will be established mainly on materials such as rubber, tin and wool.

Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR S. Savchenko

September 1950

No. 51 Top Secret

Comrade STALIN I.V.

I present the text of the report of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee on the reorganization of the military bodies of the Western and North Atlantic alliances. The report was considered at what was happening on August 1 of this year. meeting of the Defense Committee under the British Cabinet and was approved.

Summary of the report:

1. The British Chiefs of Staff consider that a significant shortcoming in the activities of the North Atlantic Alliance in the field of training

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp.

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ki military plans is the lack of close cooperation between its bodies. The Committee of Alternates established under the Council of the North Atlantic Alliance, which is located in London, is separated from the Permanent Group in Washington. The Permanent Group, in turn, is cut off from the Financial and Economic Committee and the War Production and Supply Council.

In order to remedy this shortcoming and to revitalize the activities of all Alliance bodies, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff has proposed the appointment of a military adviser to the Chairman of the Committee of Deputies from the Standing Group. The main functions of this adviser should be the following.

a) Explain to the Committee of Deputies, as well as financial and supply authorities, the military policy developed by the Alliance Defense Committee, and inform them of the activities carried out in accordance with this policy.

6) Ensure that military planning authorities take into account financial and supply capabilities.

The Committee of the Chiefs of Staff considers it necessary that

Englishman.

2. According to the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, at present the Western European countries need a strong and effective organization to unite and coordinate the military efforts of these countries in all spheres of their military policy and strategy, in particular in the field of standardization weapons and the use of military resources. In this regard, the Committee proposed the creation of a Central European Organization in Europe and the inclusion of Norway, Denmark, Italy, the United States and Canada as full members of the countries of the Western Union. However, the Committee suggested that, in the Central European Organization, the countries of the Western Union should retain the right to maintain their special relationship and, at their own discretion, to convene separate meetings to consider problems affecting these countries.

3. The Committee of Chiefs of Staff considers that the question of the reorganization of the military organs of the Western and North Atlantic alliances is very urgent. In order to speed up this reorganization, he proposed that the British government, after consulting with the governments of the USA, France and the Benelux countries, put forward its proposals directly to the Committee of Deputies, bypassing other military bodies of the Alliance.

The Committee of Chiefs of Staff believes that the reorganization of the military organs of the Western and North Atlantic alliances that it proposes will not encounter any particular difficulties. However, the Committee considers it necessary to bear in mind that the expansion of the Western Union to ten countries, and especially the inclusion of Italy, would create a risk of leakage of classified information.

well well

The proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff to include the United States and Canada in the Western Union as full members indicates that the British Government is strenuously seeking

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ways to bind the United States with concrete military obligations towards Western European countries.

APPENDIX: according to the text on 17 sheets*.

Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR S. Savchenko

September 8, 1950

No. 52 Top Secret To Comrade IV STALIN

I report that according to the received documentary information, a special body is functioning in England - the Committee for the transfer of the country to a war footing.

This Committee was established in 1948 and currently oversees the preparation and implementation of government and departmental military plans.

The overall direction of this Committee is entrusted to the Defense Committee of England.

Deputy Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR S. Savchenko

September 8, 1950

No. 53 Top Secret To Comrade IV STALIN

I present the text of the report of the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on the Civil Defense of England dated July 18 of this year.

1. The report of the Committee of Civil Defense Experts has been drawn up at the direction of the Defense Committee for the purpose of determining the amount of expenditure for the civil defense of England for the next four

of the year.

Under the term "civil defense", the Committee of Experts means precautions against air raids, construction of oil storage facilities, protection and repair of communication lines, ensuring the continuous operation of ports and enterprises during air raids, and other activities.

In compiling the report, the Committee of Experts proceeded from the possibility of a war in 1957.

2. The civil defense spending plan presented by the Committee of Experts is based on the military plans of various departments.

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp.

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All calculations are based on the assumption that in the event of war in 1957, England will be subjected to massive air raids using weapons of mass destruction. In addition, it is assumed that already in the first stage of the war, 30,000-40,000 high-explosive and incendiary bombs per month will be dropped on England.

3. In order to accelerate the work on the organization of civil defense, the Committee of Experts proposes to divide all military departmental plans into three categories, depending on the urgency of their execution.

It is recommended to include in the first category the plans for those works, the implementation of which within four years will make it possible to create the basis for the deployment of the entire system of civil defense measures and ensure the implementation of these measures by 1957. This includes such activities as, for example, the establishment of a warning system, the training of volunteers, the protection and repair of communication lines, the provision of food and other activities.

The second and third categories include plans for less urgent work, the implementation of which, however, will require significant expenses, which may necessitate the restructuring of the entire economy of England.

Total for civil defense work for 1951-1955. The Committee of Experts recommends the allocation of £936.093 million. Art.

The expenditure to be made by the Home Offices of England and Scotland will amount to £539.457 million. Art., the health departments of England and Scotland - 237.271 million pounds. Art., departments of fuel and energy - 76.214 million pounds. Art., transport departments - 34.542 million pounds. Art. The main items of expenditure for civil defense are the creation of training centers - 29.400 million pounds. Art., organization of transport - 143.250 million ff. Art. and construction of shelters - 233.123 million pounds. Art.

4. The departments' cost estimates do not take into account labor and raw material issues and assume that there will be full employment, current wage rates, and current price levels and pound sterling parity.

The estimate did not include the cost of subsidizing civil defense in private industry, as under its present policy the British Government will not provide private industry with any direct subsidies, but will provide financial assistance through income tax cuts. This indirect assistance will amount to approximately £10 million over this four-year period. Art.

However, the committee of experts is of the opinion that the implementation of the proposed four-year plan for the civil defense of England will not yet provide a reliable defense in 1954/55 and that additional expenditure will be required for this purpose.

The Committee of Ministers for Civil Defense approved the report of the Committee of Experts and submitted it for approval by the Defense Committee of England.

APPENDIX: on 20 sheets*. S. Savchenko

September 8, 1950

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp.

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No. 54 Top Secret To Comrade IV STALIN

I am presenting the texts of the report and the reference drawn up by the chiefs of staff of England on the question of military cooperation with Egypt.

The note was intended for the Chief of the Imperial General Staff as a guide in his negotiations with the Egyptian government on Anglo-Egyptian military cooperation.

Documents received from the CI resident in London and dated May 1950.

The main content of the documents is as follows.

1. The Chiefs of Staff believe that the ideal military agreement in the Middle East would be a regional pact including England, the countries of the Arab League, Israel, Turkey, Iran, and also, if possible, Greece. However, according to the chiefs of staff, "due to political difficulties, the possibility of concluding such a pact is not foreseen in the near future." That is why they propose to reach an agreement on military cooperation for the time being only between Britain and Egypt.

2. The chief of the imperial general staff in negotiations with the Egyptians had to convince the latter that in the event of a "big" war, Egypt would be the first object of attack by the Soviet Union.

A successful defense of Egypt, in the opinion of the chiefs of staff, can only be ensured if the enemy is detained at a line no closer than the northern part of Israel. Otherwise, "Extremely vulnerable cities, ports and facilities in Egypt will be subjected to brutal raids by Russian short-range aviation."

The chief of the imperial staff is invited to prove to the Egyptians that "the Russian threat in the Levant can be eliminated only by deploying large contingents of allied troops in the first stage of the war, using the territory of Egypt." The Egyptians will not be able to provide defense even for their own country. In this regard, Egypt needs to conclude a military agreement with England, which "on behalf of its Western allies undertakes to defend this vital area."

3. The Chiefs of Staff, referring to the direct threat to Egypt and the entire Middle East from the Soviet Union, propose to have in Egypt in peacetime a certain number of trained British and Egyptian land, sea and air forces and corresponding bases.

The command of these armed forces in Egypt during the war should be carried out by the so-called Egyptian headquarters, i.e. a joint Anglo-Egyptian headquarters, which will be "directly responsible for the sea, land and air defense of Egypt."

In time of peace, the command and control of the British and Egyptian armed forces should be respectively in the hands of their respective commanders, as well as the national headquarters and administrative services. As for the planning of the "defense" of Egypt, air defense measures and the use of available means, then, in the opinion of

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chiefs of staff, joint, coordinated Anglo-Egyptian action is required.

All joint measures for the defense of Egypt in peacetime must be carried out by the Anglo-Egyptian Defense Committee, the Anglo-Egyptian Committees of Senior Staff Officers and

senior administrative officers and a joint Anglo-Egyptian air defense headquarters.

4. In addition, the Chiefs of Staff propose to establish a Forward Operational Headquarters and a Headquarters for the Middle East, Africa and South Asia.

The Forward Operational Headquarters is intended to provide leadership of operations in the Levant during times of war. The command of the three branches of service is entrusted to the British, as "the United Kingdom will bear the main responsibility in the forward area and, together with the countries of the Commonwealth, will provide the bulk of the armed forces."

The headquarters of the Middle East, Africa and South Asia should consist only of the British commanders in the Middle East. This headquarters is entrusted with the direction of operations in an area stretching from the Middle East and North Africa to the Indian Ocean and southeastern Europe.
Headquarters - Egypt.

When choosing the location of the headquarters, the British proceeded from the fact that its location in Egypt would be "a major factor in ensuring the stability and peaceful development of the Middle East."

The British Defense Committee at a meeting held on May 25, 1950, considered and approved the report and the certificate of the Chiefs of Staff of England on military cooperation with Egypt.

APPENDIX: on 16 sheets*. Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin

September 30, 1950

No. 55 Top Secret November 1950 To Comrade I.V. STALIN

The Information Committee has the following information.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Burma SAO KUN KIO during his stay in Pakistan in October-November of this year. had repeated conversations with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, LIAKAT ALI KHAN, which were also attended by the British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army, General GRACEY.

During these conversations, the issue of creating a "single line of defense" from Kashmir to Vietnam was discussed. To strengthen this line of defense, the United States and Britain intend to provide weapons and financial resources, and people

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp.

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Russian reserves are to be provided by Pakistan, India, Burma, Malaya and Ceylon.

In Pakistani journalistic circles, these negotiations are regarded as the beginning of the implementation of the plan of the British Chief of Staff SLIMA, who in July of this year. visited Ceylon, Malaya, India and Pakistan and called on these countries to create a unified army in the area for "defense against communist aggression."

Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin November 15, 1950

No. 56 Top Secret

Comrade STALIN I.V.

The Information Committee has the following information.

The British authorities are taking urgent measures to strengthen the defenses of Hong Kong and Kowloon. Defensive structures are being built along the border with the People's Republic of China. New military camps have been set up in Jintian, and the airfield is being expanded with up to 40 aircraft.

Along with the strengthening of the naval and air forces, the Hong Kong authorities decided to increase the mechanized land army to 30-40 thousand people and equip it with the latest weapons.

Chief of Staff of the British Land Forces SLIM ordered to reinforce British troops in Australia, India and New Zealand in case of need to provide assistance to Hong Kong.

The British Government proposed to the Hong Kong authorities to start evacuating material assets from Hong Kong to Singapore and the Philippines. To carry out this event, the Security Administration sent eight security detachments, whose fighters are dressed in civilian clothes, to the most important border points with the People's Republic of China.

The task of these detachments is to strengthen the security on the roads, conduct raids, check the documents of persons located on the piers, trams, buses and residential premises.

Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin

December 1950

No. 57 Top secret

Comrade STALIN I.V.

I present a note on the differences in the North Atlantic Alliance, compiled on the basis of materials received through diplomatic channels and information from the foreign press. The note provides an overview of the most important developments that characterize the situation in the Alliance in recent years.

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The content of the note is as follows.

In an effort to speed up preparations for war against the Soviet Union and, in this regard, to speed up the transfer of the economies of Western European countries to a war footing, as well as the creation of the armed forces of an aggressive bloc, the United States achieved a radical reorganization of the governing bodies of the North Atlantic Alliance. This reorganization ensured the creation of permanent organs engaged in the practical implementation of plans for preparing for war, and made it possible to concentrate in the hands of the Americans almost all leading positions in the organs of the Union.

The creation at the beginning of 1951 of a unified command of the armed forces of the North Atlantic Alliance headed by Eisenhower, as well as the appointment in the last days of the American Admiral McCormick as Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces in the North Atlantic, increased the influence of the Americans in the Union and gave them the opportunity to more actively and unceremoniously interfere in the internal affairs of Western European countries.

By mid-1951, the United States had obtained from its Western European allies a significant increase in military budgets and an expansion of military production.

However, the implementation of the military-economic measures of the aggressive bloc led to a sharp deterioration in the economic situation of the countries of Western Europe. In this regard, American demands for a further expansion of military production and an increase in the armed forces met with stubborn resistance from the European members of the Union.

At the September 1951 session of the Council of the North Atlantic Alliance in Ottawa, serious disagreements arose over the distribution of the burden of military spending. In this regard, a special committee was set up to explore the possibility of "reconciling military requirements with real political and economic factors."

The proposals of this committee were not approved by the Rome session of the Council of the North Atlantic Alliance, held at the end of November 1951, and the discussion of the disputed problems was transferred to the Lisbon session of the Council, which was to begin on February 16, 1952.

Having met the stubborn resistance of the Western European countries in the issue of increasing the pace of rearmament, the United States has recently shifted its focus from "promising" rearmament to taking measures to arm existing and emerging divisions, acting on the principle, as the New York Times wrote, "Better a tit in the hand than a pie in the sky."

The members of the aggressive bloc have also still not been able to overcome their disagreements on the ways of incorporating West Germany into the anti-Soviet bloc, on the timing of the formation, equipment and strength of newly created military formations, and on the distribution of command posts in the armed forces.

All these disagreements are delaying the implementation of American plans to speed up preparations for war against the Soviet Union.

The information presented in the note suggests that further attempts by the United States to force its partners in the Atlantic bloc to speed up military preparations will obviously lead to an aggravation of differences between them and to a lengthening of the terms of military preparations in the countries of the Atlantic bloc.

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It is to be expected that at the Lisbon session of the Council of the North Atlantic Alliance, the United States will try to achieve agreed decisions, if only on the basis of somewhat truncated initial plans.

APPENDIX: on 29 sheets*. Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR "V. Zorin

February 8, 1952

No. 58 Top Secret To Comrade IV STALIN

The Committee of Information under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR presents a note "On preparations for the creation of an aggressive military-political bloc in the Balkans".

The main content of the note is as follows.

1. In order to strengthen the anti-Soviet foothold in the Mediterranean, the leading circles of the United States are now trying to create, along with the Middle Eastern command, a military-political bloc consisting of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, in which Italy, other Mediterranean countries and Austria could also take part.

The creation of a military-political bloc in the Balkans, closely connected with the North Atlantic Alliance, would allow the Americans to strengthen their strategic positions near the countries of people's democracy and the southern regions of the USSR to the plan to create a military-political bloc with the participation of these countries.

The plan to create such a bloc has been put forward by the Americans over the past few years, but the practical implementation of this plan ran into Anglo-American differences and

contradictions between the countries planned by the Americans for inclusion in the projected bloc.

2. Britain's ruling circles support the American plan to create an aggressive military-political group in the Balkans. However, the British approach to solving this problem differs significantly from that of the Americans.

While the Americans are striving for the projected bloc to be closely linked with the North Atlantic alliance and take over a certain part of the overall tasks of this alliance in the southern European strategic direction, the British are interested in linking the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish bloc, first of all, with the Middle Eastern command and use the military potential of the members of this bloc to strengthen the approaches to the Middle East.

Along with this basic disagreement regarding the "center of gravity" of the planned bloc, there is no unity of opinion between the Americans and the British.

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp.

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also on the question of which countries should be included in this block. In particular, the British oppose the intention of the Americans to annex Spain to the projected bloc, as they fear that this will lead to the loss of British control over Gibraltar.

Anglo-American differences on the issue of creating a military-political bloc in the Balkans have not been overcome to date.

In addition, preparations for the creation of this bloc are complicated by the struggle between the United States and Britain for political influence in Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. The British are stubbornly striving to restore their positions in these countries, which have been greatly shaken in recent years as a result of the strengthening of US influence in the Balkans and the Middle East. British political and military leaders regularly visit Yugoslavia and Greece. In conversations with representatives of the Yugoslav and Greek governments, they are trying to prove that close ties with England would be more beneficial for Greece and Yugoslavia than the subordination of these countries to the United States. As a result of the measures taken by the British government to expand Anglo-Yugoslav economic ties, England in 1951 again took first place in Yugoslav exports, significantly displacing the United States.

3. The tense relations that developed after the war between Greece and Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey were also a major obstacle to the creation of a military-political bloc in the Balkans. The struggle between Italy and Yugoslavia for Trieste hindered the organization of negotiations on Italy's participation in this bloc.

In an effort to remove these obstacles, over the past year and a half to two years, the Americans have been taking measures aimed at smoothing out the contradictions between the alleged members of the bloc. Recently, they have made some progress in this regard.

American diplomacy succeeded in achieving political and economic rapprochement between Greece and Yugoslavia, as well as between Greece and Turkey. Yugoslav-Turkish relations also strengthened. This allowed the Americans to proceed at the beginning of 1952 to the organization of trilateral Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav negotiations on the creation of a military-political bloc with the participation of these countries. Italy does not participate in these negotiations, as the Italo-Yugoslav relations continue to be tense. Attempts by the Americans and the British to use as a basis for the Italo-Yugoslav "reconciliation" the proposal to divide the Free Territory of Trieste between these two countries have not yet yielded real results. Italo-Greek and Italian-Turkish relations have also not improved lately. The unwillingness of the Greek and Turkish governments to subordinate the ground forces of these countries to the commander of the ground forces of the southern zone of the North Atlantic Alliance, the Italian general

Castiglioni led to an even greater aggravation of relations between Greece and Turkey, on the one hand, and Italy, on the other.

4. The question of creating a Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish bloc was discussed during the stay of the Greek government delegation in Ankara (January-February of this year), during the negotiations of the Turkish government delegation in Athens (April-May) during a visit by EISENHOWER! " in March Greece and Turkey. The main task of the negotiations between the Mediterranean countries is to find a form for bringing Yugoslavia into the projected bloc. The difficulty of this task for the Americans is that the direct

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the inclusion of Yugoslavia in an aggressive alliance with Greece and Turkey could lead to the final undermining of the positions of the TITO!?? clique inside the country, which is undesirable for the Americans.

The information presented in the note gives reason to believe that the question of the form of Yugoslavia's participation in the projected bloc has not yet been resolved. In view of this, obviously, no specific project has been developed for the organization of the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish bloc.

Anglo-American differences are also reflected in the results of the negotiations. According to reports, the British, independently of the Americans, are conducting secret negotiations with the countries that the Americans are planning to include in the projected bloc, and are trying to find out the possibility of subordinating this bloc to the goals of British policy in the Middle East.

5. Thus, the implementation of the American plan to create a military-political bloc in the Balkans is still in its initial stage. However, the Americans will undoubtedly speed up negotiations on the organization of this bloc.

As recent events show, in particular, the trip of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs ARTAHO to the capitals of the Arab countries (April this year) and the visit of the Greek Deputy Prime Minister VENIZELOS to Syria and Lebanon (May), it is possible that the Americans, along with measures to cobble together a Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish grouping, are preparing for the creation of a broader Mediterranean bloc that would unite, under American leadership, both the Balkan satellites of the United States and Turkey, as well as Spain and the Arab countries. This is all the more likely if one takes into account the fact that negotiations on a Middle Eastern command have stalled due to the negative position of Egypt. In this regard, the Americans will undoubtedly strive to find new ways to include Arab countries in an aggressive bloc.

APPENDIX: on 25 sheets*. Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin

June 5, 1952

No. 59 Top secret

June 1952 MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE

Reliable source reports. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would now like to draw a close connection between the signing of the new agreement on Trieste, the Greek-Turkish negotiations in Athens and the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations in Cairo.

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp.

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According to Italian diplomats, the Anglo-American rivalry in the Mediterranean area continues to exist, and the London government is going to resume in the Middle

East active in order to impose their own solutions.

London hastily seeks to reach a compromise with Cairo in order to end the Egyptian question before the resumption of negotiations on a pact for the defense of the Middle East.

The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that the UK may offer to "provisionally" recognize King FAROUK's sovereignty over the Sudan. Great Britain decided to pay a heavy price for the speedy conclusion of a defense pact.

The new British offensive in the Mediterranean sector is of particular concern to Italy. Efforts made to get closer to Great Britain turned out to be in vain. Italian diplomacy again received only empty promises, London stubbornly wants to make the most of Yugoslavia to implement its plan of action in the Mediterranean.

Belgrade is getting more and more involved in the political game of the Foreign Office. Yugoslavia is becoming a necessary tool of maneuver between Greece and Turkey. Questions relating to the defense of Macedonia and Thrace are gaining momentum in the Greek-Turkish negotiations, which is facilitated to a certain extent by Yugoslavia under the auspices of London. Once again, Italy remains isolated in the Mediterranean region due to tensions between Rome and Belgrade.

It is now trying to avoid complete isolation by resuming the semi-official talks with Madrid that broke off a few months ago, by sending its "Miss Dominici" to the capitals of the countries of the Middle East, by continuing its talks with Israel, which is worried about the threat of Egyptian domination, and making it clear to London that the Western Power's guarantee would allow it to resume direct negotiations with Yugoslavia.

It is in this question that the activity of Italy acquires a certain significance. Until the end of the municipal elections, there can be no question of resuming direct negotiations with Belgrade, but it is already believed that Rome sees this as an opportunity to slow down the activities of the British in the Middle East.

The tension in Italian-Yugoslav relations is becoming the most detrimental factor for Italy in the policy pursued in the Mediterranean area, given the current political orientation of British negotiations. This tension, as already mentioned, increases the restraint of the Greeks and Turks in the question of the cooperation of the armed forces of Greece and Turkey with the Italian army, since these countries fear that this cooperation may not interfere with the attempt to unite their defense system with defense system of Yugoslavia. Thus, it is possible that Italy, having not received proper commitments from London, now considers it necessary to eliminate such strained relations with Yugoslavia, or at least drag out this matter, again making it believe that the agreement with Belgrade will not be possible.

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Resident of the MGB of the USSR

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No. 60 Top Secret

To Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV To Comrade MALENKOV G.M.

I report the following information received from one of the residents of the USSR Ministry of State Security

According to some diplomatic representatives of the Arab countries, one of the main reasons for the resignation of the government of SIRRI PASHA!" was the gross intervention of the Americans. The US Ambassador to Cairo, KEFFERY, demanded from King FAROUK, through AFIFI PASHA, the resignation of the cabinet of SIRRI PASHA in connection with the latter's refusal to sign an agreement on " friendship,

economic development and trade" between Egypt and the United States, as presented to the Egyptian government by the Americans.

SIRRI PASHA's refusal to sign the above treaty came as a surprise to the US, as the former government of HIDALI PASHA agreed to sign it.

According to the aforementioned diplomatic representatives, KEFFERY's demand for the resignation of SIRRI PASHA coincided with the desire of King FAROUK, who, having learned about the collusion of SIRRI PASHA with the Wafdist leaders, was also interested in removing him from the post of prime minister.

The British, dissatisfied with the resignation of SIRRI PASHA, who allegedly refused to sign an agreement with the United States on their instructions, continue to conduct secret negotiations with the Wafdist leaders in order to persuade them to accept the British conditions for resolving the Anglo-Egyptian conflict in the event that the WAFD party returns to power. .

Minister of State Security S. Ignatiev

July 24, 1952

No. 61 Top Secret November 1952 MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE

For several weeks now, and especially after the election of Eisenhower as President of the United States, the French Foreign Ministry has been fearful of a possible expansion of the Korean conflict.

These fears, according to responsible officials of the French Foreign Ministry, are not based on the BONNET message!?" or OPPENO"", and the information of the French ambassador in Tokyo DEJAN.

If in their telegrams the first two do not talk about Korea, complaining that they do not receive information about the intentions of the American military command in the usual way, then DEJAN constantly declares its concern.

DEJAN had a long conversation with MURPHY the other day!! and General CLARK, they confirmed to him "that President Eisenhower's trip

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to Korea will take place allegedly on December 15th. He will not be delayed in Tokyo, except for an official stopover (without making any contact) to transfer from one aircraft to another."

This conversation confirmed DEJAN'S earlier impressions that, in view of the lack of prospects for a truce, "military circles believe that hostilities in Korea will be resumed on a larger scale and that this is the intention of the American military command, which is carefully preparing for these actions for more than three months now."

DEJAN cites a number of confirmatory signs in support of this assumption. He gives a long list of inspection visits by American representatives, which have become more frequent in August, September and October of this year.

During this time, Korea was visited by: General COLLINS, Admiral FEHTLER, Minister of the Navy, General HODGE, Deputy Ministers of War FOSTER and ROSENBERG, Generals SMITH, BOITNER VANDENBERG, Admiral REDFORD and others.

In these, as well as numerous trips to Korea in August, September and October by members of the US Congress, DEJAN sees confirmation of his opinion.

Also, in his opinion, "operations undertaken in early October reveal the intention of the American government" (meaning large amphibious landings in the area of the 39th parallel and large parachute landings). They emphasize operations in the Hill Triangle (inside the famous strategic triangle)." Finally, he "in the same sense indicates that "from October 22, General CLARK decided to somewhat speed up the successive change of troops."

Resident of the MGB of the USSR

No. 62 Top Secret November 29, 1952 MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE

EISENHOWER!2? after the meeting with TRUMAN!2? November 18 this year conferred with the chiefs of staff at the Pentagon. In this meeting, the first thing he asked for was BRADLEY!" lay out plans for "an important military effort in Korea next spring, in case a diplomatic solution to the Korean question is not reached before then."

The plan outlined by BRADLEY is to conduct amphibious operations on both sides of the upper part of the Korean peninsula ("pincers") with the support of the navy and after a preliminary aerial bombardment of the North Korean lines of communication; the landing should be followed by parachute landings in especially important areas.

The plan provides for the replenishment of troops by 8 divisions, including: two South Korean, three divisions of the troops of CHANG KAI-SHIK!2? and three fresh American divisions. It also provides for the use, if necessary, of "tactical nuclear weapons" to support amphibious landing operations.

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The chiefs of staff determined that the atomic weapons used should not last more than three miles (it remained unclear whether this meant the range of the projectile or the range of the guns for throwing atomic projectiles).

These plans have been drawn up at the Pentagon over the past few weeks.

Eisenhower expressed extreme skepticism about the possibility of a successful completion of the armistice negotiations and showed that he was primarily interested in the plans of the Pentagon to prepare the spring offensive in Korea. He also made it clear that the main purpose of his trip to Korea was to study the strategic and tactical aspects of such an offensive.

Resident of the MGB of the USSR

No. 63 Top secret November 1952 MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE OF THE MGB OF THE USSR

November 20 this year Eisenhower" during breakfast with Eden!2? outlined the American plans for a military offensive in Korea, and also stated that although he would fully support the efforts in the UN aimed at reaching an agreement on Korea on the basis of the Indian proposal, he himself seriously doubts that China and the Soviet Union will agree to this proposal.

Eisenhower asked IDENA to clarify again at the UN the two proposed amendments to the Indian resolution, stating that the inclusion of these amendments was a sine qua non for the adoption of the US Indian resolution.

Eisenhower also emphasized the need to show the "unity of the West" and hinted that he had instructed Senator WYLEY to clarify his (Eisenhower's) position on the POW question specifically to refute rumors of differences between Western countries.

In response, Eden announced Britain's agreement to support the amended Indian resolution, as well as its agreement in principle to a major spring offensive in Korea if the deadlock in diplomatic negotiations on this issue was not overcome. It is however clear stated:

- a) that England will not send additional troops to Korea;
- b) that the Yalu River must under no circumstances be crossed;
- c) that he reserves the right to determine Britain's position on the question of the use of atomic weapons in Korea before it is discussed by the cabinet.

Eden was less pessimistic about the possibility of the UN Assembly adopting an Indian resolution than Eisenhower.

It should be noted that Eden delivered his speech to the political committee on the Indian resolution immediately after breakfast with Eisenhower, the speech was written before breakfast and he had no time to change it.

Resident of the MGB of the USSR 664

No. 64 Top secret

November 1952 MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE

After the just-held meeting of experts of the American delegation with the participation of ACHESON¹⁸, the US position on the Korean question was determined, which boils down to the following:

1. The Americans are in great difficulty due to the fact that there are many projects regarding Korea. They, like OPPENO¹⁹?, are dissatisfied that the Western Powers have lost the initiative and that nothing is left of the draft resolution they submitted, because of the mass of amendments. The members of the American delegation are therefore concerned about the fact that How would they take the initiative back into their own hands?
2. The United States is concerned about the coldness shown by the Indian delegation towards them. The latter, in particular, does not tell them anything about her projects. The USA hopes that they will be able to learn something about the Indian project with the help of England.
3. In order to regain a leading position on the Korean issue, the US allegedly intends to make some concessions, including agreeing that the prisoners be completely released before they make their choice.

The United States, however, attaches great importance to ensuring that the fate of the prisoners remains within the competence of the Panmenchzhong Commission, and not [the General Assembly. The American delegates note that the number of prisoners named by the communists is much less than the actual number of prisoners.

Resident of the MGB of the USSR

No. 65 Top Secret December 1952 MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE

ALLEN, a member of the American delegation, stated the following:

During his trip to Korea, Eisenhower will study the situation mainly from a military point of view. It is unlikely that Eisenhower would agree to the status quo, where military operations are limited and, as such, cannot produce positive results. Most likely, Eisenhower will decide to expand

the scale of hostilities within Korea and will for the time being avoid expanding operations into Manchuria.

It is to be expected that American troops will launch a major offensive with new types of weapons, but without the atomic bomb.

Resident of the MGB of the USSR 665

No. 66 Top Secret

December 1952 MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE

In circles connected with the Pentagon, as well as in the French and British embassies in Washington, the position of the American command towards Korea, stated by the chiefs of staff at a meeting with EISENHOWER in the Pentagon on November 18, 1952, is characterized as follows:

1. Make no concessions on the question of prisoners of war.
2. Prepare a spring offensive to capture all of Korea; the offensive must be limited to Korea.
3. To carry out this offensive, to reinforce the troops in Korea with additional Korean troops and divisions of CHANG KAI-SHIK³, the United States no longer increases its troops in Korea and provides only the supply of all troops in Korea with weapons and ammunition.
4. The United States is currently not ready to spread military operations to the territory of China, since it does not have enough troops for this.
5. Do not use nuclear weapons in Korea.

Resident of the MGB of the USSR

No. 67 Top Secret December 1952 COMMUNICATION FROM THE CI RESIDENCE

DEJANI, commenting on the appointment of John Foster DULLES to the post of US Secretary of State, said that the political department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan was concerned about the possible demands of the Americans.

John Foster DULLES, being an ardent supporter of not only the policy of "containment", but also the policy of suppressing communism, will require in the near future from Japan a large contribution to the implementation of his plans, and first of all, the provision of strong Japanese infantry. This concern does not mean that the Japanese are at heart opposed to the "liberation of Asia", they see this liberation as an opportunity for a return to Japanese dominance in Asia. The Japanese don't want complications. The Japanese want Japan's rearmament to proceed gradually and in parallel with the increase in Japanese power.

The ruling circles of Japan do not want to associate themselves with American policy, not knowing what it is aimed at, what its means are, and what is the danger contained in this policy, its chances of success. Japan's ruling circles are compelled to be skeptical of American policy in connection with the US position in Korea.

According to DEJANI, disputes between D.F. DULLES and JOSIS" will be strong. Foster DULLES knows how to promise his partners. However

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the growing nationalism of the Japanese forces Yoshida to stand firm in his position as well.

Resident of the MGB of the USSR

No. 68 Top Secret

To Comrade I.V. STALIN, To Comrade BERIA LP, To Comrade BULGANIN NA.

The Information Committee of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports the following information about EISENHAUER's trip to Korea.

In the course of the election campaign, Republican candidate Eisenhower, considering the dissatisfaction of large sections of the American people with the war in Korea, promised to undertake a trip to Korea after his election and achieve an early end to the war.

According to numerous statements in the foreign press, it was Eisenhower's demagogic promise to end the war in Korea that played a decisive role in ensuring the victory of the Republicans in the elections.

Eisenhower, in an effort to create the impression that he was supposedly really striving for a speedy end to the Korean adventure, made a trip to Korea, where he was from December 2 to 5 of this year. Together with Eisenhower, the future US Secretary of Defense Charles WILSON and the current head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff BRADLEY visited Korea.

The American press admits that EISENHAUER, in going to Korea, certainly did not intend to fulfill his campaign promise to settle the Korean conflict. This, in particular, was confirmed by TRUMAN at a press conference in Washington on December 11 of this year, declaring that EISENHOWER had no "real plan to end the war in Korea."

As is known, EISENHAUER fully supported the US interventionist actions in Korea. Eisenhower's statements after he was elected president show that he still maintains his former position. Indicative in this regard is, for example, the fact that during the discussion of the Korean question at the OP session of the UN General Assembly, Eisenhower fully agreed with the position of the current TRUMAN government aimed at disrupting a peaceful settlement in Korea. So, in a conversation on November 19 of this year. With a member of the American delegation to the UN, Republican Senator WYLEY EISENHAUER, "emphasized the impossibility of agreeing with the principle of forced repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea," thereby making it clear that the new Republican government would pursue the former US course on the issue of prisoners of war. The New York Times columnist IGEN wrote on November 20 of this year. about this Eisenhower statement

following:

"... The statement appears to have been intended to stop rumors that General Eisenhower might change the United States' main position on the issue of repatriation of prisoners of war in an attempt to quickly achieve a truce in Korea."

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The fact that the future Eisenhower government does not intend to agree to a truce in Korea is also evidenced by the recently intensified calls in the United States for the continuation of the Korean War to "stimulate business activity" from those circles that supported Eisenhower in the elections. For example, the Wall Street monopoly group organ Business Week wrote on November 28:

"...A truce will make the predicted downturn in business activity almost inevitable... The downturn could come sooner and be stronger than expected. The failure of attempts to achieve a ceasefire could be an incentive."

Concerning the question of Eisenhower's trip to Korea, most of the bourgeois newspapers come to the conclusion that the real purpose of this trip was to study the situation on the spot and find new ways to continue the Korean war. As reported in the press, Eisenhower, during his stay in Korea, considered the recommendations of the American military command, containing various plans for offensive operations on the Korean front.

The well-known American journalist STUART ALLSOP, commenting on Eisenhower's trip, wrote in the New York Herald Tribune on December 7:

"It is very easy to determine the main decision that President Eisenhower now has to make. The question is whether a broad offensive should be prepared in Korea to try to inflict a decisive defeat on the communist armies there."

Eisenhower's press secretary, HAGERTY, officially confirmed that Eisenhower "with his companions studied strategic problems on the spot."

Eisenhower's intention to continue the war in Korea is also evidenced by the fact that, while in Korea, he considered a plan of measures to increase the number and armament of the South Korean troops and discussed with the head of the American group of military advisers on Formosa, General CHASE, who had specially arrived on his call to Korea, the question of using the troops of CHANG KAI-SHIK! 3 to wage war in the Far East. A New York Times report from Tokyo on December 5 states:

"The Japanese press immediately noted that the head of the American group of military advisers to the Nationalist Chinese in Formosa, Major General William CHASE, went to Korea to talk with General Eisenhower. Some government officials have indicated that they believe this means that a decision to step up Allied military pressure may require the use of Chinese TROOPS."

It is also no coincidence that Eisenhower is trying again to involve General MacArthur in the development of the Far East strategy. In his telegram sent to MacArthur from the cruiser Helina, Eisenhower stated:

"We are currently developing a program that will proceed from the highest interests of our country and the free world ... I deeply appreciate your willingness to discuss these issues with me and I assure you that I would like to organize informal meetings

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broadcasts where my assistants and I could benefit from your experience and learn about your ideas."

Discussing this decision of Eisenhower, American newspapers emphasize that MACARTHUR's participation in the development of US military-political plans in the Far East could lead to an expansion of the war.

The information cited shows that EISENHOWER's trip to Korea, formally connected with his campaign promises, was in fact undertaken by him with the aim of finding ways for the further implementation of American aggression in the Far East.

Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin

December 1952

No. 69 Top Secret

Comrade STALIN I.V. Comrade BERIA L.P. To Comrade N.A. Bulganin

The Information Committee of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports the following information on preparations for the creation of a Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish aggressive bloc.

As is known, over the past one and a half to two years, the ruling circles of the United States and Britain have been preparing the creation of a military-political bloc consisting of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, which would be closely connected with the North Atlantic Alliance. The organization of such a bloc would enable the USA and Britain to strengthen their strategic positions in the vicinity of the people's democracies and the southern regions of the Soviet Union.

1. By mid-1952, the Americans and the British managed to achieve a significant economic and political rapprochement between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. However, for some time the Titoites did not dare to enter into open military negotiations with Greece and Turkey, fearing that this could lead to a sharp increase in discontent in the country.

In order to prepare for military negotiations, the TITO! clique launched a propaganda hype from July 1952 under the slogan of "the common interests of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey in the face of the Soviet threat."

The Americans, for their part, sought to make it easier for the TITO cabal to move towards open military cooperation with Greece and Turkey. Partly to this end, in July 1952, in view of the tense relations between Yugoslavia and Italy, they reorganized the command structure of the Alliance's armed forces in the southern zone of Europe. According to the new structure, instead of a single command of the land forces of the southern zone, which was supposed to be headed by an Italian general, two separate commands were created - the southern zone (Italy) and the southeastern zone (Greece and Turkey). Thus, conditions were prepared under which Yugoslavia's entry into a military alliance with Greece and Turkey would not make it dependent on Italy.

In August 1952, the American Minister of War PACE visited Belgrade, who, according to foreign press reports, discussed with members

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the Yugoslav government on the organization of talks on the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish military cooperation in the near future. For the same purpose, in September 1952, IDEN came to Yugoslavia! Upon returning to England, as the British newspaper The Yorkshire Post pointed out, IDEN told the Turkish government delegation that arrived in London that "Yugoslavia is ready to go far towards the Greeks and Turks in the field of cooperation".

The question of concluding a Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish military alliance was also discussed during the negotiations between the American, British and French representatives with the Titoites on economic "aid" to Yugoslavia, which took place in the autumn of 1952 in Belgrade. The Turkish bourgeois newspaper Cumhuriyet wrote in November 1952 that during these negotiations Yugoslavia reacted "more friendly than usual to the establishment of military cooperation with Turkey and Greece."

2. Official negotiations with Greece and Turkey on concluding a military alliance were started by the Titoites in September 1952, when a Yugoslav military mission visited Ankara and Athens. The English newspaper The Times stated on September 17 in this connection:

"Yugoslavia has actually joined the Western defense system from the back door. The dispatch of a delegation to Turkey and Greece is seen here as evidence of the Yugoslavs' readiness to learn more about the role assigned to them in this sector of Southeast Europe.

From November 23 to 30, a Greek military mission headed by the commander of the Athens military district, General JOANNU, was in Belgrade, and from December 19 to 28, the military mission of Turkey headed by the general was in Belgrade. Greek and Turkish military missions visited a number of Yugoslav military bases and military units. The members of the missions were received by TITO. From December 26 to 29, negotiations took place in Athens between the Yugoslav military mission, headed by General SHUMONIA, and the Greek General Staff.

In the course of all these negotiations, issues of coordinating the strategic plans and military preparations of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey were discussed. By now, on most issues, apparently, an agreement has already been reached. Turkish Foreign Minister KEPRULU stated on 23 December that "an agreement in principle has been reached between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia on the question of collective defence."

Since the Titoites, for internal political reasons, still consider it undesirable to officially sign a military-political pact between the three countries, which would have to be made public, the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish bloc will obviously be formalized with the help of two- or three-party secret military conventions. The conclusion of such conventions will facilitate the planning of military operations in the area by Ridgway's staff, and at the same time will enable the Titoites to hide from the Yugoslav people the content of the specific military obligations which they assume in the aggressive bloc.

Preparations for the creation of a Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish bloc are causing great concern in the ruling circles of Italy, who fear that the creation of a Balkan military-political grouping without Italy's participation will lead to a decrease in its role in the aggressive bloc and, in particular, to the redistribution of the American "aid" in favor of Yugoslavia. The English newspaper The Times stated as early as August 23, 1952:

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"As the Italians see the growing importance of Yugoslavia and the ever-increasing readiness of the United States to invest in Yugoslavia ... their anxiety increases."

Government de GASPERI! it also fears that, in connection with the creation of the Balkan bloc, the Americans will support TITO's claims to Trieste and finally abandon the tripartite American-Anglo-French declaration of March 20, 1948, regarding the recognition of the "Italian character" of the entire Free Territory of Trieste.

In view of this, the Italian Government has recently taken measures to disrupt or at least slow down the military negotiations between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. According to reports, de GASPERI tried to achieve this goal when he met the Turkish Foreign Minister KEPRULU in mid-December 1952. De GASPERI's trip to Athens in January of this year. pursued the same goal.

The Italian magazine "Esteri", which is official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published on January 4 this year. an editorial outlining the Italian counterproject for a bloc in the eastern Mediterranean. According to this counter-project, a military agreement should be concluded between Italy, Greece and Turkey, to which Yugoslavia could later join if she made concessions to Italy on the question of Trieste. Apparently, it was this plan that de GASPERI presented to the Greek Prime Minister PAPAGOSS when meeting with him in Athens. However, the Greek government did not accept the Italian plan. In this regard, de Gasperi was forced at the end of the negotiations to officially declare that the Italian government would not interfere with the conclusion of the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish military agreement, although it continues to consider such an agreement "unviable" without the participation of Italy.

Despite this statement by de Gasperi, the Italian government will apparently continue to try to impede the creation of a Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish bloc. Undoubtedly, however,

that it will not be able to prevent the organization of this bloc, since the Americans are interested in its creation.

Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin

January 1953

No. 70 Top Secret

Comrade STALIN I.V. Comrade BERIA L.P. To Comrade N.A. Bulganin

The Information Committee of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports the following information about the intentions of the United States and Britain to draw Pakistan into an aggressive military-political bloc in the Near and Middle East.

1. Recently, American and British diplomacy has intensified its activity in putting together an aggressive "Middle Eastern defensive organization" directed against the USSR and the countries of the people's demo

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cracies. The initial draft of this bloc, called "Middle East Command," was officially put forward by the governments of the United States, Britain, France, and Turkey as early as October 1951. After the failure of attempts to involve all the Arab countries in the Middle East command, the United States and Britain put forward a new plan to create an aggressive bloc with the participation of Pakistan. The Americans and the British hope that Pakistan's participation in the Middle East bloc will facilitate the involvement of all Arab countries in this bloc.

According to Reuters on January 14, 1953.

"... some American and British officials believe that Pakistan's command would make the alliance much more militarily effective and perhaps encourage the Arab states to participate in it."

The US and Britain also believe that the strategic importance of Pakistan "on the eastern flank" of the bloc being put together is just as important as that of Turkey on its "western flank".

However, having a common point of view on the need to involve Pakistan in the Middle East bloc, both the Americans and the British are pursuing their own goals.

The British expect that participation in the "Middle Eastern Defense Organization of Pakistan", as well as Australia, New Zealand, etc. The Union of South Africa will provide England with a leading position in this bloc.

The ruling circles of England have repeatedly used the Pakistani government as a conductor of their policy in the Near and Middle East. Thus, for example, in February 1952, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, ZAFRULLAH KHAN, toured the Arab countries and urged the governments of these states to join the "League of Muslim Countries", which would unite for the purpose of "defense" all the Muslim states of the Middle East. and the Middle East, led by Pakistan.

The Americans, as the Indian press noted, are primarily interested in turning Pakistan into their military-strategic foothold. Former US President TRUMAN, speaking in Congress on March 7, 1952, stated:

"Nakistan is a valuable ally for us in South Asia because of its strategic location on the Indian Ocean and its control of mountain passes from Central Asia."

In addition, the United States believes that Pakistan, being bound by treaty obligations in the Middle East bloc, will stop its anti-American speeches in the UN when discussing certain international issues and thereby exert a certain influence on the position of other Asian and Arab countries, which sometimes act as a "united front" against the US proposals.

2. According to reports, the Western Powers have long been hatching plans to use Pakistan for their own aggressive purposes.

"The question of Pakistan's strategic position in any Middle East defensive plan," wrote a Reuters correspondent from Karachi on January 14, 1953, "has been on the minds of Western military circles for several years now."

Over the past three months, the US and Britain have taken practical steps to draw Pakistan into the Middle East bloc. According to the Indian press, the US State Department in November 1952 put this

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request to Foreign Minister of Pakistan ZAFRULLAH KHAN during his stay in Washington. Last December, the question of including Pakistan in the "Middle East Defense Organization" was discussed by British and American diplomats during the Paris session of the North Atlantic bloc council.

In the first half of January 1953, the same question was the subject of talks between US Assistant Secretary of State BYROAD and British Foreign Minister IDEN in London. According to foreign press reports, during the London talks it was decided to "invite" Pakistan to take part in the "Middle East Defense Organization" being created. The Turkish government, apparently at the behest of the United States and Britain, turned to the Pakistani government with a proposal to join the "Middle East defense system".

According to foreign press reports, the Government of Pakistan reacted favorably to this proposal, although the Pakistani Prime Minister NAZIMUDDIN, in order to calm public opinion, said that he had "no official information regarding the invitation of Pakistan to join the Middle East Command."

However, this statement by NAZIMUDDIN is refuted by the fact that at the time of BAYROAD's talks with Eden, the secretary of the Foreign Office of Pakistan, OSMAN ALI BEIG, was in London. According to Reuters on 25 January from Cairo, Pakistan's Chargé d'Affaires in Egypt TAYEB HUSSEIN discussed Pakistan's possible involvement in the "Middle East Defense System" last week with Egyptian Foreign Minister MAHMOUD FAWZI. In early March, these talks will continue in Karachi, where a special Egyptian military mission is to arrive, consisting of 8 senior officers of the Egyptian armed forces.

3. The offer of the Western Powers to Pakistan to take part in the Middle Eastern bloc caused a negative reaction from the Pakistani public and serious anxiety in India.

The Indian press points out that the accession of Pakistan to the Middle East Pact and the establishment of American military bases on its territory will mean the unconditional involvement of Pakistan in the large-scale war that is being prepared and will create a direct threat to India. These sentiments were reflected in the speeches of a number of delegates at the 58th Congress of the ruling party, the Indian National Congress, which took place on January 17-18, 1953, and also in the statement of the head of the Indian government, NERU, that the proposal of the Western powers to Pakistan "is seriously - Koit" India and "serious attention" is being paid to this issue.

The participation of Pakistan in the "Middle East Defense Organization" was opposed by the Pakistani progressive forces. In particular, the Karachi Peace Committee on January 19

his resolution demanded that

"...the Pakistani government has openly and definitively declared that Pakistan will not enter into any military agreement or join any bloc, but will make every effort to end the cold war and protect peace."

The influential bourgeois newspaper Pakistan Times also sharply criticized the American plans to create a military-political bloc in the Near and Middle East.

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"The Pakistani people," wrote the newspaper on January 8, 1953, "will never serve the interests of the aggressors and will reject any proposal to involve Pakistan in aggressive alliances or blocs."

... The aims of the proposed Middle East defensive organization are openly aggressive and detrimental to the freedom and progress of the countries of the Middle East."

The growing resistance of the peoples of India and Pakistan to Pakistan's entry into the Middle East bloc will be a serious obstacle to the implementation of the Anglo-American aggressive plans in the Near and Middle East.

Chairman of the Institute of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin

January 27, 1953

No. 71 Top Secret January 1953 MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE

We are handing over the document "Some Conclusions on the Atlantic Conference in Paris" received by the residency, prepared by a government body of one of the NATO countries.

Translated from French Top Secret

SOME CONCLUSIONS ON THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE IN PARIS

1. Anglo-American conflict escalated. On the last day of the conference, December 19, Ridgeway: 7 tried to intimidate by his resignation, and only the intervention of IDENA, who remained in Paris for another day, prevented this break.

Despite this, Ridgway showed his negative attitude, which expressed:

a) refusal to publish a communiqué on the decision to convene the next Atlantic Conference, to be held in April in Paris (the Americans wanted it to take place in Washington);

6) in a tactless tone and in a sharp form, in front of 60 officers of the NATO defense school, during the graduation of cadets, he spoke out against the thesis, which provides for a prolongation of the Cold War.

2. Some success of the English positions (reduction of the program).

a) Available stock.

The program for 70 divisions and 7,000 aircraft in 1953 and for 90 divisions and 10,000 aircraft in 1954 was completely abandoned.

The task in 1953 will be to form 35 divisions and bring them to full combat readiness.

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In order to hide the failure of the program, the NATO Information Service announced that in the future there would be no mention of divisions and the number of aircraft, as there are large discrepancies between the size of divisions of various countries and their air forces.

6) Costs.

Approximately \$400 million of expenditures foreseen for the fourth period have been reduced to \$200 million (80 billion francs). Ridgway said in this connection that if he did not receive at least 100 billion francs, he would resign.

According to the confessions of Lord ISMEY (15thai), the distribution of these credits of 80 billion francs will be favorable to England, who will pay only 10 billion, while France will spend 31 and the USA 39.

According to official information, 35 airfields will be restored and equipped, and if they are restored, they will refuse to build reinforced concrete control towers and thereby save money.

POLITICAL RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE

1. Germany. The conference decided to ratify the treaty on the European army as it is presented by the government.

Negotiations between representatives of the five countries of the Brussels Pact (France, England, Benelux) did not have a positive result. Despite the pressure, the British refused certain obligations, except to be observers in the "European" institutions. To the proposal to revise the draft constitution of the European "political power", they replied that they retain the right to express their opinion and will give an answer after studying the issue.

ADENAUER plans! stipulate that the WEhrmacht will hardly be able to fully participate in the "European army" or in the Atlantic coalition before the end of 1953. The plans provide for the strength of: for the army: 360,000 soldiers, for the navy - 80,000 people, for air defense - 18,000 people and officers in the amount of 22,000 people, including 12,300 lieutenants, 6,300 captains, 2,000 majors, 900 lieutenant colonels, 250 colonels and generals 40 people. The air force will have 1,300 aircraft.

These figures were listed by ADENAUER during his talks with the Deputy High Commissioner, the American REBER, and with the Director of the Mutual Security Administration (MSA) DRAPER. REBER and DRAPER will travel to the US to meet with EISENHOUER and prepare for Chancellor ADENAUER's possible trip. The latter promised to actively work for the development of the German-American center of the Cold War in Munich (radio broadcasts for the East, intensification of work among emigrants, the dropping of saboteur paratroopers behind the Iron Curtain into Ukraine and especially into Czechoslovakia). The main activities of the Munich center will be concentrated in Czechoslovakia, where the situation is currently considered more favorable. For this ADENAUER demanded the following from the Americans:

a) Constantly press the European states to ratify the treaty on a European army, intimidating them with the fact that ready-made military materials will be placed at the disposal of Germany (if necessary).

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thief will not be ratified). Information on this issue was published in the newspaper "Nee York Times" despite all the denials.

6) Create opportunities so that next year West Germany could join NATO and propose her as a candidate for admission to the UN. (High Commissioner REBER spoke on this issue, saying that, unfortunately, it depends not only on the Americans).

c) Reduce the monthly contribution from 850 mil. stamps up to 750 mil. stamps that West Germany contributes to the NATO budget.

d) Abolish, even before the ratification of the treaty of the European army, the existing restrictions on the part of the occupying forces, as well as under the Bonn agreement of May 26, 1952, in relation to German industrial production, which mainly relates to the ship industry, and not to the production of nuclear energy.

e) Investment next year of large American capital in the Ruhr industry.

2. Spain. Despite political objections from the British and military objections from some of the chiefs of staff, the conference decided to bring Spain into the Atlantic coalition, on the condition that the latter cede its bases. The Atlantic delegation proposed that all problems under the agreement between Spain and the coalition be considered in Lisbon and reported to NATO.

After the end of the conference, the Chief of Staff of the American Army, General COLLINS, went to Spain and then to Portugal. In Madrid, he met with Minister of Defense Minoz GRANDE and the mediator in the Spanish-American military negotiations, General VICON.

The results of these negotiations will be considered by the next Atlantic Conference. Even today, General COLLINS informed NATO that the Spanish General Staff agreed to cede to the United States two naval bases in Cadiz and Cartagena, as well as an air base in Vogas, located near Madrid.

In return, FRANCO!*, in addition to a loan of \$125 million authorized by Congress, asked for jet fighters to be delivered to him, which would be carried out by the British in 1954.

3. Italy. The Atlantic Conference listened with great distrust to the report of the Italian Defense Minister PACHARDI. It turned out that Italy had 1,000 aircraft and 11 divisions (of which 8 were infantry) ready for battle.

General RIDGEWAY, who visited Brestor at the end of November and ... and made a check there, refused to attach the Italian troops of the Alpine zone to the central European sector, which was exactly what Marshal Juin wanted. Ridgway and in the future decided to leave these forces under the jurisdiction of the command of the ground forces of the southern European sector.

The main issue raised by the Italians for general discussion was cooperation with the Turkey-Greece-Yugoslavia axis. De GASPERI! declared that this cooperation was impossible until the Yugoslavs accepted the Italian proposals on the question of Trieste. This was also supported by the Italian government press, while Greece and Turkey protested. The decision was made that the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs visit Rome with the task of reaching an agreement on this matter.

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After one secret meeting with the Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris, the Turkish Foreign Minister KEPRULU left for Rome on December 22, together with the Chief Secretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. There he spoke with de Gasperi and the Italian Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, TAVIANI. It became clear that the Italian and Yugoslav governments would continue to consider the issue of Trieste before the public, but this would not interfere with military cooperation between the General Staff of Rome and the headquarters of Belgrade-Athens-Ankara for the implementation of a continuous front of the Alps-Dardanelles.

As regards the political settlement of Italian-Yugoslav relations, and even the question of Trieste, the resolution of these questions is envisaged at the end of the spring of 1953, when IDEN visits the capitals in the Balkans.

4. Greece and Türkiye. The Greek delegation, which was new and ignorant of many issues, was no different at the Atlantic conference, with the exception of one statement that now, when Marshal PAPAGOS has a majority of adherents in parliament (230 against 60 oppositionists) and the internal situation of the country has become "solid and solid", Greece is ready to make efforts to more actively help the Atlantic Union.

Turkey, however, asked the Americans for new loans in dollars, drawing their attention to the sacrifices and efforts that the Turks made in favor of the Atlantic Union. They emphasized that 36% of their budget for 1953 would go to military spending, including 570 million Turkish liras for national defense, ~ 200 million Turkish liras for other budget expenditures, 145 million liras from American aid for current spending in 1953, 700 million lire from American aid for war materiel, or a total of 1,615 million Turkish lira. These figures were reported to Admiral WRIGHT, Commander-in-Chief of the American Atlantic Mediterranean Fleet. Turks promised:

a) Put at the disposal of the union 6 new airfields.

6) Submit a project on the development of the oil industry. The Turkish government intends to "denationalize" the existing oil exploitation and provide the country's oil wealth to an American company.

c) Spreading anti-communist propaganda - the creation of the Turkish Peace and Freedom Committee, chaired by Kulisi KEPRULU, chairman of the democratic group of the parliament.

5. Yugoslavia. The Turkish delegation defended not only itself. The Turkish foreign minister also defended Yugoslavia, proving TITO's pro-American and Atlantic zeal with facts, such as: preparations for elections in May-June, which mean new decentralization and new evolution in the liberal sense; trial in Shchipa, which proves the consistent policy pursued against Bulgaria and the conversation between TITO and the New York Times correspondent Sulzberger about the possibility of incorporating Bulgaria and Albania into the Yugoslav federation.

During this conversation, TITO also said that he was not sending troops to Korea because of the strategic position of Yugoslavia (because this help would be more harmful than helpful).

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In addition, the Turkish Minister of the Interior presented a report on the progress made in Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav cooperation:

a) In political terms, the exchange of various official visits of representatives of these countries, the project on the elevation of diplomatic missions in these countries to the embassy, etc.

6) In economic terms, a project is envisaged to increase by !/ the existing trade exchange.

c) Strategically - a report on the results of the negotiations in Belgrade between the French Admiral SALA, who returned from the maneuvers Hop8 Sjer, and Admiral PEROVIC, commander of the Yugoslav naval forces; the role of the Yugoslav army in the strategic project called "Defense of Thrace".

The conclusion of this long defense speech is that Yugoslavia and Turkey should be allowed to increase the economic aid distributed in 1952 and 1953. into three installments (it will reach \$78 million, of which the last installment of \$20 million, just released, is not sufficient). First of all, it is necessary that France expedite the promised delivery in the first half of 1953 of grain - 90,000 tons, anthracite - 5,000 tons, wool, chemical products and, above all, sheet iron for building ships.

7. Middle East. The problems on this issue were not considered in depth enough by the Atlantic Conference, which started a discussion on negotiations between NAGIB (Prime Minister of Egypt. - Note comp.) and SHISHAKLI, on the drafts of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on Sudan, on the position of the Arab League and the UN on the admission of Libya to the Arab League. The representative of the Ethiopian emperor arrived on a special mission to confirm his country's desire to join a possible pact in the Middle East and the readiness to provide the bases that may be required.

The conference listened to the Turkish Minister KEPRULYU, who made every effort to convince the various Arab governments to join the well-known pact.

From the point of view of the Atlantic Conference, an improvement in the situation in the Middle East cannot be achieved without a prior agreement between the Americans and the British, but this agreement is still problematic. An Anglo-Greek conflict broke out over Cyprus, during which ACHESON refused to explain to Eden his decision to summon the American envoy to Washington, who was entrusted with economic matters in the Middle East. review in the Middle East of the Canal Zone by Air Force Marshal STRAFFORD.

The next NATO conference is scheduled for April 1953. Before the start of the conference, General BRADLEY will visit Madrid.

Resident of the MGB of the USSR

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No. 72 Top Secret February 1953 MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE

We are sending the document received by the residency - an analytical review of the activities of the United States, England, France, Turkey and the states of the Near and Middle East to create a Middle Eastern command, compiled by a government body of one of the countries in the region.

On the results of activities in the second half of 1952 by the United States, England, France, Turkey and the states of the Near and Middle East in the field of creating a Middle Eastern command.

"States of the Middle East I. General information.

A. The activities of the governments of these states should also be considered in the future against the background of preparations for a cold war, as well as preparations for a possible world war.

B. Concrete development in this area occurs only in relation to states and factors that already have links with the NATO system.

Of particular note:

1. Plan for the NATO Middle East Command on land. This command includes Turkey and Greece. According to the plan, it includes, among others, the Balkans and at the same time efforts are being made to involve Yugoslavia in the command.

2. Provides for the creation of a Mediterranean command under the leadership of MOUNTBATTEN "3. The prospects for this command, its organization and purpose are still unclear. There are differences between the United States and England on the strategic appointment of the Mediterranean Sea. C. With regard to the countries of the Middle East and the creation of an organization of the Middle Eastern Command "There are no concrete results. The situation in this matter is no different from last year's situation, when the proposal for MEDO (MERO) was put forward." NATO, an organization whose powers are limited mainly to planning matters are currently being designed.

A. While there are no concrete results in the creation of a defense organization for the Middle East, the British command in its zone of operation is preparing for a world war. Their planning provides for the defense of approaches to the canal zone and the preparation of appropriate means. This activity was manifested in a number of maneuvers carried out, among which it should be noted: the "HATA" maneuvers in Transjordan, carried out with the participation of the Arab Legion and maneuvers in the area of the Southern Canal.

E. Britain's resumption of arms deliveries (in particular, jet aircraft) to the Arab countries must first of all be considered against the background of the new economic policy of England, which emphasizes export

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weapons to other countries. This export of weapons to the Arab countries may, in some cases, not be the result of a particular political and military orientation. But there is no doubt that this is used as a means to bind the Arabs to England and to the West in general. This will also have a bearing on the overall calculation of planning forces in the Middle East zone. E A general trend of concessions to the Arabs is likely to emerge over the coming months in an effort to come to an agreement with the Arabs regarding the defense of the Middle East.

P. Question MEDO.

In inter-Arab relations, as well as in the question of the defense of the Middle East, the coup in Egypt served as a decisive factor in the political development during the last half year.

A. The position of the powers on the eve of the coup (July 1952) on this issue is characterized as follows:

England

At first, Britain did not yet see the possibility of drawing Egypt into the organization of zonal defense. The intention of England was to use the gap between Egypt and the rest of the Arab countries in three ways:

1. To make it easier for the Arab countries to join the organization by further reducing the share of the military potential of the countries participating in the organization. Even in the original plan, for political reasons, the powers reduced the obligations of the countries participating in this organization to such an extent that the question arose about the effectiveness of this command. Now, however, the idea of command was completely abandoned and instead it was proposed to confine ourselves to a "planning institute". (Note – planning authority). Therefore, the accession to this body of the Arab countries is associated only with general obligations on their part.

2. Exclude Israel from the membership of the proposed organization and in this way refute one of the Arab objections to their accession (according to this opinion, the rest of the Arab countries and Turkey should join this body).

3. Accelerate the establishment of a planning group and not precondition this with the Arab countries. In view of the absence of such an agreement, this organization should be put into action on the basis of a Western agreement (according to the English proposal with the participation of: the USA, England, France, Turkey and the three interested dominions). When the Arab countries see this body as existing and active, they, apart from Egypt, which will thus remain isolated, will, in the course of time, join this organization. It is possible that Egypt will also join this organization so as not to be isolated and not to remain on the sidelines in the matter of defense. It should be noted that Britain's readiness to create such a body without the participation of the Arabs is an exclusively tactical step aimed at ensuring the entry of the Arabs into this body in the future.

USA

At this stage, the United States showed a certain indifference on the issue of the zonal defense plan. They were clear about the incompatibility of its form, in which the proposals of the West did not correspond to the Middle Eastern reality.

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viability and should be limited to the planning authority. Therefore, they decided to change the name ZACME (Sirgete Ashed Sottapa Miayie Easi) to Mlae Ease Geepse Ograpichabiop.

Unlike England, the United States believed that the creation of such an organization, without the participation of the Arabs, would give it the character of an alien body interfering in the affairs of a foreign zone and imposing an "imperialist" will, and that in the future this would make it difficult for the Arabs to join this organization. If the conditions for their participation are not yet ripe, these activities should be postponed. At the same time, the US concentrated its efforts to resolve a concrete peace between Greece and Turkey in NATO. The United States insisted on speeding up this peace (Note: - Apparently referring to the contentious issues that existed between Greece and Turkey) so that there would not be a delay in the creation of a Middle East command due to unresolved issues between individual countries.

France

France went even further in deviating from the ZASME plan (in the original), considering it impossible to resolve the Anglo-Egyptian question and saw more concrete prospects in concluding a number of separate flexible and secret treaties with each of the Arab countries separately. Her intention was to divide the entire zone into parts in such a way that England would maintain contact with Transjordan and Iraq, the United States and Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and France with Lebanon. This proposal was based on the desire of France to maintain its influence in Syria and Lebanon. For this reason, France opposed the dominions joining the planning authority.

Türkiye

The government of Turkey lately before the coup in Egypt and before the Anglo-Turkish negotiations since October 1952 in London concentrated its efforts on joining NATO and securing its northern borders with the help of this organization. For this reason, she took measures to strengthen her relations with Greece and Yugoslavia, and her relations with the Arabs and the issue of the Middle Eastern command faded into the background.

Among the Arab countries, the situation has remained unchanged since the proposals put forward by the Western powers in the autumn of 1951. The governments of the Arab countries (except Egypt) recognized the material, political and military advantages that would be provided to them by proposal of the West, but proved powerless to translate them into reality, due to opposition and anti-imperialist pressure from within and pressure from Egypt from without.

Q. With the emergence of the new regime in Egypt, a fundamental change took place in this matter. This regime from the very beginning, in its essence, was considered as pro-Western, which

approaches the issue of defense soundly and depends on the military and economic support of the West. Therefore, there was a hope that this regime could be influenced to join the system of zonal defense created by the West, and other Arab countries would follow it. And indeed, two months later, NAGIB became convinced of the benefits that his state could derive from accession

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to such an organization and began to look for a way to implement it, setting as a precondition the evacuation of the Suez Canal zone by the British. NAGIB expressed readiness to discuss simultaneously the issue of evacuation and the accession of Egypt to MEDO, which (accession) will be carried out only after the evacuation (this is the difference between its position and the position of the previous government, which refused to discuss the issue of MEDO before the evacuation of the British). Thus, it was established that the new regime in Egypt would not resolve the contentious issues under the zone defense plan, on the contrary, the settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian conflict would continue to be a precondition for the creation of a zone defense organization. As before, Egyptian policy is aimed at preventing other Arab countries from joining MEDO until England satisfies Egyptian demands. This is despite the fact that, in principle, the Egyptian Government approves of the idea of zonal defense.

C. Since October 1952, Turkey's position on this issue has also changed dramatically. Its skepticism towards MEDO has been replaced by vigorous activity among the Arab countries, especially in Cairo. Its representatives emphasized the advantages of this plan for the Arabs and acted as an intermediary between the West and the Arab countries in the issue of the defense of the zone. This change is caused by:

1. Satisfaction of Turkey's demand and its full participation in the NATO system, which guaranteed the security of its borders to the maximum. As a result, Turkey's sense of security of its borders with the Soviet bloc has increased, and hence its readiness to deal with questions of its Arab rear, even if this involves additional military obligations (the extensive activity of England in the matter of accelerating the resolution of the rapprochement was apparently aimed at achieving this goal).

2. Another reason lies in Iran. There, the communist danger has been very serious in the eyes of the Turkish leaders since the failure of the attempt to bring the Mossadegh to power at the end of July 1951. Hence Turkey's increased desire to take steps to secure its southern borders.

A. As a result of these changes, England agreed with the conviction of the United States and Turkey that it was now impossible to proceed with the establishment of a zonal planning body without the participation of the Arabs, and that an attempt should be made again to reach an agreement with the new regime in Egypt. (General ROBERTSON's visit to Syria and Lebanon was organized to prepare the ground for this attempt. His planned visit to Iraq was canceled at the last moment due to tensions there.)

At the same time, Britain agreed with Turkey that if the attempt failed or continued too long, then the new administration in the United States should be approached and tried to prove the feasibility of creating a planning body without the participation of the Arabs. It is impossible to predict how the United States will respond to such an appeal.

The Americans in NATO came to the conclusion that as long as the political predicament delayed the establishment of MEDO, there was a need for a more stable and effective link between CARNEY HQ and the British ground and air forces in the Middle East.

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As the area defense organization in the Middle East evolves in the future from a command to a planning body, it will be necessary to establish... (Suggested omission - Section 8 note) by other means for operational coordination. These questions were apparently discussed at a meeting in Malta (late October 1952) between NATO members interested in the Middle East.

As regards naval command in the Mediterranean, after disagreements that lasted for two years, an acceptable compromise was found for both England and the United States.

E. The main changes in the organization of the defense of the Middle East can be summarized as follows:

1. The Great Powers have abandoned the idea of command in favor of a planning authority. They again detract from the military effectiveness of the proposed organization in favor of its political purpose.
2. With the activation of the South East Command of Europe, a part of the Middle East enters the area of active planning and operational responsibility of the great powers.
3. Turkey, after having been satisfied in its requirements for the security of the borders, turns its attention also to the questions of the defense of the Middle East.
4. Egypt has turned from an absolute hostile factor to the idea of zonal defense into a factor that approves this idea in principle, with which it conditions its implementation by the fulfillment of its requirements.
5. It has been conclusively established that the non-addition of Israel to this organization is a condition for the accession of the Arabs. This does not mean that the West does not use other ways to resolve Israel's military issues.

E Further development in the near future depends mainly on two factors: on the continuation of Anglo-Egyptian relations and on the attitude of the Eisenhower government to the questions of the Middle East. In the event that the Anglo-Egyptian issue is not settled (recent events in Egypt give reason to believe that the prospects for this have diminished), then the appeal to the Arabs will end in nothing. Therefore, the possibility is foreseen that by next spring the planning authority of the Middle East will be restored.

Resident of the MGB of the USSR

No. 73 Top Secret February 1953 To Comrade I.V. STALIN

The Committee of Information under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR presents a note "Disagreements between the members of the North Atlantic bloc on the issue of the pace of creation of the armed forces."

The summary of the note is as follows.

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Over the past year, there has been a further intensification of disagreements between the United States and the Western European countries that are members of the North Atlantic bloc on the issue of the pace of preparations for a new aggressive war.

1. Adopted under great pressure from the United States at the Lisbon session of the Council of the North Atlantic bloc in February 1952, the military program of the bloc for 1952 provided for bringing the total number of divisions included in the armed forces of the bloc to 50 (including 20 reserve), an increase in the aircraft fleet to 4 thousand aircraft and the creation of 60 new air bases.

However, the representatives of the Western European countries made the fulfillment of their military obligations dependent on the economic and financial situation of the countries of Western Europe.

Soon after the end of the Lisbon session, numerous statements appeared in the bourgeois press of Western Europe and the USA that, due to serious economic difficulties, the implementation of the Lisbon program was being frustrated.

In this regard, the United States stepped up pressure on the Western European countries. In particular, they demanded from the Western European countries an increase in the terms of military service, considering this measure as the most important means of ensuring a significant increase in the size of the armed forces of the aggressive bloc. To this end, the Americans in August 1952 convened a special meeting of military experts from 6 countries - members of the "European Defense Community". However, Western European countries did not accept American demands.

Attempts by the Americans to get the governments of Western European countries to expedite the ratification of the treaty on the "European Defense Community" in 1952 also ended in vain.

Assessing the course and results of the implementation of the military program for 1952, prominent political figures in the United States and Western Europe were forced to admit that the participants in the North Atlantic bloc failed to fully implement the military program, neither in terms of creating new divisions, nor in terms of increasing the aircraft fleet. .

Justifying the delay in the implementation of the Lisbon decisions, the Western European press argued that the countries of Western Europe, in the interests of the so-called "common strategy", should concentrate their efforts on strengthening their economic position.

In this regard, the statement of the English magazine *The Statist* is very characteristic, which, in its issue of September 6, 1952, stated that it was precisely

"America should be concerned about the possibility of Russian aggression, since it is a bulwark against it. England and the countries of Western Europe must always worry about their economic situation, or otherwise they will cease to exist as free nations. These two concerns are part of a single strategy, and if you keep this in mind, then no differences will ever take on a catastrophic character.

2. The Paris session of the Council of the North Atlantic bloc (December 1952), which was supposed to take stock of the implementation of the decisions of the Lisbon session and adopt a military program for 1953, according to the bourgeois press, gave "miserable results."

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One of the main issues on the agenda of the Paris session was the assessment of the so-called "Soviet threat". The United States sought to use the discussion of this issue in order to impose new military obligations on the Western European countries.

The New York Times reported on December 17, 1952, that at the Paris session ACHESON! insisted on strengthening armaments, because the Soviet Union could allegedly quickly start a "hot war".

However, representatives of the Western European countries did not agree with the American point of view, pointing out that at present there is no need to expand military obligations, the fulfillment of which would inevitably lead to a deterioration in the economic situation of the countries of Western Europe.

Representatives of the Western European countries demanded that the pace of the creation of the armed forces be slowed down and that the United States provide its partners with more extensive "aid".

Due to the aggravation of disagreements between the USA and Western European countries, the military program for 1953, tentatively outlined already at the Lisbon session, was not adopted at the Paris session.

A communiqué issued after the end of the Paris session noted that in the future "more attention should be paid to the improvement of the combat capability of the armed forces and the auxiliaries of the alliance, rather than to their increase in numbers, if there are not enough funds to fulfill both tasks", and that "a strong defense requires a healthy economy." Commenting on these paragraphs of the communiqué, some bourgeois newspapers point out that these formulations hide the desire of the Western European countries to slow down the pace of creating new divisions.

Differences in the North Atlantic bloc on the question of the "threat of attack" from the Soviet Union are essentially a reflection of the contradictions between the United States and Western European countries on the timing of the outbreak of a new world war. The ruling circles of the Western European countries, while conducting preparations for an aggressive war together with the United States, at the same time, apparently do not share the Americans' point of view on the need to further accelerate the pace of this preparation. Western European countries are afraid that this may lead to undesirable complications for them and to a further strengthening of their political and economic dependence on the United States.

In view of the failures suffered by the United States in its attempts to speed up the military preparations of the countries of the North Atlantic bloc, and the existence of serious disagreements between the countries participating in the bloc, the press of the Western European countries and the United States openly talks about the growing crisis in the North Atlantic bloc, about the lack of unity and confidence among the members of the bloc and that "the great alliance is fading."

In this connection, the Eisenhower government is now trying, by means of new pressure, to force the members of the North Atlantic bloc to submit to American demands and speed up further military preparations.

The recent trip of US Secretary of State Dulles and Head of the Office of Mutual Security STASSEN to the countries of Western Europe was aimed at achieving the speedy ratification of the European Defense Community treaty and the creation of a European army subordinate to the American command. In case not

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To fulfill these demands, the Americans threaten to stop all "aid" to the West European countries and create an independent strong army in West Germany.

The information given in the note shows that the US desire to use the material and human resources of its partners in the aggressive bloc to the maximum for its own purposes is meeting with increasing resistance from the Western European countries and leads to a further growth of anti-American sentiments in these countries.

APPENDIX: on 21 sheets*.

CI Chairman**

No. 74 Top Secret January 30, 1958 Central Committee of the CPSU

I present the note "On the attitude of the Vatican towards the socialist countries and on the relationship between the Catholic Church and the state in the countries of people's democracy."

The note was compiled on the basis of materials received at the end of 1956 and during 1957 from KGB residents in a number of European countries.

The main content of the note is as follows.

The Vatican is currently still opposed to easing tensions between West and East and is making great efforts to prevent an agreement between the USSR and Western countries on major international issues.

A number of Vatican leaders, led by Archbishop of Milan MONTINI, fearing that the Cold War policy supported by the Vatican could further weaken the positions of the Catholic Church, insist on the need for the Vatican to pursue a more flexible policy towards the socialist countries. They put forward, in particular, the thesis that the Vatican should actively come out in favor of peaceful coexistence and international detente. However, Pius XII and his inner circle believe that in order to strengthen the authority of the Vatican among the Catholic masses, it is enough just to come out in defense of peace from time to time, without making any changes in the general political course.

Nurturing plans to "eliminate the threat of the spread of communism," the Vatican has recently intensified its subversive activities against the USSR, the PRC, and the Eastern European countries of people's democracy, while paying special attention to "work" with the youth.

The Vatican is also hostile to the socio-political system that exists in Yugoslavia, constantly accusing the government of the FPRY of pursuing an anti-church policy.

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp. ** The name of the Chair is not included in this document. - Approx. comp.

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Using his influence, he is making great efforts to convince the United States and other capitalist countries to adopt a tougher policy towards Yugoslavia.

The hostile nature of the Vatican's policy towards the USSR and the people's democracies also determines its policy in questions of normalizing relations between the Vatican and the countries of the socialist camp and regulating relations between the Catholic Church and the state in these countries.

Pius XII in January 1956, in a conversation with the Archbishop of New York, Cardinal Spellman, declared that there could be no "religious compromise or tactical cooperation between the Catholic Church and the communist countries." In his message to the Congress of West German Catholics held in September 1956, he stressed: "The Catholic Church warns the faithful a second time against the temptation to succumb to the false mirage of coexistence, compromise or internal rapprochement between Catholic institutions and the adversary's system."

In the Vatican, the negotiations between the Catholic leaders of Poland and Hungary and the governments of these countries in 1956-1957 on the issue of regulating relations between the Catholic Church and the state were perceived with dissatisfaction. However, in connection with the events in Poland and Hungary, the Vatican considered it necessary to change its tactics and did not openly condemn the participation of the Polish and Hungarian bishops in these negotiations. The Vatican leaders are showing great caution in this matter, trying not to complicate relations between the papacy and the episcopates in the socialist countries. The Vatican authorities are directing the activities of the leaders of the Polish, as well as the Hungarian episcopates, in such a way that they seek the greatest possible concessions from the governments of Poland and Hungary, using the political and economic difficulties in these countries to strengthen the position of the Catholic Church.

The leadership of the Polish episcopate managed to achieve a significant strengthening of the influence and positions of the Catholic Church in the PPR. The Polish government made significant concessions to Cardinal VYSHINSKY and agreed, in particular, to refuse to support the movement of progressive Catholics led by PIASETSKI (the Pax group).

According to data from August 1957, the Vatican has recently been studying the possibility of establishing relations between church and state in Yugoslavia similar to those that exist in Poland. In early July 1957, the Vatican Secretariat of State discussed the issue with representatives of the US episcopate, who recommended the normalization of relations between church and state in Yugoslavia.

The Vatican also discussed the possibility of negotiations between the Catholic Church and the PRC government; Representatives of the US episcopate at the same time categorically spoke out against any negotiations.

For its part, the PRC government, along with a resolute struggle against the subversive activities of the Vatican agents, is pursuing a policy of gradually tearing the Chinese Catholic clergy away from the Vatican. This course is held in accordance with the decision of the plenum of the CPC Central Committee of February 25, 1956 on this issue.

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In connection with the intensification of the hostile activities of the Vatican against the socialist countries, it seems necessary to take active measures to weaken its influence in the countries of people's democracy by organizing in these countries a broad movement of Catholics for peace and coexistence between East and West, for supporting the people's democratic system in order to in order to prepare the necessary conditions for the creation in Eastern Europe of a center of the Catholic Church independent of the Vatican. In this regard, it should be noted that the rumors about the possible creation in Eastern Europe of a center of the Catholic Church independent of the Vatican, inspired by Soviet intelligence in early 1955, caused serious concern in Vatican circles.

In terms of intensifying intelligence and counterintelligence work against the Vatican, it would be advisable to send representatives of the KGB in early 1958 to negotiate with representatives of the state security agencies of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania on the following issues:

1. Specific measures taken by the state security agencies to strengthen intelligence and counterintelligence work against the Vatican in order to identify its plans and intentions in relation to the countries of the socialist camp.
2. Measures to attract to cooperation certain prominent Catholic figures who are loyal to the people's democratic system, the possibility of organizing speeches by such figures with theoretical provisions in support of this system and in opposition to the Vatican dogmas.
3. Measures to compromise the Vatican and Catholic leaders who carry out hostile work in the people's democracies.
4. Agent capabilities for carrying out active work among the Catholic clergy in favor of creating a progressive international Catholic organization in Eastern Europe, and then (on this basis) a center of the Catholic Church independent of the Vatican.

It seems appropriate to exchange views on these issues also with our Chinese friends.

Through the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, prepare an open letter from Patriarch ALEXY and the synod under him to Christians all over the world (including

Catholics) with a call to unite the efforts of all Christian believers in the struggle for peace and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

Depending on the reaction of the Vatican to this, prepare a second appeal - on behalf of the heads of the Orthodox churches of the world, who in the spring of 1958 should come to Moscow for the celebrations on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the restoration of the patriarchate in Russia. The practical implementation of these and possible other measures against the Vatican should be carried out in contact with the Councils for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church and for Religious Cults under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Using the possibilities of the State Security Committee, to ensure the wide dissemination of the above appeals in the capitalist countries.

I ask for permission to carry out the above activities.

APPENDIX: 71 sheets

Chairman of the State Security Committee I. Serov

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No. 75 Top Secret

March 13, 1958

TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, comrade AA GROMYKO.

I provide the following information.

In the leading circles of the Vatican, a statement published in the press by the priest GAJERO, who visited in January of this year, is widely commented on. as part of the delegation of Italian peace supporters of the Soviet Union, that in a conversation with members of the delegation, A.A. GROMYKO pointed out the desirability of establishing ties between the USSR and the Vatican in the interests of protecting peace.

This statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union is considered by the State Secretariat as a "probe" of the positions of the Vatican on the question of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union.

According to the State Secretariat of the Vatican, if it wants to make any constructive proposals aimed at improving relations between the USSR and the Vatican, the Soviet government should have acted in a confidential way and not through a defrocked priest, which is GAJERO.

The representative of the Vatican in the USA, CICOGNANI, at the request of the American government, informed the Vatican Secretariat of State that the US government would not approve of the possible establishment of diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the war against Western countries.

According to CICOGNANI himself, the Vatican's contacts with the USSR can only cause serious damage to the prestige of the Catholic Church in the United States. In particular, Protestant organizations in the United States, he believes, would not fail to use this fact to accuse the Vatican of participating, together with the Communists, in a conspiracy against American "democratic freedoms."

Employees of the Department of Emergency Church Affairs of the State Secretariat of the Vatican recommend using the proposal of A.A. GROMYKO to obtain permission from the USSR government for the trip of Vatican emissaries to Kaunas and Moscow.

After detailed consultations with various leading figures of the Catholic Church, the Vatican decided that until the receipt of the official Soviet proposal on improving Soviet-Vatican relations, no response to A.A. GROMYKO's statement and at the same time not to take any action which could hinder the Soviet Union from making such a proposal.

Chairman of the State Security Committee I. Serov

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No. 76 Top secret To Comrade GM PUSHKIN.

I am sending a short note "On the differences in the Vatican on the Berlin question."

The note provides data on the interest shown by the leaders of the Vatican, especially the new Pope JOHN XX, in the Berlin issue, and on the disagreements on this issue that arose during its discussion in February of this year. at a meeting of the Congregation for Emergency Ecclesiastical Affairs.

According to these data, some of the cardinal members of the congregation, headed by Vatican Secretary of State TARDINI, defend the thesis that the Western powers should not make any concessions to the Soviet Union when discussing Berlin and other international problems. The other part, led by Cardinal MONTINI, with the support of Pope JOHN XXIII, still recognizes that it is necessary for the West to somewhat move away from irreconcilable positions in order to avoid further aggravation of the international situation.

APPENDIX: 5 sheets.

Deputy Head of the PGU KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR M. Kotov

May 28, 1958 Top secret On the differences in the Vatican on the Berlin question

The leaders of the Vatican, especially the head of the Catholic Church, the new Pope John XXIII, pay great attention to the Berlin problem. JOHN XXIII demanded from the Secretary of State of the Vatican TARDINI to collect, through the Vatican diplomatic representatives abroad, extensive information about the responses to the Soviet proposals on this issue. The necessity of obtaining detailed information from the representatives of the Vatican in the USA, England, France and the FRG was especially pointed out. The pope gave personal instructions to Cardinal DEPFNER of Berlin to report in detail on the development of the Berlin problem. The leaders of the Vatican took advantage of the stay in Rome in November 1958 (in connection with the coronation of a new pope) of extraordinary representatives of a number of countries in order to clarify the position of individual states on the Berlin question.

In February of this year. To discuss this issue in the Vatican, a meeting of the Holy Congregation for Extraordinary Church Affairs was convened, which was attended by JOHN XXIII. Cardinals TARDINI, PIZZARDO, OTTAVIANI, MICARA, TEDESCHINI, VALERI, JOBBE, FIETTA spoke at the meeting, and written statements by Cardinals MONTINI and CENTO, who were not present at the meeting, were read out. At the end of the meeting of the congregation, JOHN XXII spoke.

The meeting of the congregation was opened by the Secretary of State of the Vatican TARDINI, who outlined the content of the note of the Soviet government

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to the governments of the United States, Britain, France, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Berlin question of November 27, 1958, as well as the response notes of the Western powers, and dwelled in detail on the Soviet note on the question of a peace treaty with Germany of January 10, 1959. After that, he read the message

representative of the Vatican in FRGMUNKHA, which outlined the official position of West Germany on the Berlin question, the disagreements in the government of the FRG and the positions of various West German parties on this issue. At the end of the report, it was indicated that the Catholic episcopate of the FRG "almost unanimously" supported ADENAUER" 8.

After the TARDINI report, Cardinal PIZZARDO was the first to speak, who, although he recognized the need for negotiations between the West and the East, stated that he regards the position of the USSR on questions of the borders of Germany, on the creation of a federation of two German states, the demilitarization and neutralization of Germany, he regards as a desire to harm the German people and, to an even greater extent, damage "the entire European, and ultimately the entire Western community." "A federation of two Germanies, said PIZZARDO, would from the time of its founding be a weak link and, what is worse, a lever that Moscow would use to disrupt the peaceful coexistence of European peoples, free from the direct influence of Moscow." PIZZARDO fully endorsed the point of view of the Government of the FRG on the German question set out in the MUNICH report.

Cardinal MICARA, who then spoke, supported PIZZARDO. He noted that "the annexation of the original German territories to Poland and Russia is an injustice, and if this injustice continues, it will be a constant source of claims at any suitable moment. To recognize the borders demanded by the Russians means for Germany to wish ahead of time for a new European conflict. MIKARA stated that he was not opposed to comprehensive, however, not at the highest level, negotiations with the Soviet Union, but one cannot but be skeptical of their results, since nothing indicates a change in the methods and goals of the policy of the USSR

Cardinal OTTAVIANI's speech was most blunt when he declared that the West's policy towards the socialist countries must be not only irreconcilable, but even intolerant, since "irreconcilability and intolerance continue to be at the heart of Soviet policy." OTTAVIANI emphasized that "Russian politics essentially has not changed at all since the time of STALIN." Atheism and violence, he said, cut off all avenues for negotiations. The Vatican has nothing to choose and change, it should continue to follow the path "drawn by the clairvoyant spirit of PIA XP, resisting and calling for resistance".

The speeches of Cardinals TEDESCHINI, VALERI, JOBBE and FIETTA at the meeting of the Congregation for Emergency Ecclesiastical Affairs, as well as the statements of Cardinals MONTINI and CENTO read out at the meeting, were less intransigent and in some cases contained criticisms of the Cold War and calls for negotiations between East and West.

Thus, Cardinal TEDESCHINI noted in his speech that both the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, not to mention Germany, are interested in resolving the Berlin question and the German problem as a whole. Therefore, one should take into account the proposals contained in the Soviet note of January 10 of this year. TEDESCHINI stressed that the German

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the problem can no longer remain in a state of immobility without the risk of finally reaching a dead end. Therefore, he said, it is necessary to reach at least the first stage in its resolution. TEDESCHINI stated that he did not consider the Soviet proposals for the creation of a federation of two Germanies and the free city of Berlin to be absurd, and that for the success of negotiations on these issues, the West should not yet raise other acute problems, such as the problem of the borders of the new Germany, the discussion of which is obligatory. will drag on. Speaking of ADENAUER's position, he emphasized: "ADENAUER's intransigence is undoubtedly appropriate and commendable as a starting point. But it cannot be such when making a final decision. Therefore, he should be advised to exercise reasonable flexibility to the extent possible and in such a way that it does not undermine the authority of his country and personally himself.

Cardinal VALERI stated that he fully shared TEDESCHINI's point of view and called on the congregation "to reflect on the fact that East Germany has become a political reality in recent years ... which must be reckoned with." In confirmation, VALERY pointed to the growing prestige of the GDR in the international arena and recalled, in particular, the conclusion between the GDR and the UAR of an agreement on the establishment of consulates general in both countries, as well as the planned exchange of diplomatic missions between Iraq and the GDR. take into account reality and, despite all the obstacles, "move" politics. To persist in principles as such can be tantamount to suicide." Cardinals JOBBE and FIETTA, to one degree or another, subscribed to the theses of TEDESCHINI and VALERI. Cardinal CENTO and especially Cardinal MONTINI did the same in their written statements.

MONTINI, cautiously condemning the extremely reactionary policy of PIA XP towards the USSR, called on the members of the congregation for "bold innovations" in the field of politics, which "should not be mixed with the spirit of adventurism and frivolity." "The horizons opened by JOHN XXIII," MONTINI pointed out, require new paths and new methods from the policy of the Vatican. The Vatican, he said, should exert a positive influence on the "trampling around" policy that is typical of certain circles and countries, encouraging them to actively search for new ways that would gradually contribute to the improvement of the international situation.

At the end of the meeting, Pope John XXIP spoke. In his speech, he noted the importance of resolving the Berlin problem, because this problem, he said, should open prospects for solving, at least in principle, all the problems that now oppose the East to the West. JOHN XXIII declared that the Vatican therefore could not prematurely take irreconcilable positions on this issue, which did not meet the goals of its "new" policy.

No. 77 Top Secret To Comrade ZAKHAROV A.V.

I provide the following information.

1. According to information received from the circles of the Vatican, Pope JOHN XXII in his entourage expressed his approval of the new status of Berlin proposed by the Soviet government.

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The Pope stated that in order to ease the state of the Cold War, it is advisable that Soviet and Western troops be as far apart as possible, which will reduce the possibility of various incidents between them.

2. A commission has been set up in the Vatican, consisting of Cardinals TISSERAN and MAZELLA, to investigate the circumstances under which certain secret documents were copied from the personal archive of Pope PII XP.

Among the copied documents are the records of the PII HP about conversations with Hitler's Colonel DOLLMAN, two letters from HITLER to the PII HP, and copies of the pope's letters to HITLER.

In the leading circles of the Vatican, the opinion is expressed that the documents were copied and handed over in copies to the German embassy in Rome by the German Jesuits, advisers of PII HP LEIBER and HENDRICH.

Head of the PGU KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR F. Mortin May 1959 No. 78 Top secret

Comrade PUSHKIN G.M.

I provide the following information.

1. According to reports, the Cardinal Commission of the Congregation for Emergency Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Vatican sent in early March of this year. papal representatives accredited in the Western countries - members of NATO, as well as the Berlin Cardinal DEPFNER, directives on the position of the Vatican on the German and Berlin issues. This document stated:

— The Vatican still considers the government of Bonn to be the only legitimate government [of Germany] and does not recognize the government of the GDR. In the opinion of the Vatican, the Western states in negotiations with the USSR should proceed from this very provision.

— The Vatican considers the presence of troops of the Western powers in Berlin absolutely necessary both from the point of view of strategy and for reasons of political prestige. In his opinion, if the Western powers, as a result of threats from the Soviet Union, withdrew their troops from Berlin, this would undermine the resistance of anti-communist Catholics in the countries controlled by the USSR.

- The withdrawal of allied troops from Berlin is acceptable only on condition that foreign troops are withdrawn from all of Germany, which in turn is possible only after the resolution of all important problems of international politics, including an agreement on disarmament and on the control of its execution.

The Vatican insists that Germany can only be united through free elections. The question of a peace treaty with Germany can be resolved only by signing this treaty with the government, which must be approved by an all-German parliament elected on democratic principles.

- If there are real chances for such a resolution of the issue, then the Vatican does not consider it necessary to raise the issue of the former German territories,

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ceded to Poland, and wants only a guarantee that the German minority in Poland will enjoy all civil rights.

— The West must in no way deviate from its demands and, above all, not allow the German question to be relegated to the background, because Germany, strategically and culturally, belongs to the West and must become an organic part of the Western political, economic and military association.

— An agreement on the German question must unreservedly secure for the entire German people the possibility of participating in a future European federation.

— The Vatican doubts the sincerity of the USSR's desire to disarm and neutralize Germany, believing that the Soviet Union is guided not by fears of a repetition of German aggression, but, on the contrary, by the desire to pave the way for a war against the West in the near future.

According to other sources, in April this year. In connection with the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Geneva, the Cardinal Commission of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs decided to send to the Western Powers a document of similar content, to which the following points were added:

The Vatican supports any agreement to ban nuclear weapons.

— Guarantees of religious freedom in the countries of Eastern Europe should be included in the agreement between the West and the USSR.

2. According to the papal nuncio in Bonn MUNHA, the meeting of N.S. Khrushchev with OLLENHAUER! had a negative impact on the attitude of the West German public to the ideas

unity of the West.

Deputy Head of the PGU KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR M. Kotov

June 1, 1959

No. 79 Top secret To Comrade ZORIN VA.

1. As the date of the meeting N.S. Khrushchev and Eisenhower, the right wing of the Vatican, led by Cardinal Ottaviani, is becoming more and more uneasy. OTTAVIANI believes that the meeting of the heads of the two great powers and the possible relaxation of international tension associated with it will weaken the position of the Catholic Church. In his opinion, this, in particular, will damage the positions of the Vatican in Italy at a time when he is preparing on the eve of the congress of the ruling Christian Democratic Party (CDA) to provide strong support to the right wing of this party in its struggle against the "left" forces of the CDA.

OTTAVIANI and his supporters intended to organize a broad campaign among the American public against the meeting of N.S. Khrushchev with Eisenhower. To this end, OTTAVIANI in July of this year. traveled to the United States, where he had conversations with the leadership of the Catholic Church in the United States. In August this year. Cardinal LERCARO, an OTTAVIANI supporter, left for the USA. August 24 at a press conference in Chicago LERCARO from

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covertly opposed the visit of N.S. Khrushchev in the USA and declared: "The West has much to lose and nothing to gain from Khrushchev's visit to the United States. His visit to America will help perpetuate the communist myth of the possibility of coexistence between West and East and, therefore, will take away the last hopes of the peoples in the Soviet orbit, whose freedom is trampled on and who see in the USA the leading force in the fight against world communism." Later, at a reception with the Archbishop of Chicago, he emphasized that the visit of N.S. Khrushchev to the United States could cause the Catholic Church to lose many who are now wavering between Christianity and Communism.

According to available data, Pope JOHN XXIII does not share the points of view of OTTAVIANI and LERCARO and believes that the meeting of N.S. Khrushchev with Eisenhower meets the current interests of the Catholic Church. In the circles of the Vatican, there is an opinion that the pacifist speeches of the pope are caused, in particular, by his desire to convene an ecumenical council at all costs. The Pope fears that in the event of an aggravation of the international situation, he will not be able to convene an Ecumenical Council.

Prime Minister of Italy SEGNI during the stay of ADENAUER' in August of this year. in Italy (where he spent his holidays) discussed a number of issues with him in connection with the forthcoming exchange of visits between N.S. Khrushchev and Eisenhower, in particular the Berlin one.

When discussing this issue, SEGNI agreed with ADENAUER's opinion that if the United States makes concessions on the Berlin question, the FRG will have to speed up negotiations with France in order to create a "third force" in Europe.

Deputy Head of the PGU KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. Krokhin

September 16, 1959

No. 80 Top Secret

Comrade FIRYUBIN N.P.

I report the following information about the policy of the Vatican.

1. Secretary of State of the Vatican, Cardinal Domenico TARDINI, during a series of conversations with representatives of the US Democratic Party, John RYAN and William BANTON, who were in Rome in September of this year. stated that the Vatican would like the West to continue to support the hopes of the peoples of Eastern Europe for "liberation" from communism. For this reason, the US Democratic Party should make a specific commitment that the United States does not recognize the "annexations" of the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union, and also does not recognize "de jure" the current border between Poland and the USSR. - but the government of the GDR, and the Western troops must remain in West Berlin. According to Vatican leaders, American foreign policy should develop in such a way as not to suppress the anti-communist forces existing in the countries of Eastern Europe. the US should

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Tegorically confirm the right of the people of Eastern Europe to freely choose their own political regime.

Cardinal TARDINI expressed regret in these conversations that the United States has lately shown little interest in the specific problems of the Catholic Church in the countries of Eastern Europe and Asia. the Vatican believes, in particular, that under no circumstances should the government of Chiang Kai-shek be allowed to be condemned now, as this would lead to disorientation of the anti-communist forces of Asia; The West should not legally enter into negotiations with the PRC until "democratic, civil and religious freedoms are restored" there.

According to TARDINI, the Vatican also believes that the United States should pursue a policy of "preventive defense" of territories that have not yet come under the predominant influence of the USSR; The USA must make it clear to the Soviet government that the expansion of the political and military influence of the USSR cannot be more tolerable. TARDINI spoke in favor of cooperation between the Vatican and the United States in the fight against the current government of Cuba.

2. According to the information received, a special commission has been set up at the congregation of seminaries, universities and studies of the Vatican, which is charged with dealing with questions of cultural relations between the USSR and Italy. Jesuit Giuseppe GIAMPIETRO was appointed chairman of the commission, and Jesuit Ferdinando TROZARELLI, former rector of the Oriental Institute of the Vatican, one of the most prominent Vatican "specialists" on the USSR, was appointed secretary. The commission consists of the German Jesuit Emil HERMANN, Bishop Giuseppe NEBIOLO, deputy of the Christian Democratic Party of Italy Giuseppe ERMINI, lawyer Giulio MERLINI. The commission will meet twice a month at the congregation's premises. The chairman of the commission will have to report once a month on its work to Cardinal PIZZARDO, prefect of the Congregation of Seminaries, and once every three months to Pope John XXII.

In connection with the formation of the commission, Cardinal PIZZARDO in August of this year. sent out a confidential circular to all Italian bishops, inviting them to inform the congregation of seminaries in a timely manner of all steps that are "undertaken or only planned" in the respective dioceses in terms of expanding Italian-Soviet cultural cooperation. The circular emphasizes that cultural cooperation between Italy and the USSR is exclusively for the benefit of the "harmful theory of communism."

Cardinal PIZZARDO urges the bishops to warn all believers, especially young people, from joining the association "Italy-USSR" and from participating in other "cultural movements" that are openly or secretly organized by the Italian communists. Bishops are required to communicate to the congregation of seminaries the names of all students who travel from Italy to the USSR for a short trip around the country or for a long stay in it. Bishops should make it clear to Catholics studying at or graduating from universities that, without special permission from the congregation of seminaries, they should neither ask for nor accept hospitality or

any other favors from "Russian communist leaders". The circular regrets that the Italian-Soviet cultural agreement provides for cultural and scientific activities "both at the level of state institutions and at the level of private organizations, as well as

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but at the level of individual citizens of both countries", which means, as Cardinal PIZZARDO writes, "to introduce a Trojan horse into our citadel of Christianity".

In conclusion, Cardinal PIZZARDO demands that bishops urgently inform the congregation of seminaries about cases of penetration into the territory of their dioceses of newspapers, magazines, books or other printed publications of the USSR, as well as about which bookstores these publications are sold, in what quantity, who are bought.

Deputy Head of the PGU KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR M. Kotov

November 18, 1960

No. 81 Top Secret August 6, 1963

Central Committee of the CPSU (For the International Department and the Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU)

TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, comrade AA GROMYKO.

I report the following information about KENNEDY's conversation with Pope Paul II.

According to information received from the immediate environment of Pope PAUL VI, during his conversation with US President KENNEDY, which took place on July 2 of this year. in Rome, much attention was paid to the negotiations between the Vatican and the socialist countries. The Pope assured Kennedy that these negotiations dealt with purely religious matters and were aimed at normalizing the situation and expanding the influence of the Catholic Church in the socialist countries. PAVEL VI stressed that the Vatican intends to continue these negotiations with the socialist countries regardless of the degree of progress that can be achieved in the negotiations between the West and the USSR on international problems.

Further, PAUL VI raised the issue of establishing diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the United States. This question, in the opinion of the highest Vatican circles, is now acquiring particular urgency in connection with the fact that the Vatican is making efforts to normalize relations with the socialist countries. PAUL VI in a conversation with KENNEDY expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the United States, where a significant part of the population is Catholic, does not have normal relations with the Vatican, and that KENNEDY does not give any hope that such relations can be established in the near future .

The Minister of the Italian Government for State Participation in BO Enterprises, in a confidential conversation, said that KENNEDY was dissatisfied with the statement of the Pope that the Vatican was going to support the demands of the episcopates of Latin American countries for the creation of a supreme church commission for Latin America.

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According to the French government authorities, as well as the aforementioned Italian minister of BO, KENNEDY's conversation with PAUL VI did not proceed quite smoothly and turned out to be more "heavy" than expected.

Chairman of the State Security Committee V. Semichastny No. 82 Top secret June 1, 1961 TO THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR

Comrade Kuznetsov V.V.

I am sending you the text of a document prepared by a government body of one of the Western European states at the end of March this year. and containing information about the position of the Western powers on the German question.

Please return the item after use.

APPENDIX: on 6 sheets.

Chairman of the State Security Committee (A. Shelepin)

Copy Top Secret

On the German problem

With regard to Berlin, it should be noted that since the limited crisis that took place in September last year, no major changes have taken place in the position of this city.

The position of the new American government does not seem to differ significantly from that of the previous government. The absence of any mention of Berlin in the President's State of the Union address was interpreted, on the one hand, as a sign that the Americans wanted to further complicate the problem, and, on the other hand, as a veiled warning to the Germans that that the government of Washington, despite the fact that it is not inclined to shirk its duties, does not intend to continue the "automatic" and unconditional cooperation with the Bonn of the DULLES times! ? and EISENHAUER. Although the calming statements of KENNEDY and RASK! about Berlin cannot fully compensate for this silence on the Berlin question, however, it should be noted that at a press conference on March 9, the Secretary of State spoke more specifically: "The United States is firmly committed to defending the freedom of Berlin, as well as ensuring the safety of its inhabitants. Therefore, at the moment, we consider it necessary to maintain our positions in this city." Together with

topics

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RASK added that "we cannot foresee to what extent this position will be subject to change and evolution."

The current American government seems to be striving to hold on to its former positions, without, however, jeopardizing the period of respite that appears to be emerging in relations between the US and the Soviet Union.

The German government, based on foreign policy considerations (the need to defend itself against accusations that it takes a hostile position with respect to any attempt to reach a compromise and is the main obstacle to easing international tension), as well as for domestic political reasons (the desire not to create during the election campaign the impression that the Social Democratic Opposition is likely to succeed in achieving a peaceful solution to the German problem, or at least an improvement in relations between the two parts of Germany) is now allegedly interested in showing greater flexibility in relations with Pankov, the Soviet Union and its

satellites.

During ADENAUER's stay in London on February 22, 1961, the British got the impression that the chancellor and his entourage were less adamant about the idea of maintaining contacts with the Soviets on the Berlin question. The Germans seem to have fully agreed that it is tactically expedient to maintain such contacts and to promote the game of easing tensions in order to buy time.

What is clear, however, is that ADENAUER can never openly agree to sign an agreement authorizing the partition of Germany, and thus solemnly renounce the reunification of Germany on Western terms, which may be possible if the now unforeseen events are to be hastened.

At a press conference on March 10, Chancellor ADENAUER affirmed that "such an agreement is unacceptable" and that the Bonn government will do everything possible to ensure that the 17 million Germans living under the ULBRICHT regime are granted the right to "self-determination". ADENAUER hinted at possible compensation to the Soviet Union in exchange for recognizing the right to self-determination for the 17 million East Germans.

The position of the federal government, especially on the Berlin question, is extremely delicate. Any initiative on the part of the Germans—irreconcilable or conciliatory—would be, as never before, inexpedient. This explains ADENAUER's indecision regarding the tone and form in which he should respond to Khrushchev's message, in which he hinted to ADENAUER that it would be possible to reach a "maximum understanding" on the question of West Berlin, agreement on the rearmament of Germany, if the FRG concluded a peace treaty with Pankov's Germany (which would require its recognition), and agreement with the borders established as a result of the last war.

However, in general, the West basically follows the same line of behavior as on the eve of the summit meeting in May last year:

1) wait-and-see tactics aimed at maintaining the status quo in Berlin and establishing a connection between the solution of the German question and the settlement of other more general problems, and above all the problem of disarmament;

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2) firmness and solidarity in defending the current positions in Berlin (preservation of the rights of the occupying powers; freedom of communication between West Berlin and the FRG; freedom of movement within the former capital itself; the right of Berlin residents to self-determination).

Past experience and the behavior of the KENNEDY government, which has shown a strong inclination to use the usual diplomatic channels, indicate that the West is opposed to any summit meeting unless it is preceded by

lengthy and meticulous preparation.

The Soviets also strengthened their positions, still insisting on the proposal to turn only one West Berlin into a free city and threatening to sign a separate peace treaty with the GDR. . However, he is undoubtedly interested in alleviating the burden that the arms race places on the Soviet economy, especially in the present period of great difficulties in the field of agriculture, and could therefore agree to link the negotiations on the Berlin question with disarmament negotiations. But it is quite probable, as happened in Paris, when Khrushchev once again became convinced of the impossibility of achieving any success in one area or another, that a new crisis may break out in connection with Berlin.

This crisis could take place immediately after a possible meeting between KHRUSHCHEV and KENNEDY, which is supposed to take place in June of this year.

However, it must be borne in mind (and this was noted by ADENAUER and MACMILLAN during the last talks) that American intentions with respect to West Berlin are still unknown.

In the event that the situation in West Berlin worsens, the quadripartite working group has developed a plan which, in addition to certain official actions (note of protest

Moscow, an appeal to the Security Council), allegedly provides for countermeasures of an economic and military nature. Given the particularly sensitive nature of such measures, the governments of Bonn, London, Paris and Washington have taken an extremely cautious position on this issue and seem to be inclined only occasionally to submit to the NATO Council for approval measures that they consider it appropriate to take if necessary.

The solution of the Berlin question by turning only one West Berlin into a free city is unacceptable for ADENAUER, since this would actually sanction the division of Germany into three parts. The transformation of the whole of Berlin into a free city has the same drawback, although to a lesser extent. Moreover, such a proposal would only be propagandistic, since neither the Soviets nor the East Germans would ever agree to it. The decision based on the recognition of West Berlin as the "Land" of the Federal Republic of Germany combines the shortcomings of these two options, and also means the refusal of the three Western powers from their obligations to defend the former capital arising from the Potsdam agreements. Even the Bonn government eventually unreservedly admitted that if the West insisted on this point, this would eventually lead to a weakening of the city's defenses.

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In connection with the question of concluding a peace treaty in Bonn, there was a renewed tendency to recognize as a possible solution to this question the holding of a "free" plebiscite in both parts of Germany, which would relieve the Bonn government from the need to sign a treaty authorizing the division of the former German empire.

In the course of the plebiscite, as recommended by the quadripartite working group in its report approved by the Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the NATO Council on 2 May 1960, the citizens of both German states would be asked to choose between:

a) a proposal by the United States, Britain and France, with the consent of the FRG, for the conclusion of a peace treaty to be signed by the freely elected government of a united Germany;

6) the proposal of the Soviet Union, with the consent of the GDR, that the discussion of the question of concluding a peace treaty and its signing be conducted separately with the representatives of the FRG and the representatives of the GDR, and that the settlement of relations between the FRG and the GDR be left to both German states.

The results of the plebiscite, which must be preceded by free discussions supervised by UN representatives and in which all German citizens over 21 must take part, must be registered separately for the FRG, the GDR and Berlin.

Within a month of the holding of the plebiscite, the four powers are bound to reopen the discussion of the German question on the basis of the choice made by the majority of the citizens who took part in the plebiscite in the three zones.

No. 83 Top secret July 20, 1961 To Comrade N.S. KHRUSHCHEV

We are reporting to you the information summarized by the KGB recently received from agents about the plans and measures of the Western powers in connection with the forthcoming conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR.

The ruling circles of the USA, Britain and France have no doubt that the USSR has the firm intention of concluding, together with other interested states, a peace treaty with the GDR, and that the Western Powers are in no position to prevent this.

According to the calculations of the Western powers, the conclusion by the Soviet Union of a peace treaty with the GDR would make it difficult for them to further maneuver in the German question, would have a negative effect on the foreign policy positions of the FRG, and would increase the prestige of the GDR in international affairs even before

will lead to a serious weakening of the positions of the USA, Britain, France and the FRG in West Berlin. In this regard, they plan to put pressure on the Soviet government in order to force the USSR to postpone the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR and to demonstrate that the three Western powers are determined and able to maintain their rights in relation to West Berlin.

During the negotiations at the session of the NATO Council in Oslo in May this year. it was deemed necessary to "warn" the USSR by all possible means

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that if, as a result of the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, free access to West Berlin is closed to the Western powers, then measures will be taken on their part, as a result of which a "real threat" to the security of the Soviet Union may arise. In order to demonstrate this "threat," the military authorities of the United States, Britain, and France propose, in particular, that the armed forces of the three Western powers be re-equipped to wartime levels, that the USSR be informed through unofficial channels of the development by these powers of military plans in case restricting their access to West Berlin, as well as taking measures to misinform the Soviet government about alleged plans to transfer atomic weapons to the armed forces of the FRG.

In the course of negotiations through diplomatic channels between the United States, Britain and France, it is suggested that, at least in the first period after the conclusion of a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, the governments of the Soviet Union and the GDR will refrain from taking measures aimed at restricting the right of access of the three Western powers to West Berlin.

In the report of the ad hoc NATO working group dated March 22 this year. it was pointed out that after the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, the Soviet Union might "suggest Pankov to prudently exercise control over communications." As emphasized in the report, "the possibility of a crisis would be greatly reduced if provisions were included in a separate peace treaty de facto recognizing the current order, allowing the Allies access to Berlin."

Proceeding from such assumptions, it is believed in the governmental and diplomatic circles of the Western powers that if, after the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR, the rights of the United States, Britain and France in relation to West Berlin remain unaffected, they can "take the risk" of establishing with the GDR certain contacts on matters relating to the access of their troops to West Berlin, provided, however, that such contacts should not lead to political negotiations and diplomatic recognition of the GDR.

It should be noted that recently the ruling circles of the USA, Britain and France have become more and more convinced that after the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, access to West Berlin will be closed to them and that in order to maintain their current ties with West Berlin they will have to enter into negotiations with the GDR. However, given the position of the German government, the Western powers do not intend to enter into such negotiations, in connection with which they plan to carry out a number of political, economic and other actions of a non-military nature in order to put pressure on the Soviet Union and to prevent, after the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR, the introduction of restrictions on the access of their troops to West Berlin.

In particular, the governments of the United States, Britain and France are planning to make official statements about the "incompatibility of unilateral actions" of the Soviet Union with the obligations of the four great powers in relation to Germany and about the "dangerous consequences" of any actions of the USSR and the GDR aimed at restricting the access of the three Western powers to West Berlin. In addition, the possibility of applying to the UN Security Council is envisaged. Thus, at the session of the NATO Council in Oslo, the US representative expressed the opinion that it was possible for the Western powers to apply to the Security Council with the question of a "threat to peace" as a result of

"unilateral actions" of the USSR against West Berlin. The Americans also proposed to refer the question of the legal status of West Berlin to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, but due to the objections of England and France, they have so far rejected this proposal.

The plans developed by the Western powers also provide for the implementation of such measures as the prohibition of flights for aircraft of the countries of the socialist camp over the territory of NATO member countries, the creation of interference with radio transmissions and navigation aids of the USSR and the GDR, the breaking of the agreement on intra-German trade between the FRG and the GDR, etc. . It is planned to carry out direct subversive actions against the GDR, organize anti-government demonstrations and provocations on its territory, commit sabotage at the power plants of the republic, and supply weapons and ammunition to subversive groups in the GDR.

At the same time, the military headquarters of the three Western Powers have been drawing up military plans for a long time, providing for the use of force to maintain freedom of access to West Berlin.

These plans recommend resorting primarily to the creation of an "air bridge" to ensure ties between the USA, Britain, France and the FRG with West Berlin. At the same time, they proceed from the fact that such a measure, in contrast to the use of force to ensure access by land, could be presented to public opinion in the West as a "peaceful" action, while the Soviet Union and the GDR, in the case of if they began to create obstacles to transportation over the "air bridge", they would look like an "aggressive side".

Along with the creation of an "air bridge", military plans provide for the use of force to maintain freedom of access for the United States, Britain and France to West Berlin also by land.

A plan of this kind was developed as early as the middle of 1959 by a special Live Oak group of representatives from the USA, Britain and France.

Based on the proposals of this group, the NATO Military Committee in May-June of this year. prepared the so-called "four-phase plan for determining the limits of the enemy's resistance", which is to be considered by the four Western powers.

The first phase of the plan is exclusively "psychological" in nature and boils down to declaring a combat alert in the armed forces of all NATO member countries. The second phase provides for the creation of "breakthrough forces" consisting of military units of the United States, Britain and France, which should be deployed on the intra-German border in the area of the Helmstedt border checkpoint. During the third phase of the plan, the "breakthrough force" is to capture control posts on the motorway leading to West Berlin, as well as penetrate to a shallow depth at a number of points in the territory of the GDR. The fourth phase provides for the suspension of all military operations "pending the reaction of the enemy."

According to the information received, the Western powers have not yet adopted a final plan for carrying out measures of a political, economic and military nature in relation to the Soviet Union, the GDR and other countries of the socialist camp, which will sign a peace treaty.

From the documentary data we have, it can be seen that the Americans are demanding the consent of their allies for the rapid development of "tougher" and more detailed plans in the event of a "state of emergency".

niya" in West Berlin, which would already now be binding on the United States, Britain and France and, possibly, on all other NATO countries. The leadership of the US State Department argues this position by the fact that the USSR policy on the Berlin issue contains a "considerable element of bluff" and that the Soviet Union is unlikely to take the risk of unleashing a nuclear war over West Berlin.

The Western plans do not contain any specific proposals as to whether the Western Powers should use their armed forces if the Soviet Union and the GDR, in response to attempts by the United States, Britain and France to secure freedom of access to West Berlin by force, also use military strength. In this regard, the plan developed by the Live Oak group only in a general form indicates the advisability of using NATO military forces, although at the same time it is emphasized that, with the current ratio of conventional forces of NATO and the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, the West cannot count on to success in the implementation of their plans and that it is possible to achieve the set goals only if the "nuclear power of the allies" is used.

However, the representatives of the USA, Britain and France refrain from speaking in favor of the use of atomic weapons against the Soviet Union. At the session of the NATO Council in Oslo, the US Secretary of State RASC, in response to a question from the representative of Canada, stated that "without consultations with the allies, it cannot be said that nuclear weapons will be used in the event of restrictions on communication with West Berlin."

The fact that the plans for the "Berlin crisis" are still under discussion is explained by the fears of the United States, Britain and France that the use of force by them could provoke retaliatory actions by the Soviet Union, and this would put the Western powers before a choice: either retreat and thereby demonstrate their weakness, or unleash a war against the USSR.

The leadership of the US State Department is currently of the opinion that if the development of the "Berlin crisis" goes too far, every effort must be made to prevent a military conflict with the Soviet Union.

The British Government proceeds from the premise that the final decision on certain military measures by the Western powers should be taken only with regard to the specific situation that will develop after the Soviet Union itself takes any steps aimed at restricting the rights of the three Western powers. powers in relation to West Berlin. The detailed and final development of comprehensive plans is, in his opinion, not only premature, but also dangerous, since this could lead the West to an armed clash with the Soviet Union.

As far back as the middle of 1960, the British government made it clear to the government of the FRG that Britain did not intend to "cause a world crisis because of Berlin." In a private conversation in June of this year, British Defense Minister WATKINSON stated that under the present conditions the British Government would do everything to avoid creating a situation that would lead to an armed conflict between East and West.

Judging by some reports, the French government also takes a low-key position. In the instruction of the chief of the general staff of France, sent to the commander of the armed forces in the FRG in con

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On April 1 this year, in particular, it was proposed that in negotiations with representatives of the allies on the development of measures in the event of a "blockade of Berlin", he "made it clear to his partners that these negotiations relate to the work of the headquarters and in no way entail national obligations." As can be seen from the speech of the representative of France at the meeting of the Live Oak group in mid-May this year, the French government, given the internal political situation in

country in connection with the war in Algeria, seeks to limit, as far as possible, the participation of its armed forces in the practical implementation of the military plans being developed.

In connection with the fear that a military conflict might arise, the government bodies of the Western powers, and primarily England, consider it expedient to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union in the near future. The idea of negotiations with the USSR was also more actively supported by the Americans and the French. Thus, French Foreign Minister CUV de MURVILLE, outlining the position of his government at the NATO Council session in Oslo, said that now "there is no reason why the West could not enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union about Berlin, as it was in Geneva in 1959".

The Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain and France, who took part in the work of the NATO Council session in Oslo, came to the conclusion that it is urgently necessary to develop a position that the three Western powers could take in the event of negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The essence of this position boils down to re-proposing the "comprehensive plan" already proposed at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1959, which provides for the interconnection between the solution of the problems of disarmament, German reunification and the Berlin question. However, realizing the unacceptability of such proposals for the Soviet Union, the ruling circles of the Western powers consider it possible to supplement the "comprehensive plan" with a number of "new and tempting" provisions. In particular, the possibility of negotiating a proposal to develop a new status for all of Berlin, including the democratic sector of Berlin, is being considered. In one of the documents prepared in mid-June by the European Department of the French Foreign Ministry for the CUV de MURVILLE, it is proposed to study the development of a new "broad plan for the free unification of Germany on the basis of neutrality", the recognition by the Western powers of the Oder-Neisse border and the rejection of atomic weapons of West Germany.

Considering it possible to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union on the German problem and the Berlin question, the Western Powers proceed from the assumption that such negotiations will make it possible to delay the conclusion of a peace treaty with the GDR and the settlement of the situation in West Berlin on its basis. At the same time, they expect to achieve the consent of the Soviet Union to the conclusion of an agreement on the Berlin question, which would preserve their present rights in relation to West Berlin.

The State Security Committee is taking measures to obtain materials for the forthcoming conference of the foreign ministers of the four Western powers on the German question and materials for a possible conference of the heads of governments of the same states after this.

Chairman of the State Security Committee (A. Shelepin)

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No. 84 Top secret

February 21, 1962

CPSU Central Committee TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR Comrade GROMYKO A.A.

TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF THE SSR Marshal of the Soviet Union, comrade MALINOVSKY RYA.

I present the following information.

According to information received from the circles of the American Congress, the United States plans to provoke the government of Cuba into such actions that would allow the Americans to carry out a military operation against the Cuban Republic and quickly, in no more than one day, put an end to the government of F. CASTRO!:". To this end, the United States intends to significantly

intensify anti-Cuban propaganda, which will be directed primarily against the leaders of the government of the Cuban Republic - Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO, Che GUEVAR and Blas ROCA.

US military experts have developed a plan of operation against Cuba, which, according to the same data, is supported by President KENNEDY. According to this plan, the main blow to Cuba is supposed to be delivered from the American military base of Guantanamo Bay with the support of the ships of the navy located in the Caribbean Sea. Ground operations will be supported by air forces based in Florida and Texas.

The implementation of this plan is entrusted to Secretary of War McNamaru. A specific date for the start of the operation has not yet been scheduled, although we are talking about the coming months.

At the direction of KENNEDY McNAMAR, he is consulting with Secretary of State RACOM.

The United States is exerting pressure in all directions on a number of Latin American countries in order to force them to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The US Department of State is especially increasing pressure on the governments of those countries of Latin America that abstained from the vote on expelling Cuba from the OAS at the meeting of foreign ministers of the OAS member states in Punta del Este. In these countries, the United States supports the armed forces and the church in order to influence through them the vacillating leading statesmen and politicians.

Along with the intensification of propaganda against the government of F. Castro, the United States is currently looking for ways to present its armed attack on Cuba as a clash of all or most of the countries of Latin America with the government of F. Castro and "international communism", which could serve as a legal justification in the United States aggression against Cuba.

The State Department is exploring several options to create a pretext for attacking the Cuban Republic. In particular, the possibility of placing the military base of Guantanamo at the disposal of the OAS, organizing a training center for the military committee of the OAS and deploying symbolic contingents (company, battalion) of some states is being considered.

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Central America "to teach them how to fight the guerrillas." After that, the US plans to stage an attack by Cuban air forces on this base by the forces of the Cuban internal counter-revolution. Guatemala, Nicaragua, Venezuela and El Salvador have declared their readiness to send symbolic contingents of their troops to the Guantanamo base, and the United States is negotiating with representatives of these countries on how to implement its plan.

As another option, the US government plans to stage an attack by a revolutionary Cuban army on a country in Central America, using Cuban exiles dressed as a revolutionary army for this purpose. After a staged attack, the armed forces of the "injured" country occupy one of the small coastal Cuban islands, on which a "government of free Cuba" will be immediately established. The latter will ask the OAS to provide him with military assistance in the fight against the government of F. Castro. The Council of the OAS will decide on the provision of military assistance to the "government of a free Cuba" by all members of the OAS, including the United States, on the basis of which an open intervention in Cuba will follow.

The State Security Committee takes measures to verify the information provided.

Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR P. Ivashutin

No. 85 Top Secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 21, 1962

Used in a special message to the MO of the Central Committee of the CPSU, comrade. MALINOVSKI and comrade. Kuznetsov.

Lately there have been groupings in the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States advocating the suppression of Cuba by military means.

According to the correspondent of The New York Times HAMILTON, the proponents of military repression in Cuba in the Republican Party are led by Nelson ROCKEFELLER, who is concerned about the fate of his investments in Latin America, especially in Venezuela. In the Democratic Party, supporters of military measures against Cuba are represented by leaders Pentagon.

According to HAMILTON, the military group intends to speed up decisive action against Cuba after the elections to the US Congress in November this year.

It is proposed to unleash a war against Cuba from the territory of Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela, using the provoked sinking of ships and the destruction of aircraft of these countries as a pretext. It is also envisaged to organize an armed uprising in Cuba, the signal for which should be an attempt on Castro" by the US emigration forces.

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The cable goes on to state that these activities have received the full support of the Governments of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Paraguay, while the Governments of Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador allegedly oppose these activities.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 86 Top Secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 22, 1962

The US government, after a two-day discussion, decided to impose a naval blockade of Cuba. In his speech, KENNEDY referred to the missile bases allegedly created by the Soviet Union on the territory of Cuba, to the supply of missiles and bombers capable of carrying nuclear charges. In this regard, the President of the United States outlined the program of his government:

1. All shipments of military equipment to Cuba are subject to strict quarantine.
2. Strengthening control over the situation in Cuba and the strengthening of the armed forces.
3. Any attack by Cuba will be considered as an attack by the USSR and will trigger corresponding responses from the US.
4. Evacuation of families of American soldiers from the Guantanamo base and sending reinforcements there.
5. In order to discuss the issue of the Soviet threat to the countries of the Western Hemisphere, immediately hold consultations in the OAS.
6. Demand an urgent meeting of the Security Council, at which the Americans intend to demand the elimination of offensive-type weapons under the control of the UN. The President of the Security Council (representative of the USSR) intends to convene a meeting of the Security Council on 23 October.

7. The President intends to send a message to N.S. Khrushchev with a request to stop the supply of offensive weapons to Cuba and improve relations between the USSR and the USA.

The first reaction of UN diplomats to KENNEDY's statement boils down to the fact that the United States shows itself to be the initiator of the aggravation of the international situation. At the same time, the United States is pursuing the goal of preventing the development of the Cuban revolution and paralyzing on the eve of the elections accusations of Kennedy's opponents of indecision. Diplomats of NATO member countries are dissatisfied with the unilateral decision of the US government without prior consultations. The delegates of the Arab countries believe that KENNEDY's statement will give them the opportunity to intensify the fight against Israel, to which the Americans have pledged to supply missile weapons and, possibly, announce the military blockade of Israel.

In connection with the aggravation of the situation in the United States, the residency took the following measures: all employees were instructed to observe secrecy in working with agents and confidential relations; the operational staff is sent to obtain classified information about US policy in relation

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Cuba; measures were taken to strengthen the security of the representative office building and to increase the vigilance of the Soviet colony.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

#87 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 23, 1962

Reported tt. Khrushchev Kozlov Suslov Ponomarev, Malinovsky, Kuznetsov.

The situation in the State Department and in the diplomatic and journalistic circles of Washington became extremely tense after KENNEDY's statement. M. KILDUFF, SALINGER's deputy! October 22 this year said: "We are very nervous in anticipation of the answer of the Soviet government." Following today's Soviet response, there has been a marked change in sentiment in US government circles.

According to correspondents of the Swiss newspaper "Neue Zurich Zeitung" and the English newspaper "Daily Express", the statement of the Soviet government in the White House and the Pentagon is regarded as "general and weak", since it does not contain a clear indication of the measures to protect the Soviet state from American actions, which is interpreted as a sign that the USSR "is not ready for decisive steps."

The correspondent of the English newspaper "Daily Express" also reported that the United States, as a second series of actions against Cuba, prepared air raids on the locations of Soviet missile installations and bombers in Cuba with the aim of destroying them. He also said that the Pentagon was taking steps to organize an "air bridge" in West Berlin.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

#88 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 24, 1962

Reported tt. Khrushchev Kozlov Suslov Ponomarev, Gromyko, Malinovsky.

On the evening of October 23, Pentagon spokesman A. SILVESTR informed a foreign diplomat that 80% of the ships of the US Second Fleet, including aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, were participating in the operation to blockade Cuba, united in a special group under

codenamed "Shock Unit 136". The Pentagon ordered the command of the group to allow Soviet ships to enter Cuba with technical specialists, in the absence of prohibited cargoes. The Pentagon formed a group of American

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Russian and foreign correspondents to send it on board the ship of the special group on October 26 and 27 in order to be present during the operation of capturing any ship of the socialist countries or the USSR.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 89 Top Secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 24, 1962

Reported tt. Khrushchev Kozlov, Suslov Ponomarev, Malinovsky, Gromyko.

October 24 this year In a private conversation, the Minister-Counsellor of the US Mission to the UN, NOYES, said that if attempts by neutral countries to mediate in the dispute between the United States and Cuba do not produce results, and if the USSR and Cuba do not give assurances that nuclear missiles and other weapons in Cuba will not be destroyed, then The United States is unlikely to avoid direct military intervention. At the same time, Washington was guided by the almost unanimous support on this issue from the countries of Latin America.

October 24 this year YOST, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN, said that the US armed forces had completed preparations for military operations against Cuba and had begun preparations for the landing of troops on Cuban territory.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 90 Top Secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 24, 1962

Every half an hour on October 23, all American television and radio companies, as well as newspapers, broadcast speeches by reactionary senators and correspondents praising KENNEDY's actions. At the same time, there were obvious tendencies to stir up the situation and present the matter in such a way that KENNEDY was allegedly taking defensive measures. The authorities of New York announced the strengthening of the police protection of the city. The streets are patrolled by reinforced police squads. These measures were taken ostensibly in order to prevent possible unrest. This is due to the fact that the American population is alarmed by the actions of KENNEDY. There is growing dissatisfaction with measures to control the movement of goods to Cuba. Panic spreads among New Yorkers; many begin to take their families out of the city. From 13:00 to 15:00, about 3,000 Americans held a demonstration near the American legation, demanding the cancellation of the measures taken by the president. Organizations such as Women for Peace and Fight for Peace participated in the demonstration.

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Groups of Hungarian and Cuban reactionary elements outside the building of the Soviet representative office organized a picket of 300 people. The local press and television tried to give this gathering the appearance of a large demonstration and sent representatives of their cameramen and correspondents to the building. These measures were intended to increase anti-Cuban hysteria.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 91 Top Secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 24, 1962

After the speech of the American president, the military psychosis intensified in the country, which is fueled by official speeches by statesmen. On the eve of KENNEDY's speech, the US propaganda service tried to create an atmosphere of secrecy around the meeting in Washington. The purpose of this is to give the greatest effect to the President's speech and to continue inciting military hysteria.

According to WIENER, an employee of the American mission, KENNEDY's speech was designed to prove to ordinary Americans that the KENNEDY government could successfully resist Soviet pressure and thereby increase the prestige of the president and his party in the eyes of voters. At the same time, the Americans are counting on using blackmail and pressure to win support for their policy from the countries of Latin America in the event that force is used in the fight against Cuba. In this regard, in the press, radio and television of the United States, as well as on the sidelines of the UN, anti-Soviet propaganda is being carried out on an unprecedented scale, the purpose of which is to prove the existence of a threat from the USSR and Cuba to the United States and all countries of Latin America. At the same time, an attempt is being made to show that the measures taken by the Americans are aimed at ensuring security, primarily in Latin America. Politicians from the states of New Jersey, Connecticut, and New York were actively involved in the war psychosis campaign. The governors of these states hold continuous meetings with civil defense specialists to put the air defenses in those states on alert. The state of military psychosis in the country, the governors are trying to use to increase appropriations for the needs of civil defense and thereby increase business activity. ROCKFELLER! - The Governor of New York interrupted the election campaign and returned to Albany. He ordered —after consultation with Washington—the atomic bomb shelters in schools to be put on alert and the readiness of the state police to replace the national guard in the event of the latter being drafted into the army. ROCKEFELLER also ordered that the completion of the construction of the underground convention facility be accelerated.

state.

As of October 24 of this year. The premiere of the anti-Soviet film "We Will Bury You" is scheduled, the purpose of which is to prove to the American the aggressiveness of the Soviet policy aimed at establishing world domination.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR 711

No. 92 Top Secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 25, 1962

"The source is reliable. Comrade Comrade reported. Khrushchev Kozlov, Suslov, Ponomarev, Malinovsky, Gromyko.

Semichastny. 25.10.62

For all the ambassadors of the Latin American countries, the decision of the American government to establish a military blockade of Cuba was unexpected. According to the OAS representatives of Guatemala, Brazil, Mexico, Haiti, Venezuela and Nicaragua, no prior consultations were held with their governments. The ambassadors of these countries believe that the US actions are unjustifiably risky and express concern that these actions could lead to a possible clash between the US and the USSR. According to the source, the United States will not invade Cuba in the next 10-15 days. He believes that the United States of America will try to organize an invasion of Cuba through the collective efforts of several Latin American countries. Members of the Inter-American Defense Council since October 16 of this year. trips were made on a special plane provided by the Americans to all countries belonging to the OAS. The purpose of this trip was to get an idea of the military power and readiness of the armed forces of the OAS countries. At the end of the trip, representatives of the Inter-American Defense Council of Central America will have to submit

a secret report on its results to the Council of the Organization of the Countries of Central America. A secret meeting of this Council will take place on 12 November in Panama. The initiators of the meeting are the Americans, and the issue of further measures to combat the CASTRO regime will be discussed at it,"

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 93 Top Secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE OF 26 October 1962

Comrade Comrade reported. Khrushchev Kozlov, Suslov, Ponomarev, Gromyko.

According to a Chicago Sun and Times correspondent who was present at a meeting of American journalists with RASK, RASK% allegedly warned the American press against complacency and complacency. The RASC stated that the situation continued to be very serious, that significant complications were to be expected, and that the impression should not be given that the danger of a clash between the US and the Soviet Union had passed.

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The US position on the Cuban crisis was characterized by RASCOM as firm, but not reckless. According to RASCA, the United States is ready to negotiate through the UN on the settlement of the Cuban issue and the elimination of Soviet missile bases in Cuba in exchange for an end to the blockade of Cuba by the United States.

Regarding the possibility of the United States to abandon its bases in Turkey, the RASK stated that the United States does not intend to consider this issue, but negotiations in this direction are possible as an integral part of general disarmament negotiations. According to RASK, a personal meeting between KENNEDY and KHRUSHCHEV is currently impossible and that the United States does not intend to

at the moment to enter into bilateral negotiations with the USSR regarding Cuba.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 94 Top Secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 27, 1962

Reported tt. Khrushchev Kozlov Suslov Ponomarev, Gromyko, Malinovsky.

Sakharovsky. Semichastny. 27.X.62

HAMILGON, correspondent for The New York Times, reported on October 26 that after the Security Council meeting ended on the evening of October 25, a meeting of the National Security Council took place in Washington to by the US government. CIA director McCone, Pentagon representative, and SEABORG, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, spoke together at this meeting and said that by raising the issue at the UN, the United States achieved nothing and further undermined its prestige. They insisted that President KENNEDY within 48 hours correct the situation and take steps to destroy the missile sites in Cuba by military means. According to HAMILDON, the president's opinion on this issue is unknown, but he was in the minority. According to information that became known today, STEVENSON, the US representative to the UN, was urgently summoned to Washington and should return to New York no later than three in the afternoon on October 26.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

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No. 95 Top Secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 27, 1962

Reported to. Khrushchev N.S., Kozlov F.R., Suslov M.A., Gromyko A.A., Malinovsky R.J.

At the meeting of the NATO Council on October 22 this year. Former US Secretary of State ACHESON, in his speech, focused mainly on the fact that during the very last weeks, or perhaps within the last few days, the Americans have established that the weapons stationed by the Soviet Union in Cuba are of an offensive nature. Several bases were equipped with launch sites for medium-range missiles of two types. Some of them have a range of 1000 miles, others - 2200 miles. These missiles can hit targets located almost throughout the United States, in the Panama Canal zone and in parts of Canada. The deployment of these missiles in Cuba could lead to a sharp change in the balance of power. From now on, these missiles pose a direct threat to the United States. Some of the launch pads are ready, others are under construction. It was also possible to identify warehouses for nuclear weapons. ACHESON then reported on the measures taken by the US government. The US Navy will stop and inspect every ship it believes was carrying weapons to Cuba within 24 hours.

ACHESON added that the West is entering a phase of diplomatic and military tension. He does not rule out that Soviet ships will more or less voluntarily allow themselves to be sunk by the American fleet. It is possible that weapons stationed in Cuba will also be used. It would be surprising if the USSR did not take retaliatory measures in Berlin. American troops around the world, except for the NATO zone, are on alert. Representatives of the NATO military command, for their part, said that NORSTED!" has already taken some measures to bring the troops to combat readiness.

FINLETTER (see footnote No. 192. - Editor's note) and COLUMN stated that the NATO Council has now entered a period of permanent consultations on further developments. They called for the unity of the NATO countries. Representatives of Belgium and Holland asked FINLETTER to report what the US expects from their allies. The representative of France called for unity, which, in his opinion, is impossible without genuine consultations.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 96 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 27, 1962

Reported to all members and candidate members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as well as Comrades. Malinovsky and Gromyko.

Semichastny. 27.X.62

Since October 23 of this year, American planes have been increasingly invading Cuban airspace and flying over the island at various altitudes.

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honeycombs, including heights of 150-200 meters. More than 11 such flights took place on 26 October. US ships and aircraft conduct continuous surveillance of Cuban ports. Naval and ground forces are currently being built up at the Guantanamo base. There are 37 ships there, including two aircraft carriers. The blockade around Cuba on the evening of October 26 began to be fully implemented and extends through the Caribbean Sea, the Leeward, Lesser Antilles and Bahamas.

In the opinion of Cuban friends, the invasion and bombardment of military installations is inevitable.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

#97 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 27, 1962

Comrade Comrade reported. Khrushchev, Kozlov, Suslov, Ponomarev, Gromyko.

An atmosphere of military hysteria reigns in Washington, fueled by the press, television and radio. The basis of all articles, radio and television broadcasts is the possibility of a war over Cuba. The White House, the Pentagon, the State Department and the CIA are working around the clock. Strengthened the activities of the civil defense service.

According to press reports, plans have been developed to conduct and prepare for the urgent evacuation of the president, government and key ministries to a classified area, 300 miles from Washington (in case of WAR).

Signals of attack are constantly repeated on the radio and in the press, and instructions are given on how to behave in case of an alarm.

An emergency meeting of the Civil Defense Committee was scheduled for October 22. ROCKEFELLER will chair the meeting.

October 23 SALINGER! held a meeting at the White House with representatives of the largest American wire agencies, radio, newspapers and television companies. A decision was made to censor reports of troop movements, military plans, and government activities. The decision is already being implemented. The work plans of the president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and other senior government officials are being reviewed to reduce absences from Washington. The activities of various public organizations that criticize the actions of the government are suppressed.

Many right-wing congressmen and senators in the current situation are making open incendiary speeches, with undisguised calls for war. Among them are Republican Senators DIRKSEN, KEATING CAEPHARD. Even some liberals like Senator HUMFREY are leaning towards the idea that the US should try its chance.

All the means of military propaganda have been thrown at the preparation of public opinion, at the creation of an atmosphere of military psychosis.

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Even the acceptance by the Soviet Union of U TANA's proposal did not change the desire of the American government to carry out an attack on Cuba. The end of this week is considered to be the most critical period for developments against Cuba.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 98 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 27, 1962

"Send comrade. Gromyko. Submit Comrade. Semichastny". Sakharovsky. 27.X.

The KGB resident met with the correspondent of the television company D. SCALI, who said that in the next 48 hours there would be a landing in Cuba after the bombing of missile bases. He asked how the Soviet Union would meet this decision, what would happen to

West Berlin. The resident replied that West Berlin would be occupied, at a minimum, that all socialist countries, including China, would support the USSR. SCALI remarked why CASTRO should not make a statement about its readiness to dismantle and remove the rocket launchers if the US President gives a guarantee of non-aggression against Cuba. If CASTRO had made such a statement, it would have found a favorable response in US government and military circles. SCALIE declined to say which of the leaders he had in mind.

In the evening of the same day SCALI asked to meet urgently. At the meeting, he stated that he had been authorized by the highest authorities in the US government to make the following proposal: the US proposes that CASTRO make a public statement about its readiness to dismantle and remove long-range missiles from Cuba and never receive them, provided that the United States State guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba. CASTRO must agree to carry out the dismantling under the supervision of neutral observers assigned by the UN. In the event that the Soviet government agrees to such a proposal, the American government proposes to urgently begin discussion of this proposal between ZORIN®, STEVENSON! and U TANOM.⁸ The American government does not object to Cuba retaining defensive missiles, such as surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles and missiles to protect the coast from warships.

The resident expressed the opinion that it would be right to withdraw, under the control of UN observers, the American troops concentrated in the south of the United States and threatening Cuba. SCALI said that the President could make an implicit commitment to the withdrawal of US troops.

SCALI reiterated that he was indeed empowered by the highest authorities to make the proposal mentioned above.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR 716

No. 99 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE October 28, 1962

Comrade reported. Khrushchev, Kozlov, Suslov Gromyko, Malinovsky.

Semichastny. 28.X.62

In Washington, on October 26 of this year, a meeting of the National Security Council was held, at which President KENNEDY authorized STEVENSON (see footnote 166. - Editor's note) to declare to TANU '®& that the United States was determined not to retreat from the position which they occupied in the Cuban question. STEVENSON, in a private conversation, when talking about his meeting with the President on October 26, said that KENNEDY gave him the authority to demand guarantees from U TAN that Cuba and the Soviet Union would take steps to eliminate all launch sites on Cuban territory. missiles, as well as the elimination of missile weapons. In the event that the appropriate assurances from the Soviet Union in this regard are not received from TANOM, further US negotiations with Cuba and the Soviet Union will be meaningless.

From conversations with STEVENSON, it became known that the president authorized the US representative to the UN, as well as McCloy, to tell TANU that if the Soviet Union and Cuba refused to eliminate the missile bases in Cuba, then the US government, relying on US allies in the Western Hemisphere, will be forced to take unilateral measures to eliminate these bases. This refers to the bombardment of military facilities from the air without landing troops. The Pentagon and General TAYLOR are pushing for such unilateral action.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 100 Top Secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 29, 1962

Reported to. Khrushchev, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Suslov, Gromyko.

Message from N.S. KHRUSHCHEV KENNEDY evokes a generally favorable reaction among diplomats accredited to the UN. The majority of representatives of neutral countries regard the proposals of N.S. Khrushchev as "an example of classical diplomacy of the highest type."

Most UN diplomats, despite attempts by American propaganda to present Soviet proposals to reduce tensions as the result of a hard line of the US government, believe that, thanks to the stabilization of the situation around Cuba, the USSR can open up prospects for achieving new successes in foreign policy.

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According to the Spanish correspondent Guy BUENAU, some Americans are beginning to be dominated by the opinion that the proposals on Cuba by the USSR protected Cuba from aggression and thereby achieved its main goal.

In the opinion of General RIKHI (military adviser to U TAN)!", the Soviet Union will come out of the Cuban crisis having significantly strengthened its international position, which will enable it to further demand the elimination of military bases in a number of countries.

RIKHI believes that the USSR may raise the issue of "dismantling" the military base on Okinawa, while it will be difficult for the United States to argue its position due to the fact that this base is not part of the NATO system, as well as due to the anti-war sentiments of the Japanese population.

Diplomats at the UN draw attention to the great restraint of the Soviet government in its approach to the Cuban question. ALSIVAR, an adviser to the Ecuadorian delegation to the UN, believes that the Americans do not even suspect what political effect the Soviet government's endurance during the crisis has on the countries of Latin America.

PATENO - deputy. Colombia's permanent representative to the UN stressed that the USSR won the first stage of the Cuban crisis, because it managed to "save Cuba for communism." According to Pateno, KENNEDY is not entirely satisfied with the development of events around Cuba, since the United States has not achieved the overthrow of the Cuban government. According to PATENO, the US statement of non-aggression against Cuba will deter the preparation of aggression.

In informal conversations, the diplomats also note that KENNEDY's statement on guarantees with regard to Cuba was made in the most general form. The Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, PREBISCH, believes that, despite KENNEDY's declaration of non-aggression against Cuba, there remains the possibility of the US policy of overthrowing the CASTRO government by force of arms.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 101 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 29, 1962

From conversations on October 29 with Stevenson, Jost, O'Brien and other American officials are aware of the following.

Message from N.S. KHRUSHCHEV KENNEDY about the elimination of Soviet missile bases in Cuba under the supervision of the UN was unexpected for KENNEDY and his advisers. The State Department and the White House believe that N.S. Khrushchev made a very timely proposal to eliminate the Soviet missile bases in Cuba in exchange for the preservation of the communist regime.

CASTRO. Thus, N.S. Khrushchev managed to prevent the outbreak of a thermonuclear war and thus won sympathy and respect in the hearts of Americans and other peoples.

KENNEDY from an agreement with N.S. Khrushchev on Cuba received significant political benefits, in particular, sympathy within the country, which

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Paradise will ensure victory for the Democratic Party in the upcoming congressional elections and for Kennedy in the 1964 presidential election.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 102 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, October 30, 1962

Comrade Comrade reported. Khrushchev, Kozlov, Suslov, Gromyko.

On October 28, at a briefing for American journalists, RASK! stated that it would be wrong to assess the resolution of the Cuban crisis as a complete victory for the United States, since the Americans were forced to give guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba, as a result of which a center for the spread of communism would remain in the Western Hemisphere. The RASK warned against trying to portray the Cuban crisis as a defeat for Khrushchev and asked that no articles be published that were humiliating or offensive to Khrushchev.

According to RASK, the American government has evidence that KHRUSHCHEV was under intense pressure from the Soviet military group, which is confirmed by Khrushchev's October 27 message, which is so different from the October 26 message that it is hard to believe that they were written by one person. In order not to put Khrushchev in an uncomfortable position, his message of October 26 will not be published. RASK stated that the US should "help" Khrushchev and should not do anything that would weaken his position, given the differences in the position of various factions in the Soviet government regarding the Cuban question. The Americans should be careful, because the Soviet Union may soon try to take revenge in areas of the world where the situation is more favorable for it than it was in Cuba.

The RASK pointed to the Berlin issue, and, according to him, the firm position of the United States on the Cuban issue should by no means be a model for the US position on other international problems. The Cuban crisis gives reason to hope that the Soviet positions on other issues, including the Berlin one, will be just as reasonable and calm.

The Americans fear that in the coming days the Indian-Chinese conflict may become the most important problem, and, according to RASK, the Soviet Union may be forced to support China in this conflict.

In the near future, the United States, according to RASK, will not go to a summit meeting or a personal meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev, as this may give the impression of some kind of collusion with the Soviet Union and cause anxiety among the allies.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR 719

No. 103 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE OF NOVEMBER 1, 1962

Reported to. Kozlov, Suslov, Ponomarev, Gromyko.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs GOODWIN privately stated that the U.S. government originally planned to invade Cuba in January 1963, but allegedly because of the rapid pace of construction of Soviet launch sites in Cuba and the danger that it could be subject to bargaining in relation to West Berlin, the United States decided to speed up the conduct of operations against Cuba in the form that KENNEDY announced on October 22. Allegedly, the beginning of the Sino-Indian conflict also contributed to the adoption of the KENNEDY decision, as a result of which a group of neutral states, especially India, could not defend Cuba and, thus, the United States allegedly could count on the "neutralization" of the actions of these countries in support of Cuba.

Concerning the prospects for improving US relations with Cuba, GOODWIN stated that until the Castro government was overthrown, the US could hardly give any serious guarantees. The United States, according to GOODWIN, is currently trying to further isolate Cuba from the countries of Latin America, in particular from Mexico and Brazil, and is attempting to put pressure on these countries in order to get them to break off diplomatic relations. At the same time, the United States seeks to extend the embargo on trade with Cuba of all NATO countries in order to thus place the entire burden on the USSR in providing assistance to the CASTRO government. The Americans will continue to create military formations from Cuban emigrants in the United States, as well as on the territory of Guatemala and Panama. GOODWIN said that the final decision on the choice of method to overthrow the Cuban government would be taken later. Depending on the specific situation, the organization of a counter-revolutionary uprising inside Cuba, then supported by an invasion from Florida or the landing of emigrants in Cuba and the formation of a "free government" by them, which will be immediately recognized by the United States, can be used. GOODWIN also said that the United States does not yet intend to accept any compromise proposals coming from the Cuban government aimed at improving Cuban-American relations.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 104 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE November 14, 1962

Reported tt. Khrushchev, Kozlov, Ponomarev, Gromyko.

On November 3, 1962, the French Ambassador to the United States ALPHAN sent the following message to the French Foreign Ministry.

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"During a conversation on November 3, 1962, KENNEDY told me that the measures taken by the United States for the implementation of the blockade, air surveillance and military security would not be weakened until the agreement arising from the exchange of letters with Khrushchev was implemented. This is not so much about the inspection of Soviet ships bound for Cuba or ships chartered by the USSR, but about control over the export of rocket launchers dismantled by the Russians. If, as he feared, this operation could not be carried out in Cuban ports owing to the unwillingness of CASTRO, a way should be found to organize an export check on the high seas, which would be combined with aerial surveillance. The International Red Cross certainly has a role to play in the matter of arms imports and exports.

Before talking about other issues, the president intends to focus his attention for now on trying to end the Cuban operation, but he does not know what the Russian reaction will be in the near future. At the same time, as THOMPSON told me yesterday!?, KENNEDY believes that Khrushchev's position inside Russia has not been undermined, although the situation may be different with Soviet prestige inside the communist camp. In this regard, relations between Russia, China and India, apparently, should be most carefully studied in the coming weeks.

As I said goodbye, KENNEDY told me that, from the point of view of the United States, the results of the referendum in France seemed to him good. "No US president," he said, "has ever achieved 62% of the vote in his favor, and the number of abstentions is more insignificant than in the US. For my part, I would be very pleased if I could achieve such a result. On the other hand, KENNEDY showed concern about the internal political situation in Germany.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 105 Top Secret November 29, 1962

I present the texts of the message of US President KENNEDY to Chilean President ALESSANDRI on the Cuban issue dated October 22 of this year. and the response message of ALESSANDRI dated October 27 of this year.

Similar messages were sent by President KENNEDY to the heads of other Latin American states.

APPENDIX: on 6 sheets. Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee

under the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. Perepelitsyn

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Top Secret Sant Jago, October 22, 1962

Dear Mr. President!

Now is the time when we, the countries of the Western Hemisphere, are faced with the need, through an exchange of views on reasonable joint action in the coming days, to make a decision that can determine the future fate of man on earth.

From my address to the American people, you could imagine what a serious threat hung over the Western Hemisphere as a result of the actions of the USSR on the territory of Cuba with the permission of the Cuban government.

It is not only about the military threat to us. Such actions on the part of the Soviet Union in response to our well-known and correctly assessed measures for the defense and security of the hemisphere, the continuation of these actions, despite my warning of September 4, repeated Soviet statements in public speeches and in private conversations that that no such action is being taken or even planned, leaves no doubt that the Soviets are throwing down an open military challenge to the free peoples.

We must counter these audacious actions with our common resolve. Otherwise, the Soviet Union will resort to an ever more flagrant violation of international peace and freedom until we face an alternative: complete capitulation or the onset of a nuclear catastrophe.

We must develop a position now: the whole world is watching us. Issues on which we have minor differences in the Western Hemisphere, as well as political differences between our peoples, lose their significance in the face of this threat to peace.

I hope that, under the circumstances, you will understand that your country must, along with ours, express indignation at Cuban and Soviet actions, and that you will publicly express the feelings of your people.

I believe that you agree with me on the urgent need to convene an advisory body of the inter-American system in accordance with the pact of Rio de Janeiro!?

The United States will propose to the advisory body a resolution analyzing this new danger in detail. The text of the resolution will be communicated to you by Ambassador COLE. The stationing of offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba "endangers the peace and security of the continent" (article 6 of the pact). I am sure you agree that the adoption of such a resolution is an urgent matter.

I also propose to urgently convene a meeting of the United Nations Security Council. I have asked Ambassador STEVENSON to introduce a resolution on behalf of the United States requiring the removal of rocket launchers and other offensive weapons from Cuba under the supervision of United Nations observers. I hope that you will instruct your representative in New York to cooperate actively with our representatives and openly support the said resolution in the United Nations.

I would also like to suggest that your military representatives discuss with our military representatives the possibility of participating together

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with the United States and the armed forces of other countries of the hemisphere in such military actions as may be necessary as a result of developments in Cuba.

I am confident that by confronting the emerging threat with our united efforts, in which firmness will be combined with confidence, as required by the nature of the crisis, we will follow the path of further progress of the free world, without fear of the world domination of international communism. In this regard, in my message to Mr. Khrushchev, pointing out the actions of the USSR in Cuba, endangering world peace, I expressed the hope that measures would be taken that would allow us to resume the path of peace negotiations.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

p.p. John F. KENNEDY Sant'lago, October 27, 1962

To His Excellency Mr. John F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America

Washington

Dear Mr. President!

I have the honor to reply to what Ambassador COLE conveyed to me on 22 October this year, your letter in which you announce the important decision of your government on the Cuban question.

As I informed Ambassador COLE, and as subsequently confirmed by Chile's representatives in the United Nations and in the Council of the Organization of American States, Chile's position in the face of the present crisis is the same as that expressed by you in the said letter and in your statement of 22 October. My country has pursued, without hesitation or deviation, an unchanging international policy based on the firm foundations of the republican order and on strict observance of the principles of international law. We have always been guided by a clear sense of justice and acted sincerely, as a democratic government, responsible to public opinion, should do in all its actions. I am sure, Mr. President, that you understood us and correctly interpreted the origins of these feelings, which are so dear to the government and people of Chile.

As I informed you at the beginning of my letter, the Government of Chile endorses the recommendations you made in your statement of 22 October, and it immediately instructed its representatives in the Organization of American States and the United Nations to act in the same spirit.

The new circumstances that have arisen in connection with the deployment of dangerous offensive weapons in Cuba have created such a serious situation for the continent and the free world that the Government of Chile considers it its duty and intends to assume the corresponding obligations in these dramatic hours.

In this regard, I fully agree with you that we must take a position that will not deceive the hopes of the world. Every difference between us is now, more than ever, of secondary importance and

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it is possible that joint cooperation in fulfilling the commitments that we will have to implement in the coming days will be a positive element, helping to eliminate differences and strengthen the basis for closer cooperation between our Governments.

I am convinced that most of the continent's problems are exacerbated by a lack of full mutual understanding. In the United States, as well as in other countries of the Americas, the common man either does not know, or has a distorted or incomplete idea of the common man in the other sister country of America and his basic problems. To some extent, this is also characteristic of the circle of more responsible persons. This phenomenon manifested itself at the first General Conference of the Inter-American Press Society in Sant Yago, and it is of great importance in countries such as the United States and Chile, where, under the existing democratic system of government, the opinion of each person has a great and direct influence on actions. Governments.

We must make vigorous efforts at all levels to get to know each other better, so that our fellow citizens have a more correct and objective idea of their neighbors and brothers, so that our peoples and Governments solve more actively the problems that determine the future.

With regard to your proposal, made through me to the representatives of the armed forces of Chile, to discuss with the United States and other countries of the hemisphere the possibility of joint participation in military actions caused by the Cuban situation, I must state that, in accordance with the political structure of the State, the decision of this question depends not only on the executive branch. In this case, the adoption of a law of the Republic, granting the appropriate powers, is required. Therefore, to resolve this issue, the intervention of both chambers of the legislature of Chile: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies is necessary. However, this issue is being carefully considered by the Government and the Ministry of National Defence.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to emphasize once again how deeply I am concerned about the development of these events. As a representative of a peace-loving country that is energetically seeking to solve numerous problems in order to achieve its well-being, I must say that we are resolutely opposed to a war that could destroy all of humanity. We are confident that divine providence will inspire our own energy into the service of peace and justice to resolve the present crisis and thus save the lofty ideals of justice and the peaceful development of the free world.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

p.p. Jorge ALESSANDRI RODRIGUEZ

Right: Deputy head of the PGU KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR F. Mortin

November 28, 1962

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No. 106 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE December 10, 1962

Reported tt. Khrushchev Ponomarev Kozlov Suslov, Gromyko.

In the US State Department on November 20 this year. a briefing meeting was held for ambassadors of Latin American countries to the United States. Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs MARTIN said at this meeting that the United States was not going to change its attitude towards Cuba, even if an inspection was established on its territory and the United States made a promise of non-aggression. MARTIN also said that the United States will continue to use measures against Cuba aimed at undermining its economy. Latin American diplomats believe that the US position on the Cuban issue will not be very "tough" in the near future.

The Mexican ambassador to the OAS, Sanchez GAVITO, said in a private conversation that the United States intends to continue its current course of its "calm" attitude towards Cuba, during which anti-Cuban propaganda will be carried out, but no intervention will be undertaken. The ambassadors of Bolivia and Colombia, speaking about future US policy towards Cuba, declared that KENNEDY would not organize interventions and would not recognize the Cuban government in exile. This opinion of the ambassadors is allegedly confirmed by the following facts: during the discussion in the OAS on November 9 of the complaint of Venezuela on accusing Cuba of committing acts of sabotage in the Venezuelan oil fields, the US representative to the OAS, MORRISON, made it clear that the United States was not interested in this complaint. Morrison said in his speech that the United States would take action against Cuba only if Cuba continued to carry out aggressive plans against other countries. In this regard, the Ambassadors of Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador approached MORRISON for clarification, but he declined to answer.

At the meeting of the Council of the OAS, which was devoted to the meeting of the President of Honduras, Villeda MORALES, who was visiting the United States, the representative of Costa Rica FASSI, apparently acting not without the knowledge of the Americans, in his opening speech stated that the question of Cuba should be considered as part of the world problem and should be treated with "patience". The President of Honduras, at a press conference in Washington, along with the usual anti-Cuban statements, denied that he intended to recognize the Cuban government in exile and provide a base for the Cuban counter-revolution in Honduras.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

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No. 107 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE OF 14 March 1963

Reported tt. Khrushchev Kozlov Mikoyan Suslov Andropov, Ponomarev, Gromyko.

On March 1, 1963, French Ambassador to the USSR DEJAN sent the following message to his Foreign Ministry:

"1. Statements on the question of Cuba made on February 22 by Marshal MALINOVSKI and on February 27 by N.S. Khrushchev, they say that, despite the exchange of messages between N.S. KHRUSHCHEV and KENNEDY, who put an end to the acute crisis in the second half of October, and despite the joint letter from STEVENSON!" USA and USSR

After the removal of strategic missiles and 40 IL-28 bombers, Cuba still remains a Soviet military base and has a fairly large garrison and significant weapons. The process of communization of Cuba is going on actively and by the end of 1963 Cuba will be under

full control of the Communist Party, which is built on the same basis as the Communist Parties in the USSR and the People's Democracies.

As a Soviet military base, Cuba is also the center of propaganda and communist action for all of Latin America. Maintaining this double bastion represents a constant challenge to the US authorities and damages their credibility in the Western Hemisphere. The opinion expressed in this regard by the US public and Latin American governments can be easily explained. Consequently, there is constant pressure on the Washington government, which, quite obviously, creates some inconvenience and difficulties for the US government in maintaining its current line, which is both firm and cautious.

2. The government of the USSR is also in a difficult situation, since it has only a limited choice of maneuver, being closely monitored by the leaders of Beijing and their supporters, who since 1962 accuse the government of the USSR of being adventurous at first, and then capitulated. The government of the USSR mainly seeks to show that its actions on the Cuban question not only preserved the peace, but also saved the socialist CASTRO regime and ensured its future.

The retention of a rather strong Soviet garrison in Cuba undoubtedly corresponds to the desire of the USSR to maintain some control over Fidel Castro, who was very dissatisfied with the events of recent months. At the same time, they mask the operation to communize the island, which is now being carried out. The presence of the troops, moreover, protects Cuba from invasion or any other daring enterprise that might be organized by or with the help of the Americans. Any serious attack would require military action of considerable size.

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The presence in Cuba of a certain number of well-armed Soviet troops is, moreover, a kind of response to the presence of American armed forces in various points of the globe of great strategic or political importance (Thailand, South Vietnam, South Korea and Western Berlin). It is no coincidence that N. S. Khrushchev in his speech of January 27 emphasized that the promise to provide assistance to Cuba in the event of aggression against it also extends to People's China, the DPRK, the GDR, that is, to all countries whose expansion encounters the resistance of the armed forces. USA. From all these points of view, the operation carried out in Cuba is beneficial for Moscow, as the capital of the socialist camp and the center of international communism. On the contrary, the effect of this operation on Soviet-American relations does not go entirely in the direction desired by the Soviet government at a time when it is preparing to resume preparatory negotiations with the Americans and when important problems are still being discussed between the two countries. Continued unrest and irritation among the public and in US congressional circles and in Latin American capitals may galvanize the US government into action. This is obviously what Moscow fears the most, because, as in October last year, it would have to decide again the question: capitulation or nuclear war. It must be taken into account that a new retreat, both politically and morally, would be more difficult than last autumn. On the other hand, US dissatisfaction with the preservation of a military base and the center of Soviet propaganda in Cuba, as well as the strengthening of the communist regime on the island, cannot have a favorable effect on the mood of Americans negotiating with the USSR on various issues. Thus, the Cuban problem testifies to the existence of certain differences in the interests of the USSR as a state striving to achieve a certain settlement, and perhaps a modus vivendi with the United States. The USSR, as the main champion of international communism, forces them to take positions that seem unacceptable to the United States.

3. The complexity of the motives that determine the current behavior of the Soviet Union on the Cuban question has been manifesting itself with all clarity in recent times. On January 26, announcing its desire to resume negotiations on the Berlin question, the government of the USSR

February 18 informed the United States through diplomatic channels of its intention to withdraw several thousand soldiers from Cuba in the near future. This is undoubtedly a concession to the US government and is intended to ease its position in relation to public opinion and Congress. At the same time, Marshal MALINOVSKI, threatening with nuclear bombs, considered it necessary to issue a very serious warning to the "mad" United States, which might try to unleash aggression against Cuba. Joining the warning given by his defense minister, N.S. Khrushchev declared that an attack on Cuba would be the beginning of a general war. The government of the USSR wanted to state its position before the communist world in this way, in order to clearly show its determination. It also sought to state its position, even at the risk of complicating relations with the United States. The American government, seeking to avoid armed conflict, has so far acted with great discretion.

The Cuban question, obviously, will continue to influence relations between the USSR and the USA for a long time, indirectly - on the

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relations between East and West, as complex and sometimes divergent interests are at stake in both Washington and Moscow.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 108 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE March 1963

We are sending the document "Military problems of NATO in 1962" received by the residency.

1. NATO Military Problems in 1962 A. Major Military Problems Facing NATO in 1962

A number of major military issues were considered as a matter of priority by the NATO Council in 1962, including:

- the strategic concept and role of NATO military forces (or at least some aspects of this complex issue),

- ~ NATO nuclear forces,

- the military aspects of the Berlin crisis, which, after a period of considerable tension in 1961, went into a latent stage in 1962,

- military aspects of the Cuban crisis.

strategic aspects in the NATO military forces

As in 1961, in 1962 no fundamental decisions were taken that would significantly change the strategic concept approved by the NATO Council in 1957 in accordance with the Political Directive adopted in December 1956.

The main principles of this concept relate to the following issues:

- definition of the defense area,

- the nature of the attack against which the defense is to be organized,

- types of weapons that should be used for defense.

1) As for the defense area, the so-called "shield" forces were tasked with "preserving the territorial integrity of Western Europe"; this is the "advanced strategy".

2) Regarding the question of the nature of the attack, there are four hypotheses that should be taken into account when organizing defense:

- the possibility of a deliberate start of a general war on the initiative of the USSR, which in this case will probably begin with a "massive nuclear attack";
- the possibility of the outbreak of a general war due to a miscalculation in the assessment of the situation, an erroneous interpretation of the intentions of the West by the Soviets, or military operations of a limited nature, and the Soviets may not initially resort to nuclear weapons;
- the possibility of conducting operations with limited goals, which will be supported by the Councils openly or indirectly;

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— an attack on NATO territory by another country without the support of the USSR and without its obvious involvement in this attack.

3) With regard to the types of weapons to be used in defense, the capabilities of the types of attack and the determination to defend, "moving forward as far as possible", require:

- the introduction of nuclear deterrents in the event of a general war, regardless of whether the Soviets "use or do not use nuclear weapons";
- the choice to use nuclear weapons if necessary, if the situation so requires, to counter operations that have limited goals and which are unleashed by the Soviets or with their support;
- the introduction of means that can repel an attack on NATO territory by another country without support from the Soviet Union, and one should strive to limit the geographical scope of the conflict, taking all necessary military measures in order to achieve a favorable end to the conflict as soon as possible .

This is what the concepts underlying the "advanced strategy" look like at the moment.

From these plans, proceeding from the fact that the European countries, like the United States, will fulfill their obligations with regard to the conventional forces placed at the disposal of the Union, so that these armed forces, replenished and put on alert, can effectively contribute to increasing the persuasive power of deterrents, the concept of "joint nuclear forces" also follows.

The events of recent months, as well as the accelerated evolution of Western military concepts, have given rise to numerous strategic theories and heated debates.

Since both the Western camp and the Soviet camp have reached in the field of nuclear weapons, if not equality, which is not of great importance, then at least a "saturation limit", the so-called "nuclear dead end" is increasing the importance of conventional armed forces on an ever-increasing scale. Until now, the concept of "shield" denoted conventional armed forces, and the concept of "sword" - nuclear retaliation. However, the words change their meaning. Therefore, at the December ministerial session, McNamara', possibly influenced by the events in Cuba, gave the meaning of a "sword" to conventional forces, no doubt hinting at the mobile units of conventional forces ready to march on limited points, while the huge mass of nuclear weapons, in the face of the threat of which a limited conflict could be quickly resolved, was characterized by him as a "shield".

The Nassau Communiqué uses this new terminology.

Various new concepts are emerging with regard to the use of nuclear weapons: the concept of "pause", denoting the period of time between the response of conventional means to an attack and the use of nuclear weapons; the notion of a "threshold" beyond which it is no longer possible to avoid the use of atomic weapons without running the risk of being destroyed; the concept of "outgrowth" or "spiral" that leads each adversary from limited to total use of his nuclear arsenal.

These various notions gradually became more defined in the US Secretary of Defense's concept of choice strategy.

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MCNAMAROY. This theory, stating that technological progress has made available to the Union a wide range of nuclear weapons, highlights the capabilities of a military nature, which corresponds to the use of nuclear retaliatory strikes of choice, which allows you to nuance retaliatory strikes and give the Atlantic strategy maximum flexibility through a variety of types of retaliatory strikes in a wide range of them from "passivity" to "apocalypse" (for example, a retaliatory strike using only conventional military forces, or a retaliatory strike using conventional military forces and tactical nuclear weapons, or a retaliatory strike using thermonuclear weapons against specific military installations located - staying outside populated areas, etc.).

2. NATO nuclear forces

The problem of nuclear defense of the Union has two main aspects:

- a) The aspect of political control over the use of atomic weapons.
- 6) The aspect of the possible creation of a NATO strike force, distinct from the nuclear invasion forces of some member countries, but designed to cooperate with these latter in the event of a conflict.

In 1962, these two questions were at the center of the attention of the Council. Their discussion took place in four successive stages.

1) Time of the Directives on the use of nuclear weapons

(January-May 1962)

The Council considered that this problem was both the most urgent and the most accessible to be solved. It is about eliminating the possibility of miscalculation and the difficulties that may arise from the use of an atomic bomb as a result of a decision taken by only one of NATO's nuclear powers without the consent of the Union as a whole.

In the course of the debate, the Council received the most satisfactory assurances on the following two points: First, the United States will continue to place at the disposal of the Union a significant number of nuclear weapons of types that meet the needs of its defense. Thus, we are talking about constant, but different in content support. Second, the strategic forces of the United States and the United Kingdom, together with NATO military forces, will continue to be able to carry out strikes to more completely destroy all key elements of the Soviet nuclear strike force, including positions of medium-range ballistic missiles and evaluating equally in terms of the sequence of defeat both those of these elements that threaten the European continent and those that threaten the United States and the United Kingdom (American statement of February 21 and English statement of March 30, 1962).

On the other hand, both of these concerned governments declared their intention to provide their allies with the maximum (to the extent that this would meet safety requirements) of information about nuclear weapons and their troops abroad, in order to enable all Member States to have full understanding of the entire range of problems that have arisen in connection with the organization and control of NATO's nuclear defense. In order to constantly and systematically obtain and study information about nuclear weapons transferred to the Union, it was created as part of permanent representatives

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For all NATO member countries, there is a special committee called the Nuclear Committee. For this purpose, a special procedure was developed, which received the code name "Kabal". Since its inception, the Nuclear Committee has already heard several interesting reports made by American and British experts.

Having thus assured his allies that his country's strategic forces would regard both the defense of Europe and the defense of American territory as equally important, the President of the United States undertook to agree to any directive or procedure of political consultation which will accept the Union on the issue of the use of atomic weapons (see FINLETTER's statement (see footnote 192. - Editor's note) dated April 26, 1961). The consequence of this commitment was a long and comprehensive discussion, which eventually culminated in the elaboration of the "Directives" adopted at the ministerial session in Athens. According to the provisions of these directives, the use of atomic weapons should be preceded by prior political consultations, provided there is sufficient time for them to take place.

It was agreed that the directives on the use of nuclear weapons could be revised in the light of new developments in this matter. These directives will be considered valid until the Council decides to cancel them.

2) The first proposals and measures for the creation of an Atlantic strike force (May September 1962)

As is known, for the first time submarines equipped with Polaris missiles were proposed to the Union by President KENNEDY in his speech delivered in Ottawa in May 1961. The Berlin crisis, which for a long time attracted the full attention of the Council, was the reason why consideration of the American proposal was postponed. However, it was not forgotten, and on June 15, 1962, the representative of the United States made a statement concluding that the creation of a force equipped with medium-range ballistic missiles did not meet urgent military needs, but recognized that such a force could be of great political significance. At the same time, the United States repeated its offer to participate with allies in the creation of a force that would be armed with about 200 sea-based missiles. These missiles would be common property, and these forces would be financed, controlled and staffed on a multilateral basis. Particular attention was paid to the fact that the resources needed to create such a force should in no case absorb the funds intended for the implementation of further measures to create non-nuclear forces of the Union.

The American statement of June 15 put this problem in the perspective it should be, namely, in the political perspective. Indeed, it was becoming clear that an Atlantic strike force could only be created at sea because of the political objections raised by both the United States and many European partners regarding the deployment of missiles on land.

, However STICKER! and General NORSTED!? did not consider it necessary to take this into account requirement, although they, however, recognized its importance. In particular, the Secretary General tried to direct the work of the Council towards

in line with his views, which leaned towards a global consideration of all possible hypotheses in military terms, and in his speech to the Council on October 17, General NORSTAD did not hesitate to include in the list of his requirements a relatively large number of medium-range land-based ballistic missiles.

Thus, the discussions in the Council quickly rolled to a dead end, the beginning of which, however, coincided with the onset of the Secretary General's illness. It was obvious that the time had come to return to the original sources, that is, to the American proposals, in order to start work in a different direction.

3) Proposals for the project to create multilateral naval strike

forces (September-November 1962)

The Belgian representative at the Council's meeting on 18 September proposed moving to a consideration (on a purely semi-official level) of the technical, financial, legal and political aspects of establishing a multilateral force equipped with sea-based missiles.

The discussion was initiated by a report made on October 22 by a group of American experts on the probable structure and probable tactical and technical data of a multilateral force equipped with 200 X-type medium-range ballistic missiles based on 25 merchant-type ships. At the end of the report, many questions were asked by various delegations, including the delegations of Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. These questions were answered in detail at the second meeting, held on 6 December, which included, in addition to the group of American experts present at the meeting on 22 October, experts from most of the member countries. The result of this comparison of different points of view was the clarification of a large number of technical issues. In addition, it opened up the main dossier on the question of the establishment of a multilateral maritime strike force.

Nassau (18-21 December 1962)

The meeting between President KENNEDY and MACMILLAN® in the Bahamas, December 18-21, attended by the foreign and defense ministers of both countries, led to Britain joining the idea of a multilateral naval force. In fact, the agreement between the two powers provides for the following:

1) The supply to the United Kingdom of Polaris missiles to be installed on submarines, and it was agreed that these submarines should be used as part of NATO's nuclear forces.

2) Allocation in the near future to the NATO armed forces of units of American and British strategic forces.

Placement at the disposal of the Union, after the conclusion of an agreement between the countries concerned, of tactical nuclear forces currently deployed in Europe.

4) Creation of multilateral NATO nuclear forces with mixed crews, in which all member countries will be invited to participate.

The Nassau Agreement was concluded between the two main nuclear powers of the Union, and immediately after its conclusion, France was offered to join the agreement on completely equal terms in all respects.

There is no doubt that the new and important factors that emerged during the meeting in the Bahamas will contribute to an in-depth consideration of the whole complex of the problem and give it a decisive and concrete direction.

3. Military aspects of the Berlin crisis

In 1962, the Berlin crisis, although not reaching the degree of tension that was noted in relations between East and West in 1961, nevertheless made itself felt throughout the year, sometimes leading to dangerous incidents in connection with the question of air or ground access. Therefore, the Berlin crisis was often spoken of at meetings of the Council, either when it was a question of assessing the situation at any given moment, or in connection with the continuation of the planning work begun in 1961. In addition to having an impact on the war effort of most countries of the Union, the events of 1961 forced the Council to:

- to approve the so-called "Live Oak" plans presented by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces of NATO in Europe and defining the responsibility of the United States, France and Great Britain with regard to the free exercise of their rights in Berlin,

- to clearly define the functions of the Supreme Commander of the NATO Armed Forces in Europe, as, on the one hand, the military executive body implementing tripartite decisions, and, on the other hand, the Supreme Commander of the NATO Armed Forces in Europe,

- to determine the conditions and forms of the exercise of his right (that is, the right of governments) to take political initiative for the implementation of military plans relating to Berlin, in the event that it risks causing consequences for the entire Union as a whole.

It was from this perspective, and within the framework of the instructions given to the military authorities in document CM/61/104, that the Council studied for a long time the Standing Group Review, which is a catalog of military land, naval and air plans drawn up in the case of possible action by NATO armed forces if the efforts made by the three powers to maintain access to Berlin in accordance with the Live Oak plans prove to be fruitless.

The resolution on this subject, finally approved at the meeting of October 31, 1962, also states that "the choice and execution of any one of these plans should be subject to the preliminary political decision taken by the governments of the member countries at that time. when the time comes for its adoption.

Simultaneously with the thus carried out "codification" of the system of intervention through the armed forces (however, this system is not exhaustive) and under the pressure of some countries that are supporters of the "global" consideration of possible Western responses in the event of a crisis in Berlin The Council recognized the need to carry out, in parallel with the preparation of military plans, the development of political and economic "emergency plans".

, 4. Military aspects of the Cuban crisis

As far as the Union as a whole is concerned, the Cuban crisis has retained its predominantly political character.

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It should be noted, however, that from the onset of this crisis on October 22, 1962, until the end of November, it led to the introduction of a state of limited military vigilance in the NATO armed forces.

No. 109 Top secret

March 23, 1963

CPSU Central Committee TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR Comrade GROMYKO AA.

I present an overview of information about US policy towards Cuba.

The US Government continues to regard as one of its main goals in Latin America the elimination of the existing order in Cuba. However, at present the KENNEDY government is compelled to take into account both the prevailing international situation and the situation in Cuba itself, and in particular the presence of Soviet military contingents there. As BANDI, presidential aide for national security, said in private, overthrowing CASTRO is the most important US task, but this task must be accomplished in a way that does not trigger a thermonuclear war.

The US government is currently seeking to create a more favorable environment for the implementation of its plans for Cuba, undertaking measures aimed at further isolating Cuba, exacerbating its internal political situation through an economic blockade, and increasing subversion, up to preparing internal counter-revolutionary action against the CASTRO government. At the same time, the United States is providing direct assistance to Cuban emigrants and some Latin American countries in preparing forces for a possible new invasion of Cuba in the future.

In order to isolate Cuba internationally, the United States not only exerts pressure on Latin American countries, its allies in aggressive blocs, and a number of neutral states, but also attempts to damage Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp. The US government declares that it does not consider the settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean Sea to be completed, and continues to emphasize the differences in the positions of the USSR and Cuba on the question of ground inspection. Using an inspired campaign in Congress and the US press about the "build-up of Soviet military power in Cuba", it seeks to achieve the withdrawal of all Soviet military contingents and military specialists from Cuba. With the help of both official propaganda and disinformation channels available to American intelligence, the US ruling circles are trying to cause mutual distrust between Cuba and the USSR.

The US government seeks the severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba by those Latin American countries that still maintain such relations, and the complete cessation of all Latin American states.

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any other contacts with America (trade, currency transactions, cultural ties, student trips, etc.). At the same time, the United States, emphasizing that the current regime in Cuba is a "hotbed of the spread of communism and subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere" and a direct threat to the governments of all Latin American countries, is preparing the ground for these governments to support the anti-Cuban measures of the United States and for possible collective sanctions against Cuba through the Organization of American States (OAS).

In order to establish an economic blockade of Cuba, the United States seeks from its partners in the OAS and NATO, and bilaterally also from other capitalist states, support for American measures aimed essentially at stopping all trade and shipping between the capitalist countries and Cuba. In this way, the United States hopes not only to worsen the economic situation of Cuba and to impose on the USSR and other socialist countries an economically burdensome and technically difficult, in the opinion

United States, the task of constantly supplying this country, but also, if possible, directing the dissatisfaction of the Cuban population against the USSR and the socialist countries in connection with economic difficulties in Cuba.

A large place in the anti-Cuban plans of the United States is given to a sharp increase in subversive activities in Cuba, primarily economic sabotage and sabotage, in order to cause disorganization of the Cuban economy, mass dissatisfaction of the population with the CASTRO government and prepare the conditions for a counter-revolutionary rebellion within the country. According to Cuban friends, 97% of the total number of acts of sabotage in January-February of this year. accounts for sabotage of a purely economic nature. Only for the period from December 25, 1962 to January 25, 1963, 444 cases of sugar cane burning were registered, and for the first half of February, ~ 572 such cases. Cuban friends also have information about the possible sending of special sabotage groups to Cuba in the near future with the aim of organizing an assassination attempt on F. CASTRO. In this regard, the statement of US Assistant Secretary of State MARTIN at the meeting of the NATO Council at the end of February this year draws attention to itself. that in conditions when the Cubans do not have an established and well-functioning "communist apparatus", that is, a party, F. CASTRO himself is "a link between the various political trends existing in Cuba", and that "it was enough one bullet" to disrupt the current political unity in the country.

According to credible data, ACHESON! and Assistant to the President BANDI believe that the only serious reason for which it would be worth risking the organization of an invasion of Cuba is a widespread counter-revolutionary uprising in the country, or the assassination of F. Castro and the appearance in connection with At a meeting of the NATO Council at the end of February of this year, US Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs MARTIN said that if in the event of an uprising in Cuba, the Soviet troops stationed there would be forced to shoot Cubans, this will lead to the intervention of the United States and other countries of Latin America.

" According to available data, which is verified, the US government does not plan an armed invasion of Cuba by US military forces in the coming months.

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As for the invasion by the forces of Cuban emigration and some Latin American countries, the KENNEDY government in the future does not exclude the possibility of a new attempt to eliminate the socialist system in Cuba by organizing such an invasion with support in one form or another from the United States itself. However, it considers that such an invasion would be most expedient and successful only in combination with the organization of a major counter-revolutionary insurrection in Cuba itself. As KENNEDY stressed to Venezuelan President Betancourt in February 1963, "The liberation of Cuba should be, as far as possible, the work of the Cubans themselves." The main measures of the United States are now aimed at creating conditions for the possibility of combining an internal rebellion with intervention, starting from the infiltration of counterrevolutionary agents into the country and to concrete steps to politically isolate Cuba and train armed formations of Cuban emigrants both in the United States itself and in some Latin American countries.

The decision to organize a new invasion of Cuba by the forces of the Cuban emigration and some Latin American countries and the determination of its date will, therefore, depend on whether the United States succeeds and how soon in achieving the greatest possible political isolation of the CASTRO government, exacerbating the internal political situation in the country and creating conditions for a major counter-revolutionary uprising in Cuba itself.

APPENDIX: 17 sheets*.

Chairman of the State Security Committee V. Semichastny No. 110 Top secret March 29, 1963 Central Committee of the CPSU

TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, Comrade GROMYKO A.A.

I am sending a translation of the recording of the conversation between the President of Venezuela, BETANCOUR, and the President of the United States, KENNEDY, held in Washington in February 1963.

APPENDIX: 6 sheets**.

Chairman of the State Security Committee (V. Semichastny)

BETANCOUR: Mr. President, we in Venezuela are well aware of the extent and importance of the responsibility of the United States of America and you personally as the leader of the free world. At the same time, in Venezuela, as in all of Latin America, it is understood that the struggle of the free world against communism is an issue that not only concerns every continent and even every

* The application is not published. - Approx. comp. ** It is given with some abbreviations. - Approx. comp.

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do of an individual country in any region of the globe, but also affecting the vital interests of these countries. If the free world defeats communism in only one region of the globe, then this is regarded as a retreat, the defeat of communism throughout the world, and leads, although temporarily, to a weakening of the pressure of communism on the free countries throughout the world.

Venezuela has been under constant and increasing threat from communism for several years now. I say "unfortunately" because you, Mr. President, are among those world leaders (there were few and there are not many even in the Western Hemisphere) who understand that Latin America is not only geographically, but in all other respects it is a single whole, and that as such it must be considered. You have shown a deep understanding of the problems of Latin America, which is reflected in your impressive Alliance for Progress program, the success of which (and it will certainly have it, since this program cannot fail to end successfully) will ensure you the honor of going down in history as a liberated the liberator of our countries from economic slavery, poverty, ignorance and disease, just as Bolivar or San Martin were the liberators of our countries from political slavery.

Since communism is a worldwide disease, it threatens all areas of the globe. However, nowhere is this threat more serious and real than in Latin America.

For the past four years, Castro's Cuba has been not only a communist foothold in Latin America, but also (and perhaps more dangerously) a springboard for communist subversion on the continent. Mr. KHRUSHCHEV did a great service to the free world, in particular to Latin America, in a certain way, by making clear, in the most dramatic way, when the Soviet Union planted its deadly missiles on its territory, the seriousness of the threat posed by Castro's Cuba. . However, as I already dared to point out earlier, we, Mr. President (including, of course, your country as an integral part of the Western Hemisphere), did not consolidate our victory over Moscow in the matter of curbing its influence on Cuba, did not bring it to its logical end, and stopped halfway. I believe that we should not have contented ourselves with demanding the elimination of the most egregious manifestation of Soviet penetration into Cuba - the so-called offensive weapons - leaving that Latin American republic in the hands of world communism. I understand, Mr. President, that at that time (and I told you this last year) there was little else that could be done without the risk of nuclear war. But in view of the fact that the countermeasures against Cuba ceased halfway, the respite which the free world had gained through the defeat of world communism ended very soon. True, last year the open military threat from Cuba was not so tangible. Instead, however, subversive activities intensified in the Latin American republics, especially in Venezuela.

Mr. President, what I am about to propose to you is based on the conviction that last year's Cuban crisis proved without any doubt that Mr. Khrushchev had no intention of risking a nuclear war with the United States of America because of Cuba. Therefore, we must no longer stop halfway in the elimination of the Cuban threat.

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My proposals, Mr. President, are not categorical. This is food for thought for you and your advisers, although, to be frank, I hope you will agree with most, if not all, of these proposals.

We offer:

- 1) That the United States take decisive action to force the five Latin American countries that still maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba to break off those relations;
- 2) take steps within the OAS to support these US actions; in this regard, Venezuela is ready to file a complaint with the OAS about subversive and sabotage activities inspired by CASTRO against Venezuela, similar to the complaint of Venezuela against the Dominican Republic, which was examined by the OAS and served as the basis for collective measures against the Dominican dictatorial regime, which in ultimately led to his downfall;
- 3) impose the strictest controls and restrictions on the travel of Latin Americans to Cuba and Cubans to Latin America; Latin American countries (in this regard) should by law prohibit their citizens and especially students from traveling to Cuba in order to stop the influence of communist ideology on Latin American youth;
- 4) to take measures against the government of British Guiana to stop the penetration of Cuban agents into Venezuela and other Latin American countries, in particular into Brazil, through the border between British Guiana and these countries, we believe that the United States can condition the provision of any assistance British Guiana with a demand for a satisfactory solution to this question;
- 5) joint forces of Venezuela, Colombia and the United States organize patrols on the coasts of Colombia, Venezuela and Central America to intercept Cuban agents and military materials sent to these countries by surface sea transport;
- 6) that the OAS demand the immediate removal of all Soviet troops and paramilitary contingents from Cuba, and if this demand is not met, impose a naval blockade of Cuba in order to cut off the supply of arms and troops to the CASTRO regime;
- 7) that the United States provide assistance with money, weapons and equipment, as well as in terms of military training in the creation of the Caribbean security forces, consisting of the military contingents of Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, "Free Cuba" and some countries of Central America, which will be needed will be achieved if "police measures" are taken against Cuba.

KENNEDY: I want to assure you, Mr. President, that the people and government of America, and I personally, fully share your concerns about the threat of international communism emanating from Cuba. We also share your view that the Western Hemisphere has not always acted as it should have done to face this danger. However, you yourself, Mr. President, stressed today the interdependence of the struggle against communism in various parts of the world. I'm sure you were referring to the extremely important issues of disarmament, the nuclear test ban, Berlin, and India's relationship with communist China. Unless these problems are resolved, there can be no hope for lasting peace in any part of the world, including the Western Hemisphere. We know and this

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Mr. KHRUSHCHEV is well aware that we in the free world cannot act in any part of the world and on any of these issues without taking into account the relationship between East and West as a whole. That is why, without establishing any system of priorities, we believe that at present we should act on Cuba gradually, step by step, and not try to achieve a solution to the Cuban question at once with one blow. In the event that the questions of Berlin, disarmament and a ban on nuclear tests are resolved, it can hardly be assumed that Mr. Khrushchev will continue a policy that inevitably leads to conflict with us in such an area as Cuba, which, moreover, at best could have been only a minor episode in the overall design of communism for the free world.

My Government and I personally firmly believe that the liberation of Cuba from communism should, as far as possible, be left to the Cubans themselves. We certainly want to help the Cuban people in this matter. Representatives of the military circles of the United States, as you already know, are meeting with your military experts and experts from other Latin American states to find out what else can be done to help the Cuban people in their struggle for freedom. We are also in constant contact with the leaders of the Cuban anti-Castro underground in order to determine how we can help it logistically.

With regard to the proposals you made, I will instruct the secretary of state and the secretary of defense to study your proposals and report back to me as soon as possible. I trust that your ambassador to the United States and some of your closest associates will be able to help us further refine your proposals.

No. 111 Top Secret February 5, 1964

Central Committee of the CPSU (For the International Department and the Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU)

TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR, Comrade GROMYKO A.A.

I present the following information about the attitude of the Western powers to the discussion of the German and Berlin problems in the framework of negotiations between East and West.

The governments of the USA, Britain and France believe that at present there are no prospects for a successful discussion of the German and Berlin problems with the USSR, since, in their estimation, the Soviet Union will not make any concessions now.

During the session of the NATO Council in December 1963, RASK! expressed the opinion that these problems do not belong to the range of issues on which an agreement can be reached in the course of negotiations between East and West on detente. He was unanimously supported by the foreign ministers of the other Western powers.

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According to information received from ERKHARD's close associates, although the government of the FRG does not see any real possibilities for resolving the German question at the present time, however, having obtained assurances from the United States that the Americans will not agree to conclude any agreements conducive to "prolonging division of Germany", decided not to allow the removal of the German question from the agenda of international negotiations.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany January 8 this year. discussed a draft "ten-point statement" prepared on his behalf on the question of the unification of Germany, which will be presented to the quadripartite group of ambassadors in Washington. This project provides for the creation of a committee of four great powers - the USA, Britain, France and the USSR - which should, during the "transitional period", be responsible for implementing measures aimed at the gradual unification of Germany, and, when the time comes, appoint referendum throughout German territory under international control. The "statement" says that the unification

Germany is conceived "within the framework of European security" and in such a way as not to disturb the "balance between the powers."

During his stay in the USA at the end of December 1963, ERHARD arranged with JOHNSON to discuss the German and Berlin problems in a group of ambassadors in Washington. At the same time, in conversations with foreign diplomats, prominent officials of the government of the FRG note that the study of these problems by the Western powers will be carried out on a purely theoretical plane and that it will hardly have any practical significance.

Members of the FRG government make no secret to their Western counterparts that drawing attention to German affairs is of the greatest value to the government of the FRG in terms of domestic policy and is intended to calm German public opinion.

While evaluating the cardinal solution of the German and Berlin problems in the current situation as an unpromising one, the United States at the same time calls on the West Germans to "show flexibility" and "try new ways." JOHNSON, in a conversation with ERHARD, stated that the United States will continue to take into account the responsibility of the four great powers for the reunification of Germany, however, the initiative to create an internal political basis for the settlement of relations between both parts of Germany, as well as the relations of the FRG with Eastern Europe, is first of all, the task of West German policy, in the implementation of which the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, of course, must consult with the US government.

JOHNSON informed EHRHARD that the United States approved of the idea of a four-power standing committee on Germany, in which the two German states would be represented by some kind of committee of experts. All questions about trade, transport, passes and any other questions should be decided by experts from "both parts of Germany", but with the preservation of the common responsibility of the four powers.

These considerations met with the approval of EHRHARD and the government of the FRG as a whole. Concerning the reasons for the manifestation of such ideas in the United States, the West German Minister for Special Assignments KROHNE, in a confidential conversation, expressed the suspicion that the United States is increasingly striving to get rid of its responsibility for solving internal German problems, as it sees that in the near future it will not be possible to fix the split in Germany. Based on this,

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The United States considers it necessary to try, by maintaining the status quo and developing a "genuine modus vivendi", to ensure the "freedom" of West Berlin and the inviolability of its ties with the FRG, especially in the area of the economy. According to KROHNE, the Americans are interested in bringing the Germans somewhat closer together and thereby depriving the German question of its urgency, neutralizing it as a hotbed of a possible international conflict.

It is believed in the ruling circles of the Western powers that at present the US government, seeking support for its policy from West Germany, especially in connection with the aggravation of Franco-American differences, is striving to ensure that, to a greater extent than before, agreement - to cooperate with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on all their steps relating to negotiations with the USSR on the German and Berlin problems.

Deputy Chairman of the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. Zakharov

No. 112 Top secret

February 26, 1964

CPSU Central Committee TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR Comrade GROMYKO A.A.

I present the note "Considerations on the Presidency of JOHNSON", prepared at the beginning of December 1963 by a government agency of one of the European countries.

The note, which consists of four sections, attempts to predict what effect JOHNSON's coming to power could have on international politics and on the possibility of the West German government maintaining its former foreign policy, and primarily its position on the German question.

In the first section, devoted to the analysis of the international situation, it is noted that with the coming to power of JOHNSON, only changes in style, but not in the principles of American politics, can be expected, since he is a new man who has not yet shown himself in politics, and his activities will be hampered by uncertainty about whether he will be nominated as a candidate for the presidency of the Democratic Party in the upcoming August of this year. congress of this party.

In addition, European government circles believe that the political activity of Americans will be slowed down in the near future, because the United States has found itself in a group of countries whose freedom of action is tied as a result of a change of governments and preparations for the upcoming elections. These countries also include England and West Germany.

The document expresses the fear that the "unstable period" that has begun in connection with the existing situation in the United States, Britain and West Germany can be used in their own interests by countries with a stable leadership, and primarily by the Soviet Union and France.

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The second section deals with the question of possible US policy after JOHNSON came to power. At the same time, it is indicated that the first information from Washington confirms the previously expressed assumption about the immutability of the former US political course, which was characterized, on the one hand, by efforts aimed at further increasing the country's power, and, on the other hand, by readiness to find ways for negotiations with the East on the settlement of disputed issues. At the same time, it is emphasized that the statements made by JOHNSON do not reveal the ways and forms of implementing this political course in the future.

It has been suggested that JOHNSON's first term as president would be devoted primarily to domestic political issues, "unless there is some kind of foreign policy crisis," and that, with the election campaign approaching, this period would take up a significant portion of 1964.

Referring to reports from Washington, the authors of the note emphasize that at present there are no well-defined starting points for continuing American-Soviet negotiations on a wide range of issues. Obviously, they say, future negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union will be limited to exploring the possibilities of reaching an understanding on consular issues, cultural exchanges, and the opening of a direct airline.

In their opinion, the further procedure for discussing issues between East and West, the range of which has not yet been determined, could look like this:

1. Separate meetings between the heads of governments of various states of the West in Washington.
2. Convening a conference of heads of government of Western states in 1964.
3. Possible convening of a summit meeting between East and West.

The note states that a high-level meeting between East and West should be carefully prepared and take place only after consultations of Western countries with

by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the entire range of issues proposed for discussion, and only when the usefulness and chances of success of such a meeting become clear.

The third section of the note deals with the problem of relations between England and France. It is pointed out that after the death of KENNEDY, the British tried to take over the leadership of the West and made specific proposals on the subject of further negotiations between East and West on detente, while trying to create the impression among the allies that the United States allegedly supported a similar program of negotiations with the East. .

The authors of the note regard the British initiative as a desire not only to stand at the head of the Western world, but also to oppose the increased influence of de Gaulle, which, in their opinion, can further increase in connection with the possibility of improving American-French relations.

The fourth and last section of the note is devoted to an analysis of the reaction of the Soviet Union to JOHNSON's coming to power. The note expresses the opinion that the Soviet Union, being still interested in maintaining an atmosphere of detente and reaching agreements with the West

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house, will not take any steps that could complicate the position of JOHNSON, but at the same time will not make any concessions to the United States.

APPENDIX: 17 sheets.

Chairman of the State Security Committee V. Semichastny

APPENDIX to the letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Gromyko A.A.

Considerations on the JOHNSON Presidency

A. Shifts Since Kennedy's Death

1. The assassination of KENNEDY and the coming to power of a new president, of course, served as an occasion to deeply analyze the impact of these events on world politics and on the possibility of maintaining the Federal Republic of its former political course, and, first of all, its position in the German question.

The main principles of this analysis are the following:

a) We do not expect fundamental changes in American policy.

6) However, changes in style can be expected.

2. These changes in style are considered in relation to the following facts:

a) First, the question of personality. KENNEDY, a representative of the younger generation, was replaced by a vice president, a representative of the older generation, in which, roughly speaking, one can see the fact that decisive energy was replaced by more pronounced experience.

b) Secondly, the question of circumstances. KENNEDY's foreign policy course was known; in domestic terms, his re-nomination for the presidency by the Democratic Party was beyond doubt. JOHNSON is in a worse position than KENNEDY: in the field of foreign policy he has yet to demonstrate his abilities, and in the field of domestic policy, given the upcoming elections, he still needs to strengthen his candidacy.

3. In our considerations, we attach great importance to the issue of shifts in world politics that can occur after the failure of the most powerful leader in the West.

At the same time, we proceed from the fact that (this will be of particular importance for the development of relations between East and West):

a) from among the heads of government who were in power during the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on the Ban on Nuclear Tests in the Three Environments,

b) only Khrushchev remained as head of government.

4. In connection with the shifts, various aspects of the changed situation in the western union were also discussed in detail. At the same time, it was noted that the United States is now included in a large number of those countries that are mainly associated with a change of government and the preparations for elections going on at the same time, which, in our opinion, may adversely affect their freedom. actions in the field of foreign policy.

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a) JOHNSON is a new man in the presidency, shackled by the upcoming party convention in August 1964, which will discuss the nomination for a new president.

b) The current Prime Minister of England, Sir Alexander DOUGLAS-HOME, is faced with the question, in connection with the elections next year, whether the Conservatives will be able to hold on to power or whether Labor will come to power.

c) ERHARD¹⁶ is also a new person in the post of Federal Chancellor, whose attention is riveted to himself by the upcoming 1965 elections to the Bundestag.

5. In our opinion, in the light of these shifts, de Gaulle is coming to the fore as a stable force in the Western alliance.

a) De Gaulle is an outstanding personality of the free world and

6) the only leader of the free world with the experience necessary to solve the complex problems common to all.

6. As a result of these reflections, our attention is riveted to two personalities who have maintained a stable position in the East and in the West - Khrushchev and de Gaulle. At the same time, we fear that both these strong men in the East and in the West may use the current unstable period, albeit in different ways.

The same concern is noted in England.

a) At present, the British do not give priority to the question of a political union with the United States. According to our information, this union somehow will get better again.

6) The absence of KENNEDY will become noticeable for England, and above all for the still boundless, but already ready for the sowing field of European politics.

c) Foreign policy, that is, success in Europe, is apparently the only means that could save DOUGLAS-HUME from defeat in the elections to the House of Commons.

d) After KENNEDY's death, many in the world suddenly found themselves alone.

B. Specific Starting Points 1. After JOHNSON's speech at the joint

At the beginning of the Congress, the period of uncertain assumptions was replaced by the first concrete political facts.

a) JOHNSON confirmed our expectations that there should be no doubt about the immutability of American policy. JOHNSON spoke in favor of the KENNEDY program not only out of tradition, but out of conviction.

6) However, no specific statements have been made regarding the form and when political activity and the new initiative will be shown. Obviously, no final decision has yet been made on either the policy towards the East or the policy towards the Atlantic.

2. In general terms, the duality of the unchanging American policy was outlined: adherence to the existing principles of a foreign policy aimed at further strengthening of power, and at the same time, a willingness to find ways for negotiations in order to achieve a possible settlement of relations with the other side.

a) Those who try to test our courage will find that it is great;

b) those who seek friendship with us will be convinced of its sincerity.

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3. The detailed definition of this principle did not go beyond the statement that the previous obligations will be strictly observed from South Vietnam to West Berlin, that in settling differences with the other side, it is necessary to act diversified and proactively.

However, a careful analysis of JOHNSON's statements shows that the possibility is not ruled out that "versatility" and "initiative" can be used to introduce treaty amendments to "obligations" in the event that these "obligations" are recognized as interfering with the détente of international tension. .

4. The first reports from Washington clearly indicate that initially, that is, at least until the end of this year, domestic policy will be a paramount issue for JOHNSON. At the same time, these reports indicate that, in connection with the approaching preparations for the election campaign, a period of waiting in the field of foreign policy will extend into a significant part of 1964.

Our diplomatic observers characterize the future political line in their statements as follows:

a) "Urgent Government Business: For the next three weeks, President JOHNSON will be entirely occupied with studying the legislative program and studying the budget,

6) if there is no foreign policy crisis".

5. One gets the impression that these statements contradict MIKOYAN's statements, which he made after conversations with American politicians. Based on his statements, the impression was created that he had reached an agreement with the Americans on the fact that in the near future, even almost immediately, to continue efforts to resolve foreign policy problems. At first, our observers overestimated these statements by MIKOYAN. Their actual meaning is confirmed by the White House, but not the impression that in the near future or immediately there are plans to resume contacts between East and West on issues of détente.

6. In one of his informational conversations with Ambassador KNAPSHEIN, SELINGER noted that MIKOYAN was right that the procedure for continuing negotiations was discussed, but that no new, well-defined starting points for continuing US-Soviet negotiations emerged.

a) The question of disarmament will be discussed at the December session of the NATO Ministerial Council,

6) after which the United States will come into contact with the Soviet Union.

7. This means that the procedure has been clarified, but the subject of the continuation of more extensive American-Soviet negotiations is not only not outlined, but not defined at all. Until the start of the session of the NATO Ministerial Council, it will obviously hang in the air.

How narrow, in our opinion, the subject matter of the bilateral US-Soviet talks can be judged from information coming from Washington.

a) The United States will continue to explore any possibility of reaching some kind of understanding with the Soviet Union through bilateral negotiations.

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6) US government agencies are discussing with the Soviet Union the question of opening consulates in both countries.

c) Negotiations on cultural exchange will continue in a few weeks.

d) According to our information, an agreement will soon be reached on the establishment of airlines.

8. So, the specific subject matter of the negotiations between East and West has largely not yet been determined.

9. The further procedure for discussing issues related to relations between East and West appears very poorly. In our opinion, such a sequence is admissible, which

a) will begin with separate meetings between the heads of the various governments of the West in Washington, and then

6) lead in 1964 to the convening of a conference of leaders of the West, which

c) at a still completely uncertain time, it could build a bridge to a summit meeting between East and West.

10. Our view on the question of a summit conference between East and West can be summarized as follows:

a) Such a conference must be carefully prepared.

6) It can take place only when the usefulness and chances for success of negotiations between the Soviet premier and the leading figures of the West become clear.

c) It can take place only after consultations with the federal government on this set of issues and subject to the preservation of the guarantees currently in force with respect to the German question.

11. Taking into account all of the above, it should be noted that the prospect of such a conference is extremely remote. Given the need to coordinate at the highest level the point of view of the West and the subsequent coordination of points of view between the East

and the West, then the implementation of such a program will apparently drag on until the second half of 1964.

a) In view of the fact that, at least until the presidential election in November 1964, the work program of President JOHNSON is very significant, he will not be able to take part in the summit conference of the Atlantic powers in the coming months. All reports of the possibility of a summit meeting in the spring of 1964 are premature.

6) Although during the coming months JOHNSON will receive heads of state and government, nevertheless, the upcoming party conventions in July and August 1964 in connection with the preparations for the presidential elections will significantly limit the scope of his activities, since, according to reports in Washington sources, before taking part in the summit conference, JOHNSON intends to wait for the outcome of the election.

12. In accordance with this, a three-phase plan for US foreign policy is outlined in general terms, which boils down to the following:

a) Until the end of 1963, the main focus will be on domestic policy issues.

6) During the first months of 1964, detailed negotiations will take place with individual leading political figures in Europe (federal

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the government is making efforts to ensure that negotiations between ERHARD and JOHNSON take place in 1963).

c) It is possible that in the summer of 1964 there will be a summit meeting of the leaders of the West.

13. What emerges from all of this is the likelihood of a very long-term program.

a) Until recently, the Soviet Union was the initiator of this development, but, after the conclusion of the Treaty on the Ban on Nuclear Tests in the Three Environments, having lost interest in continuing negotiations on detente in the near future, it again directed this development along the path of the Cold War.

6) After the death of KENNEDY, a new element has clearly appeared in American politics, which further emphasizes the protracted nature of the forthcoming negotiations.

Glychans and

1. After the death of KENNEDY, the impression was created that the British intended to replace the Americans shackled by this death as soon as possible and, taking the initiative, to support or restart negotiations between East and West, that is, to act, so to speak, in the role of successor kov Americans in the leadership of the West.

2. Until now, only the British have made concrete proposals on the subject of further negotiations between the West and the East regarding détente in order, according to the interpretation of the government circles in London, to emphasize the role of England after the death of KENNEDY in resolving issues of international and Atlantic politicians.

As possible issues on which it is necessary to continue to seek agreement between West and East, BUTLER" named the following, which have recently been repeatedly mentioned also by Sir DOUGLAS-HUME!:

a) Establishment of control posts of observers on the territory of NATO member countries and countries participating in the Warsaw Pact.

6) Conclusion of an agreement on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons to other countries and a non-aggression pact between individual countries.

3. In his remarks after his return from Washington, Sir Alexander HUME emphasized this theme in the same sequence, and with regard to the Federal Republic, he tried to give the impression that the United States, after his conversations with leading American figures, supported the alleged program. The United States is allegedly determined to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union primarily on the following secondary issues:

a) Establishment of inspections at the most important transport junctions on both sides of the Iron Curtain as a guarantee against a surprise attack.

6) Measures to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons.

c) The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two military blocs.

4. However, as already noted, the statements of American leaders during our contacts with them do not contain indications that the Americans really have a specific program, especially one that could be referred to not as a program of "secondary agreements".

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We see in these statements of British leaders an attempt to take the initiative, at least temporarily, in negotiations between East and West, taking the lead instead of the United States. A certain readiness of England to pursue such a policy has been noted by the government of the Federal Republic for a long time, in addition, it is also visible from the statements of Prime Minister Sir DOUGLAS-HOME on November 29, 1963, and it is not without interest that MIKOYAN allegedly recommended to the British act during this period as an intermediary in relation to the United States.

5. Ultimately, in such efforts by the British, the federal government sees the desire to oppose the increased influence of de Gaulle - the only one of the "former" in the Western world.

London fears that 1964, the year of US elections, already weakened by a change in leadership, could be the year of initiatives by French President de Gaulle, whose political influence increased due to the course of events.

6. Indeed, we believe that de Gaulle now has a stronger chance of success in relations with the United States, since France can act as a recognized nuclear power, and therefore, in view of the existence of French atomic power, she herself the cause of the former disagreements between Washington and Paris is eliminated.

According to the English point of view,

a) the main cause of tension in relations between France and the United States, caused by de Gaulle's personal determination to have at his disposal independent French deterrents, was eliminated as a result of the creation of the first French models of atomic weapons and various types of bombers;

b) in view of this state of affairs, efforts to eliminate other misunderstandings and the atmosphere of mutual discontent will have much better prospects.

7. The voices heard in the White House about future US policy also indicate that there are basically no fundamental differences between the Americans and the French.

a) With regard to France, "there are no fundamental differences between the United States and France regarding an alliance uniting these two countries.

b) President JOHNSON intends to meet with President de Gaulle in the near future."

8. In the light of these opportunities, the French see even the consequences of the Kennedy assassination as confirmation of their thesis that Europe, while remaining a partner of the United States within the Western Union, but an independent partner, should strive even more urgently to stand on its own feet. The official French representatives in this regard declare the following:

a) The shock that took place in the United States demonstrated how dangerous it is for a country or continent to make its security, in case of special need, dependent on a distant country, no matter how powerful, or dependent on the decision of one person, sincere whose readiness to support his allies is by no means in doubt.

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6) Thus, the shots in Dallas served as an impetus for reflection for the French and many other Europeans, including Federal Chancellor EHRHARD.

9. In view of these signs of rivalry between England and France during the period of the "American interregnum" brought about by the change of President, the question arises before us whether the position of the FRG will not now become even more difficult than it was before, because in addition to the contradictions between the FRG and the USA and France and between the FRG and England.

It seems to us that de Gaulle's intention to establish relations between France and the United States in a new way can be used for the speech of the Federal Republic of Germany and as an active mediator in relations between London and Paris *, since, in our own understandable interests, the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is aimed at something to promote the establishment of the former mutual understanding between France and the United States.

D. The reaction of the Soviet Union

1. The response in the Eastern bloc to the Kennedy assassination seems to have been one of sincere sympathy. The exception was the Chinese and their supporters, who did not pay enough attention to this event and whose comments about this event abounded in vicious attacks. Thus, the reaction to the Kennedy assassination throughout the Eastern bloc was an expression of the presence of contradictions.

2. Reviews in the Soviet Union about KENNEDY as a person and political figure were emphatically businesslike.

a) KENNEDY - "an outstanding US statesman";

6) "deep condolences";

c) "many bright sides in the history of Soviet-American relations" are connected with him.

3. Moscow's reaction to the KENNEDY assassination was characterized by the zeal with which it denied the idea of any involvement in this assassination and even the idea of any connection with it. In practice, such thoughts have been suggested since the arrest of OSWALD. After all, he was not

only a convinced communist, but, in addition, he repeatedly visited the Soviet Union, where he probably received training, and besides, he was married to a Russian. Thus, the circumstances were such that the possibility was admitted that this murder was committed for political reasons and precisely by OSWALD.

a) If one can believe in the effectiveness of the neo-Stalinists in Moscow, in the effectiveness of the communists who sympathize with the hard line of the Chinese, then up to

6) the assumption that these circles could use any means to strike at the policy of peaceful coexistence was only one step away.

c) The same applies to the Chinese, who are constantly fighting against reaching an understanding on any issue between West and East.

d) However, to date, there is nothing in American investigations that could serve as confirmation of this. Naobo-

* So in the text. — KGB note.

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mouth, the US has a clear interest in dispelling any suspicion in this regard, which is being done perhaps prematurely.

4. Characteristic of the Soviet Union's efforts was its desire to dispel any suspicion that the motives for the assassination of KENNEDY had anything to do with Moscow (issuance of consular papers against OSWALD to the United States) and any suggestion that OSWALD was a committed communist. At the same time, Soviet propaganda contradicts itself.

a) First of all, it made efforts to expose the ultra-right fascist and racist forces of the USA as criminals.

6) However, at the same time, she admitted the possibility of participation in this crime of Trotskyists from among Russian emigrants in the USA.

The leading political leitmotif of Soviet statements was that the shots aimed at KENNEDY

a) at the same time they were directed against all tendencies towards détente of international tension,

6) against the communists not only in the USA, but throughout the world, as well as

c) against the Eastern bloc and Cuba.

6. These statements of Soviet propaganda testify to the tendencies and clear interest of the Soviet Union in the further use of the so-called spirit of the Moscow Treaty.

a) At a time when Moscow switched back to the Cold War, this seems paradoxical to us, but

6) Moscow appeals to JOHNSON and points out to him that, apart from the course of continuing cooperation with the Soviet Union, there is no other course.

7. Literally, Moscow states the following on this occasion:

a) "What will be the policy of the JOHNSON government?"

6) KENNEDY's policy was based on taking into account the real alignment of forces on the world stage.

c) This alignment of forces persists to this day, and any politician who does not change his sense of reality must take this circumstance into account.

d) The dark forces behind the Kennedy assassination counted on the fact that with the help of this crime they would be able to change the political course of Washington.

8. If we draw a conclusion from this, then the following should be noted:

a) Moscow would not want Washington's course to change. It is interested in maintaining the so-called atmosphere of détente.

6) Moscow still intends not to offer the West anything specific, not to give it any hints regarding real concessions. In other words,

c) it needs a period of calm associated with a non-committal prospect of the possibility of reaching a settlement in the future.

d) Moscow, given its difficulties with Beijing, is apparently interested in once again clearly muting the mutual polemics with Beijing in order to

e) for whatever reason this may be, to strengthen their own positions both in domestic and foreign policy terms.

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9. In principle, the Soviet Union offers nothing new to the JOHNSON government either. He still insists on his previous range of issues for negotiation and, despite his calls for the West to remain calm, invariably ensures that the West agrees to his program.

Indicative in this regard are the following statements in Moscow and East Berlin:

a) "The problems and difficulties of their solution remain the same as they were under KENNEDY.

6) General and complete disarmament.

c) Non-Aggression Pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

d) Failure to provide atomic weapons to the FRG.

e) The conclusion of a German peace treaty and the settlement of the Berlin question.

f) These questions are becoming more urgent every day, and no American president can evade their solution.

10. For the most part, the East invariably adheres to its former position. Any desire to meet the new American president is imperceptible. The East calls for the preservation of the present situation and stands for the maintenance of a somewhat thinned international atmosphere. Therefore, at present, we believe that Moscow is apparently not interested in subjecting JOHNSON to serious political tests.

Of course, such a line of the Soviets does not exclude the possibility of pressure on their part.

a) Under certain circumstances, the Soviet Union may attempt to test the strength of the new American leadership. For these purposes, he can use the German and Berlin questions.

6) According to the Germans from Moscow, the latter is hardly interested in drawing special attention to anti-Soviet tendencies in the USA. Moscow rather fears that a representative of conservatives like GOLDWATER may win the upcoming presidential elections.

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that the Soviet Union will not put too much spoke in the wheels of either President JOHNSON or his foreign policy.

F. Mortin

No. 113 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, May 8, 1964

Reported t.t. Brezhnev, Mikoyan, Podgorny, Suslov, Andropov, Ponomarev, Kuznetsov.

April 22 this year The Office of the Press and Information sent the following considerations to the Office of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany on the advisability of a meeting between ERKHARD® and Com. Khrushchev N.S.

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So far SHREDER! he looked for an opportunity for the FRG to take the initiative so that West Germany would cease to be an object of political speculation by other countries. It would be desirable to develop a clear concept that would contain some prospect of concluding a peace treaty. According to available information, the Soviet Union intends to show a new initiative in the German question and, in doing so, will come up with the theory of three states, substantiating it by the fact that West Germany does not have any proposals of its own on this score. The possibility of a direct demand to Bonn for recognition of the status quo must be reckoned with. On the basis of this, as well as the desire of the USSR to isolate the FRG, direct negotiations between ERKHARD and N.S. Khrushchev undesirable. They are also undesirable for domestic political reasons, since without achieving positive results and obtaining concessions from the USSR, they can only benefit the opposition. Against this are internal party considerations, as well as considerations of pre-election tactics (agitation in the GDR in favor of the SPD testifies to the interest in the formation of an SPD government in the FRG). If a proposal is received from Moscow to hold a meeting, it should be considered from this angle as well.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 114 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE KGB RESIDENCE, May 8, 1964

Reported tt. Brezhnev Mikoyan, Suslov, Podgorny, Andropov, Ponomarev Kuznetsov.

In April of this year. In Bonn, a meeting of the FRG ambassadors to the main countries of the world was held, at which, in particular, the question of relations with the USSR was discussed. A pessimistic opinion was expressed about the possibility of improving relations with the USSR One of the reasons for the narrowness of opportunities for the political and diplomatic activity of the FRG in the East was the interaction between the USSR and the GDR due to their well-known interdependence. Moscow is well aware of the difficulties of ULBRICHT ""!, consisting in the fact that, out of loyalty to the USSR in the conditions of a divided Germany, he is forced to maneuver between Lenin's theory and Stalin's practice, fencing himself off with a wall in Berlin. ULBRICHT knows that only the Soviet Union can give him freedom of action.

On the question of the expediency of negotiating with Moscow, confusion was observed at the meeting.

The West German ambassador in Moscow, GREPPER, presented only the results of the failed attempts to reach an agreement on the reunification of Germany and supported SCHROEDER in that the Soviet
Polish statement from

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April 15 this year indicates how the Soviet Union intends to proceed in the German question further. According to GREPPER, the Soviet Union is not interested in negotiations with ERHARD.

The German ambassador in Washington, KNAPSHTEIN, pointed out that the US president wanted to strengthen contacts with the USSR in order to reach at least minor agreements in the hope that on their basis it would be possible to agree on major problems later. He expressed the fear that in this connection the German question would lose its paramount importance. KNAPSHTEIN called for the use of existing ties with the Western powers in order to achieve their consent to the indispensable participation of the FRG in all negotiations between East and West. In his opinion, Schroeder's concept of benevolence and waiting is not particularly far-sighted.

Resident of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR

No. 115 Top secret

MESSAGE FROM THE RESIDENCE, August 8, 1964

Reported: tt. Khrushchev N.S., Brezhnev L.I., Mikoyan A.I., Podgorny N.V., Suslov M.A., Andropov Yu.V., Ponomarev B.N., Gromyko A.A., Malinovsky R.J.

In the document of one of the government agencies of the FRG, prepared for negotiations with SPAAKOM?? in Bonn on July 14, 1964, it is said that the results of the discussions of the project proposed by the Americans for the creation of NATO strategic nuclear forces consisting of 25 naval vessels (200 Polaris A-Z missiles) allow us to move on to concrete negotiations on the treaty soon. In connection with the elections in the United States and the elections to the Bundestag, the FRG, together with the Americans, is striving to ensure that the treaty on the creation of multilateral nuclear forces is signed before the end of 1964. These terms are supported by all the countries participating in the negotiations, with the exception of England. a proposal to the American project, which provides for the transformation of tactical nuclear forces based on land (Pershing missiles and T R-2 aircraft) into multilateral nuclear forces Negotiators either reject this proposal, which would fundamentally change the principle multilateral nuclear forces, or at least treat it with restraint. The working group on the study of the project to create multilateral nuclear forces decided to study the British proposal and at the same time consider without interruption the American project. Belgium took an active part in the work of the above-mentioned working group, but its representative stressed that his country was not in a position to make a financial contribution to the development of nuclear forces, since for Belgium this would be an unbearable burden on the budget with needs that go beyond commitments to NATO.

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The Belgian defense minister has a negative attitude towards the American project. SPAAK is positive. He rejects new offers from England.

It is proposed that in the course of negotiations with SPAAKOM there will be a reaffirmation of the common interest in continued negotiations on the American project and consideration of the British proposal as a possible addition to, but not a replacement for, the US project.

Notes to Documents No. 1-115

! The document was prepared in July 1945 by a post-war planning group specially created under the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of Great Britain as recommendations to the British government for the development of conceptual problems of the security of the British Empire for the remote post-war period. In the document, British military circles put forward and try to substantiate the thesis that in the post-war years the main source of threats to the security of the British Empire in all regions of the world is allegedly the Soviet Union, and recommend to the government a number of political, economic and military measures to repel these threats and strengthen the security of the empire. Among them, an alliance with the United States in order to rely on their economic and military might, the creation of a system of alliances and military-political blocs directed against the USSR, the strengthening of military-strategic communications on its periphery and the construction of military bases, the use of the the time of the UN and other international organizations, the possibility of using the army to protect regimes and suppress "unrest" both in the dominions and colonies, and in the United Kingdom. The document was obtained by the London residency of foreign intelligence through undercover means. A complete translation of his text was reported to Stalin and other leaders of the state in November 1945. Due to the length of the document, it is presented in a slightly abbreviated form.

? Ireland.

3 Thailand.

* Refers to Syria and Lebanon.

5 On June 26, 1945 in San Francisco, at the conference of countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition, the UN Charter was signed.

6 Jebb Hubert Miles, Baron Gladwyn, is a prominent British politician and diplomat. Participant of international conferences of countries - members of the anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War, in 1946 - acting. UN Secretary General. At the indicated time - Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Council of Foreign Ministers - a body established in 1945 by decision of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference consisting of the USSR Foreign Ministers of England, the USA, France and China. Known as an active supporter of the political and military integration of Western European countries.

7 Sargent Orme Garton is an English diplomat, an active participant and one of the leaders of England's foreign policy during the Second World War and in the post-war period. At the indicated time - Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain.

8 Marshall George Catlett (1880-1959) - military and statesman, US diplomat. During the war years, he participated in the work of international conferences of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, in 1947-1949 he was the US Secretary of State. In 1947, he put forward a program for the restoration and development of Europe after the Second World War based on the provision of economic assistance to the United States, called the Marshall Plan.

9 See doc. No. 2.

0 There are no appendices to Jebb's memorandum in the intelligence archives.

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and Byrnes James Francis (1879-1972) - US statesman and politician, diplomat. Participated in 1945 in the work of the Crimean (Yalta) and Berlin (Potsdam) conferences of the heads of the allied powers, in 1945-1947 he was the US Secretary of State. The Byrnes Treaty referred to in the document is a draft treaty proposed by the US Secretary of State

collective security of the countries of Western Europe under the auspices of the United States, drawn up according to the type of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro (see note 13).

12 This refers to the UN Charter.

13 This refers to the Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Also known as the Western Hemisphere Defense Treaty and the Rio Pact. Signed by 20 states of Latin America at the Inter-American Conference on the Maintenance of Peace and Security on August 15 - September 2, 1947. In fact, it was the first military-political bloc after the Second World War created at the initiative of the United States.

m Bevin Ernest (1881-1951) – British statesman and politician, diplomat. In 1945-1951 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs.

15 See doc. No. 2.

6 Robert Daniel Murphy (1894-1978), US diplomat. Before World War II and during the war years, he held a number of senior positions in US missions abroad and in international organizations. Participated in the work of the Berlin (Potsdam) conference in 1945. In 1944-1945, he was a political adviser with the rank of ambassador to the headquarters of the Allied Armed Forces in Europe, and in 1945-1949, to the US military administration in Germany.

7 Litchfield is an American diplomat. At the indicated time, he held a responsible position in Murphy's apparatus (see note 16).

18 See doc. No. 2.

19 See doc. No. Z.

20 See doc. No. 4.

1 Douglas is an American diplomat. At the indicated time - US Ambassador to London.

2 Strang Williams is an English diplomat. Responsible officer of the Foreign Office. At the indicated time - political adviser to the commander-in-chief of the British zone of occupation of Germany.

23 Sforza Carlo (1872-1952), Count - Italian statesman and politician, diplomat. In 1947-1951 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy.

24 Harry Truman (1884-1977) - 33rd President of the United States.

25 See doc. No. 2.

26 De Gasperi - at the indicated time - Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy.

27 In March 1947, US President Truman sent a message to Congress in which he tried to justify the right of the United States to provide economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey in the fight against "totalitarian regimes" and the "communist danger." Truman's concept formed the basis of US foreign policy during the Cold War and was called the Truman Doctrine.

2 Brussels Pact (Brussels Treaty) on collective self-defence. Signed in 1948 by Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In fact, it meant the creation of a military-political grouping of Western European states, was a preparatory stage for the creation of NATO.

23 We are talking about preparing for the creation of NATO.

30 See doc. No. 11.

3 See doc. No. 3.

3? Hickerson is an American diplomat and head of the European section of the US State Department.

33 Marshall - see doc. No. 2; Lovett is a major banker, statesman, political and military leader of the USA, in 1947-1949 - Deputy Secretary of State of the USA, in 1950-1953 - Deputy, First Deputy Secretary of Defense of the USA.

3 Forrestal is the US Secretary of War.

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35 Stettinius Eduard Reilly (1900-1949) - US statesman and politician, diplomat, in 1944-1945 - US Secretary of State, in 1945-1946 - US Permanent Representative to the UN and the Security Council.

% Franco Baamonde Francisco (1892-1975) - head of the dictatorial regime in Spain in 1939-1975 years.

37 Kennan George Frost ~ US diplomat.

3 Bohlen Charles Eustace (1904-1974) - US diplomat. At the indicated time - adviser to the US State Department.

33 Inverchapel - British diplomat, at the indicated time - British Ambassador to the USA.

% Smith Walter Bedell (1895-1961) US military leader and diplomat. In 1946-1949, he was US Ambassador to the USSR. In the first half of 1948, he negotiated with the Soviet leadership on the issue of the decision taken by the Western powers at a meeting in London to create a government for West Germany, to which the Soviet government sharply objected, considering it step towards the division of Germany.

41 Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg (1884-1951), US politician, senator. Author of the resolution of the US Senate, which determined the main tasks of the post-war US political course and authorized the creation of a system of military-political blocs with the participation of the US.

2 Bidault Georges Augustin (1899-1983) – French statesman and politician. At the indicated time - the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France. In 1946 and 1949-1950 - Prime Minister.

43 See doc. No. 2.

4 McNeil Hector - British statesman and politician, at the indicated time - Minister of State.

45 See doc. No. 15.

46 See doc. No. 15.

47 See doc. No. 2.

48 See doc. No. 13.

49 See doc. No. 13.

5% See doc. No. 4.

m See doc. No. 4.

52 See doc. No. 13.

53 See doc. No. 15.

m“ See doc. No. 14.

55 See doc. No. 2.

56 See doc. No. 15.

5 Pearson Lester Bowles (1897-1972) - Canadian statesman and politician, diplomat. At the indicated time
- Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada. From 1963 to 1968 he was prime minister.

58 See doc. No. 15.

See doc. No. 15.

60 See doc. No. 15.

61 See doc. No. 13.

62 Achilles is a senior US State Department official.

63 See doc. No. 13.

6 See doc. No. 13.

65 See doc. No. 13.

6 See doc. No. 13.

67 See doc. No. 21.

68 Balfour is an English diplomat. At the indicated time - the British envoy in Washington.

69 See doc. No. Z.

70 See doc. No. 15.

"Spaak Paul-Henri (1899-1972) - Belgian statesman and politician, diplomat. In 1946-1949 ~ Prime
Minister.

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72 See doc. No. 13.

3 See doc. No. 15.

7* See doc. No. 15.

75 See doc. No. 13.

6 See doc. No. 21.

p See doc. No. 13.

8 See doc. No. 15.

79 See doc. No. 15.

80 See doc. No. 13.

8 See doc. No. 21.

82 See doc. No. Z.

83 See doc. No. 4.

8 See doc. No. 24.

8 Schuman Robert (1886-1963), French statesman and politician, in 1947-1948 - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the French Republic.

86 See doc. No. 4.

81 See doc. No. 4.

88 The published coded correspondence between the British Foreign Secretary and his ambassador in Washington refers to August-October 1948, the period of active formation of the structure, organs and mechanism of action of the NATO military-political bloc being created. From the correspondence one can see the contradictions between England and the USA on the question of the role that these countries should play in the bloc being created, and the share of each country's expenses for its maintenance. In fact, we are talking about a struggle for dominant influence on the future policy of the bloc. It can be seen from the published documents that both Britain and the United States were united in their desire to involve other European countries in the bloc, to combine their political, economic and military potential in order to use it in the interests of their policy directed against the USSR. At that time, Soviet foreign intelligence had the opportunity to carefully and in detail monitor the process of creating NATO, receive documentary information on this issue and report it to the country's leadership.

89 The US statement is quoted inaccurately. The State Department said in a statement that the United States was willing to "take full part in the planning." – Note KI.

% Harriman William Averell - US statesman and politician, diplomat, participant in international conferences of allied countries during the Second World War. During the period specified in the document (1948-1950) - Special Representative of the United States in Europe for the implementation of the "Marshall Plan".

9 See doc. No. 2.

2 See doc. No. 15.

33 Bonnet Georges Etienne (1889-1973) – French statesman and politician, diplomat.

9“ Massigli - French diplomat, French ambassador to Great Britain in 1944-1945.

95 See doc. No. 2.

% Strang V. - English diplomat, senior officer of the Foreign Office.

7 Lee Trygve - in the specified period - Secretary General of the United Nations.

33 Acheson Dean Gooderham (1893-1971), US statesman and politician, diplomat. In 1945-1947 - Deputy. Secretary of State, in 1949-1953 - US Secretary of State.

See doc. No. 4.

'% See doc. No. 27.

01 Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969) - Vietnamese revolutionary, founder and leader of the Communist Party of Vietnam. From 1951 to 1969 – President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

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9? Mao Zedong (1883-1976) - Chinese party, political and statesman. In 1949-1954 - Chairman of the Central People's Government Council of the People's Republic of China in 1954-1959 - Chairman of the PRC.

03 See doc. No. 40.

14 Attlee Clement Richard (1883-1967) – British statesman and politician. During the specified period ~ Prime Minister of Great Britain.

195 MacArthur Douglas (1880-1964) – American General of the Army, during the Second World War he commanded the US armed forces in the Far East, in 1950-1951 he led the operations of the armed forces of the US and other countries in Korea.

06 See doc. No. 40.

197 See doc. No. 41.

108 See doc. No. 4.

199 See doc. No. 39.

10 See doc. No. 41.

11 See doc. No. 4.

12 See doc. No. 4.

"3 Nehru Jawaharlal (1889-1964), one of the leading leaders in the struggle for the liberation of India from colonial oppression, since 1947 - Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of India.

114 Bao Dai - Emperor of Annam from 1926-1945. Abdicated during the August Revolution of 1945 in Vietnam. In 1940-1955, he was the head of a puppet government created in the territory of Vietnam occupied by French troops.

115 In November 1951, the Committee of Information was liquidated, foreign intelligence was returned to the Ministry of State Security, where the First Chief Intelligence Directorate was formed. Part of the information and analytical service of the CI continued for some time to remain with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, until the beginning of 1953, some, mainly large analytical, materials prepared on the basis of information received by foreign intelligence were reported to the country's leadership on behalf of the Information Committee and signed by V. Zorin . Telegraph information was reported on behalf of the MGB.

116 At the time indicated, Eisenhower was the commander of the armed forces of the North Atlantic Alliance.

17 Tito Josip (1892-1980) - President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1953-1980.

118 Sirri Pasha - head of the Egyptian government.

"9 See Doc. No. 36.

12 Oppenot is a French diplomat, senior official of the French Foreign Ministry.

21 See doc. No. 7.

122 See doc. No. 61.

123 See doc. No. 11.

1* Bradley Omar Nelson (1893-1971) - American army general. In 1949-1953 he was Chairman of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces and the NATO Military Committee.

125 Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) was a Chinese statesman and politician. From 1927 he was the head of the Kuomintang regime, from 1949 he headed the regime in Taiwan.

16 See doc. No. 61.

127 Eden Anthony (1897-1977) – statesman and politician of Great Britain, diplomat. Minister of Foreign Affairs during World War II. From 1955 to 1957 he was Prime Minister of Great Britain.

28 See doc. No. 40.

129 See doc. No. 61.

130 See doc. No. 62.

131 Dejean Maurice Napoleon (1899-1982) was a French diplomat. In 1950-1952 - head of the French mission under the Supreme Commander of the Allied

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mi forces in the Far East. In 1952-1954 - Ambassador to Tokyo, in 1956-1964 - Ambassador to Moscow.

132 Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967), Prime Minister of Japan from 1946 to 1954.

33 See doc. No. 62.

14 See doc. No. 58.

135 See doc. No. 63.

136 See doc. No. 11.

137 Ridgway Matthew Banker is an American general. During the American intervention in Korea, he commanded the US 8th Army and a contingent of UN forces. From 1952-1953 he was Supreme Commander of the NATO Armed Forces in Europe, from 1953-1955 he was Chief of Staff of the US Army.

38 See doc. No. 63.

1393 Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967) - German statesman and politician, in 1949-1963 - Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

140 Franco Baamonde Francisco (1892-1975) – head of the fascist regime in Spain in 1939-1975 years.

4! See doc. No. 11.

42 See doc. No. 40.

43 Mountbatten - British statesman and politician, lord, until 1947 - Viceroy of India, author of the project for the division of India along religious lines ("Mountbatten Plan"), in subsequent years played an active role in the development and implementation of British policy in the Far East .

14 MEOO - Middle Eastern Defense Organization.

145 Naguib - at the time indicated in the document ~ Prime Minister of Egypt.

146 Mosaddegh Mohammed (1881-1967) - Prime Minister of Iran in 1951-1953. He advocated the independence of the country's foreign policy, played a large role in the movement for the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. In 1967, he was overthrown and killed in a coup d'état prepared with the help of external forces.

147 See doc. No. 40.

48 See doc. No. 71.

9 Ollenhauer Erich (1901-1963) - Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in 1957-1963. In 1963 he was elected chairman of the Socialist International.

50 See doc. No. 71.

151 See doc. No. 62.

152 John Foster Dulles (1888-1959) – US Secretary of State from 1953-1959, known as a supporter of politics from “positions of strength” and “brinkmanship”.

153 Rusk Dean - US diplomat, in 1950-1951 - US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. From 1952-1960 he was President of the Rockefeller Foundation, and from 1961-1969 he was Secretary of State of the United States.

154 See doc. No. 71.

155 Ulbricht Walter (1893-1973) – one of the founders of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, since 1960 ~ Chairman of the State Council of the GDR.

156 Macmillan Harold (1894-1986) – British statesman and politician. British Prime Minister 1957-1963.

157 Castro Rus Fidel - since 1976 - Chairman of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of Cuba.

158 Rockefeller Nelson ~ Member of the financial and industrial group of the Rockefeller family in the USA.

159 See doc. No. 84.

6 Salinger is President Kennedy's press assistant.

161 See doc. No. 85.

162 See doc. No. 84.

163 See doc. No. 82.

164 Norsted - American general, commander of the armed forces of NATO

in 1956-1963.

165 See doc. No. 87. 166 Zorin V.V. - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. 167 Stevenson Adlai - US politician and diplomat, 1961-1965

Dah is the US Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council.

168 U Thant - at the time indicated in the document - Secretary General of the United Nations.

169 See doc. No. 98.

10 See doc. No. 96.

1 See doc. No. 82.

172 Thompson Llewellyn - US diplomat in 1957-1962, in 1969-1972 -

US Ambassador to the USSR

73 See doc. No. 3.

114 Cole is an American diplomat, the US ambassador to Chile.

15 See doc. No. 98.

16 Kuznetsov V.V. - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

77 McNamara is the US Secretary of Defense.

"8 Stikker - Dutch statesman and politician, minister

Foreign Affairs in 1948-1952, Permanent Representative to the UN in 1958-1961, Secretary General of NATO in 1961-1964.

179 See doc. No. 95.

18° See doc. No. 82.

181 See doc. No. 40.

82 See doc. No. 82.

83 Erhard Ludwig (1897-1997) - Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1963-1966. 184 Johnson Lyndon (1908-1973) - 36th President of the United States (1963-1969).

185 John Fitzgerald Kennedy (1917-1963) 35th President of the United States.

186 See doc. No. 111.

17 Butler Richard Austin (1902-1982) - British statesman and political

sky figure, diplomat, in 1963-1964 - Minister for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain.

188 Douglas-Home Alec was Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1963-1964. 189 See doc. No. 111. 19 Schroeder - a political and statesman of the FRG, at the indicated time -

German Foreign Minister.

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